Court filings: District Court, the districts' reply in support of motion for an order directing the State to distribute the districts' undisputed teacher retirement and health insurance damages; District Court, order; District Court, Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) petition for release from federal court supervision and post-unitary commitments; District Court, notice of filing, Arkansas Department of Education (ADE) project management tool; District Court, motion for extension of time

The transcript for this item was created using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and may contain some errors. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT . EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT \ VS. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL l\1RS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL THE DISTRICTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING THE STATE MAR 3 1999 OFFICE Of DESEGREGATION MONITORINS PLAINTIFF DEFENDANTS INTERVENERS INTERVENERS TO DISTRIBUTE THE DISTRICTS' UNDISPUTED TEACHER RETIREMENT AND HEAL TH INSURANCE DAMAGES I. ADE Not A Party to Settlement. ADE contends that this Court should not compel it to make any payment to the Districts until all remedy issues are resolved or until ADE becomes a party to a settlement. This contention is without merit. With PCS SD dropping its objection, all the parties are in agreement that the Districts are entitled to at least the amounts shown on Revised Exhibit 504. There is no reason why this amount should not be paid to the Districts as soon as practicable. The Districts need this money to fund obligations tied to the payment, in particular LRSD teachers' salaries. While resolution of the remaining remedy issues may increase the amount ADE owes the Districts, resolution of those issues will not decrease ADE's liability. Moreover, a separate order directing ADE to pay to the Districts the amounts it undisputedly owes them should avoid entangling these payments in an eventual appeal. The Court could then by separate order to resolve the questions of whether the Districts are entitled to receive the same percentage of their costs as other districts in the state and whether the Districts should receive prejudgment interest. Regardless of which way the Court rules on these issues, an appeal is likely. "-, \ However, no party could appeal an Order directing ADE to pay the Districts the amounts that all parties agree is the least that they are owed. Therefore, given the Districts' immediate need, the Court should order ADE to pay the Districts the amounts shown on Revised Exhibit 504 as soon as practicable. II. Section 11.F. of the 1989 Settlement Agreement. Section 11.F. of the 1989 Settlement Agreement should be considered by the Court in determining the Districts' remedy. ADE suggests that the Districts are making this contention for the first time. However, NLRSD raised Section 11.F. during the liability phase, and it was the subject - ofa footnote in the Eighth Circuit's decision in this case. See LRSD v. PCS SD, 148 F.3d 9556, 964 n.2 (8th Cir. 1998). While not the basis for liability, the Districts contend that the Court should not adopt a remedy which violates Section 11.F. The remedy proposed by ADE would violate Section 11.F. because it would result in the Districts being paid less for teacher retirement and health insurance than other school districts in the state. III. Prejudgment Interest. The Districts' claim for prejudgment interest does not rest entirely on 28 U.S.C. 1961 as suggested by ADE. The Districts have cited to the Court ample authority for an award of prejudgment interest in this case. Even so, ADE argues that prejudgment interest should be denied because ADE' s liability was not "reasonably capable of assessment." This is not true. Tristan Green testified that the he "borrowed" the methodology now proposed by ADE from the methodology used 2 by ADE to determine the amount of Educational Equity Trust Funds received by school districts. See June 6, 1999 Transcript, p. 176 and Court's Exhibit 492. All of the numbers used to calculate the Districts' damages under ADE's methodology have been readily ascertainable. However, ADE '-, refused to pa~ the Districts until ordered to do so by the Eighth Circuit. As the Eighth Circuit stated, "the districts are entitled to be held harmless against any adverse effect of the funding change." Id., 148 F.3d at 968. One adverse effect of the funding change has been an almost four year delay in payment, and the Districts should be held harmless for this delay through an award of prejudgment interest. WHEREFORE, the Districts pray that the State immediately be ordered to pay the Districts the amounts set forth on Revised Exhibit 504 