Green factors

RE: MEMORANDUM April 10, 1992 Supreme Court Decision Concerning Desegregation of DeKalb County, Georgia Public Schools.________ On March 31, 1992, the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in Freeman v, Pitts, a school desegregation case from DeKalb County, Georgia. The Freeman decision reaffirms seve-ra-t-impOLr.arLt_s.choo.l-deseg.rega-t-ion principles set forth in prior Supreme Court opinions. including that sehoo-1dis-fer-icts operating under -court- supervision -have an aff-i-rmatiwe-duty-ho- eliminate-all vestiges- of illegal segregation to the extent practicable and to comply-in- good faith with--a-l-l cou-rt- orders
that, when evaluating whether a school district should be declared unitary, the district court should review the six so-called "^reen^ factors student assignments, faculty, staff, transportation, physical facilities. and extracjurricular^achivrties to ensure the effects of prior discrimination have been remedied
ni that the quality of education for minority students is an important ----T- r-.i n, I. . . - . .. __ -lit,. MM II and relevant ^r^uiry_ when^^detejinji^ng whether a school district, or aspects of its operations, should- herelea.sed from c 0 ux-1spe^w.i s i o n. At the same time, the Court ruled that school districts are respons-ib-lef-or~remedying resegregation that results from- demographic- conditrons-thafct h eydrd- "not'cause. and that court-ordered school desegregation plans are not perpetual, but rather are "intended as a temp5jLaj:y_measure." Specifically, the Court's holding in Freeman reject^d the Elevenths Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling that the-DeKalb County School System ("DCSS") could not be declared with respect to some areas of its operations-while unitary the court maintained supervision of other aspects of its- administration which still were not free from the ef-feets of prior -de-wr-e segregation. Instead, the Court held that the transition from a coxrttsupervisedr- segregated- school system, to a "unitary" system free of court scrutiny may beaocorap-lished incxementally, in a series of steps, where the trial court finds that to be an appropriate process. It ruled, however, that prior to releasing particular areas of a school district operations from court supervision, a district court must ' s- consider ^hree factor'^
Gwhethex_tbe-sehoel-dist-rict-has comp.lied_ f u 1 ly ,wi.th. the^ court-o-rdered- deseg-regationp-1 ainthe a reas of sChoo 1' administration- to- be-'re-tingu-Mhed-f-ronj-fehe '^o^^-tjA-juxi-Sdiction
^^ether judieia 1" supervistoni-sneeded in an_.axea--thatotherwise could~be- released, to-bring-about compliance with the plan in other areas of the school -a- district's operations
and,'-Tihether the_achoo-l-district-has demonstrated~agood faith commitment-to- the- court' s desegregation orders and the U.S.-eonstitntron. 2Although the Supreme Court generally affirmed existing desegregation principles, the Freeman decision could have an impact on current desegregation cases. The precise impact, however, will \ay from district to district depending on the facts of the case and the status of desegregation. I. The Court's Decision The DCSS is located in a suburban county east of Atlanta. It serves approximately 76,000 students in over 90 schools. In 1969, a federal district court approved a desegregation plan developed by DCSS which was designed to remedy the effects of prior jure segregation. Under this plan, DCSS closed several historically African-American schools, implemented a neighborhood school student assignment policy, and established programs to improve the academic achievement of African-American students. Between 1969 and 1986, the demographics of the school district changed dramatically, as migration by African-American families -into DeKalb County caused the African-American student population to rise to a level of 47%, with most African-American students attending predominantly African-American schools in the southern portion of the County. Most white students in DCSS went to predominantly white schools in the northern portion of the County. In 1986, DCSS sought an end to court-ordered desegregation. The District Court found DCSS-had-eliminated 3 w he vestiges of segregation in student assignments, physical f aciLi-ties, extracurricular activities, and transportation. In particular, the court held DCSS had no. role in bringing about resegregation of the county schools or related population shifts. The court found DCSS had fulfilled its constitutional Obligation to achieve maximum feasible desegregation in this area and the three others, and that DCSS should be free to manage these operations on its own. The court retained jurisdiction over DCSS, however. because it foi^d that additional measures were^necessary to-..integ.tate-facxiLty and staff _and .-tO-&giLa.l-ze ,,resQurrAs . Itfll The U.S. Court of Appeals for the E1 eye^nth Circuit reversed, holding that release_from_a^desegreg-ation order cannot-be achieved incrementally. Only after a school district has eliminated discrimination simultaneouslyin-a-1-1areas identified as appropriate by the-trial court can a school district become unitary, the Court said. It added that all tinges of discrimination ^ust be eliminated simultaneously for a period of not less than thr.ee-years. so as to_d.emo.nstrate both a district's good-f-aith- and a likelihood that ..the. district will not regress once court monitoring ends. The Court of Appeals declared DCSS had an aftirmativecdiuty to take all steps necessary to eradicate segregation including segregation solely attributable to demographic changes. The Supreme Court disagreed, and held that "a federal ^^y-^court in a school desegregation case has the discrAti nn to 4order an incremental or partiaL-withdrawal-of its supervision andcontrol. " The Court rej,ected as "formalistic" the notion that a district CQiii_mu.s.t_ma_i.nt.ain,actiy_e. supervision over every aspect of school operations unti_l_a school district has become unitary in alL.respects. It ruled that a district court choosing to approve incremental withdrawal of its supervision must consider three questions before issuing such an order: (1) "whether there h^s t^en complete and satisfactory pt^e^/M^dLcomplijn^ the court-ordered desegreqatioD_p_Lan in the rea ,.of schoo.]operations where-supervisien-wi-l-l-be-w-tthcdrawn
f (2) whether...iudic_ial control in the area to be released "is necessary or practicable to -achieve compliance.' with the plan in other areas of school district-operations
and (3) whether^ the school district has demonstrated a good faith commitment tc^ court's decree, and to its duties under the Constitution,* which were the basis for the Court's intervention in its affairs. Regarding the District Court's findings that DCSS was once desegregated, and that its resegregation resulted solely from demographic changes, the Supreme Court declared: "Once the racial imbalance due to the de jure violation has been remedied, the school district is under..no. duty.to. remedy imbalai^e_jcaused-by,demogr-apiiio<-feaGfeors." The school_di.strict had- met-its burden, the Court said, to show that "current [conditions of racial] imbalance [were] not traceable . . [its] prior violation." . to 5The Supreme Court sent the Freeman case back to the Court of Appeals to consider further proceedings to resolve at least two issues: i_rs^, whethe-r .rniirtQj.dered rslipf in t-h? 6 ( a ^e_a. o^taLtieii,t_aasi9nmen.ts_is_need.e<i_.in-..o-rdeE=^.to.- cu re-other 1 the-jCQurt' s desegr-ega^ionplan
