District court, motion to extend time, plaintiff's response to Joshua's comments on plaintiff's proposed findings, motion for new trial or, motion for relief, Joshua intervenors' motion for reconsideration, and Arkansas Department of Education (ADE) project management tool.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<items type="array"> <item>

<dcterms_description type="array">

<dcterms_description>District Court, motion to extend time; District Court, order; District Court, plaintiff's response to Joshua's comments on plaintiff's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; District Court, two orders; District Court, motion for new trial or, in the alternative, motion for relief from judgment of order; District Court, Joshua intervenors' motion for reconsideration; District Court, notice of filing, Arkansas Department of Education (ADE) project management tool This transcript was create using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and may contain some errors. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT V. NO.4:82CV00866 WRW PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL MOTION TO EXTEND TIME For its Motion, Plaintiff Little Rock School District ("LRSD") states: RECEIVED SEP - 4 2002 OFACEOF DESEGREGATION MONITORING PLAINTIFF DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS INTERVENORS 1. LRSD requests an additional forty-eight hours within which to respond to the Joshua Interventor's "Comments of the Joshua Intervenors on the LRSD's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" which was filed on August 29, 2002, but which LRSD received by mail on August 30, 2002. 2. LRSD requests additional time because of the number of issues raised by Joshua including new issues which could have been included in Joshua's August 19, 2002 submission. Without objection, the Joshua Intervenors previously received an extension of time of three days to file their "Comments." 3. Counsel for the Joshua Intervenors has stated that he does not object to the extension of time requested by the LRSD. WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, LRSD requests a forty-eight hour extension of the time within which they must file their response to Joshua's "Comments of the Joshua Intervenors on the LRSD's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" to and including September 5 at 5:00 p.m. Respectfully Submitted, LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT FRIDAY, ELDREDGE &amp; CLARK Christopher Heller (#81083) John C. Fendley, Jr. (#92182) 2000 Regions Center 400 West Capitol Little Rock, AR 72201-3493 (501) 376-2011 B~~ ~----- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been served on the following people by depositing a copy of same in the United States mail on September 3, 2002. Mr. John W. Walker Via Fax &amp; mail JOHN W. WALKER, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Sam Jones Wright, Lindsey &amp; Jennings 2200 Nations Bank Bldg. 200 West Capitol Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Steve Jones JACK, LYON &amp; JONES, P.A. 425 W. Capitol, Suite 3400 Little Rock, AR 72201-3472 2 Mr. Richard Roachell Roachell Law Firm 11800 Pleasant Ridge Road, Suite 146 P. 0. Box 17388 Little Rock, AR 72222 Ms. Ann Marshall Desegregation Monitor 1 Union National Plaza 124 W. Capitol, Suite 1895 Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Dennis R. Hansen Office of the Attorney General 323 Center Street 200 Tower Building Little Rock, AR 72201 BChristopherHe~li IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT~t,{4,:,... EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS Dts-,.4g; c!;;t, WESTERNDIVISION J,q S["p ~~ SY.. Mf:s ~ 4f. 0 3 2002 LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT lr,t,_.f~TIFF I:.._&gt;/ZlE:frl( V. NO.4:82CV00866 WRW PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL 1- j,r,--;_ () z_ MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL lJ (LV} ~/) KA THERINE KNIGHT, ET AL ~ ;/.;~;fr~ Ur c MOTION TO EXTEND Til\.1E For its Motion, Plaintiff Little Rock School District ("LRSD") states: Df2p C1_E:f?,r DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS INTERVENORS 1. LRSD requests an additional forty-eight hours within which to respond to the Joshua Interventor's "Comments of the Joshua Intervenors on the LRSD's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" which was filed on August 29, 2002, but which LRSD received by mail on August 30, 2002. 2. LRSD requests additional time because of the number of issues raised by Joshua including new issues which could have been included in Joshua's August 19, 2002 submission. Without objection, the Joshua Intervenors previously received an extension of time of three days to file their "Comments." 3. Counsel for the Joshua Intervenors has stated that he does not object to the extension of time requested by the LRSD. WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, LRSD requests a forty-eight hour extension of the time within which they must file their response to Joshua's "Comments of the Joshua Intervenors on the LRSD's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" to and including September 5 at 5:00 p.m. ,HIS DOCUMENT ENTERED ON DOCKET SHEET IN COMPLIANCE WITH RU.LE 58 Ai\JD/OR 79(a) FRC ON G O '2.- 6 7 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT V. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL I. PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO JOSHUA'S COMMENTS ON PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Good Faith and Monell. RECEIVED SEP - 6 2002 OFACEOF DESEGREGATION MONITORING PLAINTIFF DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS INTERVENORS In assessing good faith, the LRSD believes that the Court should distinguish between the conduct of the LRSD Board of Directors (the "Board") and the conduct of individual employees, and the LRSD cited the Court to the Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S . 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), which recognized this distinction for the purpose of establishing municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Joshua argues that it is not appropriate to make this distinction because "implementation falls to the day-to-day employees .. . . " Joshua's Comments, p. 2. Joshua's argument is unpersuasive because the Revised Plan was an agreement between the Board and Joshua, and the issue is whether the Board substantially complied with the agreement. See Revised Plan 11. Revised Plan 2 contained the LRSD's core obligations. The statement of each specific obligation begins, "The LRSD shall implement programs, policies and/or procedures designed to ensure .. .. " See Revised Plan, 2. The Board decided the programs, policies and procedures to be implemented, and in certain instances by whom. For example, Revised Plan 2.6 provided, "LRSD shall implement programs, policies and/or procedures designed to promote participation and to ensure that there are no barriers to participation by qualified African- Americans in . . . extracurricular activities .. .. " The Board met this obligation by implementing a policy assigning to school principals the responsibility for promoting participation and ensuring that there were no barriers to participation by qualified AfricanAmericans in extracurricular activities. See,~, CX 719, Policy JJIB-Rl (high schools) and R- 2 (middle schools) ("When racial disparities are identified in interscholastic athletic or spirit groups, the principal will work with the school staff to develop a plan for improvement where appropriate."). Thus, the Revised Plan did not "establish[] roles and responsibilities for LRSD representatives other than school board members .. . ," as Joshua contends. Rather, the Board assigned roles and responsibilities to its employees as a part of implementing the Revised Plan. See CX 719. The fact that the "day-to-day" implementation of the Revised Plan fell to the Board's employees does not distinguish Monell. That was the precise question that Monell addressed: when should an governmental entity, like the Board, be held liable under 1983 for the tortuous conduct of its employees. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Similarly, even if the Court finds violations of the Revised Plan,1 the Court must decide whether the Board should be held accountable for those violations. Monell provides the Court a ready framework for making that decision. Monell also cannot be distinguished because it deals with a finding ofliability, rather than implementation of a remedy. See Joshua's Comments, p. 2. The LRSD does not cite Monell for the purpose of establishing the governing legal standard. The common question in Monell and the present case is to what extent should a governmental entity be held accountable for the acts of its employees. Monell provides guidance in answering that question. Finally, to the extent Joshua contends that the Board guaranteed that no employee would commit an act of racial discrimination, the Revised Plan does not support that contention. The 1The LRSD does not concede that Joshua came forward with evidence to establish any violations of the Revised Plan. 2 Board agreed to "in good faith exercise its best efforts to comply with the Constitution, to remedy the effects of past discrimination by LRSD against African-American students, to ensure that no person is discriminated against on the basis ofrace, color or ethnicity in the operation of LRSD and to provide an equal educational opportunity for all students attending LRSD schools." Revised Plan, 2.1. In an organization the size of the LRSD, there will be employees who make bad decisions, some in good faith and maybe some not in good faith. All the Board can do is adopt policies and take reasonable steps to ensure its employees comply with those policies. That is what the Board agreed to do under the Revised Plan, and the evidence clearly established that it lived up to that agreement. II. Castaneda Joshua's reliance on Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1282, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (I 977), is misplaced. 1n that case, the Supreme Court stated, "Because of the many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings ofone definable group will not discriminate against other members of their group." Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1282, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977). The LRSD has not asked the Court to make such a presumption. The evidence before this Court differs materially from the evidence before the Supreme court in Castaneda. That case concerned a challenge to the Texas system for selecting grand juries through the use of grand jury commissioners. The plaintiff used statistical evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination against Mexican-Americans. Id. at 496. This shifted the burden to the State of Texas "to dispel the inference of intentional discrimination. Inexplicably, the State introduced practically no evidence." Id. at 497-98. The Supreme Court noted that the State failed to produce any evidence "about the way in which the commissioners operated and their reasons for [selecting persons for the grand jury lists]." Id. at 500. In the present case, Joshua failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by the LRSD. While Joshua presented evidence showing a small number of African-Ameri'can 3 AP English teachers at Central High School, no evidence was presented of the "degree of underrepresentation." Id. at 494. This required evidence comparing the proportion of AfricanAmerican English teachers who had the training required to teach AP courses2 and who requested to teach AP courses3 with the proportion of African-American AP teachers. Id. Joshua failed to present evidence establishing the proportion of African-American English teachers with the training required to teach AP courses, and no African-American English teacher at Central festified that his or her request to teach AP courses had been denied. Even Dr. Faucette admitted on cross-examination that he had never requested to teach AP, despite his direct testimony that he had been denied the opportunity to do so. See Tr. July 22, 2002, pp. 177 and 215-16. Moreover, even assuming that Joshua had come forward with the necessary proof and that the degree of underrepresentation was sufficient to create an inference of intentional discrimination, see id. at 495-96, the LRSD, unlike the State of Texas, provided a race-neutral explanation for the small number of African-American English AP teachers at Central: the labor agreement with - the District's teachers, which requires consideration of factors such as experience, education and seniority in making teaching assignments. See Tr. July 22, 2002, pp. 90 and 218-19. Finally, this Court need not presume that LRSD's African-American administrators would not engage in racial discrimination because the LRSD presented evidence to they would not. Dr. Lacey testified that the District's secondary principals would not accept or condone racial discrimination within their schools. See Tr. July 24, 2002, p. 803-05 . See also Tr. July 22, 2002, pp. 85-86 (racial discrimination not acceptable at J .A. Fair), pp. 122-123 (racial discrimination not acceptable at Hall); Tr. July 23, 2002, 522 (teachers treat black and white students the same at McClellan). Similarly, Sadie Mitchell testified that principals fulfilled their responsibility to identify and eliminate barriers to African-American participation in extra- 216 2Specialized training is required to teach AP courses. See Tr. July 23, 2002, p. 518. 3Teachers are asked each year to request teaching assignments. See Tr. July 22, 2002, p. 4 curricular activities. See Tr. July 22, 2002, p. 262. More generally, the Court heard evidence of the administration 's commitment to complying with the Revised Plan and to working in the best interest of all students. See, U, Tr. Nov. 19, 2001, pp. 189 and 191 ("We talked a great deal about how to embed the plan in the work of the District, so it became the work of the District, and not something sitting over to the side that was layered on top of what people normally did.") Therefore, this Court has a sufficient evidentiary foundation to conclude that LRSD's AfricanAmerican administrators would not discriminate against African-American students or teachers.4 See Coates v. Johnson &amp; Johnson, 1982 WL 285 *53 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Joshua next purports to provide the Court examples of "objective" violations of the Revised Plan not cured by the fact that the decision maker was African-American. Each of these alleged violations will be discussed in tum. First, Joshua asserts that the Revised Plan obligated the LRSD "to ensure" no racial discrimination in student discipline and this, in tum, obligated the LRSD to investigate the cause - of the racial disparity in student discipline. See Joshua's Comments, p. 3. Joshua then pulls out of context a single sentence from the testimony of Dr. Linda Watson to purportedly establish a violation of these obligations. 1n fact, the Revised Plan did not obligate the LRSD to investigate the racial disparity in student discipline. See LRSD's Proposed Findings, p. 56. The LRSD agreed to "implement programs, policies and/or procedures designed to ensure that there is no racial discrimination with regard to student discipline." Revised Plan 2.5. In this instance, the procedure to be implemented was also agreed to by the parties. The LRSD was to "strictly adhere to the policies set forth in the Student Rights and Responsibilities Handbook to ensure that all students are disciplined in a fair and equitable manner." Revised Plan 2.5 .1. This is 4Joshua makes much of the fact that Central's Principal Rudolph Howard was not called to testify at trial. The LRSD disagrees that Howard's testimony was necessary. The anecdotal evidence concerning Central falls far short of that necessary to establish institutional discrimination. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 806 (1998). Moreover, Joshua's general objections and Judge Wright 's refusal to allow the LRSD to conduct meaningful discovery (See Tr. October 2, 2001 , Docket No. 3503) made it extremely difficult for the LRSD to anticipate Joshua's witnesses before the parties simultaneous submission of their witness lists. 5 what the LRSD did, and it provides context for Dr. Watson's testimony that, "I can't say we were looking at it based on race. We were looking at the number of suspensions. We are trying to offer programs that African-American students, as well as any other students, [ could) participate in." Tr. Nov. 19, 2001 , p. 163.5 The LRSD never agreed to reduce or eliminate the racial disparity in student discipline, and Joshua's attempt to read such a requirement into the Revised Plan cannot be reconciled with the plain language of the agreement. Second, Joshua asserts that the Revised Plan "promised affirmative action" to increase African-American participation in extracurricular activities. See Joshua's Comments, p. 3. If Joshua contends that the Revised Plan required an "affirmative action" program with regard to extracurricular activities, the Revised Plan clearly contained no such requirement. Revised Plan 2.6 required the LRSD "to implement programs, policies and/or procedures designed to promote participation and to ensure that there are no barriers to participation by qualified African-Americans in ... extracurricular activities." The LRSD's obligation to promote - participation cannot reasonably be construed as an obligation to create an affirmative action program. To the extent Joshua means that the LRSD was to actively work to encourage participation and eliminate barriers, the LRSD did this. To establish the alleged violation of this obligation, Joshua argues Sadie Mitchell "had the lead responsibility" for implementation of this obligation, but that her approach was to "wait for complaints." See Joshua's Comments, 3-4. The record does not support Joshua's premise. As discussed above, the Board assigned responsibility for monitoring this obligation to school principals. The LRSD's witnesses all agreed on this point. See,~' Tr. July 22, 2002, p. 136. Joshua concludes that Mitchell had "lead responsibility" because she supervised the Assistant Superintendent for School Services, 5 As Dr. Watson explained, the LRSD attempted to provide programs to help all students in need, not just African-American students. Nothing in the Revised Plan required the LRSD to provide these programs to only African-American students. To exclude non-African-American students because of their race would in fact violate the Revised Plan's requirement that there be "no discrimination with regard to student discipline." See Revised Plan 2.5 . 6 Dr. Lacey, who supervised secondary school principals.6 As to her actual responsibility, Mitchell testified: Q. You are aware. Let's just talk about the reality. You were aware -- you have not heard the testimony. But you are aware, for instance, quiz bowl and debate, Odyssey of the Mind, various activities were all white, were you not? A. Yes. Q. I see. Did you develop a plan for changing that? A. I did not develop a plan. The building principal did. Q. Well, in the three years that the plan was in operation before the report seeking release from unitary status, did you have any occasion to prepare any writing reflecting that was shared with the Joshua Intervenors or the public reflecting what actions you would take to change those patterns? A. I did not, because Joshua did not request a report through the formal compliance complaint. Q. You are not suggesting that you only prepared requests or reports at Joshua's request, are you? A. I only respond to complaints from patrons, community, Joshua, OD Ms, and anybody else, through fonnal complaints. Tr. July 22, 2002, p. 262 (emphasis supplied). Mitchell's testimony was entirely consistent with District policy. Secondary principals were responsible for resolving complaints about extracurricular activities. See, ~ ex 719, Policy JJIB-Rl (high schools) and R-2 (middle schools) ("When racial disparities are identified in interscholastic athletic or spirit groups, the principal will work with the school staff to develop a plan for improvement where appropriate."). The Handbooks provided that students or parents not satisfied with the principal's resolution of their complaint could appeal to the Assistant Superintendent for School Services or the Associate Superintendent for School Services, and then to the Superintendent. See ex 670, p. 3. Nothing about this process violated the Revised Plan. 6Following this reasoning, the Superintendent had "lead responsibility" because he supervised Mitchell. 