Dismissal for settlement plan

A'/e. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION FILED district COURT eastern district ARKANSAS DEC 1 2 1995 LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT JAMES W. McMRMACK. CLERK ' OEP CLERK :S,McMRMA ' t PLAINTIFF vs. No. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1, ET AL MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL RECEIVED DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL DEC I 4 1995 INTERVENORS SERVICEMASTER MANAGEMENT SERVICES, A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Office of Deseflregatiofi INTERVENOR Montofiiiy ORDER Upon motion of the Joshua Intervenors, and without objection. the time for filing a response to the Little Rock School District's motion for an order of dismissal is hereby extended to and including January 5, 1996. IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of December 1995. JUDGE WfS DOCUMENT ENTERED ON DOCKET RWppt i COMPLIANCE WITH RUL IN 2 S 8 8 1 I RECEfVED 1 5 1995 Office of Desegregation ^ASTefOo oisVfICT g'^y^r, '^^kansas Moiuiuimy CH --------- - _ JAMES W. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT (^URT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION 2 I99S '^COKMACK. CIERK 'EP CLERK LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. PLAINTIFFS V. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. DEFENDANTS MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL. INTERVENORS KATHERINE W. KNIGHT, ET AL. INTERVENORS MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME Come now the Joshua Intervenors, by and through undersigned counsel, and move the Court for an extension of time within which to file their response to the Little Rock School District's motion for an order of dismissal state: 1. Additional time is needed in which to respond to the motion recently filed by the LRSD. Said motion is not being made for purposes of delay. Counsel for the Little Rock School District does not oppose said extension. WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, Joshua Interevenors respectfully pray the Court for an order extending the time in which they may respond to the LRSD motion to and including January 5, 1996. 2. 3.Respectfully submitted, John W. Walker, P.A. 1723 Br Little/ tway (501) :ohk, AR 72206 By: CBRTIF .TE OF SERVICE 8 I do hereby state that a copy of the foregoing was forwarded to all counsel of record via U.S. mail on December, 1995. ,his day of Jo: Walker IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT RZCEIVED PLAINTIFF V. LR-C-82-866 DEC 1 1995 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL Office Of Desegregation Woiinonnfl UI ucQ a J DEFENDANTS MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL INTERVENORS KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL INTERVENORS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ORDER OF DISMISSAL Introduction The settlement agreement in this case requires that the case be dismissed with prejudice with respect to LRSD, PCSSD and NLRSD. The settlement agreement was approved by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and by this court, but the required order of dismissal was overlooked and has not been entered. In accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement. LRSD, PCSSD and NLRSD are entitled to an order of dismissal. Statement of the Case The "RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS AGAINST THE LRSD, I* which was approved by this court and the court of appeals as Attachment B to the settlement agreement, contains the following requirement: "It is further understood and agreed that the litigation now pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Western Division, entitled Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, et al. No. LR-C-82-866 and cases consolidated therein and their predecessors (including, but not limited to. Cooper v. Aaron. Norwood v. Tucker and Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District) (the II Litigation") is to be dismissed withprejudice as to the LRSD and the former and current members of its board of education named in the Litigation. This dismissal is final for all purposes except that the court may retain jurisdiction to address issues regarding the implementation of the Plans." Pulaski County Desegregation Case Settlement Agreement, Attachment B, p. 2. The settlement agreement also requires that this case be dismissed with respect to PCSSD and NLRSD. Settlement Agreement, Attachment C, p. 2 and Attachment D, p. 2. The settlement agreement contains the following "Agreement Regarding Litigation Among Joshua And The Districts": "Joshua releases the Districts of all liability for issues which have been raised, or could have been raised, in this Litigation and commits that there will be no further litigation among or between Joshua, Knight and any of the districts, other than proceedings to enforce the terms of this settlement or the terms of the Plans." Settlement Agreement, p. 19. This litigation ended with the approval of the settlement agreement except that this court has retained jurisdiction. in accordance with the agreement. to resolve issues related to implementation of the desegregation plans and enforcement of the settlement agreement. An order of dismissal, however, has not yet been entered. Argument The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the parties' settlement agreement on December 12, 1990. LRSD V. PCSSD. 921 F.2d 1371 (Sth Cir. 1990) . The court of appeals directed the district court, on remand. "to approve the parties' settlement agreement as written by them." Id. at 1394. On January 18, 1991, this court 2ordered that II [t]he parties' settlement agreement is hereby approved as written by them." According to the terms of the settlement agreement set forth above, LRSD, PCSSD and NLRSD were entitled to an order of dismissal with prejudice upon this court's approval of the settlement agreement. The order required by the settlement agreement will not affect this court's authority, as described in the settlement agreement, to retain jurisdiction to address issues regarding implementation of the desegregation plans and to conduct proceedings to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement or the desegregation plans. The question of whether a certain component of the settlement agreement should be implemented has arisen once before. In LRSD V. PCSSD. 971 F.2d 160 (Sth Cir. 1992) , the court of appeals confronted the issue of whether the district court was required to extend certain millages in accordance with Item M of the settlement agreement. The district court had "thought it 'unwise to infer from the court of appeals' approval of the settlement agreement that [the district court was] required to extend the omitted millages. II Id. at 164. The Eighth Circuit said: "What the district court failed to recognize is that we directed it to 'approve the parties' settlement agreement as written by them." "[A]s written by them," the settlement agreement included Item M, which corrected the problem of the omitted millages. The extension of the omitted millages is therefore settled as the law of the case." Id. at 165 (citations omitted, emphasis in original). 