within ten days of entry of the Court's Order or to show cause why payment cannot be made within ten days; that the Districts be awarded prejudgment - interest on said amounts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1961; that they be awarded their costs and attorneys' fees expended herein and that they be awarded all other just and proper relief to which they may be entitled. Respectfully submitted, NORTH LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT Mr. Steve Jones JACK, LYON & JONES, P.A. 425 W. Capitol, Suite 3400 Little Rock, AR 72201-3472 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT Mr. M. Samuel Jones WRIGHT, LINDSEY & JENNINGS 2200 Worthen Bank Bldg. 200 West Capitol F:IHOMEIFENDLEY\LRSD\des-tea,rep-<lis.wpd 3 Little Rock, AR 72201 LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT FRIDAY, ELDREDGE & CLARK First Comm'ercial Bldg., Suite 2000 400 West Ca~itol Little Rock, AR 72201-3493 (501) 376-2011 BY: F:IHOME\FENOLEY\LRSD\d<sterep-dis.wpd 4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I cytify that a copy of the foregoing has been served on the following people by U.S. Mail on this31j,...day of March, 1999. Mr. John W: Walker \ JOHNW. WALKER, P.A. 1 723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Richard Roachell Roachell Law Firm First Federal Plaza 401 West Capitol, Suite 504 Little Rock, AR 72201 Ms. Ann Brown Desegregation Monitor Heritage West Bldg., Suite 510 201 East Markham Street Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Timothy G. Gauger Office of the Attorney General 323 Center Street 200 Tower Building Little Rock, AR 72201 F:IHOMEIFENDLEY\LRSO\dcslnrtp-dis.wpd (hand-delivery on 3-4) 5 - - FILED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT ARKANSAS Oi vr tlQ WESTERN DMSION MARO 4 1999 DiS&RtG~11ua tiAOt\10il LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, ~~~ES if :J~~;~.~~7~K OEP ClfRK - * Plaintiff, vs. * * * * No. LR-C-82-866 * * * PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL * RECEIVE DISTRICT No. 1, et al., * * Defendants. * ",.J, . R ~ i999 * * off\CE Of \~ MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, et al., * f\H>t~Rffi~1\0~ M0~\'00\1 .~ * Intervenors, * * * KATHERINE KNIGHT, et al., * * Intervenors, * ORDER On July 1, 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit handed down an opinion on the issue of funding of retirement and health insurance for teachers and directed this Court to decide, in the first instance, exactly what relief is appropriate. See Little Rock School Dist. v. North Little Rock School Dist., 148 F.3d 956 (8th Cir. 1998). The Court stated as follows: The three Pulaski County School Districts should be placed in a position no worse than they would have occupied if the previous system of funding for teacher retirement and health insurance had not been changed. This does not mean that these districts are entitled to receive both an amount equivalent to what the old system would have produced for teacher retirement and health insurance, and the whole amount now paid to them as Equalization Funding. Such a result would be a double recovery, a windfall. But the districts are entitled to be held harmless again~t any adverse effect of the funding change. This means that it will be up to the District Court, after appropriate submissions from the parties, to calculate, as near as may be, the difference between what the old system - MFP A plus teacher retirement plus health insurance - would have produced, and what the new system - Equalization Funding in one lump sum - is producing. The appellants suggest that this effort will necessarily involve speculation. Admittedly it cannot be exact, but we believe that the District Court can make a reasonable and informed estimate. 148 F.3d 956, 968. The Eighth Circuit's mandate was filed in this Court on August 17, 1998, and the parties subsequently submitted papers setting forth their respective views on the matter. A hearing on this issue was held on January 6, 1999, following which the parties filed posthearing briefs on the issues raised at the hearing. Before the Court is a motion by the three Pulaski County school districts - Little Rock School District ("LRSD"), Pulaski County Special School District ("PCSSD"), and the North - Little Rock School District ("NLRSD") - for an Order directing the State of Arkansas to distribute the districts' undisputed teacher retirement and health insurance damages [doc.