7 Moreover, the implicit assumption in Joshua's argument is that the Revised Plan required proportional representation of African-Americans in all extracurricular activities. The plain language of the Revised Plan invalidates this assumption. It called for encouraging participation and removing barriers to participation so activities would be open to all interested students. See Revised Plan, 2.6. Nothing required the LRSD to manufacture interest or establish quotas for the sake ofracial balance. Revised Plan 2.12.2 required the LRSD to develop remedies to racial disparities in activities "where appropriate." Thus, the Revised Plan acknowledged that not all racial disparities in activities require a remedy. No remedy would be appropriate, for example, where the racial disparity results solely from individual student choices. In a related argument, Joshua contends that the Revised Plan required the District to investigate the racial disparity in the University Studies Program at Hall High School. This contention ignores the fact that Revised Plan 2.6 applies to "qualified" African-Americans. Joshua presented no evidence as to the proportion of qualified African-Americans at Hall from which it could be determined whether there was a racial disparity. Moreover, it is not true that "there is no claim or evidence of an LRSD study of possible barriers . . . " As quoted above, Mitchell testified that principals had this responsibility, and she believed they fulfilled that responsibility. See Tr. July 22, 2002, p. 262 Next, Joshua contends that the LRSD's use of activity accounts to address financial barriers violated Revised Plan 2.6. See Joshua's Comments, p. 4. The implicit assumption in this argument is that the LRSD agreed to eliminate every barrier to participation. That is not true. The LRSD agreed to "implement programs, policies and/or procedures designed ... to ensure that there are no barriers to participation by qualified African-Americans in . .. extracurricular activities." See Revised Plan 2.6 ( emphasis supplied) and Tr. July 24, 2002, p. 775. Joshua argues that the process developed by the LRSD for addressing financial barriers to participation was inadequate, but there is no factual basis for this argument. There was no 8 evidence that a single student was denied participation in an extracurricular activity due to a financial barrier. Later in its Comments, Joshua argues that a financial barrier caused a reduction in the African-American enrollment in the University Studies Program at Hall. Joshua's Comments, p. 8. While it is a fact that students must pay tuition to UALR to participate in the program, it is pure speculation to conclude that this caused the decline in African-American enrollment in the second year of the program. See Final Report, p. 46. There was no evidence that a single student was denied admission to the program because he or she was unable to pay the tuition. To Dr. Lacey's knowledge, only one student had sought financial assistance to participate in the program, and the District was able to solicit a private donation to pay the tuition for that student. See Tr. July 24, 2002, p. 802. See also Tr. July 22, 2002, p. 268 (Mitchell testified that she had used money from her budget to buy instruments for students in need). Finally, Joshua argues that the way in which Rudolph Howard assigned AP English - teachers at Central showed bad faith in violation of Revised Plan 2. I. As discussed above, the evidence presented by Joshua failed to create an inference of intentional racial discrimination under Castaneda. More importantly, the District implemented policies "designed" to address this potential barrier. Dr. Lesley testified that the District suggested principals involve more teachers in teaching Pre-AP and AP classes, rather than having one teacher teach all of the Pre-AP and AP sections. This would allow greater opportunity for African-American teachers to teach Pre-AP and AP courses. See Tr. July 22, 2002, p. 695 . Jim Mosby, Principal of Southwest Middle School, did as the District suggested and had all of his core subject teachers teach at least one Pre-AP course. See Tr. July 24, 2002, p. 571. The District also participated in the College Board's "Teachers of Color" program. See Tr. July 24, 2002, p. 671. These efforts demonstrate the District's recognition of this potential barrier and implementation of procedures and programs designed to address it. This was all the Revised Plan required. III. Substantial Compliance. 9 The issue before this Court is whether the LRSD "substantially complied" with its Revised Plan obligations. See Revised Plan 11. No evidence was presented as to what the parties meant by "substantial compliance." However, the phrase "substantial compliance" has a recognized meaning in the context of termination of a consent decree and should be interpreted consistent with that meaning. See AMI Civil 4th 3014 (Supp. 2001) ("You should interpret words or phrases associated with a particular trade or occupation as experienced and knowledgeable members of that trade or occupation use them, unless evidence discloses that the parties used them in a different sense."). The LRSD cited Cody v. Hillard, 139 F.3d 1197, 1199-1200 (8 th Cir. 1998) only for the purpose of establishing the recognized meaning of the phrase "substantial compliance" in this context. Cody actually addresses the generally applicable standard for termination of a consent decree. That standard does not apply in the present case because the Revised Plan included a standard for termination. See Revised Plan 11. If the Court decides not to rely on Cody to define substantial compliance, then Cody is irrelevant. Moreover, Joshua misinterprets Cody in arguing that it establishes a three-step inquiry. The court in Cody stated: [T]he district court must exercise its discretion in determining whether those violations were serious enough to constitute substantial noncompliance and to cast doubt on defendants' future compliance with the Constitution. See McDonald [v. Carnahan], 109 F.3d [1319,] 1322-23 [(8 th Cir. 1997)]. Moreover, the ultimate question of whether the defendants are likely to comply with the Constitution in the absence of court supervision is a question of fact, see Dowell, 498 U.S. at 24 7, 111 S.Ct. at 636-37. Id. at 1199-1200. The most logical reading of this paragraph is that violations of a consent decree "constitute substantial noncompliance" only when they "cast doubt on the defendants' future compliance with the Constitution." Under Joshua's interpretation, a district court would be required to continue supervision of a school district based on substantial noncompliance, even though the district court had no concerns about the school district's future compliance with the Constitution. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the district court's "duty to return the operations and control of schools to local authorities" at the earliest practicable date. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992). N. The Agreement. The LRSD agrees that the issue before this Court is whether the LRSD substantially complied with the Revised Plan, and at this time at least, the LRSD does not seek to be declared unitary based on anything other than its substantial compliance with the Revised Plan. The LRSD cited the Court to other unitary status cases to provide context for assessing the LRSD's compliance and the evidence presented by Joshua. As the discussion in Section IT, supra, illustrates, Joshua is trying to rewrite the parties' agreement and impose additional obligations on theLRSD. Revised Plan 2 required implementation of policies "designed to ensure" specific goals. Joshua 's arguments suggest that the LRSD guaranteed achievement of the goals. To avoid these goals being construed as obligations, the LRSD insisted that the following language be added to - the Revised Plan: The identification of specific goals in this Revised Plan is not intended to create an obligation that LRSD shall have fully met the goal by the end of the plan's term. LRSD's failure to obtain any of the goals of this Revised Plan will not be considered a failure to comply with the plan if LRSD followed the strategies described in the plan and the policies, practices and procedures developed in accordance with the plan. Revised Plan, p. 14 n.2. As stated, the Revised Plan only required the LRSD to develop appropriate programs, policies and procedures. The LRSD worked hard to achieve its goals (e.g. Tr. August 1, 2001, pp. 725-26; Tr. Nov. 20, 2001, pp. 188-89, 428), but it made no guarantees. This Court should reject Joshua's attempts to read such guarantees into the parties' agreement. V. Joshua's Failure to Challenge the LRSD's Compliance. Joshua is correct that Revised Plan 11 does not expressly require an issue to be raised pursuant to Revised Plan 8 before it may be the basis for denying the District unitary status. However, an implied term of the LRSD's agreement to pay Joshua in advance for monitoring 11 was that Joshua would bring compliance issues to the Board's attention in a timely manner.7 Current Board President Baker Kurrus testified that the Board agreed to pay Joshua in advance to facilitate "a process whereby you on behalf of your clients were going to step forward and tell us what we were doing wrong." Tr. July 24, 2002, p. 763. Kurrus testified that the Board relied on Joshua to bring compliance issues to the Board's attention so they could be addressed and would not prevent the District from being declared unitary. Tr. July 24, 2002, p. 763. The Board's reliance was reasonable, and thus, principles of estoppel should bar Joshua from complaining about policies of which it was aware but never challenged during the term of the Revised Plan. See Waste Management of Ohio, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 132 F.3d 1142, 1144-45 (61 h Cir. I 997)(recognizing a district court's jurisdiction to consider whether the equitable principle of estoppel has altered a party's obligations and duties under a consent decree). Joshua's failure to raise compliance issues is also relevant in interpreting the Revised Plan. Under traditional contract law principles, a party with knowledge that the other party's - performance violates the parties' agreement must put the breaching party on notice or the nonbreaching party will be held to have waived the breach. See Bharodia v. Pledger, 66 Ark. App. 349, 355, 990 S.W.2d 581 , 585 (l 999)("It has also been held that a party with knowledge of a breach of contract by the other party waives the right to insist on a forfeiture when he allows the other party to continue in performance of the contract."); Stephens v. West Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 7 Ark. App. 275,278,647 S.W.2d 492,493 (1983)("The rule is that a party to a contract who, with knowledge of a breach by the other party, continues to accept benefits under the contract and suffers the other party to continue in performance thereof, waives the right to insist on the breach."). For example, Joshua complains that the LRSD violated Revised Plan 2.7.1 by not preparing a formal program evaluation each year of every program designed to improve AfricanAmerican achievement. However, Joshua knew no later than August 11 , 1999, when ODM 7Counsel for Joshua bad no conflict of interest in making such an agreement. It would have been in the best interest of the class to have violations of the Revised Plan remedied as soon as possible. 