3One of the reasons the district court had given for declining to implement Item M was that even though the court of appeals had approved the settlement agreement in its entirety, it had not specifically mentioned Item M in its opinion. Id. at 164. The court of appeals made it clear that the parties were entitled to implementation of all of the terms of the settlement agreement: "The Special Master approved the agreement, including Item M, as did the district court. Most importantly. when the matter came before this court on appeal from the district court, we held that the settlement agreement as drafted by the parties met constitutional standards and directed the district court to approve the settlement agreement as submitted by the parties. therefore. We do not. agree with the district court that it is necessary to infer approval of Item M from our earlier opinion. Our language was clear in its approval of the entire agreement, including Item M." Id. at 165. The releases of liability for each of the districts and the dismissal with prejudice of this litigation are important components of the settlement agreement and are at least as significant as the extended millages. The approval by the court of appeals and this court of the entire settlement agreement entitles the three school districts to an order dismissing this case with prejudice. Conclusion This court should enter an order dismissing this case with prejudice effective January 18, 1991. Respectfully submitted. LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT 4FRIDAY, ELDREDGE & CLARK 2000 First Commercial Bldg. 400 West Capitol Street Little Rock, AR 72201 (501) 376-2011 Christopher Heller Robert Shafer John C. Fendley By* Christopher Hell Bar No. 81083 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief In Support of Motion for Order of Dismissal has been served on the following by depositing copy of same in the United States mail on this 30th day of November, 1995. Mr. John Walker JOHN WALKER, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72206 Mr. Sam Jones WRIGHT, LINDSEY & JENNINGS 2200 Worthen Bank Bldg. 200 West Capitol Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Steve Jones JACK, LYON & JONES, P.A. 3400 Capitol Towers Capitol & Broadway Streets Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Richard Roachell Roache11 and Streett First Federal Plaza 401 West Capitol, Suite 504 Little Rock, AR 72201 Ms. Ann Brown HAND DELIVERED Desegregation Monitor Heritage West Bldg., Suite 510 201 East Markham Street Little Rock, AR 72201 5Mr. Timothy G. Gauger Office of the Attorney General 323 Center Street 200 Tower Building Little Rock, AR 72201 6 a/'rLuMe-<i- IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT PLAINTIFF V. LR-C-82-8&6 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL RECE!^ DEFENDANTS MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL DEC I 1995 INTERVENORS KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL Office Of Desearegaiiofi INTERVENORS MOTION FOR ORDER OF DISMISSAL' ' For its motion, the Little Rock School District (LRSD) states: 1. This court approved the parties' settlement agreement in an order filed on January 18, 1991. The January 18, 1991 order dismissed the State of Arkansas as a party to this case pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement. 2. The settlement agreement also requires that this case be dismissed with prejudice with respect to LRSD, PCSSD and NLRSD. The "RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS AGAINST THE LRSD," which was approved by this court and the court of appeals as Attachment B to the settlement agreement, contains the following requirement: "It is further understood and agreed that the litigation now pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Western Division, entitled Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, et al, No. LR-C-82-866 and cases consolidated therein and their predecessors (including, but not limited to. Cooper v. Aaron. Norwood v. Tucker and Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District) (the "Litigation") is to be dismissed with prejudice as to the LRSD and the former and current members of its board Litigation. of education named in the This dismissal is final for all purposesexcept that the court may retain jurisdiction to address issues regarding the implementation of the Plans. II Pulaski County Desegregation Case Settlement Agreement, Attachment B, p. 2. The settlement agreement also requires that this case be dismissed with respect to PCSSD and NLRSD. Settlement Agreement, Attachment C, p. 2 and Attachment D, p. 2. The settlement agreement contains the following 3 . "Agreement Regarding Litigation Among Joshua And The Districts"
"Joshua releases the Districts of all liability for issues which have been raised, or could have been raised, in this Litigation and commits that there will be no further litigation among or between Joshua, Knight and any of the districts, other than proceedings to enforce the terms of this settlement or the terms of the Plans." Settlement Agreement, p. 19. 4. LRSD, PCSSD and NLRSD were entitled to an order of dismissal upon this court's approval of the settlement agreement on January 18, 1991. A review of the docket shows that the required order has not been entered. According to the terms of the settlement agreement, the district court should enter an order of dismissal with respect to LRSD, PCSSD and NLRSD effective January 18, 1991. 5. The requested order of dismissal would not affect this court's jurisdiction "to address issues regarding the implementation of the plans" or to conduct "proceedings to enforce the terms of [the] settlement or the terms of the Plans." WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above and in the accompanying brief. the Little Rock School District moves in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement for an order 2dismissing this case with prejudice with respect to LRSD, PCSSD and NLRSD as of January 18, 1991, except to the extent the court retains jurisdiction to address issues regarding implementation of the plans and to conduct proceedings to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement or the desegregation plans. Respectfully submitted. LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT FRIDAY, ELDREDGE & CLARK 2000 First Commercial Bldg. 400 West Capitol Street Little Rock, AR 72201 (501) 376-2011 Christopher Heller Robert Shafer John C. Fendley By: Christopher Helle, Bar No. 81083 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion for Order of Dismissal has been served on the following by depositing copy of same in the United States mail on this 30th day of November, 1995. Mr. John Walker JOHN WALKER, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72206 Mr. Sam Jones WRIGHT, LINDSEY & JENNINGS 2200 Worthen Bank Bldg. 200 West Capitol Little Rock, AR 72201 3Mr. Steve Jones JACK, LYON & JONES, P.A. 3400 Capitol Towers Capitol & Broadway Streets Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Richard Roachell Roachell and Streett First Federal Plaza 401 West Capitol, Suite 504 Little Rock, AR 72201 Ms. Ann Brown HAND DELIVERED Desegregation Monitor Heritage West Bldg., Suite 510 201 East Markham Street Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Timothy G. Gauger Office of the Attorney General 323 Center Street 200 Tower Building Little Rock, AR 72201 .ristopher Heller 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT V. FILED U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT ARKANSAS APR - 9 1996 JAMES W McCORMACK, CLERK By. PLAINTIFOEH. CLERK (f PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL APR 1 2 1996 DEFENDANTS MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL ^Office of Desegregation dsori.'! INTERVENORS KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL INTERVENORS NOTICE OF APPEAL Plaintiff Little Rock School District hereby gives notice of its appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from the March 11, 1996 Order which denies the Little Rock School District's Motion to Dismiss this case with prejudice and refuses to reconsider its previous order concerning a contract between the Little Rock School District and ServiceMaster Management Services. Respectfully submitted. LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT FRIDAY, ELDREDGE & CLARK 2000 First Commercial Bldg. 400 West Capitol Street Little Rock, AR 72201 (501) 376-2011 By(' Christopher Heller Bar No. 81083 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal has been served on the following by depositing copy of same in the United States mail on this 9th day of April, 1996