and s. , whetherDGSS-.has .[made] an affirmative commitment to comply in good faith with the of [the] desegregation-pTsn-so-ihat-parent s-r-atudents and the public.have_assurance-aganstfurther~TiT5ir]ries' or stigma. " II. Freeman's Implications As noted above, the precise impact of the Freeman decision will vary from district to district depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. We can, however, provide some general guidance regarding the meaning and possible impact of the case. Set forth below are answers to some frequently asked questions. (1) Did the FtegmgQ decision change the law of desegregation? Answer: While it clarified some new issues, the Freeman decision reaffirms basic desegregation principles established since Brown. First, the Court reaffirmed the principle that school districts that once operated racially dual school systems have "an affirmative duty" to-e-liminate the vestig_es.r_.of segregation "to the extent practicable." Second, 6the Court reminded lower federaL .courts that in determining whether a school system is unitary. it is to review all "facets." of district operations, including student assignments, faculty, staff, physical facilities, transportation and extracurricular activities. And finally, the Court reiterated'' what it said last year in Board of Education of Oklahoma Citv Dow'^1, namely, that court-ordered desegregation plans are not perpetual and that, in order for school systems to be relieved of federal court supervision, they must demonstrate "a good faith commitment to the entirety of a desegregation plan so that parents, students, and the public have assurance against-further injuries or stigma.? While the Court previously had not addressed the issues of incremental unitariness and demographic changes, these holdings were foreshadowed in the Court's 1976 decision in Pasadena Board of Education v, Spangler and already had been stated as the law in some federal courts of appeals. (2) Does the Court's ruling regarding "incremental" unitariness mean that districts can be relieved more easily from federal court jurisdiction? Answer: Possibly. It is certainly true that the V , Court held that the Court of Appeals' blanket rule that school systems must eliminate all vestiges of segregation in all the so-called "Green* factors simultaneously was wrong as a matter of law, and this could mean that some school systems could be relieved of federal court supervision more readily, on a 7step-by-step basis. without ever simultaneously satisfying all of the Green factors. However, the Court also ruled that the Gre^--factors-are "interrelated," and that federal courts cannot withdraw theix. supervision, of. school, districts in one Green area if continued supervision is required to ensure compli^ce_ in_other areas. school system of supervision Also, whether a court can relieve a . regarding one Green factor depends upon whether the school system can satisfy the court of "its good faith commitment to the whole of the court's decree and to those provisions of the law and the constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first instance." (3) Does the Court's ruling regarding demographic changes in DeKalb County mean that school systems are no longer responsible for residential segregation that occurs implementation of a court order? after the Answer: The answer to this question depends upon the facts of each case. In Frogman, the Court ruled that the DeKalb school system, which it noted achieved desegregation in the area of student assignments in the first year of the remedy, was noJi- responsible for racial segregation that occurred since the entry of the decree because- there was no' Xi^?,^ce that the school system"'IraTd 'caused thedemogr-a-phic changes--or contributed to* the-'reseqreq3ti"on''b'f"''its'"s'ch'ooIs The Court made it clear, however, that such evidence does exist, the school systenL,Md-LU-he.~hA.T-d- responsible-unle^s-'it carries the burden of showing that it did not-cause'that 3resegregation. This point was made particularly clear in the con,qurring opinions of Justice Souter ("[rjacial imbalance in student assignments caused by demographic change [residential segregation] is
not insulated from federal judicial oversight where the demographic change..i,s_jLtseLf-caused---by_past segregation) and Justice Blactoiun ("[i]t is not enough. however, for DCSS to establish that demographics exacerbated the problem
it must prove its own policies did not contribute") . (4) Does the Court's reference to the quality of education expand school district responsibility under desegregation plans? Answer: It has been clear since the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in
MilliJ<en,' v. Bradlev that. in addition to correcting the racial isolation that results from past segregation, school systems a.re..required .to_correct.^the "educationaL deficits," as well. By "educational deficits," the Court was referring to inadequacies in the education provided to minority children that are inherent in a dual system. Speci-f rc~educa-tional_ programs ..a.nd...jsurr iculum..of f erings may be required to remedy these "inadequacies" or "deficits." Since Ml1liken. the-dower federal court^'have ordered school systems and state governments to fundatvariety-of*educational programs, such as early childhood education, smaller classes. etc., to correct educational deficits flowing-from past segregation. 9It was on the basis of these well-established principles that the Freeman Court ruled that,[when a federal court considers whether__t_o_relinquish ^supervision over all or part of a school district' s.-operations ,-"quality of education [is] a legitimate inquiry in determining-[a school district's]* compliance with the desegregation decree." It was for this reason that the Freeman Court pointed with approval to the district court's order requiring DeKalb County to equalize the allocation of resources between predominantly African-American and predominantly white schools. (5) What does a school district have to prove to be unitary? Answer: As the Supreme Court said in its Oklahoma City decision last year and reiterated this year in Freeman. in order to be nitar a school_ system iSu^ demonstrate that it. has_ eliminated thg.^es.tj.ges^f-seg-geg-a-t-jon^-to the- eafae-nt P^spfe.icable, that it will nut rotti-rn tVTftS" 'foiiiitfr discjriminatocy ways, and that it has compliad with- oou-rt-egder s in good faith. With respect to the demonstrating ^ood fai^, * the Court added in Freeman that J_'B.ystpm has* tin bad.,aitb'*.ti,ft=Ju3drr-STrf^ci?gnt. Instead, a schooli system must demonstrate "jwa affi-gfliafc-ive ommi-bmen'&^o-'compf'ry ini go In order for a district court to find a school* district unitary with respect to one of the Green factors. the 10Court established a three-part test, specifically: "whether there- hasbeen~f tri-l-a-nd~s-afe-irS-f-ac-to-E.y~GorapJ-Lan.cg_wiiiL-_tlie_iecree in thos-easpeets_athesystem-where-superv-i-s-ienis te-Joe withdrawn
" (2) whether retention of judicialcontro-t-is necessary or practicable to- achieve-comp-l-ianee~withthedec-ree in nf thp.-5w^hnn1-<
yrt-pTn-