12 issued its report on LRSD's implementation plans, that the LRSD did not intend to do so. Joshua's failure to put the LRSD on notice that it considered this a violation constitutes a waiver of this alleged violation. Also under traditional contract principles, Joshua's failure to assert many of the interpretations of the Revised Plan they now advance militates against the Court adopting Joshua's interpretation. The Court should give weight to the parties ' interpretation of the Revised Plan as evidence by their conduct during performance. See AMI Civil 4th 3015 (Supp. 2001) ("You should give weight to the meaning placed on the language by the parties themselves, as shown by their statements, acts, or conduct after the contract was made."). Using the same example as above, Joshua's failure to object to the LRSD's interpretation of Revised Plan 2.7.1 during the plan 's term weighs in favor of the Court adopting the LRSD's interpretation as set forth in ODM's August 11 , 1999 report and the Interim Report. VI. Dr. Terrence Roberts Joshua contends that LRSD's discussion of Dr. Terrence Roberts' testimony ignored his "ultimate views." Joshua 's Comments, p. 9. Joshua points to Dr. Roberts ' testimony wherein he seems to draw a distinction between the LRSD seeking unitary status and compliance with the Revised Plan: The concern was to be released from court supervision. And it seemed to be a matter of whatever it took to achieve that goal, and it didn't really have anything to do with the students or the Plan. Tr. July 24, 2002, p. 629. In fact, the only thing LRSD could do in order to be released from court supervision was to comply with the Revised Plan. Revised Plan, 11 . It would have been impossible for LRSD to pursue unitary status in a way that "didn't really have anything to do with the students or the Plan." Joshua also reminds the Court of Dr. Roberts' testimony that the true beneficiaries of the LRSD's advanced placement curriculum are white students. Joshua 's Comments, p. 10; Tr. July 24, 2002, p. 630. This testimony does not advance Joshua 's case. Although there are presently F\HOME\FENDLEY\LRSD 200l\des-unitary-response-Joshua-coJ1YllC"llts.wpd 13 more white students than black students enrolled in advanced placement courses, LRSD has removed barriers to enrollment in those courses, significantly increased the enrollment of African-American students in advanced placement courses, and put in place a system of Pre-AP courses and other supports designed to insure continued increases in the enrollment of AfricanAmerican students in advanced placement courses. Tr. July 22, 2002, p. 86; Tr. Nov. 20, 2001, pp. 374-75; Tr. July 24, 2002, pp. 668-95 . Joshua misconstrues the LRSD's request for an orderly transition (Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 63) as signaling that the LRSD "plans changes in student assignment policies which would promote segregation of pupils." Joshua's Comments, p. 10. According to Joshua, "this aspect of the LRSD submission clashes with repeated LRSD assertions that the District is committed to a future without legal violations ." In fact, the LRSD's request for a transition period is designed to allow the LRSD to maintain its current policies while the District considers the legality of continuing those policies after it is declared unitary: Compare Gretter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) with Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). If the LRSD were planning to change its student assignment policies, it would not seek court approval of a transition period. VII. Section 2.7-Achievement Although the issue before the court is whether the LRSD implemented "programs, policies and/or procedures designed to improve and remediate the academic achievement of AfricanAmerican students," Joshua argues that conditions which existed before implementation of the Revised Plan and which were drastically changed by the implementation of the Revised Plan 2.7 can somehow be considered as evidence that the LRSD failed to implement the Revised Plan. Joshua's Comments, pp. 14-15. Joshua contends that the achievement disparity between AfricanAmerican and white children exists partly because "the LRSD admittedly taught its AfricanAmerican students, including in the massive Title I Program, in a manner causing harm to their achievement levels." Joshua's Comments, p. 14. Dr. Lesley flatly denied this accusation: F\HOJ\ff\FENDLEY\l.RSD 200 1\des-unitary-response-Joshua-conmcnts.wpd 14 Q. [By Bob Pressman] Do you wish to deny that any part of the difference in the success rates on the two Benchmark Exams was due to black students having been less exposed in the Little Rock Schools to the content of the Benchmark Exams than white students? A. Yes, I will deny that. To the best of my knowledge, it doesn't happen that we differentiate. Tr. August 1, 2001 , p. 697. Dr. Lesley testified that "[t]he instruction for white children and black children is the same in the Little Rock School District, but school is not the only place where children learn." Tr. August 1, 2001, p. 696. The evidence clearly does not show that the academic achievement disparity which existed in LRSD before the implementation of the Revised Plan was the result ofLRSD failing to properly teach African-American students. Tr. August 1, 2001 , pp. 696-97. But the issue before the Court remains whether LRSD substantially complied with the requirements of Revised Plan 2.7. Dr. Lesley testified about the many things the LRSD did during the term of the Revised Plan which v.:ere "designed to improve and remediate the academic achievement of African-American students." Tr. Nov. 19, 2001 , pp. 194-214; Tr. August 1, 2001, pp. 713-26. Regarding the low Benchmark Exam scores for white children and African-American children in the LRSD, Dr. Lesley testified that "those scores are why we changed the curriculum." Tr. August 1, 2001, p. 697. Joshua's argument that the LRSD somehow failed to teach its African-American students is further undercut by the fact that African-American students in the LRSD generally perform better on the Benchmark Exams than African-American students throughout the State and that poverty, rather than race, accounts for the low scores. Tr. Nov. 20, 2001, pp. 420-22; Tr. Nov. 20, 2001, pp. 415-17, 441; CX 731. The evidence in this case also shows that the programs, policies and procedures designed to improve and remediate the academic achievement of African-American students are working. CX 594; Tr. Nov. 20, 2001, pp. 405-10; Tr. August 1, 2001, pp. 724-25. Regarding the tests LRSD uses to assess early literacy, Dr. Lesley testified: F'.\HOME\FENDLEY\LRSD 2001\des-unitary-respomc::-Joshua-corrmcnts wpd 15 On every one of those measures, there are eight tests, on every one of those measures there was a considerable narrowing of the achievement gap between African-American and other students, and the gap was completely closed on two of them and almost on two others, by the end of grade two. Tr. Nov. 20, 2001 , pp. 409-410. The LRSD believes that it will continue to improve the achievement levels of its African-American students. Tr. Nov. 20, 2001 , p. 422 ("[W]e have in place now almost everything we need to do to keep improving."); Tr. Nov. 20, 2001 , p. 428 ("[T]here is a great deal going on that we think will keep the District moving forward and keep improving.") Joshua has provided the Court no reason to believe otherwise. F \HOME\FENDLEY\LRSD 200 I \des-uni1ary-rcsponsc-Joshua-corrmen1s wpd Respectfully Submitted, LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRJCT FRJDA Y, ELDREDGE &amp; CLARK Christopher Heller (#81083) John C. Fendley, Jr. (#92182) 2000 Regions Center 400 West Capitol Little Rock, AR 72201-3493 (501) 376-2011 BY~- 16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been served on the following people by depositing a copy of same in the United States mail on September 5, 2002: Mr. John W. Walker JOHN W. WALKER, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Sam Jones Wright, Lindsey &amp; Jennings 2200 Nations Bank Bldg. 200 West Capitol Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Steve Jones JACK, LYON &amp; JONES, P.A. 425 W. Capitol, Suite 3400 Little Rock, AR 72201 -3472 Mr. Richard Roachell Roachell Law Firm 11800 Pleasant Ridge Road, Suite 146 Post Office Box 17388 Little Rock, Arkansas 72222-7388 Little Rock, AR 72201 Ms. Ann Marshall Desegregation Monitor 1 Union National Plaza 124 W. Capitol, Suite 1895 Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Dennis R. Hansen Office of the Attorney General 323 Center Street 200 Tower Building Little Rock, AR 72201 F:\HOME.\FENDLEY\l.R.SD 200 1\dc.s-uni1ary-response-Joshua-comments.wpd 17 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. 4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, et al MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, et al KA THERINE KNIGHT, et al ORDER FILED U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT ARKANSAS SEP O 6 2002 DEFENDANTS INTER VEN ORS INTER VEN ORS Before the Court is the request of the Magnet Review Committee ("MRC") for approval of the interdistrict magnet schools' final budget for the 2001-2002 school year and proposed budget for - the 2002-2003 school year. The MRC communicated both budgets to the Court in a letter dated July 31, 2002, attached to my August 19, 2002 Order (docket no. 3661). Without objection, I hereby approve both budgets as submitted. IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of September, 2002. Wm. R. Wilson, Jr. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE THIS DOCUMENT ENTERED ON DOCKET SHEET IN COMPLIANCE Wl--q-i ~Ulf; 58 AND/OR~ ON 5"L 9/1 .11-- sy_"7'" ~--_.._--'---- U.f !fm~cRRT EASUAN DISTRICT ARKANSAS IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRJCT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS SEP 1 2 2002 WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT VS. 4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, et al MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, et al KATHERINE KNIGHT, et al RECEIVED SEP 1 3 2002 OFRCEOF DESEGREGATION MONITORING ORDER ~~M~;.,. ' DEP. CL'. AK PLAINTIFF DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS INTERVENORS On July 30, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike, asking this Court to strike from the record any evidence presented by Joshua concerning events which occurred after March 15, 2001 . On August 9, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Designation of Testimony to be Stricken. The Joshua Intervenors filed a Response to Plaintiffs Designation of Testimony to be Stricken on August 14, 2002. There are portions of the testimony that Joshua does not object to striking. Thus, the following testimony is excluded by agreement of the parties: PAGE LINES 45 5-25 46 1-12 60 24-25 61 1 63 16-25 64 1-21 71 20-25 6 7 4 72 1-18 91 15-25 110 14-25 197 12-25 394 24-25 395 1-10 425 3-24 453 20-25 454 1-25 455 1-25 456 1-25 457 1-25 460 6-25 461 1-11 461 18-25 462 1-25 498 1-3 501 19-24 527 4-11 The disputed portions of the testimony will be dealt with in categories according to similar subject matter. The following portions of testimony will remain because the specific time period referred to either cannot be ascertained from the testimony or is clearly prior to March 15, 2001: (1) page 45, lines 1-4; (2) page 53, lines 6-25; page 54, lines 1-25; page 55, lines 1-25; page 56, lines 1- 21 ; (3) page 56, lines 22-25; page 57, lines 1-25; page 58, lines 1-6; (4) page 58, lines 