Mr. John Walker JOHN WALKER, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72206 Mr. Sam Jones WRIGHT, LINDSEY & JENNINGS 2200 Worthen Bank Bldg. 200 West Capitol Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Steve Jones JACK, LYON & JONES, P.A. 3400 Capitol Towers Capitol & Broadway Streets Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Richard Roachell Roachell and Streett First Federal Plaza 401 West Capitol, Suite 504 Little Rock, AR 72201 Ms. Ann Brown HAND DELIVERED Desegregation Monitor Heritage West Bldg., Suite 510 201 East Markham Street Little Rock, AR 72201 Ms. Elizabeth Boyter Arkansas Dept, of Education 4 State Capitol Mall Little Rock, AR 72201-1071 John C. Everett 3822 N. Parkview Drive P.O. Box 1646 Fayetteville, AR 72702 Joseph S. Mowery 111 Center Little Rock, AR 72201 Christopher 2 Filed U 3, OlSTtsiCT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT ARKANSAS MAR 1 I 1996 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION JAMES By
3 W McCjORMACK, C U-xJAWa OEP CCLLIERK LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT PLAINTIFF No. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1, ET AL DEFENDANTS MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL INTERVENORS KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL INTERVENORS SERVICEMASTER MANAGEMENT SERVICES A Limited Partnership INTERVENORS MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Before the Court are a number of motions (listed in the order filed) which the Court now addresses: (1) motion of the Pulaski County Special School District ("PCSSD") to withdraw supervision from three discrete areas of the PCSSD plan [doc.#2481]
(2) motion of the Little Rock School District ("LRSD") for partial unitary status [doc.#2483 ]
(3) motion of the Joshua Intervenors ("Joshua") to enjoin the LRSD from entering into a service contract without following bidding procedures, requests for infoirmation and without prior involvement of Joshua [doc.#2506]
(4) motion of PCSSD to clarify the PCSSD desegregation plan [doc.#2520]
(5) motion of Joshua for the Court to set forth in detail the continuing vs. Ctev I 3 obligations of the LRSD under the desegregation plan with respect to faculty and staff desegregation [doc.#2544]
(6) motion of PCSSD for an Order regarding portable buildings [doc.#2546]
(7) motion of LRSD for an Order dismissing this case without prejudice with respect to LRSD, PCSSD, and the North Little Rock School District ("NLRSD") [doc.#2573]
(8) motion of Joshua for reconsideration of 2 6 4 the Court's Order of December 11, 1995, and for completion of the hearing [doc.#2594]
and (9) motion of PCSSD regarding the replacement of portable buildings with permanent construction. dated October 25, 1995 [doc.#2612]. I. The Court first addresses PCSSD's motion to withdraw supervision from three discrete areas of the PCSSD plan [doc.#2481] and LRSD's motion for partial unitary status [doc.#2483]. The PCSSD states that it has substantially complied with plan provisions regarding library media services, staff development and counseling services, while the LRSD states that it has substantially complied with LRSD plan provisions regarding Home Instructional Program for Preschool Youngsters ("HIPPY"), Rockefeller Early Childhood Program, Parkview Science Magnet Program, and Job Training Partnership Act/Summer Learning Program ("JTPA"). Both the PCSSD and the LRSD argue that the Court should withdraw supervision from these areas of the respective plans. The PCSSD's and LRSD's motions were both filed on August 23, 1995. On February 9, 1996, the parties entered into a Stipulation whereby it was agreed that the PCSSD, LRSD, and NLRSD should be released from court supervision and monitoring in certain discrete areas of the desegregation plans. The parties further stated that they are in the process of assessing what additional areas of the desegregation plans are ripe for release from Court supervision and monitoring and to identify what areas of the desegregation plans -2-remain deficient in terms of compliance. The additional hearings that were scheduled to address the motions to withdraw were cancelled at the parties' request as a result of the Stipulation. In light of the Stipulation and subsequent cancellation of the hearings, the Court finds that both the PCSSD's motion to withdraw [doc.#2481] and the LRSD's motion for partial unitary status [doc.#2483] have both been superseded by the Stipulation. Accordingly, these motions are denied as moot. II. On August 31, 1995, Joshua filed a motion to enjoin the LRSD from entering into a service contract without following bidding procedures, requests for information and without prior involvement of the Joshua Intervenors [doc.#2506]. In its motion Joshua argues that (1) the LRSD had not discussed the proposed management services contract with the Joshua Intervenors, (2) the proposed management contract has potential adverse racial effect and impact, (3) the proposed management contract has not been let for bids and is not a part of the program. research and evaluation instrument for the next five years, (4) the proposed management contract has potential adverse monetary effects upon financial resources of the district and has the potential for adversely affecting the ability of the school district to meet its a desegregation obligations, and (5) the proposed management contract was not negotiated at arms' length and was designed to provide special favor to some unknown person in the school district. -3-The Court held a hearing on Joshua's motion on Saturday, October 28, 1995, and again on Friday, December 8, 1995. At the hearing on December 8th, counsel for Joshua tendered into evidence a document entitled "Settlement," which Joshua maintains constitutes a settlement offer by LRSD that was accepted by Joshua with respect to the ServiceMaster contract. Joshua claims that this constitutes an offer by LRSD to settle the matter with Joshua by having the Court enter an Order enjoining the LRSD from entering into the ServiceMaster agreement and terminating the district's liability pursuant to Paragraph 14.12 of the contract. The LRSD, however, contends that this document was not intended as an offer to settle, in that it is stamped "Draft" and is not signed by any party or the attorney for any party. On December 11, 1995, this Court issued an Order in which it ruled as follows: This Court declines to rule on whether this 'settlement' constitutes a binding agreement on the district or on whether the board of directors delegated Mr. Malone the authority to enter into it with Joshua. The Court finds that even if Mr. Malone had the authority and even if it was an offer to settle which Joshua accepted, settlement. public This policy 'settlement' prohibits this type of purports to create a situation in which this Court, by agreement of Joshua and LRSD, would by court order declare the agreement to be non-binding on the part of LRSD and would relieve LRSD of any liability. Indeed, Paragraph 14.12 of the ServiceMaster contract provides an "escape clause" for LRSD should this Court terminate or ServiceMaster agreement. modify the It provides that LRSD shall have no obligation to appeal decisions affecting the contract. Therefore, it implies that LRSD will in good faith abide by the terms of the contract and will not contract with Joshua or anyone else to procure a court order allowing it to escape liability. It would not be consistent with public policy to permit one party to a -4-contract to escape its obligations unilaterally without a similar provision for the other contracting party. This Court finds that ServiceMaster and LRSD did not intend that this clause would permit Little Rock to escape liability without a ruling on the merits. Therefore, the Court holds that this purported settlement cannot be enforced against ServiceMaster. Order, at 5-6 [doc.