#3245]. On February 23, 1999, the State, by and through the Arkansas Department of Education (" ADE"), responded in opposition to the districts' motion, and the districts, on March 3, 1999, filed a reply to ADE's response. Having considered the matter, the Court hereby grants the districts' motion. There is no dispute to be resolved as to the appropriate methodology for determining the districts' damages with regard to teacher retirement and health insurance - all parties agreeing on the ADE's proposed methodology - and all parties are in agreement that the districts are entitled to at least the amounts shown on Revised Exhibit 504, which total $20,380,490.00. While it is true, as noted by the ADE, that there remain issues to be 2 resolved, including the issue of prejudgment interest and the issue of whether the State should be required to pay the districts 100% of each district's costs for teacher retirement and health insurance or the average percentage of actual costs received by other school districts in the State, the Court agrees with the districts that there is no reason why the undisputed amount shown in Revised Exhibit 504 should not be paid to the districts as soon as possible. As noted by the districts, resolution of the remaining issues may increase the amount the State owes the districts (a question on which the Court expresses no opinion at this time), but resolution of these issues will not decrease the State's liability. Accordingly, the Court grants the districts' motion for an Order directing the State to distribute the districts' undisputed teacher retirement and health insurance damages [doc.#3245]. The Court will resolve the remaining issues. in due course. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that within ten (10) days of the date of entry of this Order, the State of Arkansas make payment to the three Pulaski County school districts in the amount of $20,380,490.00, to be distributed as follows: 60% to LRSD, 30% to PCSSD, and 10% to NLRSD. d~ Dated this ..:.J_ day of March 1999. UNITED STATF.S DISTRICT COURT rHIS DOCUMENT ENTEAEI) ON DOCKET SHEET IN CC1MPw.e-N ~T~ RULE 58 AND/OR 79(a) FRCP ~N 3~ ~1 BY_~~~---- 3 EDWARD L. WRIGHT (1803- 1977) ROBERT S. LINDSEY (1813-101) ISAAC A. SCOTT, JR. JOHN G. LILE WRIGHT, LINDSEY & JENNINGS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW JOHN O. DAVIS JUDY SIMMONS HEH"tY KIMBERLY WOOD T".CKER RAY F. COX, JR. GORDON S. RATHER. JR . TERRY L. MATHEWS DAVID M. POWHL ROGER A. GLASGOW C. DOUGLAS IUFORO, JR. PATRICK J. GOSS ALSTON JENNINGS, JR. JOHN R. TISDALE KATHLYN GRAVES M. SAMUEL JONES Ill JOHN WILLIAM SPIVEY Ill LEE J , MULDROW N.M. NORTON CHARLES C. PRICE CHARLES T. COLEMAN JAMES J . GLOVER EDWIN L. LOWTHER , JR. CHARLESL. SCHLUMBERGER WALTER E. MAY GREGORY T. JONES H. KEITH MORRISON BETTINA E. BROWNSTEIN WALTER McSPAOOEN ROGER 0 . ROWE NANCY BELLHOUSE MAY Mr. John Walker John Walker, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, Arkansas 72206 Ms. Ann Brown ODM Heritage West Building, Suite 510 201 East Markham Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Mr. Richard Roachell Roachell Law Firm 401 W. Capitol, Suite 504 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 RE: PCSSD Dear Counsel and Ms. Brown: 200 WEST CAPITOL AVENUE SUITE 2200 LITTLE ROCK. ARKANSAS 72201-3699 (501) 371-0808 FAX (501) 3769442 WEBSITE : www.wl j .com OF COUNSEL ALSTON JENNINGS RONALD A. MAY M. TODD WOOD Writer's Di rect Dial No . 501 212 1273 mjonesQwlJ .com March 25, 1999 TROY A. PRICE PATRICIA A. SIEVERS JAMES M. MOODY. JR . KATHRYN A . PRYOR J. MARK DAVIS CLAIRE SHOWS HANCOCK KEVIN W. KENNEDY JERRY J. SALLINGS FRED M. PERKINS 111 WILLIAM STUART JACKSON MICHAEL 0 . BARNES STEPHEN R. LANCASTER JUDY ROBINSON WILBER BETSY MEACHAM KYLE R. WILSON C. TAD BOHANNON DON S. McKINNEY MICHELE SIMMONS ALLGOOD KR I STI M. MOODY J. CHARLES DOUGHERTY M. SEAN HATCH PHYLLIS M. McKENZIE ELISA MASTERSON WHITE JANE M. FAULKNER ROBERT W. GEORGE J . ANDREW VINES Mr. Christopher Heller Friday, Eldredge & Clark 400 W. Capitol, Suite 2200 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 RECEIVEO Mr. Stephen W. Jones Jack, Lyon & Jones 3400 TCBY Tower 425 West Capitol Avenue Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Mr. Timothy Gauger Assistant Attorney General 323 Center Street, Suite 200 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 MAR 2 4 1999 OFFICE OF DESEGREGATION MONITOR/NG Enclosed is a copy of PCSSD Petition for Release from Federal Court Supervision and Post-Unitary Commitments which is being filed today. MSJ/ao Encl. 93678-v1 Cordially, WRIGHT, LINDSEY & JENNINGS LLP t-__ 'IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT V. NO. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOLREcev8:n DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL. ~M ~- ' ,. MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL. KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL. MAR 2 4 1999 OFFICE OF DESEGREGATION MONITORING PCSSD PETITION FOR RELEASE FROM FEDERAL COURT SUPERVISION AND POST-UNITARY COMMITMENTS INTRODUCTION PLAINTIFF DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS INTERVENORS The PCSSD believes that it has earned unitary status. It asks this Court to examine the record that has been made, to hold a hearing, if necessary, on those issues, if any, which might be legitimately in controversy, and to ultimately enter its decree declaring that the PCSSD has earned unitary status and release it from further court supervision. Upon the entry of this Court's decree, the PCSSD commits to do those things and to maintain those activities described in Exhibit A to this petition that being the Pulaski County Special School District Post Unitary Commitments. Exhibit A was distributed to the parties on or about March 5, 1999, and no comments of any kind have been received. In this petition, the PCSSD will briefly revisit the background of this case, will set - forth the controlling law, will examine the determinations of other courts from around the 91963 I - country which have declared other districts to be unitary, and will then apply the facts of this case to the controlling legal principles. BACKGROUND This action was filed on November 30, 1982 by the LRSD against the PCSSD and others.1 Liability was adjudicated against the PCSSD and others on April 10, 1984 and a consolidation of the three school districts in Pulaski County was ordered. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (hereafter the Court of Appeals), en bane, affirmed most of the findings of liability of the district court, but reversed the court ordered consolidation and prescribed a different remedy. The Court of Appeals ordered that the boundaries of the LRSD would become those of the city of Little Rock as they then existed. The Court of Appeals also ordered - the transfer of the Granite Mountain community from the LRSD to the PCSSD. As a result of these transfers, the PCSSD lost 36% of its tax base, one-third of its schools, and 25% of its students. In the same opinion, the Court of Appeals ordered all three districts to develop desegregation plans that would distribute students in a way such that each school would have approximately the same racial balance as each district had as a whole. Significantly, the Court of Appeals specifically held that the remedy it then ordered was a complete remedy for the constitutional violations of which the PCSSD had been found guilty; specifically those violations relating to annexations and deannexations, segregated housing, school siting, student assignments, special education, 1 The LRSD supports the PCSSD in its petition for unitary status. 91963 2 - transportation, emplo~ment of faculty and administrators, and black participation in school affairs. Thereafter, other proceedings occurred, both before the district court and the Court of Appeals, culminating in 1989 in the Settlement Agreement and an agreed upon desegregation plan for each school district. While the present PCSSD Plan was not finalized in all of its particulars until April, 1992, the PCSSD has operated since 1989 under substantially the same plan. Thus, the PCSSD will highlight for the Court its efforts and activities since 1989 which it believes warrant a finding of unitary status. THE APPLICABLE LAW In 1992, the United States Supreme Court discussed the issue of unitary status in Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992), explaining that: [A]s we explained last term in Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S._,_, 111 S. Ct. 630,636, 112 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1991 ), the term "unitary" is not a precise concept: "[l]t is a mistake to treat words such as 'dual' and 'unitary' as if they were actually found in the Constitution .... Courts have used the term dual' to denote a school system which has engaged in intentional segregation of students by race, and 'unitary' to describe a school system which has been brought into compliance with the command of the Constitution. We are not sure how useful it is to define these terms more precisely, or to create subclasses within them." It follows that we must be cautious not to attribute to the term a utility it does not have. The term "unitary" does not confine the discretion and authority of the District Court in a way that departs from traditional equitable principles. 112 s. Ct. at 1443-44. The Freeman court further explained that: [1] Proper resolution of any desegregation case turns on a careful assessment of its facts. ~. ~. at 439, 88 S. Ct., at 1694. Here, as 91963 3 in most cases where the issue is the degree of compliance with a school desegregation decree, a critical beginning point is the degree of racial imbalance in the school district, that is to say a comparison of the proportion of majority to minority students in individual schools with the proportions of the races in the district as a whole. This inquiry is fundamental, for under the fonner de jure regimes racial exclusion was both the means and the end of a policy motivated by disparagement of or hostility towards the disfavored race. In accord with this principle, the District Court began its analysis with an assessment of the current racial mix in the schools throughout DCSS and the explanation for the racial imbalance it found. 