7-25; page -2- 59, lines 1-25 ; (5) page 60, lines 1-23; page 61, lines 2-20; (6) page 62, lines 1-25; page 63, lines 1-15; (7) page 65, lines 11-25; page 66, lines 1-25; (8) page 70, lines 17-25; page 71 , lines 1-14; (9) page 92, lines 1-14; (10) page 93, lines 1-23; (11) page 105, lines 10-11 ; (12) page 122, lines 13-16; (13) page 196, lines 12-25; page 197, lines 1-11 ; page 198, lines 8-25; page 199, lines 1- 16; (14) page 329, lines 20-25; page 330, lines 1-24; (15) page 338, lines 21-25; (16) page 348, lines 18-25; (17) page 350, lines 11-25; page 351 , lines 1-21 ; (18) page 381 , line 25; page 382, lines 1-23; (19) page 400, lines 15-25; page 401 , lines 1-25; page 402, lines 1-25; page.403, lines 1-25; page 404, lines 1-25; page 405, lines 1-25; page 406, lines 1-25; page 407, lines 1-25; page 408, lines 1-10; (20) page 408, lines 11-25; page 409, lines 1-25; page 410, lines 1-25; page 411 , lines 1-25; page 412, lines 1-25; page 413 , lines 1-25; page 414, lines 1-5; (21) page 414, lines 6- 25; page 415, lines 1-25; page 416, lines 10-13; (22) page 418, lines 15-25; page 419, lines 1-25; page 420, lines 1-25; page 421 , lines 1-25; page 422, lines 1-25; page 423 , lines 1-25; page 424, lines 1-25; page 425, lines 1-2, line 25; page 428, lines 12-25; page 429, lines 1-17; (23) page 434, lines 9-25; page 435, lines 1-9; (24) page 436, lines 10-25; page 437, lines 1-2; (25) page 439, lines 1-5; (26) page 458, lines 1-25; page 459, lines 1-25; page 460, lines 1-5; and (27) page 497, lines 21-25; page 499, lines 1-16. The following testimony is excluded from the record, and the reasoning for its exclusion is set forth following the description of the specific testimony: (1) The testimony at page 71 , lines 15-19, is stricken. That testimony refers to an evaluation conducted at the end of the 2000-2001 school year, which is necessarily after March 15, 2001. ,., -.)- (2) The testimony at page 122, lines 11-12 and lines 17-19, is stricken. The questions and answer found there concern the year 2002. (3) The testimony at page 198, lines 1-7, is stricken. It is a continuation of the testimony at page 197, lines 12-25, which the parties agreed should be excluded because it refers to the 2001-2002 school year. (4) The following testimony is excluded: page 340, lines 18-25; page 341 , lines 1-25; page 342, lines 1-25; page 343, lines 1-25; page 344, lines 1-25; page 345, lines 1-25; page 346, lines 1-25; page 347, lines 1-25; page 348, lines 1-17; page 349, lines 1-25; and page 350, lines 1-10. As set forth at page 329, lines 14-16, Justin Mercer graduated in 2002, making 2001-02 his senior year. English IV AP, the class Mr. Mercer took from Mrs. Brooks, is a senior class. Because Mr. Mercer's experiences in that class occurred during the 2001-02 school year, they were subsequent to March 15, 2001, and are stricken. (5) The testimony at page 379, lines 10-25; page 380, lines 1-25; page 381 , lines 1-24; page 382, lines 24-25; and page 383, lines 1-5, is cross-examination regarding Mr. Mercer's experience with Mrs. Brooks during the 2001-02 school year. See paragraph 4 above. It is stricken. (6) The testimony at page 395, lines 11-25, and page 396, lines 1-9, is redirect examination regarding the experiences of Mr. Mercer with Mrs. Brooks. See paragraphs 4 and 5 above. The testimony refers to evidence generated after March 15, 2001 , and is stricken. (7) The testimony at page 398, lines 8-25, and page 399, lines 1-9, involves Mr. Mercer's experiences with Mrs. Brooks during his senior year. See paragraphs 4-6 above. That testimony is stricken. -4- IT IS SO ORDERED this I :Z,~ay of September, 2002. -5- Wmwt!JJl:a UNITED ST A TES DISTRJCT JUDGE THIS DOCUMENT ENTERED ON DOCKET SHEET IN COMPLIANCE ':'.~J!T?t2~~~~~ _P..!:.CEIVED SEP 2 7 2002 ' A OFFICEOF ~ ESEGREGATIOH MONITORING IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURI EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION ., 1 . - - , . :3, .a-: . . ,-. - - ,-- LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT V. NO. 4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL ;DISTRICT NO.1, ET AL 1v1R.S. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL DEFENDANTS INTER VEN ORS INTERVENORS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR IN THE ALTERNATNE MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER The Joshua Intervenors respectfully move the Court pursuant to Rule 59( e) to alter or amend the judgment entered herein on September 13, 2002 or in the alternative to provide relief pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the Judgment or Order herein. Robert Pressman, ass Bar No. 405900 22 Locust Avenue Lexington, MA 02421 (781) 862-1955 Jqhn W. Walker, AR Bar No. 64046 J9HN W. WALKER, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, Arkansas 72206 (501) 374-3758 (501) 374-4187 (Fax) Rickey Hicks, AR Bar No. 89235 Attorney at Law Evergreen Place 1100 North University, Suite 240 Little Rock, Arkansas 72207 (501) 663-9900 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . I hereby certi~ that a copy of the foregoi~g t~,~n sent lfif~d U.S . Mail, postage prepaid to the followmg counsel of record, on this ,;&lt;_J oay of ~ , 2002: Mr. Christopher Heller FRIDAY, ELDREDGE &amp; CLARK 400 W. Capitol, Suite 2200 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Ms. Ann Brown Marshall ODM One Union National Plaza 124 West Capitol, Suite 1895 Mr. Sam Jones WRIGHT, LINDSEY &amp; JENNINGS 2200 Worthen Bank Building 200 West Capitol Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 ~- ,, V Mr. Dennis R. Hansen Office of the Attorney General 323 Center Street 200 Tower Building Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 1--'Ir. Steve Jones JACK, LYON &amp; JONES, P.A. 425 W. Capitol, Suite 3400 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201-34 72 Mr. Richard Roachell ROACHELL LAW FIRM 11800 Pleasant Ridge Road, Suite 146 Post Office Box 17388 Little Rock, Arkansas 72222-73 8 8 John W. Walker JOHN W. WALKER SHAWN CHILDS JOHN W. WALKER, P.A. ATTORNEY AT LAW 1723 BROADWAY LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72206 TELEPHONE (501) 374-3758 FAX (501) 374-4187 September 23, 2002 C : .S-le:,ll!, FILED U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT ARKANSAS SEP 2 4 2002 JAMES W. McCOR/vi,\Ci( Cl.ERK By: ________ Ol!P&lt;roll!NBEL ROBERT McHENRY, P.A. DONNA J. McHENRY 8210 HENDERSON ROAD LITILE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72210 PHONE: (501) 372-3425 FAX (501) 372-3428 EMAIL: mchenryd@swbell.net Honorable Judge William R. Wilson United States District Court 600 West Capitol, Suite 423 RECEIVED Little Rock, AR 72201 Re: LRSD v. PCSSD, et al. Case No. LR-C- 82-866 Dear Judge Wilson: SEP 2 4 2002 OFFICE OF DESEGREGATION MONliORIMG Today we filed a motion for reconsideration. We found several errors in it and wish to correct them. We are hand delivering a substituted Motion for Reconsideration to the Court. The substitute motion does not alter or modify the substance of the motion filed today. It has been hand delivered to Judge Ray, the Little Rock School District counsel, the ODM and other counsel. JWW:js Enclosure- Motion for Reconsideration cc: United States District Court Clerk All Counsel of Record ( ,ere~; / ~~t \/John W. Walker RECEIVED SEP 2 4 2002 - OFACEOF IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS SEP 2 4 2002 DESEGREGATION MONITORING WESTERN DMSION JAMES W. McCOR'" ACK By: ''"''"' , CLERK LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT V. NO. 4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. l, ET AL MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL DEP CLERK PLAINTIFF DEFENDANTS INTER VEN ORS INTERVENORS JOSHUA INTERVENORS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION The Joshua Intervenors respectfully request the Court to reconsider the following findings of fact and conclusions oflaw which it has reached. In making this request, Joshua has been time limited because of the exceeding length of the Court's Opinion and the fact that the Court has sought to address issues that were not the subject of the evidentiary presentation for which the Joshua Intervenors had the burden of proof Joshua notes that the subject of the hearings, as determined by the Honorable Susan Webber Wright, then presiding Judge of this case, was for Joshua to present the areas ofits greatest strength from among the various objections which Joshua had made to the Compliance Report of March 15, 2001. The Court did not indicate that she would allow Joshua to present evidence on matters other than those which were the subject of the hearing before the Court. We make this notation because the successor Court Judge, the Honorable William R. Wilson, has faulted Joshua for not presenting evidence beyond the issues -on which evidence was taken. Joshua also notes that there was no issue that Joshua assumed the 1 burden of proof upon with respect to Joshua's obligations and undertaking with respect to compliance. Joshua had no power to impose any particular compliance upon the school district. Furthermore, Judge Wright made it clear that the agreement between the State of Arkansas with respect to the loan forgiveness of the $20 million dollars which was loaned by the Arkansas Department of Education to the Little Rock School District was not to be the subject of these hearings. Her reasoning was that the matter was premature because all the parties to that agreement were not before the Court, Joshua had not signed off upon it and that it had nothing to do with whether or not Little Rock had substantially complied with meeting the requirements of the Revised Desegregation and Education Plan which the parties agreed upon in January of 1998. The Court has also addressed the issue of the involvement of the ODM with respect to the issues which were litigated before Judge Wright and Judge Wilson. The competence of the ODM, quality of the ODM reports, the budget of the ODM and the relationship between ODM and Judge Susan Webber Wright, were not before the Court in evidentiary form. Those matters had nothing to do with Joshua's burden of proof in demonstrating that the LRSD had not substantially complied with the obligation of the Revised Desegregation and Education Plan. Nor was the issue of overall counsel fees with respect to the duration of the litigation and the payments to lawyers, and the public perception of those fees a matter of evidence to be: . considered when Judge Wright formulated the issues. The issue of attorney's fees has no relevance to the issue of whether LRSD has substantially complied with its obligations. The Court, Judge Wilson, has recited histo,y regarding his perception of the fee event and made assumptions regarding those matters. In due respect to the Court, the assumptions are not valid and represent a predisposition which could only have come from previous attitudes regarding the 2 role of lawyers in this long standing case. The Joshua