#2586]. On December 22, 1995, Joshua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's Order of December 11, 1995, and for completion of the hearing [doc.#2594]. Joshua states they have not completed their presentation in support of their initial motion to enjoin the LRSD from entering into a service contract, and they argue the Court has not ruled on the substantive grounds which it has set forth in its motion. The Court has considered the matter and remains convinced that its interpretation of the contract was correct and that it would not be consistent with public policy to permit one party to a contract to escape its obligations unilaterally without a similar provision for the other contracting party. See Order, at 6. Joshua cites Union Nat. Bank v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 860 F.2d 847 (8th Cir. 1988), in support of its motion. The Court finds Joshua's reliance on Union Nat. Bank to be misplaced, however. as that case involved a termination clause between the parties to the contract, see id. 860 F.2d at 849, while the case at Bar involves a purported settlement between a contracting party and a third party allowing the contracting party to escape its obligations unilaterally without a similar provision for the non-settling -5-party. Union Nat. Bank is thus distinguishable and provides no support for Joshua's motion for reconsideration. In any case, even if Joshua is correct that such a unilateral escape from contractual obligations would be permissible under Arkansas law, the parties in this case intended that the contract would be performed in good faith unless this Court issued an Order allowing the LRSD to escape liability pursuant to 5 14,12 of the contract. The Court has not and will not at this time issue such an Order allowing the LRSD to escape liability under the contract. Accordingly, the Court denies that portion of Joshua's motion which asks for reconsideration of the Court's December 11, 1995, Order. With respect to that portion of Joshua's motion which asks for completion of the hearing, the Court finds that this aspect of the motion should be and hereby is denied as moot. The Court notes that the December Sth hearing was not completed because Joshua specifically requested that the matter be continued so that it could file an interlocutory appeal of the Court's Order. Tr. at 92, 97. Indeed, Joshua stated that such an appeal would "resolve a lot of matters. II Tr. at 90. It was only after Joshua concluded that the Order was not appealable that Joshua now asks that the hearing be completed. However, because the Court's docket is full. the Court is unable to schedule the matter for a hearing in the immediate future. Accordingly, for administrative purposes. and because the Court in any case denies Joshua's motion for reconsideration, the Court concludes that Joshua's motion to enjoin the LRSD from entering into a service contract without following -6-bidding procedures, requests for information and without prior involvement of the Joshua Intervenors [doc.#2506] should be and hereby is denied without prejudice. Joshua may refile the motion to the extent they wish to pursue the matter after reviewing today's order. Should Joshua refile the motion, the Court will schedule the matter for a hearing. III. On September 14, 1995, the PCSSD filed a motion to clarify the PCSSD desegregation plan [doc.#2520]. PCSSD seeks to clarify those parts of the plan and programs that are or were calculated to further desegregate the southeast sector schools within the PCSSD, i.e., the Talented and Gifted Program within the southeast sector. the Fine Arts Program at Landmark, the Specialty Program at Bates Elementary, and Harris Elementary. The Court has considered the motion and finds that it should be and hereby is denied without prejudice. Joshua has not filed a response to the motion even though they would appear to be significantly affected by the matters contained therein. In any case, the status of this motion is questionable given the subsequent motions of PCSSD regarding potential school closings and new construction that would affect the schools in the southeast sector and elsewhere. Should PCSSD refile this motion, Joshua is expected to file a timely response stating their position on the matter. -7-IV. The LRSD moves for an Order dismissing this case without prejudice with respect to the LRSD, PCSSD, and NLRSD as of January 18, 1991, except to the extent the Court retains jurisdiction to address issues regarding implementation of the plans and to conduct proceedings to enforce the terms of the settlement or the terms of the plans [doc.#2573]. The Court finds that the motion for an order of dismissal should be and hereby is denied. Let there be no mistake that, with the entry of the settlement agreement, the claims involved in this ongoing litigation were dismissed. at least as a technical matter. The Court finds. however, that no useful purpose would be served by entering an order of dismissal at this time. The Court of Appeals has instructed this Court "to monitor closely the compliance of the parties with the settlement plans and the settlement agreement, to take whatever action is appropriate, in its discretion, to ensure compliance with the plans and the agreement. and otherwise to proceed as the law and the facts require." Little Rock School List. V. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371, 1394 (Sth Cir. 1990) . The LRSD has frequently exhibited indifference or outright recalcitrance towards its commitments and has been slow to implement many aspects of its agreements (although some improvements have been made) . Therefore, the Court finds that an order of dismissal should be deferred in order to ensure compliance with the plans and the agreement. Even had the LRSD acted in good faith throughout the years. the logistics and -8-complexity of this case are such that this Court's monitoring function would be impaired by entering this time. an order of dismissal at V. On October 25, 1995, Joshua filed a motion asking the Court to set forth in detail the continuing obligations of the LRSD under the desegregation plan with respect to faculty and staff desegregation [doc.#2544]. Joshua objects to certain staff and faculty assignment practices of the LRSD and contends that the parties have a material disagreement. Joshua seeks an Order which either defines or interprets the obligations of the LRSD with respect to faculty and staff. The Court has considered Joshua's motion and finds that it should be and hereby is denied without prejudice. The obligations of the LRSD regarding faculty and staff are clearly set forth in both the LRSD Plan and the Interdistrict Plan and need not be repeated here. Moreover, the parties have agreed in their Stipulation that they are in the process of assessing what additional areas of the desegregation plans are ripe for release from Court supervision and monitoring and to identify what areas of the desegregation plans remain deficient in terms of compliance. Should the parties be unable to reach agreement regarding faculty and staff desegregation, Joshua may refile its motion. -9-VI. On October 26, 1995, PCSSD filed a motion for an Order regarding portable buildings [doc.