Court filings concerning LRSD approval of revised desegregation and education plan and PCSSD petition for release from federal court supervision

District Court, motion for extension of time to respond to Little Rock School District (LRSD) motion for approval of revised desegregation and education plan; District Court, Joshua intervenors' request for a hearing to develop procedures for the consideration of the motion of the Little Rock School District (LRSD) for the approval of a revised plan; District Court, Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) petition for release from federal court supervision; Court of Appeals, ruling; Court of Appeals, reply brief of Mrs. Lorene Joshua et al.; District Court, Knight intervenors' response to motion for approval of Little Rock School District's (LRSD's) revised desegregation and education plan; District Court, Little Rock School District's (LRSD's) reply to the Joshua intervenors' request for a hearing to develop procedures for the consideration of the motion of the Little Rock School District (LRSD) for the approval of a revised plan; District Court, two orders; District Court, motion for an extension of time to respond to Pulaski County Special School District's (PCSSD's) petition for release from federal court supervision; District Court, three orders; District Court, notice of filing, Arkansas Department of Education (ADE) project management tool; District Court, Joshua intervenors' first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents regarding Little Rock School District's (LRSD's) motion for approval of the revised desegregation and education plan This transcript was created using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and may contain some errors. IN THE U ITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT v. O. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL . DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL. MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL. KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL. RECEIVED OCT 8 1997 OFFICE OF DESEGREGATION MONITORING PLAINTIFF DEFENDA TS INTERVENORS INTERVENORS MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO LRSD MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF REVISED DESEGREGATION AND EDUCATION PLAN Knight Intervenors, et al., by and through their attorneys, ROACHELL LAW FIRM. for their Motion, state: 1. They were served with a copy of the Little Rock School District's Motion for Approval of its Revised Desegregation and Education Plan on September 29, 1997. 2. Due to several of the leaders of the Knight, et al. Intervenors being out of town, there will be insufficient time to frame a response to its Motion. 3. Knight, et al., Intervenors should be granted an extension of ten (10) days in which to respond to the Motion. WHEREFORE, Knight, et al., Intervenors prays that it be granted an additional ten days or until October 19, 1997, to respond to the Motion for Approval of LRSD's Revised Desegregation and Education Plan and that they be granted all other relief to which they may be entitled Respectfully submitted, Richard W. Roachell Arkansas Bar No. 78132 ROACHELL LAW FIRM 401 West Capitol Avenue, Suite 504 The Lyon Building Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 (501) 375-5550 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Richard W. Roachell, do hereby certify and state that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, on October 6, 1997 to the following persons: Mr. John W. Walker John W. Walker, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72201 Ms. Ann Brown ODM Heritage West Building. Ste. 510 201 East Markham Street Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Timothy Gauger Assistant Attorney General 323 Center Street, Suite 200 Little Rock, AR 72201 2 Mr. Christopher Heller FRIDAY, ELDREDGE & CLARK 2000 First Commercial Building Little Rock, AR 72201 M. Samuel Jones ill WRIGHT, LINDSEY & JE::-.iNJNGS 200 West Capitol Avenue Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Stephen W. Jones 3400 TCBY Tower 425 West Capitol Avenue Little Rock, AR 72201 Richard W. Roache!! .,- ----- .. - 'RECEIVED FILED U.S. DISTRICT COURT !:ASTERN DISTRICT ARKANSAS - OCT 9 1997 OCT 7 1997 OfflCE OF DESEGREGATION MONITORING IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION JAMES W. McCORMACK, Cl.ERK LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. PLAINTIFFS V. NO. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS INTERVENORS MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL. KATHERINE W. KNIGHT, ET AL. THE JOSHUA INTERVENORS' REQUEST FOR A HEARING TO DEVELOP PROCEDURES FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE MOTION OF THE LRSD FOR THE APPROVAL OF A REVISED PLAN On November 30, 1995, the LRSD filed a motion for an order - dismissing this case retroactively. This court, which had by that time considerable knowledge about the quality of plan implementation efforts in the LRSD, denied the motion on March 11, 1996. This court reasoned in part (at 8): The LRSD has frequently exhibited indifference or outright recalcitrance towards its commitments (although some improvements have been made). Therefore, the Court finds that an order of dismissal should be deferred in order to ensure compliance with the plans and the agreement. Even had the LRSD acted in good faith throughout the years, the logistics and complexity of this case are such that this Court's monitoring function would be impaired by entering an order of dismissal at this time. On September 26, 1997, the LRSD filed a brief motion and a short memorandum seeking "approval of LRSD's revised desegregation and