112 S. Ct. at 1437. The PCSSD will comply with this requirement, as did the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1996 in the Wilmington case when it affinned the district court's declaration of unitary status in Coaljtion to Save Our Children v. State Board of Education of the State of Delaware, et al .. 90 F.3d 752 (3rd Cir. 1996): A critical starting point in identifying vestiges of discrimination is the degree of racial imbalance in the school districts. This inquiry is fundamental, because under the fonner de jure regime, a racial exclusion was both the means and the end of a policy motivated by disparagement of, and hostility towards, the disfavored race. The Court's 1968 opinion in Green squarely addressed this issue, noting that "[t]he pattern of separate 'white' and 'Negro' schools ... established under compulsion of state laws is precisely the pattern of segregation to which Brown I and Brown 11 were particularly addressed." ~. 391 U.S. at 435, 88 S. Ct. at 1693. However, the ~ Court also made clear that in examining the problem of racial imbalance in our schools, we are to look "not just to the composition of student bodies ... but to every facet of school operations - faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities." J.Q..; see also Swann. 402 U.S. at 18, 91 s. Ct. at 1277 (the Green factors are "among the most important indicia of segregated system.") Because compliance with~ factors is a condition precedent to unitary status, we will survey each of those factors here. 90 F.3d at 760. The PCSSD will likewise assess the Green factors especially as each of them is - addressed in its Desegregation Plan. The Wjlmjngton Court also commented upon 91963 4 ,. - federal court supervisien in general. Addressing the Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins. the WjJmjngton Court noted: Given the Court's recent assertion that federal supervision of local school districts "'was intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination,'" Jenkins._ U.S. _115 S. Ct. at 2049 (quoting Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247, 111 S. Ct. at 637), we underscore that the phrase "to the extent practicable" implies a reasonable limit on the duration of that federal supervision. Indeed, to extend federal court supervision indefinitely is neither practicable, desirable, nor proper. 90 F.3d at 760. The Wilmington Court further explained that: This equitable remedy and, by definition, its jurisprudential legitimacy, were meant to have a limited lifespan. The remedy was designed to serve only as an implement for monitoring and guidance, not as a permanent substitute for state and local school boards, or r*84] indeed, for the state legislature. Thus in our zeal to insure maximum educational opportunities for all Delaware school students, the federal courts must bear in mind that the responsibility for administering the schools ultimately belongs to locally elected officials. Indeed, we must acknowledge that although it has been proper for us to supervise multiple generations of students in the service of unassailable ideals, in the process we have also denied multiple generations of elected officials the freedom to participate fully in representative government. 90 F.3d at 779. Additional legal principles and teachings from other cases will be set forth as appropriate infra as particular topics are addressed. THE LAW OF THIS CASE The Court of Appeals, in its 1990 decision, reaffirmed the 1985 en bane court's decision that the previously mandated territorial exchanges were the remedy for all of the interdistrict violations. It explained that: 91963 We also held, however, agreeing in this respect with the District Court, that interdistrict violations of the Constitution had occurred, and that an interdistrict remedy was accordingly required. We directed the District 5 Court, on remaRd, to adjust the boundary between LRSD and PCSSD in two respects: (1) by transferring the Granite Mountain area from LRSD to PCSS0; and (2) by expanding LRS0 so that the new boundary line between it and PCSSD would be the city limits of the City of Little Rock, as they then existed. We further held - addressing the question of student attendance within each of the districts - that "each school district as reconstituted shall be required to revise its attendance zones so that