#2546]. In its motion, PCSSD asks for permission to begin construction on one permanent classroom at Jacksonville Elementary, four permanent classrooms at Bayou Meto, seven permanent classrooms at Landmark Elementary, and three permanent classrooms at Pine Forest Elementary. On January 29, 1996, PCSSD filed a subsequent motion regarding the replacement of portable buildings with permanent construction dated October 25, 1995 [doc.#2612]. This latter motion supplements and essentially supersedes the previous motion filed on October 26, 1995. In its supplemental motion, PCSSD seeks permission to begin construction on two permanent classrooms at Cato Elementary, two classrooms at Arnold Drive Elementary, four permanent classrooms at Bayou Meto, seven permanent classrooms at Landmark Elementary, and three permanent classrooms at Pine Forest Elementary. The Court has carefully considered the matter and concludes that PCSSD's request is consistent with the district's long-range plans for replacement of portable buildings. The construction will not increase the capacity of the aforementioned schools, with the exception of Pine Forest Elementary.' Accordingly, the motions for an Order regarding portable buildings are hereby granted. 1 On Sqjtembcr 15, 1995, the Court approved a motion granting the PCSSD permission to add a kindergarten class to improve racial balance at Pine Forest Elementary. The district has represented to the Court that one of the permanent classrooms would reflect the additional capacity resulting from the new kindergarten class. -10-VII. In sum, the Court denies as moot PCSSD's motion to withdraw [doc.#2481], denies as moot LRSD's motion for partial unitary status [doc.#2483], denies that portion of Joshua's motion which asks for reconsideration of the Court's December 11, 1995 Order [doc.#2594], denies as moot that portion of Joshua's motion which asks for completion of the hearing [doc.#2594], denies without prejudice Joshua's motion to enjoin the LRSD from entering into a service contract without following bidding procedures, requests for information and without prior involvement of the Joshua Intervenors [doc.#2506], denies without prejudice PCSSD's motion to clarify the PCSSD desegregation plan [doc.#2520], denies LRSD's motion for an Order of dismissal [doc.#2573], denies without prejudice Joshua's motion for an Order setting forth in detail the continuing obligations of the LRSD under the desegregation plan with respect to faculty and staff desegregation [doc.#2544], and grants PCSSD's motions for an Order regarding portable buildings [doc.#'s 2546 & 2612]. IT IS SO ORDERED this // ^^day of March 1996. 'A DGE PHIS DOCUMt.NT ENTERED ON DOCKET SHEET IN COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 58 AND/OR 79(a) FRCP ON BY -11- 1 J IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT. ET AL. PLAINTIFFS V. NO. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. ET AL. DEFENDANTS J ! i LORENE JOSHUA ET AL. INTERVENORS THE JOSHUA INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO THE LRSD'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL 1 The Joshua intervenors oppose the LRSD's motion for an order of dismissal and i i i urge that it be denied. The Little Rock defendants ignore, among other things: the details of the treatment of the issues of continuing jurisdiction and monitoring by the Court of Appeals, when that Court addressed the proposed settlements in 1990
the overall legal context in which the Court of Appeals considered the settlements
the differing terms of the "Pulaski County School Desegregation Case Settlement Agreement" (September 28.1989) with regard to the State and the local districts
and the history of this case since the Court of Appeals decision. I. A. The Legal Context: The Doctrine of Continuing Jurisdiction and the Violations To Be Remedied The legal context relevant in considering the LRSD motion begins with the decision in Brown v. Board of Education. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II). The Court there began 1by reiterating the holding of Brown. However, the focus of Brown II was "the manner in which relief [should]... be accorded" in segregated systems, jd., at 298. The Court recognized that "the transition to a system of public education freed of racial i discrimination" might "require solution of varied local school problems" (id., at 299) arising in many areas of school administration, id., at 300. The Court held that local district 1 courts could best oversee the required remedial efforts (id., at 299), and directed that those courts retain jurisdiction of cases during the transition period. I The Supreme Court returned to the proper role of a district court in the remedial I 1 phase of a school desegregation case in Raney v. Board of Education of the Gould Sch. I i Dist., 391 U.S. 443 (1968), there confronting a case which had been dismissed. The Court I rejected this approach, identifying the need for a Court to focus in the remedial period on whether "a constitutionally permissible plan" "is operated in a constitutionally permissible fashion...." ii, at 449. A district court should retain jurisdiction "until it is clear that disestablishment has been achieved...." The next relevant part of the legal context is the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case in 1985, addressing, in part, this court's order (then Judge Henry Woods) requiring consolidation of the three local districts. See Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District. 778 F. 2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert, denied. 476 U.S. 1186 (1986). The Court of Appeals "[held] that the district court's findings on liability [were] not clearly erroneous and that intra- and interdistrict relief [were] appropriate. [The court found], however that the violations [could] be remedied by less intrusive measures than consolidation." See 778 F.2d at 408. The Court then set forth in detail "principles" to 2govern the required intra- and interdistrict remedies (at 434-36), and "remanded [the case] to the district court for further action consistent with [its] opinion" (at 436). B. The Court of Appeals Decision of 1990 Concerning the Settlement On remand, the parties ultimately developed five agreements in an effort to repond to the Court of Appeals' 1985 decision. In its opinion of December 1990, the Court of Appeals described Judge Woods' treatment of these agreements as follows: 'The District Court rejected both the settlement plans and the settlement agreement, as submitted. It purported to modify them and to order the unwilling parties to put them into effect as modified." Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District. 921 F.2d 1371, 1376 (Sth Cir. 1990). The Court of Appeals rejected this general approach (ii)
however, it is vital, with regard to the current motion, to focus with care on the Court's treatment of the question of continuing jurisdiction and monitoring. The Court of Appeals first discussed the standards governing its review of the parties' settlement. See, for example, id., at 1383-85, 1388-89. On the one hand, it emphasized the importance of the parties' agreement and the public policy in favor of settlements. Id, at 1383,1388. The Court also recognized, however, its responsibility to insure that the agreements were not "unfair to class members...", or ones inconsistent with the "[court's] strong interest in not involving itself, along with the prestige of the law, in an ongoing equitable decree vzhich is either manifestly unworkable or plainly unconstitutional on its face." Id, at 1383. The context for the Court's 1990 decision, then, had multiple facets. It included legal principles regarding the fundamental importance of continuing jurisdiction until violations 3are cured