Intervenors were not informed at the time that this matter was reassigned to the Honorable William R. Wilson of the Court's negative attitude toward lawyers who were involved with and associated with this case. While Judge Wright may have had such attitudes, they were not expressed and do not form the basis for any judicial ruling. The attitude of the late Honorable Judge Henry Woods was well known. He disapproved of certain payments to certain counsel, i.e., counsel for Joshua and the legion of , I predecessor and associate counsel who were involved in this case when it was first filed as Aaron v. Cooper in 1956. The parties are entitled, we submit, to have facts found upon the record which means a record which is developed in open Court. The fee issue is particularly sensitive because the Court has proceeded to make assumptions regarding fees and costs. In doing so, the principal erroneous finding is that the Joshua counsel, including the Legal Defense Fund counsel, were paid more than $3,750,000 for their work between 1987 and the present time. Joshua requests that the Court either delete its references to payments to counsel or afford the issue to be revisited in a manner which establishes the fact .and does not further cloud public perception, a point to which the Court appears most sensitive. The Court also seems to disregard the role of Joshua because the Court makes no reference.to how Joshua became involved in this case in the first place and why it was necessary for the school district to seek an interdistrict remedy in the first place. Those matters were not before the Court and we submit should be excised from the Court's Opinion. It is important to note that the late Honorable Judge Henry Woods refused to allow the Joshua Intervenors to intervene in the first place. It was His ruling that the Black plaintiffs did not need their own advocate or representative because the Court would protect the interests of the Black children. That position was overturned by the Court of Appeals and from that point on, Joshua has been the real plaintiff seeking to validate and protect the Constitutional rights of African American children which the LRSD set out to accomplish through counsel who have since been discharged.1 With those points in the foreground and in context, Joshua respectfully asks the Court to reconsider its lengthy Memorandum Opinion of September 13, 2002 with respect to issues which were not before the Court or for which the Court may have made mistakes. 1. On page 2, the Court indicates that the Settlement Agreements of 1989 were to be implemented "under the supervision of ... the Office of Desegregation Monitoring." We believe the terminology to be inappropriate because Judge Wright never entered an Order determining the ODM to be the supervisor of any district. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the ODM ever - performed in that role. 2. As stated preliminarily, Judge Wright required Joshua to develop the facts surrounding what Joshua believed were their strongest grounds for challenging the school district's request for release from Court supervision . The Cou1i did not afford LRSD the opportunity to establish its case because the burden of proof rested with the Joshua Intervenors. Accordingly, Joshua requests that any facts that were found beyond the submitted grounds identified as subject areas for evidentiary hearings should be excised. In this respect, there was no burden imposed upon Joshua to demonstrate its own actions or conduct and no party requested that Joshua make such a demonstration. Moreover, the Agreement did not call for such a demonstration. 1The record will reflect that the District hired Philip Kaplan, P.A. Hollingsworth, Janet Pulliam and their associates to pursue the interdistrict litigation which resulted in the 1989 Settlement Agreement but which Settlement Agreement was reached without those counsel. 4 3. The Court notes on page 7 the role of Judge Wright with respect to Her supervision of this overall case. The Court omits, however, reference to the fact that the LRSD filed a motion seeking to have Judge Wright recused from the case. Although she refused to recuse, her withdrawal made the recusal issues moot for purposes of appeal. The Court appears to have adopted LRSD's reasoning set fo11h in its motion for recusal when it addresses the role of the Office of Desegregation Monitoring. We believe that is inappropriate, with all deference to the Court, and we believe that it tends to denigrate the significance of Judge Wright's work in seeking to implement through use of the ODM the dictates of the 811 ' Circuit. 4. When the ground rules were set by Judge Wright, she indicated that the Joshua Intervenors should present "noncumulative" evidence regarding the areas which Joshua most strongly regarded from the among the many areas to which it objected. Page 7, footnote 12. By ruling that cumulative evidence would be disallowed, the Court narrowed the hearing time and the presentation of evidence. The focus of the Court was upon brevity and substance. The successor Court agreed to follow the procedure set forth by Judge Wright. 5. In footnote 15, page 9, the Court notes that this action was filed on November 30, 1982, but it later gives the impression that Joshua counsel have been involved in this case since that time. Joshua r,equests that the Court, if it must address the history at all again, acknowledge that Joshua did not participate before the Honorable Henry Woods in the liability phase of the case as it is now styled and it only intervened at the remedy stage in 1987. Although this matter is not the subject of the evidentiary hearings, the Court may make this correction by reference to the docket entries and by reference to the Court of Appeal's Decision which allowed Joshua to intervene for purposes of remedy. Joshua fw1her notes that the 1989 Settlement Agreement 5 effectively merged the captioned case with, inter ctlia, Clark v. The Board o(Education of the Little Rock School District. Clark was the continuation of Aaron v. Cooper. Accordingly, this is a 46 year old case rather than a 20 year old case because the liability rulings of Clark remained and because, despite the beliefs of the late Judge Bill Ove1ton, there was never a determination that the LRSD had achieved unitary status. 6. In footnote 30, page 16, the Comi indicates that the claims for relief and remedies differed from those being sought in Clark. Joshua requests that the Court clarify those differences for as Joshua reads Judge Woods' later Opinion, Judge Woods, himself, found the school districts to be faulted for both interdistrict and intradistrict violations of the rights of African American children and he determined that consolidation with a resulting desegregation plan for the consolidated district would be necessary. Judge Woods' appointment of Special Master Aubrey - McCutcheon is not mentioned. Mr. IVlcCutcheon made findings during the remedial process that the districts were continuing to implement their policies by engaging in practices which tended to discriminate against African American school children. We believe that if history is to be written it cannot be fair unless the myriad hearings and other developments before Mr. McCutcheon are placed into perspective. Mr. McCutcheon is a necessary connection to legacy of Judge Henry Woods who the C0urt acknowledges to be the Court's mentor. 7. In footnote 47, pages 26 and 27, the Court makes reference to the evolution of the ODM and its budget. That matter was not before the Court. While Judge Wright's approval of the ODM budget is a matter of public record, we believe the Court may wish to excise these figures because they are inaccurate. Joshua is aware that the ODM budget was never fully spent. Joshua submits that the Court may wish to readdress this issue also because Judge Wright 6 approved the budgets and the manner in which Your Honor treats the budget seems to be at least an implicit criticism of Judge Wright's actions and of the Court of Appeals for requiring the creation of the office in the first place. We submit that the ODM and its budget are not fair issues for the instant proceedings and that the Court's attitude regarding the merits of plaintiff's objections may be clouded by the belief expressed that too much money has been spent on the "professional group." In making the request for the reconsideration on this point, we note that all . ' ' of the governmental parties have resisted in one form or another the ODM activities. We also note that the Court may be signaling that it wants to end the role of the ODM as that role was established and created by the 81 h Circuit There is no evidentiary basis for doing that or for allowing that inference to publicly flow On many occasions, Judge Wright commended the ODM work as being useful, helpful and even impo1iant in helping the districts achieve desegregation - goals. 8. On page 38, the Court notes that on December 27, 1996, Judge Wright held that LRSD would benefit from a "temporary hiatus" from monitoring. We have searched the record and do not find that she ever lifted that Order. Accordingly, LRSD has not been monitored as contemplated since 1997. Instead, it has been in advisory position to the LRSD. The Court has to also note with reference to the budget of ODM which it set forth on page 27 that monitoring for LRSD when done by the ODM, a 35% cost for LRSD, would have been approximately $250,000 per year. There surely cannot be an inference that Joshua was to take over the role of ODM with respect to monitoring at a rate of approximately $49,000 per year, a point the Court refers to at least five times. (Pages 39, 42, 43, 88 and 90). 