" and (3) "whether the school district-h-asdemonstratedto--thepub-l-ic-and*tcthe paren-t-s-andstirdent3~of~the once disf avored' race", 'its'good aith-eommitme&ttote-he-who-leo-ftheGou-rt-'-sdecree^.and to tho5.ep-r-ovisions of the law and the constitution -that, were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first instance." (6) Does the Freeman case mean that school systems which are receiving state desegregation aid for plans including educational components will lose that support? Answer: The Freeman decision signals strong support for those court orders that have required state governments to provide support for educational programs as part of a desegregation decree, since the Court emphasizes in Freeman the importance of ensuring that the "educational vestiges" of segregation have been eliminated. It is these "vestiges" that state governments have been ordered to help correct, and the Freeman case reaffirms the appropriateness of this approach. School districts that are examining their position under Freeman should pay particular attention to this aspect of the case. 0326m 11 Op E 391 U.S. 430 GREEN V. COUNTY SCHOOL BD. OF NEW KENT CO., VA. 1689 ! 11 1 1 t rr 1 391 U.S. 430 Charles C. GREEN ct al. V. Cite as 88 S.Ct. 1089 (1968) den of establishing that additional time to abolish segregated public school systems is necessary to public interest and 1 c f I 1 j f 1, rs )- is i- )- tr t. d IB COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF NEW KENT COUNTY, VIRGINIA et al. No. 695. Argued April 3, 1968. Decided May 27. 1968. Proceeding attacking as deprivation of constitutional rights a freedom of choice plan allowing each pupil to public school he would attend. TThhee is consistent with good faith compliance at earliest practicable date. Const. Amend. 14. U.S.C.A. 3. Schools and School Districts =13 In context of longstanding state-imposed segregated public school system. fact that in 1965 school board opened doors of former white school to Negro children and of Negro school to white children under its freedom-of-choice plan permitting each pupil to choose :tul o ino United Eastern States District Court for the District of Virginia entered judgment adverse to plaintiffs. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 382 F.2d 338, affirmed in part and remanded and certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brennan, held that where in three years of operation of freedom of choice plan, not a single white child had chosen to attend a former Negro public school and 86% of Negro children in system still attended that school, the plan did not constitute adequate compliance with school board s responsibility to achieve a system of determining admission to public schools on nonracial basis and board must formulate new plan and fashion steps promising realistically to convert promptly to desegrated system. Judgment of Court of Appeals vacated insofar as it affirmed district court and case remanded to district court for further proceedings. 1. Schools and School Districts <^13 Unitary, nonracial system of public education is the ultimate end to be brought about under Supreme Court de-i : - I*! ''>w Si school he would attend did not establish board had taken steps adequate to abolish its dual, segregated system. U.S. cisions declaring unconstitutional segre- C.A.Const. Amend. 14. 4. Constitutional Law =220 School boards operating state-com-pelled dual systems of public education
,,e affirmative duty of taking whatever steps might be necessary to convert have to unitary system in which racial dis-crimination would be eliminated. U.S. C.A.Const. Amend. 14. .5. Schools and School Districts =13 In determining whether respondent school district by adopting its freedom-of- choice plan met its obligation to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert from dual system to unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated, it was relevant that adopting of freedom of choice plan did not come until ten years after second Brown decision directing prompt and reasonable start of desegregation. 6. Schools and School Districts G=13 Governing constitutional principles precluding dual systems of segregated public education no longer bear imprint TH n c: irvTi O rriI cn gated school systems established under compulsion of state laws. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. 2. Schools and School Districts =13 Constitutional rights of Negro chil-dren require school officials to bear bur- 88 S.Ct.106Va i of newly enunciated doctrine and delays elimination of unconstitutional dual system are no longer tolerable. 1. Schools and School Districts =13 Public school plan failing to provide meaningful assurance of prompt and 3 II jiii k' Sil! * h I I'flj lil'ii' 1.1 If
1-' i 1690 88 SUPREME COURT REPORTER effective disestablishment of dual system of segregated schools is intolerable. 8. Schools and School Districts =1.3 Time for mere deliberate speed in elimination of segregation in public schools has run out. 9. Schools and School Districts =13 Burden on school board today is to come forward with plan that promises realistically to work to eliminate segregation in public schools and promises realistically to work now. ence method. 391 U.S. 430 for the apparently less effective 15. Scliools and School Districts =13 Any plan adopted to disestablish state-imposed segregation in public schools must be evaluated in practice and federal district court should retain jurisdiction until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed. lol it- - 10. Schools and School Districts <=13 Federal district courts have obligation to assess effectiveness of proposed plan to achieve desegregation in public schools. h
11. Scliools and School Districts ==13 Effectiveness of proposed plan to desegregate public schools must be assessed in light of circumstances present and options available in each instance. 16. Schools and Schixil Districts =1.3 In desegregating a dual system of public education, a plan utilizing student "freedom of choice is not an end in itself but is only a means to constitutionally required end, the abolition of system of segregation and its effects, and, if it proves effective, it is acceptable, but, if it fails to undo segregation, other means must be used to achieve that end. i W.f 12. Scliools and School Districts @=13 It is incumbent upon school board to establish that its proposed plan promises meaningful and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation in public schools. 17. Scliools and School Districts <5=13 School officials have continuing duty to take whatever action may be necessary to create a unitary nonracial public school system. i is! t ( It b l' <1 . sb -1, I .-J 13. Scliools and School Districts =13 Federal district court in assessing effectiveness of proposed plan to desegregate public schools must weigh claim of school board in light of facts at hand and in light of any alternatives which may be shown as feasible and more promising in their effectiveness. 14. Scliools and School Districts =1.3 Where federal district court finds school board to be acting in good faith anj its proposed plan has real prospects for dismantling state-imposed dual system of segregated education at earliest 18. Schools and School Districts =13 Where freedom of choice plan offers real promise of converting state- imposed dual system of segregated public schools to unitary nonracial system, there may be no objection to allowing such device to prove itself in operation, but if there are reasonably available other ways, such as zoning, promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system, "freedom of choice must be held unacceptable. 