the need to provide, in this case, remedies for intra- and interdistrict violations of the constitution
the parties' agreements
and the principles regarding review of settlements in class actions, striking a balance between the fact of agreement and important legal standards. The Court's application of these principles produced, we submit, the following holding relevant to the matters raised by the current LRSD motion. The district court must retain jurisdiction of the case with regard to the three local school districts for a considerable time to monitor compliance with the settlement agreements (see, for example. ii, at 1383, 1388)
and the parties have agreed to this continuing jurisdiction and monitoring, if necessary to secure approval of the agreements. I^, at 1386,1390. The following excerpts from the Court of Appeals decision demonstrate that this interpretation is a valid one. 921 F.2dat1376 We now reverse the judgment of the District Court. In general, we direct that Court, on remand, to approve the settlement plans and settlement agreement as submitted by the parties. We also make certain other directions for the future of the case. 921 F. 2d at 1383 This does not mean that a court must automatically approve anything the parties set before it. In the present case, for example, any remedy will necessarily reguire some judicial supervision -monitoring, at least - for a long time. A court has a strong interest in not involving itself, along with the prestige of the law, in an ongoing equitable decree which is either manifestly unworkable or plainly unconstitutional on its face. In addition, this is a class action, and courts are not obliged (indeed they are not permitted) to approve settlements that are unfair to class members, or negotiated by inadequate class representatives. 921 F.2d at 1386 4The district Court was concerned about the lack of sufficient detail in the plans to guarantee successful implementation. The answer to this concern lies, we think, in the fact, upon which we place a great deal of weight, that the parties have all agreed to continued monitoring. Indeed, such monitoring by the District Court and its agents is essential. It is important for the settlement plans to be scrupulously adhered to - and here we have in mind especially the kind of programs that the plan contemplates for the incentive schools - and it will be the job of the district Court to see that this monitoring is done effectively, and that appropriate action is taken if the parties do not live up to their commitments. 921 F.2d at 1388 As indicated above, this does not mean that the parties will be free of supervision or monitoring. Quite the contrary: a necessary condition of our holding that the plans are not facially unconstitutional is that the parties'compliance with them will be carefully monitored. As we shall make clear at the conclusion of the opinion, when we set out the directions to be followed by the District Court on remand, the office previously known as the Office of the Metropolitan Supervisor will be reconstituted as the Office of Desegregation Monitoring, to be headed by a Monitor appointed by the District Court, with such additional personnel as the District Court shall deem appropriate. 921 F.2d at1390 ....We accept these undertakings [of the districts], again with the reminder that that compliance with them will be closely monitored. If the District Court becomes convinced in the future that money is being wasted, and that desegregation obligations contained in the settlement plans are being flouted, it will be fully authorized to take appropriate remedial action. As the parties agree, the settlement agreement implicitly authorizes the District Court to retain jurisdiction to oversee its implementation. See 14 App. 3466. The approach which we urge is also consistent with the Court of Appeals' summary of its rulings appearing at 921 F.2d 1394. The Court wrote in paragraph (8.): The District Court is instructed to monitor closely the compliance of the parties with the settlement plans and the settlement agreement, to take whatever action is appropriate, in its discretion, to ensure compliance with the plans and the agreement, and otherwise to proceed as the law and the facts require. The Court added, in addressing the issue of a transition to the standards of the 5settlements, that if the parties could not resolve the matter by agreement, "the district Court [was] authorized to take such action as may be just" (at 1394, para, 9). To be sure, the Court also wrote: "On remand, the District Court is directed to approve the parties' settlement agreement as written by them." li, at para. 6. However, as the excerpts of the opinion quoted above demonstrate, the Court of Appeals interpreted the "settlement agreement" to reflect the parties' agreement to continuing jurisdiction over the local districts and monitoring of the agreements. After all, each release relating to the three districts contained this sentence: 'This dismissal is final for all purposes except that the Court may retain jurisdiction to address issues regarding the implementation of the plans." E.g., "Settlement Agreement," Attachment B., at 2. The quoted language from the release also puts to rest the LRSD's reliance on the dismissal of the State in this court's order of January 18,1991. See Motion, at para. 1. The quoted sentence is absent from the release regarding the State. See "Settlement Agreement", at Attachment A, p. 2. C. The Court of Appeals Decision Regarding the Modification of the Settlement The opinion of the Court of Appeals in 1991 addressing the standards to be employed by this court in considering proposed modifications to the settlements also warrants brief reference. In describing the manner in which this court should proceed on remand, the Court plainly paraphrased the standard set forth in Brown II, to which we have alluded above. See Appeal of Little Rock School District, 949 F.2d 253, 257 (Sth Cir. 1991). The Court added: "We ask the District Court, to the extent practicable, to give this 6matter priority on its docket." at 258/ D. The History of the Case Since the 1990 Decision The Court of Appeals' reference to this court's docket provides an apt starting point for our final argument. We recently had occasion in the Joshua intervenors' application for a fee award to cite the official case docket - totalling 128 pages for the period from December 11,1989 to September 15,1995 - as evidence of the mammouth effort which has been undertaken by Joshua representatives, during the monitoring period following the Court of Appeals decision at the end of 1990. Roughly 10 days after the filing of our fee petition, and almost 5 years after the proposed dismissal date, LRSD filed the current motion - seeking an order under which the case would be treated as if dismissed for some purposes 5 years ago. We have to wonder if the timing of the motion relates to the Joshua fee petition in some way
and we can only wonder because the defendants do not inform the parties or the court, by use of examples or otherwise, what would be accomplished by the motion, and what, if any, difference it would make. The court should not lend its power to the requested form of belated wand waving. Conciusion The motion should be denied. Neither the formulation which appears in the motion. at pages 2-3, nor the one in the memorandum, at page 1, is consistent with the language employed by the Court of Appeals in 1990 in reviewing the proposed settlement. The LRSD's argument based upon the opinion of the Court of Appeals concerning the milages does not justify the relief sought here. The 1990 opinion of the Court of Appeals did not address the matter of millages in a manner analogous to the matter of continuing Jurisdiction. 7moving papers are otherwise inadequate at this late date, given the insufficient explanation offered for the proposal. I Respectfully submitted, I JOHN W. WALKER, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, Arkansas 72206 (50U 374-3758 By