education plan." Despite the foregoing ruling, the memorandum, incorporated by reference in the motion (para. 1 - 10), asserts that "LRSD has now substantially complied with its obligations under the plan for six years." AT 1. It also characterizes the new plan as one which "leaves it to the district's professionals to determine the best means to fulfill each obligation." At 4. In brief, officials found to exhibit frequently "indifference or outright recalcitrance toward (their] commitments" asset that they are entitled to have the court approve a largely standardless plan. Put another way, LRSD asserts the right to have approved a plan under which a number of unidentified persons define the content of the district's obligations, as they go along. It is apparent that the motion of the LRSD presents - substantial questions, warranting careful consideration. The predicate for this view is not limited to the foregoing general observations about the past performance and the degree of discretion granted by the plan. First. LRSD cites the Supreme Court decision in Rufo v Inmates of Suffolk Co. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992), concerning modification of a consent decree. That decision holds that a party seeking modification of a consent decree "bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree." Id., at 383. It "may meet it initial burden by showing a significant change either in factual conditions or in law." Id., at 384 . In considering factual matter, it is appropriate to evaluate whether a party "made a 2 reasonable effort to comply with the decree .... " Id., at 385. Second. Once a party has met its burden of showing a factual or legal matter warranting modification, the court "should determine whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstances." Id., at 391. This can not be said is there is simply an effort "to rewrite a consent decree so that is conforms to the constitutional floor." Id. Third. The Court of Appeals applied Rufo in this case to a proposal concerning the closing of Ish Incentive School. LRSD v PCSSD, 56 F3d 904, 912-15 (8th Cir. 1995). In approving that proposal, the court emphasized with regard to the replacement school for Ish students, "King will be integrated." Id., at 914. In the light of the foregoing factors, including the - standards governing in the case of a request for modification of a consent decree, the Joshua Intervenors seek a hearing to discuss at least the following factors. (1.) An opportunity for intervenors to conduct discovery. The LRSD relies to a considerable extent on assertion. The plan refers to policies (unspecified) in many areas. The meaning of the educational component of the plan is not self-evident. The quality of implementation efforts is relevant under Rufo. The impact of the student assignment proposals on desegregation is significant in view of the appellate ruling in this case cited above. (2.) The need for a report or reports by the Office of Desegregation Monitoring regarding the nature and the quality of 3 LRSD implementation in key areas. The LRSD seeks to dilute its obligation to address achievement disparity, as wells racial disparity in other areas. Compare the initial portion of the Interdistrict Plan to the new plan. It is appropriate to request ODM to determine whether the LRSD made an organized effort to eliminate the achievement disparity and other racial disparities to the extent possible, before changing the plan. Rufo addresses the quality of implementation efforts, and cautions against efforts to move to the "constitutional floor: -- from the provisions to which a party voluntarily agreed. (3.) The possibility of a delay in the consideration of the motion until the court of appeals reviews the denial of a fee award to intervenors' counsel. The parties should be on equal - footing when addressing such fundamental changes in the plans. That is not the case now. (4.) A time period for the intervenors to respond to the motion, whatever the court's reaction to these issues. District court decisions cited by the LRSD do not warrant the relief sought by the District. In the Denver litigation, the court found in 1987 that "the defendants have made a sincere and strenuous effort to meet the requirements of the October 1985 Order.'' Keyes v School District No. 1, 653 F. Supp. 1536, 1540 (D. Colo. 1987); see also Keyes, 902 F. Supp. 1274, 1286 (D. Colo. 1995) ("The District has complied in good faith with the Interim Decree entered by this Court in 1987."). The court in the Dallas case voted significant improvement in the district's 4 implementation efforts over time. Tasby v. Woolery, 869 F. Supp. 454, 457, 460, 477 (N.D. Tex. 1994). This case does not present a parallel situation. Here, the court has found implementation to be deficient. E.g., Order of March 11, 1996, at 8-9. (5.) The district's request that ODM monitoring continue to be restrained. In intervenor's view, as noted, ODM monitoring should focus on key elements of the current plan and that the ODM monitoring role should be consisitent with the one which the Court of Appeals established. (6.) The actions, advice and recommendations provided by the court or through the ODM to the school district which actions. advice and recommendations have not been otherwise shared with the intervenors. CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the Joshua Intervenors respectfully move the court to set a hearing for the purpose of developing procedures for the consideration of the motion of the LRSD for the approval of the revised plan. The Intervenors further respectfully request that ODM monitoring be resumed and continued in the interim and in the manner contemplated and directed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. With respect this requested relief, Joshua also respectfully requests that the court and the ODM disclose any and all information, assistance, advice and counsel which, it or anyone associated with the court, have provided to the Little Rock School District or any of its employees, board members or agents during the past year, during 5 - the time when monitoring was abated. Respectfully submitted, John W. Walker, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72206 (501) 374-3758 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I do hereby state that a copy of the foregoing pleading was s~ry~ via United States mail to all counsel of record on this ~ day of October, 1997. 