19. Schools and Sclrool Districts =13 Where in three years of operation of "freedom of choice plan, allowing each pupil to choose public school he would attend, not a single white child had chosen to attend former Negro public school and 85% of Negro children in system still attended that school, the practicable date, then plan may be said to provide effective relief, but if other plan did not constitute adequate compli- more nromising courses of action are ance with school board s responsibility to promising open to the board, that may indicate lack of good faith or at least place heavy burden upon board to explain its prefer- achieve a system of determining admission to public schools on nonracial basis and board must formulate new plan and t I I I I . t. te-. r-i ''1^: . 1 391 U.S. 433 GREEN V. COUNTY SCHOOL BD. OF NEW KENT CO., VA. cite as 88 S.Ct. 1689 (1988) 1691 fashion steps promising realistically to convert promptly to desegregated system. 4k i? 431 Samuel Tucker, Richmond, Va., for petitioners. Frederick T. Gray, Richmond, Va., for respondents. Louis F. Claiborne, Washington, D. C., for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court. (Also in Nos. 740 and 805) the "school system serves approximately 1,300 pupils, of which 'i40 are Negro and 550 are White. The School Board operates one white combined elementary and high school [New Kent], and one Negro combined elementary and high school [George W. Watkins]. There are no attendance zones. Each school serves the entire county. The record indicates that 21 school buses11 serving the Watkins school and 10 serving the New Kent schooltravel overlapping routes throughout the county to transport pupils to and from the two schools. HJIi 4 li W-'i - - S Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. The question for decision is whether, under all the circumstances here, respondent School Boards adoption of a "freedom-of-choice plan which allows a pupil to choose 432 his own public school constitutes adequate compliance with the Boards responsibility to achieve a system of determining admission to the non-racial basis < public schools on a * * " Brown v. Board of Education * " of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 300-301, 75 S.Ct. 753, 756, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (Broum //). Petitioners brought this action in March 1965 seeking injunctive relief against respondents continued main- The segregated system was initially established and maintained under the compulsion of Virginia constitutional and statutory provision.s mandating racial segregation in public education, Va. Const., Art. IX, 140 (1902)
Va.Code 22-221 (1950). These provisions were held to violate the Federal Constitution in Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, decided with Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 487, 74 S.Ct. 686, 688, 98 L.Ed. 873 (Brown /). The respondent School Board continued the segregated operation of the system after the Brovm, 433 decisions, presumably on the authority of several statutes enacted by Virginia in resistance to those decisions. Some of these statutes were held to be unconstitutional on their face or as applied.* One 51 r tenance of an alleged racially segregated statute, the Pupil Placement Act, Va. school system. New Kent County is a rural county in Eastern Virginia. About one-half of its population of some 4,500 are Negroes. There is no residential segregation in the county
persons of both races reside throughout. The school Code 22-232.1 et seq. (1964), not repealed until 1966, divested local boards of authority to assign children to particular schools and placed that authority in a State Pupil Placement Board. Under that Act children were each year automatically reassigned to the school previ- system has only two schools, the New Kent school on the east side of the county ously attended unless upon their applica- and the George W. Watkins school on the tion the State Board assigned them to west side. In a memorandum filed May another school
students seeking enroll- 17, 1966, the District Court found that ment for the first time were also as- I. E. g., Griffin v. County Scliool Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 81 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256
Green v. School Board of City of Roanoke, 304 F. 2d 118 (C.A.4th Cir. 1962)
Adkins v. School Board of City of Newport News, > 148 F.Supp. 430 (D.C.E.D.Va.), affd, 240 F.2(l 325 (C.A.4th Cir. 1957)
James V. Almond, 170 F.Supp. 331 (D.C.E.D.Va. 1959)
Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 439, 100 S.E.2d 030 (1959). <:> ITI SITI nr5 o s 3 I it fe- 4 d ! i! '11 I5
U! IL 1692 88 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 391 U.S. 433 I I f- f i> signed at the discretion of the State Board. To September 1964, no Negro pupil had applied for admission to the New Kent school under this statute and no white pupil had applied for admission to the Watkins school. The School Board initially sought dismissal of this suit on the ground that petitioners had failed to apply to the State Board for assignment to New Kent school. However on August 2, 1965, five months after the suit was brought, respondent School Board, in order to le- main eligible for federal financial aid, adopted a freedom-of-choice plan for desegregating the schools. Under that 434 plan, each pupil, except those entering the first and eighth grades, may annually choose between the New Kent and Watkins schools and pupils not making a choice are assigned to the school previ- i" * ously attended: first and eighth grade * * * also to set up procedures for pupils must affirmatively choose a school, periodically evaluating the effectiveness After the plan was filed the District choice Court denied petitioners prayer for an injunction and granted respondent leave to submit an amendment to the plan with respect to employment and assignment of teachers and staff on a racially nondis- criminatory basis. The amendment was duly filed and on June 28, 1966, the District Court approved the freedom-of- choice plan as so amended. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, en 382 F.2d 338, affirmed the F banc, District Courts approval of the freedom- of-choice provisions of the plan but remanded the case to the District Court for entry of an order regarding faculty 435 which is much more specific and more comprehensive and which would incorporate in addition to a minimal, objective time table some of the faculty provisions of the decree entered by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, affd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (1967). Judges Sobeloff and Winter concurred with the remand on the teacher issue but otherwise disagreed, expressing the view that the District Court should be directed * * * of the [Boards] freedom of choice' [plan] in the elimination of other features of a segregated school system. Bowman v. County School Board of Charles City County, Va., 382 F.2d 326, at 330. We granted certiorari, 389 U.S. 1003, 88 S.Ct. 665, 19 L.Ed.2d 598. i*> J ^4 i I' IP. 11/ < : . - p- -i A*.?.I 2. Congress, concerned with the lack of progress in school desegregation, included provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to deal with (he problem through various agencies of the Federal Govern- in ent. 7S Stat. 246. 