each school will reasonably reflect the racial composition of its district." Litt! Rock School District v, Pulaski County Special School District. m. 778 F .2d at 435. Our opinion included a number of other directions with respect to magnet schools, student-attendance arrangements, and other matters. The District Court held that LRSD would automatically expand whenever the city annexed new territory, so that LRSD would always be contiguous with the city as it existed from time to time. We reversed. We held that the remedy contemplated by our en bane opinion was intended to be a complete cure for all interdistrict violations that we had found. The en bane opinion, we said, prescribed "a full and sufficient correction of wrongs done in the past," including all interdistrict violations. Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District, 805 F.2d 815, 816 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District. 921. F.2d 1371, 1377 (8th Cir. 1990) It is significant to note that many features of the PCSSD Plan, the lnterdistrict Plan, and the Plans of the other school districts were not specifically mandated as remedial devices by the Court of Appeals. For instance, the six interdistrict schools, while subsequently embraced by the Court of Appeals, were never mandated as part of any prescribed remedy. For that matter, the Court of Appeals never specifically mandated that the PCSSD pursue affirmative action in hiring and in staffing its schools and other operations. Indeed, it held in 1985 that the territorial transfer was the remedy for, among other things, violations in the areas of special education, transportation, and employment of faculty and administrators. Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District, 778 F.2d 404, 434-435 (8th Cir. 1985). 91963 6 To be sure, these topics and others are prominently featured in the Plan. Some are among the ~ factors to be discussed later. However, because they were not specifically mandated as part of any remedy, issues arise such as burden of proof as to compliance and will be discussed fully infra. THE GREEN FACTORS I. RACIAL BALANCE AND STUDENT ASSIGNMENT The guidelines for racial balance in all three districts were initially addressed and laid down by the en bane Court in 1985. It explained then that: In constructing a desegregation remedy, a court may not rigidly require a particular racial balance. Pasadena Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-38, 96 S. Ct. 2697, 2704-06, 49 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1976); Milliken 1,418 U.S. at 739-40, 94 S. Ct. at 3124-25; Swann, 402 U.S. at 22-25, 91 S. Ct. at 1279-81 . Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the awareness of the racial composition of a school district or school districts is a useful starting point in developing an effective remedy, and thus the limited use of racial ratios is within the Court's equitable discretion. Swann, 402 U.S. at 25, 91 S. Ct. at 1280. Thus, the Supreme Court has approved a remedy imposed by the district court requiring that all schools in the school district be roughly within the same racial balance. Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,455 n. 3, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2945 n. 3, 61 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1979): Swann, 402 U.S. at 23-25, 91 S. Ct. at 1279-80. Our Court has consequently approved the use of flexible ratios in desegregation remedies on numerous occasions ... In any event, in this case, we have closely tailored the remedy to the violations and we are not requiring a particular racial balance in each district (Citations omitted.) LRSD V. pcssp, 778 F.2d at 433. 91963 The en bane Court then articulated the guideline applicable in this case: 4. After the boundaries between LRSD and PCSSD have been adjusted, each school district as reconstituted shall be required to revise its attendance zones so that each school will reasonably reflect the racial composition of its district. Consistent with ear1ier district court orders with respect to these schools, school districts may, where necessary, be pennitted to depart from this remedial guideline in that school 7 enrollments niay over- or underrepresent blacks or whites by as much as one-fourth of the remedial guideline for either race. We see no reason why, on this record, the variance should exceed this level. [Emphasis added.] 778 F.2d at 435: Ultimately, of course, the current PCSSD Plan was examined by the Court of Appeals which approved the student assignment goals agreed to by all of the parties. The Court of Appeals explicitly approved the student assignment goals of the PCSSD and the other parties interpreting them as follows: So far as racial ratios were concerned, the Plan included the following goals: 13. With the exception of Bayou Meto, the goal of the plan shall be to achieve a minimum black student enrollment of 20% by the end of six years in all PCSSD schools .... 