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT PLAINTIFF ., V . NO . LR - C - 8 2 - 8 6.it. PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL NECEn,m DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL. DEFENDANTS MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL. DCi 14 1997 INTERVENORS KATHERINE KNIGHT I ET AL. OFFICE OF INTERVENORS DESEGREGATION MONITOR/NG PCSSD PETITION FOR RELEASE FROM FEDERAL COURT SUPERVISION INTRODUCTION The PCSSD believes that it has earned unitary status. It asks this Court co examine the record that has been made, to hold a hearing on those issues, if any, which might be legitimately in controversy, and to ultimately enter its decree declaring that the PCSSD has earned unitary status and release it from further court supervision. In this peticion, the PCSSD will briefly revisit the background of this case, will set forth the controlling law, will examine the determinations of other courts from around the country which have declared other districts to be unitary, and will then apply the facts of this case to the controlling legal principles. BACKGROUND This action was filed on November 30, 1982 by the LRSD against the PCSSD and others. 1 Liability was adjudicated against the PCSSD and others on April 10, 1984 and a consolidation of the three school districts in Pulaski County was ordered. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (hereafter the Court of Appeals), en bane, affirmed mos~ of the findings of liability of the district court, but reversed the court ordered consolidation and prescribed a different remedy. The Court of Appeals ordered that the boundaries of the LRSD would become those of the city of Little Rock as they then existed. ~he Court of Appeals also ordered the transfer of the Granite Moun~ain community from the LRSD to the PCSSD. As a result of these transfers, the PCSSD lost 36% of its tax base, one-third of its schools, and 25% of its students. In the same opinion, the Court of Appeals ordered all three districts t o develop desegregation plans that would distribute students in a way such that each school would have approximately the same racial balance as each district had as a whole. Significantly, the Court of Appeals specifically held that the remedy it then ordered was a comolete remedy for the constitutional violations of which the PCSSD had been found guilty; specifically those violations relating to annexations and deannexatior.s, segregated housing, school siting, student 1The LRSD supports the PCSSD in its petition for unitary status. assignments, special education, transportation, employment of faculty and administrators, and black participation in school affairs. Thereafter, o~her proceedings occurred, both before the district court and the Court of Appeals, culminating in 1989 in the Settlement Agreement and the agreed upon Desegregation Plan for each school district. While the present PCSSD Plan was not =inalized in all of its particulars until April, 1992, the PCSSD has operated since 1989 under substantially the same plan. Thus, the PCSSD will highlight for the Court its efforts and activities since 1989 which it believes warrant a finding of unitary status. THE APPLICABLE LAW In 1992, the United States Supreme Court discussed the issue of unitary status ~n Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992), explaining that: [A)s we explained last term in Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. , , 111 S.Ct. 630, 636, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991), the term "unitary" is not a precise concept: "[I)t is a mistake to treat words such as 'dual' and 'unitary' as if they were actually found in the Constitution .... Courts have used the term 'dual' to denote a school system which has engaged in intentional segregation of students by race, and 'unitary' to describe a school system which has been brought into compliance with the command of the Constitution. We are not sure how useful it is to define these terms more precisely, or to create subclasses within them." It follows that we must be cautious not to attribute to the term a utility it does not have. The term "unitary" does not confine the discretion and authority 3 of the District Court in a way that departs from traditional equitable principles. 112 S.Ct. at 1443-44. The Freeman court further explained that: [l] Proper resolution of any desegregation case turns on a careful assessment of its facts. Green, supra, at 439, 88 S.Ct., at 1694. Here, as in most cases where the issue is the degree of compliance with a school desegregation decree, a critical beginning point is the degree of racial imbalance in the school district, that is to say a comparison of the proportion of majority to minority students in individual schools with the proportions of the races in the district as a whole. This inquiry is fundamental, for under the former de jure regimes racial exclusion was both the means and the end of a policy motivated by disparagement of or hostility towards the disfavored race. In accord with this principle, the District Court began its analysis with an assessment of the current racial mix in the schools throughout DCSS and the explanation for the racial imbalance it found. 