252, 266, 42 U.S.C. 2(X10c ct seq., 2000d et swp, 200011-2. In Title VI Congress declared that No person in the United Stales shall. on the ground of race, color, or national origin, he excluded from partieipatiou in, he denied the benefits of, or be subjected to diseriinination under any program or .activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. 2000(1. The Dciiartruent of Health, 3^r1u<.'ation, and Welfare issued regulations covering racial discrimination in federally aided school systems, as directed by 42 U.S.C. 2000(1-1, and in a statement of policies, or guidelines, the Department s Office of Education established standards according to which school systems in the process of desegregation can remain qiinlified for federal funds. 45 CFR 80.1-80.13, 181.1-181.70 (1067). Free- dom-of-choice plans arc among those considered acceptable, so long as in oper- ation such a plan proves effective. 45 CFR 181.54. The regulations provide that a school system subject to a final order of a court of the United States tor the desegregation of such school * * system with which tlie system agrees to comply is deemed to be in compliance with the statute and regulations. 45 CFR See also 45 (IFR 181.G. .80.4(c). See gcncrnlly Dunn, Title VI, the Guide- lines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 Va.L.Rev. 42 (1067)
Note, 55 Gco.L.J. 325 (1066)
Comment, 77 Yale L.J. 321 (1907). 3. This case was decided per curiam on the basis of the opinion in Bowman v. County Scliool Board of Charles City County, 382 F.2d 326, decided the same day. Certiorari has not been sought for the Bowman case itself.391 U.S. 437 GREEN V. COUNTY SCHOOL BD. OF NEW KENT CO.. VA. Cite fts 88 S.Ct. 1089 (1908) 1693 ti j bii The pattern of separate white and "Negro schools in the New Kent County school system established under compulsion of state laws is precisely the pattern OIVU Vi OV14VW of segregation to which Broivn I and Brown II were particularly addressed, and which Brown I declared unconstitu- tionally denied Negro school children equal protection of the laws. Racial identification of the systems schools was complete, extending not just to the composition of student bodies at the two schools but to every facet of school operationsfaculy, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities. In short, the State, acting through the local school board and school officials. or- ganized and operated a dual system, part ............ . .J__*. white and part Negro.' [1,2] It was such dual systems that 14 years ago Brown Z held unconstitu- tional and a year later Brown II held must be abolished
school boards operating such school systems were required by Brown II to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. 349 U.S., at 301, 75 S.Ct. at 756. It is of course true that for the time tern. i school problems. Id., at 299, 75 S.Ct. at In referring to the personal in- 756. terest of the plaintiffs in admission to immediately after Broion II the concern was with making an initial break in a long-established pattern of excluding 436 practicable on public schools as soon as nondiscriminatory basis, we also noted a that [t]o effectuate this interest may call for elimination of a variety of ob- stades in making the transition * * >> Ne- gro children from schools attended by white children. The principal focus was on obtaining for those Negro children courageous Yet we Id., at 300, 75 S.Ct. at 756. emphasized that the constitutional rights of Negro children required school officials to bear the burden of establishing that additional time to carry out the ruling in an effective manner i.s necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. Ibid. We charged the district courts in their review of particular situations to consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a -n * enough to break with tradi- tion a place in the white schools. See, ., Cooper V. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 e. g., Under Brown S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5. // that immediate goal was only the first system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will also consider the adequacy of any plans the 437 defendants may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. Id., at 300-301, 75 S.Ct. at 756. [3, 4] It is against this background that 13 years after Brorm II commanded the abolition of dual systems we must n J Ci. TU ni inra 52 Jf <3 J A * The transition to a uni- step, however. tary, nonracial system of public education was and is the ultimate end to be brought about
it was because of the "complexities arising from the transition measure the effectiveness of respondent School Boards freedom-of-choice plan to achieve that end. The School Board contends that it has fully discharged its obligation by adopting a plan by which i student, regardless of race, may svstem of public education freed of every -------- , ................. .... freely choose the school he will attend. to a X------ , racial discrimination that we prtivided for "all deliberate speed in the imple- The Board attempts to cast the issue in its broadest form by arguing that its X 7 \ r^rinpinlpq of Brown 1. its broadest form by arguing mat ns ST^ffsT at 299-301, 75 S.Ct. at 755. freedom-of-choice plan may be faulted Thus we recognized the task would neces- aarily involve solution of varied local ment as only by reading the Fourteenth Amend- universally requiring compul- g ,1 I 4-1 iw I: 1694 88 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 391 U.S. 437 Bl a I 'LW, - - > it I I sory integration, a reading it insists the wording of the Amendment will not support. But that argument ignores the thrust of Brown //. In the light of the command of that case, what is involved here is the question whether the Board has achieved the racially nondiscrimina-tory school system Brotm II held must be effectuated in order to remedy the established unconstitutional deficiencies that Brown II commanded school boards to bend their efforts.'* [5-9] In determining whether respondent School Board met that command by adopting its freedom-of-choice plan, it is relevant that this first step did not come until some 11 years after Broivnl was decided and 10 years after Brown II directed the making of a "prompt and reasonable start. This deliberate per- I i 39 of its segregated system. In the context petuation of the unconstitutional dual of the state-imposed segregated pattern system can only have compounded the of long standing, the fact that in 1965 the Board opened the doors of the former white school to Negro children and of the Negro school to white children merely begins, not ends, our inquiry whether the Board has taken steps adequate to abolish its dual, segregated system. Brown II was a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems tempered by an awareness that harm of such a system. Such delays are no longer tolerable, for the governing constitutional principles no longer bear the imprint of newly enunciated doc-trine. Watson V. City of Memphis, supra, 373 U.S. at 529, 83 S.Ct. at 1316