^n W. Walker, Bar No. 64046 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing pleading has been served upon all counsel of record, by placing a copy of the same in the United States Mail with sufficient postage prepaid, on this 18th day of December, 1995. /ohr?W. Walker 7 L 8 Arkansas Democnit ^(Jiazctte 22, 19QS-? Lawyer in case tells s judge not to toss desegregation suit mt XXA-^ BY CYNTHIA HOWELL Ownocrat-Gazette Education Writer r 3 attorney for tlie? District, ask^^" Wnght Nov. 30 to end toe high-prbr. tile school case but to continue TXT ^sicsauou lawsuii, accnrrting (o at- Hicw Ibe thrM Pulaski CounlY" toey Joto Walken irto black families m toe case. a u ' All three distncts are entitled-fo
'" :miceol ___ .. A federal judge should deny toe toiUe Rock School Districts request to dismiss its 13-year-old school desegregation lawsuit accordi^ to at- uidcx lamuies In a motion submitted to US ''Jabber WnghL Walker said toe districts request for dismissal includes little explanation or justificatioa He ----- said toe district failed to inform toe--------------------------------dismissal ot". court by toe use of examples what hrjfZ overdue,
would be accomplished if the dis- dismissal from toe case as toe language included in toe' 1989 financial settlement of ther case, Heller said at toe time he sub-^ der is at least four years overdue he said. T' lissal is granted. Heller called his request to tii&. judge both a housekeeping mea-' sure and a symbolic gesture to remind people that toe settlement agreement was supposed to end to^ Walker questioned toe motives of toe district He noted that toe motion for dismissal was filed 10 days after he filed a request for i* -i V -rr~vii/tuuuw~ S8O5.00O in legal fees from the three although toe districts had-'to,' ^^001 districts in- ---------------------- volved in the desegregation ! llQim J _: f 11 ,,,, , ------oJ case. We have to wonder if the timing of toe motion relates to toe Joshua meet specific desegregation obliga^ The Little Rock School Distri^ ^ , -------------xyiouiui -_________ accused Walker in rece<^- some way, said bying to impose new Walker, who represents toe Joshua P^'^bons on toe district spedf-. ically in regard to the assignment^r nla/*lr J_V . intervenors, the class of black chU- dren and their parents in the de- , . ----------- segregation case, and we can only bergarten throu^ three, wonder because toe defendants do ~~~~~~------------ not inform toe parties or toe court by use ot examples or otherwise what would be accomplished by toe rnotiom and what if any difference it would make. The court should not lend its power to toe requested form of belated wand-waving, '* Walker quotes toe Sth U.S. Circuit Com of Appeals at St Louis rei^atedly on Wrights ongoing role in the case as a monitor to ensure that toe distact implements and complies with its desegregation plan. black teachers to jobs in grades' killQCPPSrtPn Mimii/rk 'A^iPublic school patrons should insist parties negotiate issues in good faith I 8Y KRISTEN BABER Special to the A/kansas Democrat-Gazette am the concerned parent of two children in the Little Rock Public Schools. Our school board and the other parties to the desegregation case enter^ into an agreement on a desegregation plan that was approved by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1991. To some extent we are inextricably bound by that agreement, except where, if changed circumstances justify it, the parties may compromise on modifications to the agreement I have been attending meetings between the parties to the desegregation case. These meetings are held in an attempt to agree on necessary modifications to the dese^egation plan, with minimal court involvement. I began to attend the meetings so I could understand the issues because I believe in public schools. I want to support them and I believe it is vital for our school district to get out from under court supervision. I believe in public schools because, more than any other public institution, they form the core of our communities. Our children receive benefits from attending school with a diverse population and everyone benefits from providing a good education to all. Court supervision is detrimental to the district in two ways: Too much money that should be spent on children is being spent on lasers, court costs and the office of desegregation monitorins and being in court means continued instability. Ail school patrons should attend these meetings and encourage the parties to negotiate in good faith and to get us out of court . The following comments are made to parties in the case. Linda Pondexter, president of the Little Rock School Board: The meetings between parties have the potential for successful changes in the plan, but the meetings need a neutral chairperson. At the last meeting, Chris Heller, a lawyer representing the school district and John Walker, attorney for the Joshua Intervenors, appeared poised to agree on some issues. However, you were so convinced that Heller and the administration had conspired against you with the suggestion for a changed format for the meetings, you were a hindrance rather than an aid to negotiations. I realized then that we need a neutral chairperson
one who is flexible enough to hear suggestions without feeling threatened. John Walker I support you in many ways. I want the Little Rock Schools to be integrated
I want my children to go to school with children of all colors and backgrounds and I want the same for black children. I am afraid that your efforts are going to result in the opposite effect Private schools are gaining more students as this case drags on. Integration alone will cause some Commentary white flight, but your resistance to strong discipline in the schools and your unwillingness to compromise will cause the public schools to lose people who can afford private schools even though, ideally, they would choose an integrated school. You say that it is racial discrimination when the police are called when black children scuffle just as we all scuffled when we were youngsters. We all know that there are more fights now. more violence and certainly more guns and knives found on school property. I dont want children who have nowhere to go to be suspended. but I also dont want children who are chronically antisocial or are violent to be in the classroom with mine. When our schools are not perceived to be safe and well-disciplined, families who can afford private school will leave. The result is that the school system will become one of poor, disadvantaged students. You say that I and other white parents come to the meeting to seek special favors for our children. I doubt if Ill ever convince you otherwise. The only special favor I want for my children is for you to re-examine the perspective from which you view the involvement of white parents and children. Looking at the issues as white versus black will only aggravate, not heal, our wounds. We all need you to help effect a compromise that will allow a stable, s^e, disciplined and integrated school system. --------- .position for those who do not When you are being an advocate for black chil- c L, !**?