9. On page 3 8, the Court heads a discussion "the perplexing final resolution of Joshua's 7 request for still more attorney's fees from LRSD." Joshua requests the Court excise this section for several reasons. First, it indicates a bias or hostility toward Joshua counsel. Second, it implies collusion between the lawyers. Third, it suggests that the terms of the Settlement were not made known to Judge Wright, a conclusion not supported by any evidence. Fourth, it complains unfairly that a matter on appeal should not be resolved by the parties. The Court criticizes an Agreement without evidence about, or without inquiring into, it. The implication that LRSD and Joshua entered into an attorney client relationship suggests professional misconduct on the part of the attorneys. Finally, there is nothing to indicate that for the monthly amount of $4,000+ Joshua's counsel agreed to undertake all the monitoring aspects, including the ODM's role, of LRSD's implementation of the plan. The Court takes issue with Joshua counsel's approved 1997 hourly rate of $250. Nonetheless, counsel has been awarded even greater fees than that as was - His Honor awarded greater fees while in private practice. Surely, the Court understood that Joshua did more than 16 hours per month in monitoring this case. There is no record to establish this fact, however, and if it is important for public perception or otherwise, Joshua is prepared to demonstrate the hundreds of meetings held with school district officials during the three year period; numerous meetings with the ODM; public confrontations during monitoring occasions where Joshua counsel were threatened with arrest and where because of the persistence and vigor ofJoshua' s monitoring, the district revised its policies. We, therefore, believe that it is important for the Court to address the issue by hearing, affording appropriate and reasonable time for developing the issues, or, that the matter be removed from the Court's Opinion because it is based only upon speculation and conjecture. Joshua notes here that the process requires lawyers. For instance, Steve Jones, representing the NLRSD and Sam Jones representing the PCSSD basically 8 sat in Court throughout these proceedings and were paid fees and costs while Joshua counsel have not been paid a dime. But the process affords the districts the right of counsel and the districts have had no reluctance in paying their counsel on a contemporaneous basis and they are not held to public or Court contempt for being paid. In page footnote 58, the Court "guesses" that all attorneys have been paid at least $8 _million dollars. A "guess" is inappropriate for a Court, we submit, when the facts are more easily I ascertainable and the facts establish that the payment for Joshua in 1990 represented payments for 34 years of work and costs during that time. There is no estimate for the amounts which the districts paid their counsel to forestall desegregation before 1990. On the other hand, this issue has already been addressed and we submit has no place in this Opinion because it does not contribute to the issues which the Court heard. Undersigned counsel Walker does not accept the - Court's conclusion that he has directly benefitted from the perpetuation of this case. On the other hand, the three districts have received almost one billion dollars from the State of Arkansas since 1990 because of the various actions undertaken by counsel. Careful inquiry by the Court would disclose that the annual desegregation amounts from the State to the three school districts is in the range of $50 million or more per year. Were this a contingent fee case, plaintiffs' counsel would have indeed benefitted. l 0. The Court makes reference on page 46 to the achievement disparity goals approved by the Court of Appeals as being unreachable citing the testimony ofDrs. Walburg and Armor which was given in 1996. That testimony came after the original Settlement Agreement in 1989 and then preceded the 1998 Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, whatever views Walburg, Armor and even Judge Wright had about the elimination of the achievement gap, the parties 9 agreed to address it in the manner set forth in the Plan. The Court's comments regarding _ Walburg and Armor are inapposite to the hearing which the Court held and should play no part in the Court's ruling. 11. On pages 4 7 and 48, the Court refers to the failure of objection by the ODM and Joshua to the Interim Compliance Report. There is no record basis for this, i.e. , no witness Jestified to this effect and there is no evidence that Joshua was silent at any time. The only evidence is that Joshua was continually involved and seeking to be involved in the devisation of policies and procedures and was continually meeting with district officials regarding compliance issues. See Court Exhibits 553 through 569. 12. On page 48, the Court chastises ODM for its report of disciplinary sanctions which was filed on June 14, 2000. The repo11 was made to Judge Wright before she relinquished her jurisdiction and before the March 15 report seeking release from Court supervision was filed by LRSD. She was aware and there are many cites in the record to reflect that ODM presented its report in such a way as to inform the district of the facts it found and to make recommendations regarding those facts within the context of discussions which followed subsequent to the submissions of the reports. Had Judge Wright found criticism with the ODM reports, we believe the Court was obliged to share those criticisms with the parties prior to LRSD having fil~d its report seeking relief from Court supervision. See pages 48 through 50. On page 49, the Court acknowledges that the March 15 report of the school district failed to adequately address the disproportionality of African American student discipline. The report is not evidence, as Mr: Chris Heller acknowledged. This failure by itself demonstrates that the issue of discipline was not ripe for objection or release at the time the report was made. If the data were not available and were not presented there would be no basis for an objection from Joshua regarding the matter. ODM should not be faulted, nor should Joshua, for failing to object to data which did not exist at the time. 13. On pages 52 through 54, the Court notes that Joshua did not present evidence or arguments that LRSD "was not in substantial compliance with its obligations regarding faculty _and staff, student assignment, special education and related programs, parental involvement, and school construction and closing." The Court had previously instructed Joshua not to present any of that evidence. The Court now states that Joshua's failure to present any of that evidence "requires a finding that they have abandoned those arguments." Joshua finds it incongruent for them not to be allowed "to present any evidence on certain matters and upon compliance with a no evidence presentation then receive a finding that they abandoned their position. Surely, the Court will not hold it against Joshua when it did not present evidence that the Court refused to let in in the first place. 14. On page 58, the Court appears to chastise Joshua counsel for never raising a compliance issue under Section 8.2 of the Plan. The Plan did not require Joshua to raise the specific compliance issue in order for them to oppose release from Court supervision. Furthermore, as pointed out above, there was no place in this hearing on the issues as formulated for this issue to be addressed. Furthermore, there is much evidence that Joshua regularly brought matters of compliance to the attention of the school district administrators. See Court Exhibits 553-569. 15 . The Court interprets footnote 2 of the Revised Plan (Opinion page 60) as "not" being the intention of the parties to have the remediation goal fully achieved within three years. 11 Joshua's evidence did not say that it did. For Joshua's evidence was that certain goals were to have been fully met while others would be ongoing. Surely, the goal of remediation of achievement disparities would be ongoing but elimination of disparities in discipline need not be, for example . . The Court makes an assumption regarding the reason for this footnote. There is no basis for the assumption from the record. 16. In footnote 67, page 60, the Court seems to be uncomfortable with the practical~ty of I the goals in the 1990 Plan regarding achievement disparities. Judge Wright also had some discomfort with that goal as previously noted but the achievement goals were agreed to and, contrary to the opinion of the Court, they must be implemented. The question is not whether they should have been agreed to by the LRSD, for they were, but whether they must deliver on those goals or promises. There is a presumption that there is a correlation between student achievement and money expenditures by school districts. Twel ve years after the money began to flow and between one half billion and a billion doll ars more spent in this district than which otherwise would have been spent, the achievement disparities remain. The only conclusion to be drawn is that the substantial monies expended were not used for the purpose of remediating achievement disparities between African American and white students. The beneficiaries of the monies have primarily been white students who have seen their achievement rise in ways to cause the gap to remain if not increase between and their still less fortunate brethren. 17. Beginning on_page 63 , the Court makes an analysis regarding the "Green factors ." We submit that the Green factors do not apply to this Settlement Agreement and that those factors should be excised. The Court takes the position that LRSD went beyond what it was required to do and "voluntarily" assumed desegregation obligations. We submit that these were 12 not voluntarily entered into, they were the result of negotiation brought about by the strength of the Joshua litigation position. They constitute benefits to the class of minority children which were bargained for by their counsel. The district was not doing the children a favor; rather, it was meeting an obligation which has been unaddressed during the 46 years of this litigation. 18. On page 72, the CoUii emphasizes that LRSD has never been adjudicated to be a _"constitutional violator." We ask that the Court reconsider that position if for no other reason than that the settlement did not address fault. The Court discusses Judge Overton's Opinion and makes reference to the appellate's decision affirming Judge Overton at 705 F.2d 265 . The Court of Appeals approved Judge Ovetion 's Decision because the Plan before the Court represented the school board's attempt to temporarily reorganize attendance patterns while the school board pursued longer ranged plans to ensure an integrated school system citing this case. In other words, had this case not been filed , the Court of Appeal's Decision arguably would have been otherwise. On page 74, the Court noted that LRSD operated under the 1990 Settlement Plan for 8 years," a long time." The Court fails to note that during that "long time" Judge Wright found considerable disenchantment with the manner of operation and even required the school board members to come to Court to hear the evidence on many occasions. The Court even found the school district to be in contempt during this time. The Court disregards that history and seeks to demonstrate that LRSD has been a model of compliance during the Judge Wright years. That simply is not the case. This Court recognized as much on pages 30-32 of its own Opinion. The Court is requested to explain on the one hand the findings of Judge Wright and on the other hand its compliments of the district for these 8 years. 19. On pages 77 through 8 5, the Court appears to take issue with the concept that LRSD 13 .e specifically agreed to narrow the achievement gap between African American and other students. This lead the Court to impose an obligation upon Joshua to demonstrate that minority student achievement was a vestige of de jure desegregation. The Court thus imposed a liability concept upon Joshua during the hearing without any notice and without any cause. The Settlement Agreement is a remedy and as such may address issues other than those for which there has been a specific violation. But when the Settlement Agreement is approved by the Court it becomes the law of the case and the parties do not have to readdress at each hearing the underlying basis for the remedy being provided. 