see Bradley v. School Board, City of Richmond, Va., supra
Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 86 S.Ct. 358, 15 L.Ed.2d 265. Moreover, a plan that at this late date co th at U1 di p! T tl ti i) li i d t c i t I 1 complex and multifaceted problems would fails to provide meaningful assurance of 1 arise which would require time and flexibility for a successful resolution. School boards such as the respondent then operating state-compelled dual system.s were nevertheless clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to 438 prompt and effective disestablishment of a dual system is also intolerable. The time for mere deliberate speed has run out, Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 234, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 1235, 12 L.Ed.2d 256, the context in which we must interpret and apply this language [of Brown II] to plans for desegregation has been significantly altered. 3 -i Si, Ft if.'? , I - : 7 < I it. t i . .. : t.i pv *f4 convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. See Cooper v. Aaron, supra, 358 U.S. at 7. 78 S.Ct. at 1404
Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, Va., 382 U.S. 103, 86 S.Ct. 224, 15 L.Ed.2d 187
cf. Watson V, City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 83 S.Ct. 1314, 10 L.Ed.2d 529. The constitutional rights of Negro school children articulated in Brown I permit no less than this
and it was to this end 439 Goss V. Board of Education of City of Knoxville, Tenn., 373 U.S. 683, 689, 83 S.Ct. 1405, 1409, 10 L.Ed.2d 632. See Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263, 84 S.Ct. 1235, 12 L.Ed.2d 288. The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now. ^13 "i S 4 5 S i 4. We bear in mind that the court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimina-tion in the future. I^)iiisinna v. United .States. 3S0 U.S. 145, 154, 85 S.Ct. 817, 822, 13 L.Ed.2d 709, Compare the remedies discussed in, e. g., NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Ury Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, GO S.Ct. 203, 84 L.E'(U219
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 0,5 S.Ct. 254. 89 L.Ed. IGO
Standard Oil Co. v. United States. 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 834. See also Griffin v. County Scliool Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218, 232-234, 84 S.Ct 122G, 1233- 1235, 12 L.Ed.2d 25G. Ai .jt 1- 1 1 ? 5 *5 - V
4 37 591 U.S. 440 GREEN v. COUNTY SCHOOL BD. OF NEW KENT CO., VA. Cite ns 88 S.Ct. 1689 (1968) 1695 Is [10-15] The obligation of the district courts, as it always has been, is to assess the effectiveness of a proposed plan in d 1, >t I / d achieving desegregation. There is no universal answer to complex problems of desegregation
there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every case. The matter must be assessed in light of the circumstances present and the op- lions available in each instance. It is tion of Gould School District, 391 U.S. 443, at 449, 88 S.Ct. 1697, at 1700, 20 L.Ed.2d 727. [1618] We do not hold that freedom of choice can have no place in such a plan. We do not hold that a freedom- of-choice plan might of itself be unconstitutional, although that argument has been urged upon us. Rather, 440 it g HI 61 tv 11 e e ? r 4 - incumbent upon the school board to establish that its proposed plan promises meaningful and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation. It is incumbent upon the district court to weigh that claim in light of the facts at hand and in light of any alternatives which may be shown as feasible and more promising in their effectiveness. Where the court finds the board to be acting in good faith and the proposed plan to have real prospects for dismantling the state-imposed dual system at the earliest practicable date, then the plan may be said to provide effective relief. Of course, the availability to the board of other more promising courses of action may indicate a lack of good faith
and at the least it places a heavy burden upon the board to explain its preference for an apparently less all we decide today is that in desegregating a dual system a plan utilizing freedom of choice is not an end in itself. As Judge Sobeloff has put it, Freedom of choice is not a sacred talisman
it is only a means to a constitutionally required endthe abolition of the system of segregation and its effects. If the means prove effective, it is acceptable, but if it fails to undo segregation, other means must be used to achieve this end. The school officials have the continuing duty to take whatever action may be necessary to create a unitary, nonracial sys- tem. Bowman v. County School effective method. Moreover, whatever plan is adopted will require evaluation in practice, and the court should retain jurisdiction until it is clear that state- Board of Charles City County, 382 F. 2d 326, 333 (C.A. 4th Cir. 1967) (concurring opinion). Accord, Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F.2d 178 (C.A. 8th Cir. 1968)
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, supra. Although the general experience imposed segregation has been completely been such under freedom of choice to date has removed. See Raney v. Board of Educa- ness as a as to indicate its ineffectivetool of desegregation, there tl :ti "n pl .ij "Th 3- Sil cj:> M 52 co wl j- i,'. .'*1 fj IS*.' (SO 5. Tlie views of the United States Commission on Civil Hights, which we neither adopt nor refuse to adopt, are as follows: Freedom of choice plans, which have tended to perpetuate racially identifiable schools in the Southern and border States, require affirmative action by both Negro and white parents and pupils before such disestablishment can be achieved. (b) During the past school year IlOOi!10(i71, as in the previous year, in some areas of the South, Negro families with children attending previously all- white schools under free choice plans wcre targets of violence, threats of vio- Tliere are a nnnihcr of factors which have prevented such affirmative action hy substantial numbers of parents and pupils of both races: (a) Fear of retaliation and hostility from the white community continue to deter many Negro families from choosing formerly all-white schools
lence and economic reprisal by white persons and Negro children were subjected to harassment by white classmates notwithstanding conscientious efforts by many teachers and principals to prevent such misconduct: (c) During the past school year, in some areas of the South public officials improperly influenced Negro families to keep their children in Negro schools and excluded Negro children attending for- I 7^]9 < '9 *1 ! I 1! Si i
! ,1 f 1 f I S- A < is
Hl 1696 may 88 SUPREME COURT REPORTER well be instances in which it can serve as an effective device. Where it offers real promise of aiding a desegregation 441 program to effectuate conversion of a state-imposed dual system to a unitary, non-racial system there might be no objection to allowing such a device to prove itself in operation. On the other hand, if there are reasonably available other ways, such for illustration as zoning, promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system, freedom of choice must be held unacceptable. [19] The New Kent School Boards "freedom-of-choice plan cannot be accepted as a sufficient step to effectuate a transition to a unitary system. In three years of operation not a single white child has chosen to attend Watkins school and although 115 Negro children enrolled in New Kent school in 1967 (up merly all-white schools from official func- tiun.s