14. With the exception of Bayou Meto, it is hoped that the dynamics of the plan will result, by the end of the implementation period, in all PCSSD schools being within the range of plus or minus 25% of the then prevailing district-wide average of blacks by organizational level. However, at a minimum, at the end of the implementation period, no PCSSD school shall have a black enrollment which exceeds the then prevailing black ratio, by organizational level, in the Little Rock School District. LRSD v. PCSSD, 921 F.2d at 1378-79. As will be explained further, the PCSSD believes it has satisfied, for a period of years, the racial balance and student assignment components of its Plan. Before specifically examining the racial balance outcomes in the PCSSD, it is useful to examine the racial balance outcomes that pertain in Freeman v. Pitts, in which a declaration of unitary status was affirmed even upon facts dramatically different than the outcomes found in the PCSSD. As the Supreme Court explained in Freeman: 91963 8 Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake. It is to be pursued when racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation. once the racial imbalance due to the de jure violation has been remedied, the school district is under no duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors. Swann, 402 U.S., at 31-32, 91 S. Ct., at 1283-84 ("Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the system. This does not mean that federal courts are without power to deal with future problems; but in the absence of a showing that either the school authorities or some other agency of the State has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court should not be necessary"). If the unlawful de jure policy of a school system has been the cause of the racial imbalance in student attendance, that condition must be remedied. The school district bears the burden of showing that any current imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation. 112 S. Ct. at 1447. It is instructive to set forth the outcomes of the DeKalb County schools as summarized by the United States Supreme Court. Concerned with racial imbalance in the various schools of the district, respondents presented evidence that during the 1986-1987 school year DCSS had the following features: (1) 47% of the students attending DCSS were black; (2) 50% of the black students attended schools that were over 90% black; (3) 62% of all black students attended schools that had more than 20% more blacks than the systemwide average; ( 4) 27% of white students attended schools that were more than 90% white; (5) 59% of the white students attended schools that had more than 20% more whites than the systemwide average; (06) of the 22 DCSS high schools, five had student populations that were more than 90% black, while five other schools had student populations that were more than 80% white; and (7) of the 7 4 elementary schools in DCSS, 18 are over 90% black, while 10 are over 90% white. !d..,, at 31 a. 112 S. Ct. at 1438. Despite these statistical outcomes, the United States Supreme Court found that the system was unitary with respect to student assignment and racial balance. As we 91963 9 - will examine below, the track record of the PCSSD is far superior to that of the schools in DeKalb County, Georgia, is in compliance with any and all tests which may be reasonably applied, and that the PCSSD has demonstrated its entitlement to unitary status. THE PCSSD OUTCOMES District-wide, the racial composition of the PCSSD since 1989 has been as follows: 89-90 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT EIGHT YEAR ENROLLMENT COMPARISON 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 Total 21 .607 21 ,597 21 ,062 21 ,633 20.426 20,417 20,534 20,295 % Black 26 26 27 28 30 31 32 33 91963 10 . Since 1989, the composition of the District's elementary schools has been as follows: School Adkins Elem Arnold Drive Elem Baker Elem Bates Elem Bayou Meto Elem Cato Elem Clinton Elem College Station Elem Crystal Hill Elem Dupree Elem Fuller Elem Harris Elem Jacksonville Elem Landmark Elem Lawson Elem Oak Grove Elem Oakbrooke Elem Pine Forrest Elem Pinewood Elem Robinson Elem PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT EIGHT YEAR ENROLLMENT COMPARISON2 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 Total 371 360 352 420 411 397 % Black 40 36 39 36 37 39 Total 387 411 408 390 348 375 % Black 18 16 14 18 23 25 Total 294 291 268 283 294 304 % Black 27 30 25 27 25 24 Total 698 638 737 680 599 550 % Black 47 46 47 45 45 53 Total 602 596 6