- dren, remember that you do not stand alone. It {grated schools? That goal will not be reached by is the largely white PTA members at my chil- drens area school who take children on field trips, provide tutoring and pay for an art teacher. Many of those resources would disappear if Little Rock were to become a one-race school system. I agree with you that it is unfair that so few black children are in the gifted classes in elementap^ schools. All children deserve those opportunities, but the court cases drain on school finances makes it that much harder to provide such opportunities to all children, Mr. Walker, please realize that I am not your enemy and neither are the majority of the white parents that I know. If you want to fight, attack the dragons that lead to more white flight Ann Brown, desegregation monitor You have stated that factors that will draw white children to the district are on-time bus schedules and good curriculum. I have told you that I believe white parents want cooperation between the school board and the superintendent good curriculum and to be out of court You responded, I could not disagree more. You told me that you do not believe parents care about being in court When I recount that to parents, they laugh. Parents do care about on-time bus schedules, but more importantly they want good curriculum tau^t in a safe and stable environment where their tax dollars are spent on the students and not on lawyers fees nor your salary. The public perception is that there are too many in control of this case who are gaining financially from the ongoing litigation, What your comments reveal to me is that being out from under court supervision is not your primary goal. Does the district court realize that? Dr. Henry Williams and Dr. Russ Mayo: The district needs to act in good faith, also. At the last meeting Pondexter repeatedly asked whether the district could provide a list of what parts of the desegregation plan had been complied with and what was left to do. Your response was always. Our employees are conducting interviews with a view to the hearing. That is no answer at all. I was surprised to learn that neither the school district nor the desegregation monitor knows which parts of the plan have been complied with. Does the district court realize that? What are the monitors monitoring? AH members of the Little Rock School Board: None of the parents I know wants to change superintendents again. If Heniy Williams is so bad, convince us with facts. But realize this: the parents want a satisfactory compromise in the desegregation case. We^will rally support for those a members of the schck)l board who help find way to get us out of court and we will rally op- Joshua intervenors: Is your goal safe, inte- I ArkansaTDemo^ C^azctk ] . SUNDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1995 this protracted court case and uncompromising positions that erode safety and discipline in the schools. Those factors are driving afHuent
par- ents from the district sj
* Black and white parents: Our children-need us to speak up and say we dont want to sperid our tax dollars on lawyers fees and on th'e desegregation monitors salary, especially'when that monitor believes that parents arent concerned about the district remaining in court. What we do want is a school system where children of all colors and backgrounds can learn together. We parents need to remember that-iVis not just up to the court to solve the schools problems: it is also up to the school board we elect and the lawyers we have chosen to represent us. We want our schools to be about good education for all and we want our money spent toward that goal. Walker tells me that the state is constitutionally required to pay for public education and that there is no way the school system could go bankrupt
but he must know that if dire tactics are used, such as putting the district in receivership or consolidating the districts, affluent parents will leave in larger numbers than before. Walker also tells me that if I really want to help black youngsters I need to speak out fbr their rights in the community. This is mjc first step. Unless we agree on some modifications-and get out of court, this will be a one-race school < system and the children will be as segregated as ! when this suit was first filed. I Kristen Baber is a lawyer who Hoes in LiOle Rock.r-y TUESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1997 A I , L.I I I W| I Cooyr^t O Little Rock Newsoaoers. Inc. j Arkansas Demcxn'at'i^(i^azettc I LR schools win a^eOof (iismissal"tan suit Although vre can well under- Pulaski County districts and the stand the frustration the district state from the case. The state was BY CYNTHIA HOWELL settlement agreement among the will bring more into focus the fact underetanding ^at compliance ARKAiNSAs DEMocRAT-GAZETm three Pulaslti County districts and that a settlement apeement was monitoring would contmu . . The Little Rock School Distact the state that provided for the dis- reached to end the litigation, smd Wri^had denied the Little court has experienced over the dismi^d several ye^ ago, but The Uttle Rock School District the state mat provmeu lor uie u- 7,: Rod: totricts request for an or- years in carrying out our instate- the districts were not Ody the Litis entitled to be dismissed tom its missal. , .. Hr nf di.^missai sadng that the tion, we conclude that the districts tie Rock distact raised the issue in .................... ''^T^eoking for the day' haTbel r^akiSLt in motion should have been grant- 1995, but all three are expected to when all federal jurisdiction ends implementing its desegregation ed. - . der of dismissal, saying that the tion, we conclude that the districts ------------------ - 1 motion should have been grant- looj, uuu on implementing us aesegregauuu cd, wrote U.S. Circuit Judge benefit tom the latest co^ order. plan. Ordering ffie dismissal could Roger Wollman of Sioux Falls, 15-year-old desegregation lawsuit --------------- ionU^ng^m appeak'rourt pan- matter and a symbolic reminder when dism^rould Roger"Wollman'of" Si^ Fails, "But Woihnan also warned that 81 ruled Monday. that the 1989 settlement agree- and contro of the djstact retunm pl^Orde^me msmissai coma ger all three districts must continue to A three-judge panel of the Sth ment ended litigation on desegre- usSpurpLe the judge As we held in our 1992 deci- implement desegregation plans 0.8. Circuit Court ofAppeals at St gation issues, leaving the courts to This is a small step m that direc- seivenou purp , j u8 terms of the settlement under Wright's supervision. Louis reversed a 1996 order by monitor and orfy thed^ tiom saim agreement became the law of the As the agreement specifically U-S.pistoct Judge Susan Webber tacts compliance with its desegre- moS the diSs desegrega- cSe, Wollman said. , SdMeXu^sl^^'or'^^^^ aSasSSs* gsaasassa the case despite language in a 1989 of what we do everyday, except it the desegregation lawsuit with the Court_______________________ The settlement agreement provided for the dismissal of all three See DESEGREGATION, Page SB Desegregation Continued from Page 1B to comply with our instruction), to retain jurisdiction to address issues regarding the implementation of Sie desegregation plans, he wrote. 7 He said the entry of a dismissal order will do nothing to relieve any of the three Pulaski County districts of their continuing desegregation obligations as listed in their plans. Any post-dismissal stance by the districts to the contrary, it i should be made clear, would subject them to appropriate sanctions and the granting of remedial relief to those adversely affected by the districts' refusal to honor their desegregation commitments. Wollman wrote the order on behalf of a panel that also included Chief Circuit Judge Richard S. Arnold of Little Rock and Circuit Judge Gerdld Heaney of Duluth, Minn. Attorneys made oral arguments in the case Feb. 25 in Little Rock.
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