(d) Poverty deters many Negro families in the South from choosing formerly nn-white sebools. Sonic Negro parents are embarrassed to permit their children to attend such schools without suitable clothing. In sonic districts special fees are asae.sse<l far cauraes which arc avail- ai)lc aniy in the white scliaols
(e) Irnproveinonts in facilities and equipment * * have been instituted in nil-Negro .scliools in some school districts in a manner that tends to discon rage scdiools. Negroes from selecting white Southern School Desegregation, 19G6- 1907. at 88 (1907). Sec id., at 45-09
Survey of School Desegregation in the Southern and Border States 1965-19G0, at 30-44. .51-52) U. S. Commn on Civil Rights J9CC). 6. In view of the situation found in New Kent County, wh^re there is no residential segregation, the elimination of the dual school system and the establishment of a unitary, non-racial system could be readily achieved with a minimum of administrative difficulty b.y means of geographic zoningsimply by assigning students living in the eastern half of the county to the New Kent School and those living in the western half or the county 391 U.S. 440 from 35 in 1965 and 111 in 1966) 85% of the Negro children in the system still attend the all-Negro Watkins school. In other words, the school system remains a dual system. Rather than further the dismantling of the dual system, the plan has operated simply to burden children and their parents 442 with a responsibility which Brown // placed squarely on the School Board. The Board must be required to formulate a new plan and, in light of other courses which appear open to the Board, such as zoning, fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a white school and a Negro school, but just schools. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated insofar as it affirmed the District Court and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. to the Watkins School. Although a geographical formula is not universally appropriate. it is evident that here the Board, by separately busing Negro children across the entire county to the Negro school, and the white children to the white school, is deliberately maintaining a segregated system which would vanish with non-racial geographic zoning. The conditions in this comity present a classical case for this expedient. Bowman v. County School Board of Charles City County, supra, n. 3, at 332 concurring opinion). Petitioners have also suggested that the Board could consolidate the two schools, one site (e. g., Watkins) serving grades 1-7 and the other (e. g., New Kent) serving grades 8-12, this being the grade division respondent makes between eleinen- tary and secondary levels. Petitioners contend this would result in a more efficient system by eliminating costly duplication in this relatively small district while at the same time achieving immediate dismantling of the dual system. These are two suggestions the District Court should take into account upon remand, along with any other proposed alternatives and in light of considerations respecting other aspects of the school system such as the matter of faculty and staff desegregation remanded to the court by the Court of Appeals. I I 391 U. Artli The GO c of m schoo Court sas d appea F.2d grant tice I deseg sistir and 1 in di. quatc syste estab erati' in a Negr at al verse Cour 1. Aj choic prop issue plaii dent boar gate was cidei peak 1?Statement of Intention to Establish Green Factor Research Committees Presented to the LRSD Board of Directors - February 9, 1995 As part of the process for moving the Little Rock School District toward unitary status, the Superintendent intends to implement the following measures: A. Establish committees to research specific areas, Green Factors, that have potential for achieving unitary status Committees will be established to research the following areas: 1. Student Assignment 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Faculty Ratios Staff Ratios Transportation Extracurricular Activities Facilities Student Achievement FEB 9 1995 Ofic3 QI Oe
icC. The work of the committees will be coordinated by Dr. Russ Mayo, Associate Superintendent, and the Student Assignment Office. B. C. Define the composition of the committees and the structure of their work Each committee will be composed of ten to fifteen people who understand the importance of unitary status in the Little Rock School District. The committees will include persons with appropriate skills in observing, interpreting, and communicating conditions and factors of influence in the topic areas. Committee members will include teachers, administrators, and community members. Each committee will be co-chaired by a LRSD administrator and an individual selected by the Superintendent. Each committee will produce a report that addresses the opportunity for the LRSD to seek unitary status in its respective area. The reports will identify if such action is feasible and provide information to support its findings. Identify the funding source for the committees The Green Factor Research Committees will be financed with funds from the LRSD legal fees account. Approximately $12,000 - $15,000 is anticipated for this activity. Project Timeframe: The Superintendent intends to submit a resolution to the Board for action at the next Board meeting on the establishment of Green Factor Research Committees. Each Research Committee will be expected to deliver its report with a six-week period. Assuming project start up by March 1, the Green Factor reports should be available by mid-April.Statement of Intention to Establish Green Factor Research Committees Presented to the LRSD Board of Directors - February 9, 1995 As part of the process for moving the Little Rock School District toward unitary status, the Superintendent intends to implement the following measures: A. B. C. Establish, committees to research specific areas, Green Factors, that have potential for achieving unitary status Committees will be established to research the following areas: 1. Student Assignment 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Faculty Ratios Staff Ratios Transportation Extracurricular Activities Facilities Student Achievement The work of the committees will be coordinated by Dr. Russ Mayo, Associate Superintendent, and the Student Assignment Office. Define the composition of the committees and the structure of their work Each committee will be composed of ten to fifteen people who understand the importance of unitary status in the Little Rock School District. The committees will include persons with appropriate skills in observing, interpreting, and communicating conditions and factors of influence in the topic areas. Committee members will include teachers, administrators, and community members. Each committee will be co-chaired by a LRSD administrator and an individual selected by the Superintendent. Each committee will produce a report that addresses the opportunity for the LRSD to seek unitary status in its respective area. The reports will identify if such action is feasible and provide information to support its findings. Identify the