20. On page 87, the Court makes a finding of fact (No. 3) that Joshua did not pursue the compliance issues by use of the correct procedures before objecting to the report as a whole. As stated before, Joshua was not obliged under the plan to do so. 21. In addressing the fii1dings of fact pages 87 through 160, the Court appears to have adopted the LRSD's proposed findings. While the Court has great discretion, we make the following notations inter alia: a) on page 87, the Court speculates regarding resolution between Joshua and the school districts; b) the Court speculates that Dr. Lacey would take appropriate action if she perceived any race based treatment despite the absence of any record of her past actions on this issue, page 93; c) on page 94, the Cou11 found that since 1989, LRSD had a good record of acting in good faith (see paragraph 18 supra); d) on page 96, the Court accepted the "belief' by Dr. Linda Watson that both Joshua 14 and ODM were provided with copies of a compliance plan and did not require any evidence; e) on page 96, the Coui1 without any record basis, concluded that Joshua counsel and staff have free access to LRSD's offices and schools and routinely received copies of any requested documents; f) on page 100, the Court excuses the district 's failure in excluding Joshua from planning and other meetings that the district had regarding compliance; g) on pages 103 through I 07, the Court does not address the elimination of disparities as being intended by the Plan; rather, the Court addresses overall reduction in suspensions where the racial disparities remain; h) on page 106, the advisory ODM Report is criticized by His Honor with respect to discipline but Judge Wright did not make the same criticism. Had she done so, a duty to address the issue would have been created; i) on page 109 a "suspension index" was created without any explanation (see finding 30), i.e. no witness explained it. The Court accepted the calculation by LRSD that there was no diminishing of disparity in discipline between 1997 and 200.0; j) the Court on page 110 imposed upon Joshua a burden to prove that disproportionality in discipline was a result ofracial discrimination. Joshua submits that that is the wrong legal standard to be applied under the law of this case. The issue is relie( not causation; k) on page 111, the Court disregarded the incidents of discrimination presented in 15 discipline. (See footnote 108) In doing so, the Court disregarded the admonition by Judge Wright not to present cumulative evidence regarding any matter and then held that the presented incidents were too "isolated" to allow judgment regarding the entire school system; I) on page 112, the Court may wish to reconsider the word "probable" in finding 38 in discussing the testimony of Dr. Watson. A review of her testimony establishes that "environmental factors may be" - not "probably were" the explanation for racial disproportionality; m) on page 113, the Cowi notes that Dr. Watson indicates that African American teachers suspended African American students more than white teachers. That appears to be a finding of racial treatment by African American teachers toward African American students. This establishes continuation of systematic discrimination toward African American students as well as perpetuation of disparities; n) on page 115, at footnotes l I l-112, the Court seems to condone disparities in sports activities by noting on page 116 that students tend to gravitate toward sports that they have grown up playing. That in itself we submit is racial)' .e., . whites-golf, tennis, soccer; blacks - football, basketball and track; o) on pages 116-117, in addressing the testimony of Ray Gillespie, the Court does not address the inferences to be taken when white coaches publicly mistreat Black athletes nor the reasonable perceptions which are influenced by those actions; p) on page 118, the Court in finding 9, accepts a "means" test for participation in 16 extra-curricular activities but this flies in face of the reality that most African American children in the .LRSD - in contrast to its white students- cannot meet the "means" tests imposed; q) with respect to advanced placement courses, the district has increased the enrollment of white students to a point to where the preexisting disparity has been extended. The programs undertaken by the district which are cited by the Co1;1rt r) ' are minuscule. For example (SMART involved a summer number of 200 pupils and Teachers of Color could only involve six teachers per year in being prepared for AP. This program was sta11ed in January, 2001, less than two months before the R;eport herein); the Court disregarded the testimony of Jason Mercer who presented multiple incidents of unfair treatment at "famed" Little Rock Central High Scho?l and the Court entirely disregarded the testimony regarding of parent Romona Horton's travails regarding her precocious children who were also enrolled at Little Rock Central High School; s) the Court accepts a "means" test for participation in the University Studies Program despite the obvious conclusion that it will disqualify the great preponderance (90%) of African American students who attend Hall High School. The Court also concluded that in one instance, LRSD solicited a private donation to pay tuition for an African American student to take a course offered under the University Studies Program. The testimony does not identify that the race of that student. The Court is requested to correct this finding; 17 t) with respe.ct to counseling services, finding no. 24, page 133, the Court may wish to revisit this finding because it seems at odds with Ms. Watson's testimony; u) with respect to academic achievement, the Court notes the obligation of the LRSD to be to approve the academic achievement of African American students. The issue is not simply to improve the achievement of African American students, rather, it is to bring their achievement levels to a range within reasonably proximity of the achievement levels of white and other students; v) with respect to page 146, finding no. 16, there is no evidence of what Joshua counsel "knew." Indeed, the 8th Circuit said that the parties should not retreat from the concept of eliminating the achievement gap; and w) on page 114, finding 18, the Court again speculates regarding the loan provision forgiveness by the State of Arkansas toward LRSD. The Court then goes ahead and gives L.RSD two more years in order to comply with the State agreement without there being joinder o( or a hearing upon the issue. The Court faults Joshua for not raising that issue but fails to acknowledge that when it was raised by Joshua, Judge Wright chose not to address it for the reasons set forth on pages 1 and 2, supra. This finding was not made upon any evidence regarding 'the Joshua objections to LRSD's Motion for Release from Court Supervision. CONCLUSION The Joshua Intervenors respectfully submit that there are compelling reasons for the Court to revisit the record in order to determine whether the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are supported by the evidence presented during the hearings before Judge Wright and His 18 Honor. We also note that it is appropriate for the Court to again consider the context of the evidentiary presentations and withdraw its conclusions regarding those areas of compliance that the Court did not allow evidence to be developed regarding. t~ u.,;,~f1 .2-9-&lt;k~,aa ~ ,,., l ; ~11,i/I Robert Pressman, Mass Bar No .. 4(6,5 00 22 Locust A venue Lexington, MA 02421 (781) 862-1955 Respectfully submitted, J~"'Walker, AR Bar No. 64046 J W. WALKER, P.A. l 723 Broadway Little Rock, Arkansas 72206 (501) 374-3758 (501) 374-4187 (Fax) Rickey Hicks, AR Bar No. 89235 Attorney at Law Evergreen Place 1100 North University, Suite 240 Little Rock, Arkansas 72207 (501) 663-9900 19 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been se~-Mail, postage prepaid to the following counsel of record, on this "!};z_ day of . , 2002: Mr. Christopher Heller Mr. Dennis R. Hansen ERIDAY, ELDREDGE &amp; CLARK Office of the Attorney General 400 W. Capitol, Suite 2200 323 Center Street Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 200 Tower Building Ms: Ann Brown Marshall ODM One Union National Plaza 124 West Capitol, Suite 1895 Mr. Sam Jones WRIGHT, LINDSEY &amp; IBNNINGS 2200 Worthen Bank Building 200 West Capitol Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 20 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Mr. Steve Jones JACK, LYON &amp; JONES, P.A. 425 W. Capitol, Suite 3400 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201-3472 Mr. Richard Roachell ROACHELL LAW FIRM 11800 Pleasant Ridge Road, Suite 146 Post Office Box 173 88 Little Rock, Arkansas 72222-7388 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION RECEIVED SEP 3 O 2002 OFFICE OF DESEGREGATION MONITORING LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT PLAINTIFF . v. No. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. l, et al. DEFENDANTS NOTICE OF FILING In accordance with the Courts Order of December l 0. 199.3. the Arkansas Department of Education hereby gives notice of the filing of ADEs l'rojcct Manugcrncnt Tool for September 2002. Respectfully Submitted. MARK PRYOR Attorney General DENNIS R. I IANSEN. # 97225 Chief Deputy Attorney General 323 Center Street, Suite 1100 Little Rock. Arkansas 7220 I (501) 682-2586 Attorney for Arkansas Department of' Ed ucation CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE L Dennis R. Hansen, certify that on September 27. 2002. I caused the foregoing document to be served by depositing a copy in the United States mail. postage prepaid. addressed to each of the following: Mr. M. Samuel Jones, 1II Wright, Lindsey &amp; Jennings 200 W. Capitol , Suite 2000 Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. John W. Walker John Walker, P.A. I 723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Richard Roachell Attorney at Law P.O. Box 17388 Little Rock. AR 72222-7388 Mr. Christopher 1-leller Friday. Eldredge &amp; Clark 400 W. Capitol. Suite 2000 Little Rock. AR 72201 -3493 Mr. Stephen W. Jcmc'.) .lack. I ,yon &amp; .Jones 425 W. Cnpilol , Suite 3-t00 Little Rock. /\ R 7220 I Ms. Ann Marshall One Union National Plaza 124 West Capitol , Suite 1895 Little Rock. AR 7220 I Dennis R. Hansen This project was supported in part by a Digitizing Hidden Special Collections and Archives project grant from The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and Council on Library and Information Resources.</dcterms_description>

</dcterms_description>

</item>
</items>