funding source for the committees The Green Factor Research Committees will be financed with funds from the LRSD legal fees account. Approximately $12,000 - $15,000 is anticipated for this activity. pzy'CMvmztlti. fTimpfrnmp. Project Timeframe: The Superintendent intends to submit a resolution to the Board for action at the next Board meeting on the establishment of Green Factor Research Committees. Each Research Committee will be expected to deliver its report with a six-week period. Assuming project start up by March 1, the Green Factor reports should be available by mid-April.! Arkansas Democrat (gazette THURSDAY, JANUARY 19, 1995 I Itu Copyrigw O Uttle Hock Newspaoera. '"O- I Long negotiations end as district, NLR teachers agree on contract BY SUSAN ROTH Democrat-Gazette Education Writer North Little Rock teachers finally have a tentative contract, five months into the school year. The Classroom Teachers Association settled for a 2,9 percent raise with conditions in a meeting with North Little Rock School District negotiators Wednesday, Im pleased with the settlement and I think the teachers will be, too, said Louene Lipsmeyer, the unions president and chief spokesman for its negotiating team. The two sides began negotiating the one-year contract last summer in what Lipsmeyer said was the longest process she could remember. The contract still must be ratified by the school board and union membership to take effect, Lipsmeyer declined to reveal the teachers original salary proposal, but she said the unions last offer was a 4 percent raise. The teachers group accepted a 2.9 percent increase, retroactive to the start of the school year in August 1994, with the stipulation that teachers will make more money if additional revenue is collected. For each $82,500 collected above revenue projections, another $50 will be added to each teachers annual salary. The contract contained a similar arrangement for the last three years, Lipsmeyer said. Other sticking points involved extra pay for teachers who spend extra time at work. While most teachers salaries are based on 187 workdays, some teachers, such as athletic coaches, receive supplemental pay because they come to school early for practice or stay late, or both, Our policy says those positions had to be negotiated, Lipsmeyer said. We had asked for a list of those positions but were never able to get it or find out the number of extra days pay they were getting. The most contentious point, however, was the school boards proposal to increase the stipend for high school drama teachers from 4 percent to 15 percent. Board members felt those teachers give much more of their time than others. We felt that was way too much of an increase over what was proposed for other teachers, Lipsmeyer said. But the union agreed to a one-year-only 15 percent stipend for the drama teachers, on condition that the next contract be more equitable for all.\ I, f > (L^tzx Ji (rfc^ Jrs hVl Jt Mj JUcv c bb n* 9 ' 5* b a s k - i * . <' f'?
,'1 - i : J ' t ij J Ms J ^1 . -^1 'M tj :t L-! /'Mii V j fl i J? >f >' ^5 rs .:3 .i I 'liI Arkansas Democrat 7^ ((jazelk FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1995 iZCtk Williams proposes 7 panels to assess integration advance DY CYNTHIA HOWELL Democraf-Gazette Education Writer Little Rock Superintendent Henry Williams proposed Thursday calling OU committees of em- ployee.s and community members to research how well the school district meets its desegregation obligations. Under Williams plan, the district would establish seven committees of 10 to 15 teachers, ad- niinislralors and residents. Those panels would assess the district's progress in eliminating all vestiges of what was once legal racial segregation and dis- crimination schools. in the public That work will help the district identify what must be done before it can ask U.S. District Judge Susan Webber Wright to release the district from federal court supervision, Williams told members of the school board Thursday night. Wright is presiding in the district's I2-year-old school desegregation lawsuit. She monitors the district's compliance with its desegregation plan. Committee members would be paid for the extra work, William.s said. That would cost the district from $12,000 to $15,(X)0 per committee, or as much as $10.5.000 overall. 'rhe committees would be given six weeks to conduct research and submit reports to the board. Dr. Russ Mayo, the districts comniitlee plan on the U.S. Supreme Courts so-called Green factors. The high court has said in other desegregation cases that federal courts must consider a districts efforts in those ar- ea.s before releasing the district from supervision. The school board is considering paying Williams a bonus of 5 percent of his annual base salary of $115,(X)0 for each area in which the district is released from court supervision. For example, if Wright finds that the districts staff is racially balanced. Williams would get a bonus of $5,750. Achieving all the proposed goals would net him more than $50,000 in bonuses. The board delayed voting Thursday on the superintendents incentive pay until possibly the Feb. 23 board meeting, Board member Katherine Mitchell said she disagreed with a proposed incentive to give the superintendent a 5 percent bonus for every 5 percent increase in white students in the district, up to 50 percent white. District enrollment is 35 percent white and 65 percent black. Mitchell said she didnt think the goal was attainable, and she would rather pay Williams for closing the disparity gap in test scores for black and white students. In other business Thursday, the board: Voted to rebuild Chicot El- associate superintendent for de- ementary School, damaged by ar- segregation, would oversee the son last year. The school will be committees. Each would be co- rebuilt with walls dividing the chaired by a district adminis- classrooms at a cost of about Irator and someone selected by $150,000 to the district. Except Williams. for the walls, insurance will pay to replace the school, where fur- The committees would research, respectively: niture and book shelves once Student assignments to separated classrooms. schools. Faculty hiring and job assignments. Listened to a presentation from a representative of Ser- viceMaster, a Chicago-based pri- Support staff hiring and job vale company interested in con- assignments. trading with the district to pro- Transportation making vide custodial and maintenance sure that the burden of mandatory busing doesnt fall disproportionately on one race. Student participation in extracurricular activities. services. The company would manage, train and equip current employees to do the work more efficiently at a cost to the district ___ similar to whats now spent. The physical condition of They would remain district em- school buildings in various neighborhoods. Student achievement. Delayed action on an ad- Williams generally based the ministrative proposal to elimi- ployees and there would be no layoffs. nate the Learning Foundations class at four junior high schools starting next year. The mandatory course was designed to help students develop strong study skills. Reviewed a proposed code of conduct obligating board members and the superintendent to conduct business in an open, constructive and positive manner.
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