112 S.Ct. at 1437. The PCSSD will comply with this requirement, as did the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1996 in the Wilmington case when it af:irmed the district court's declaration of unitary scatus in Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Board of Education of the State of Delaware, et al., 90 F.3d 752 (3rd Cir. 1996) : A critical starting point in identifying vestiges of discrimination is the degree of racial imbalance in the school districts. This inquiry is fundamental, because under the former de jure regime, a racial exclusion was both the means and the end of a policy motivated by disparagement of, and hostility towards, the disfavored race. The Court's 1968 opinion in Green squarely addressed this issue, noting that "[t]he pattern of separate 'white' and 'Negro' schools ... established under compulsion of state laws is precisely the pattern of segregation to which Brown I and Brown II were particularly addressed." Green, 391 U.S. at 435, 88 S.Ct. at 1693. However, the Green Court also made clear that in examining the problem of racial imbalance in 4 our schools, we are to look "not just to the composition of student bodies ... but to every facet of school operations - - faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities." Id.; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 18, 91 S.Ct. at 1277 (the Green factors are "among the most important indicia of segregated system.") Because compliance with Green factors is a condition precedent to unitary status, we will survey each of those factors here. 90 F.3d at 760. The PCSSD will likewise assess the Green factors especially as each of them is addressed in its Desegregation Plan. The Wilminoton Court also commented upon federal court supervision in general. Addressing the Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins, the Wilminoton Court noted: Given the Court's recent assertion that federal supervision of local school districts "'was intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination,"' Jenkins, U.S. , 115 S.Ct. at 2049 (quoting Dowell, 498 U.S. at:247, 111 S.C~. at 637), we underscore that the phrase "to the extent praccicable" implies a reasonable limit on the duration of that federal supervision. Indeed, to extend federal court supervision indefinitely is neither practicable, desirable, nor proper. 90 F.3d at 760. The Wilmington Court further explained that: This equitable remedy and, by definition, its jurisprudential legitimacy, were meant to have a limited lifespan. The remedy was designed to serve only as an implement for monitoring and guidance, not as a permanent substitute for state and local school boards, or [**84] indeed, for the state legislature. Thus in our zeal to insure maximum educational opportunities for all Delaware school students, the federal courts must bear in mind that the responsibility for administering the schools ultimately belongs to locally elected officials. Indeed, we must acknowledge that although it has been proper for us to supervise multiple generations of students in the service of unassailable ideals, in the process we have also denied multiple generations of elected officials the freedom to participate fully in representative government. 90 F.3d at 779 5 Additional legal principles and teachings from other cases will be set forth as appropriate infra as particular topics are addressed. THE LAW OF THIS CASE The Court of Appeals, in its 1990 decision, reaffirmed the 1985 en bane court's decision that the previously mandated territorial exchanges were the remedy for all of the interdistrict violations. It explained that: We also held, however, agreeing in this respect with the District Court, that interdistrict violations of the Constitution had occurred, and that an interdistrict remedy was accordingly required. We directed the District Court, on remand, to adjust the boundary between LRSD and PCSSD in two respects: (1 ) by transferring the Granite Mountain area from LRSD to PCSSD; and (2) by expanding LRSD so that the new boundary line becween it and PCSSD would be the city limits of the City of Little Rock, as they then existed. We further held--addressing the question of student attendance within each of the districts--that "each school district as reconstituted shall be required to revise its attendance zones so that each school will reasonably reflect the racial composition of its district." Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District, supra, 778 F.2d at 435. Our opinion included a number of other directions with respect to magnet schools, student-attendance arrangements, and other matters. The District Court held that LRSD would automatically expand whenever the city annexed new territory, so that LRSD would always be contiguous with the city as it existed from time to time. We reversed. We held that the remedy contemplated by our en bane opinion was intended to be a complete cure for all interdistrict violations that we had found. The en bane opinion, we said, prescribed "a full and sufficient correction of wrongs done in the past," including all interdistrict violations. Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District, 805 F.2d 815, 816 (8th Circ. 1986) (per curiam) . Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District, 921 F.2d 1371, 1377 (8th Cir. 1990) 6 It is significant to note that many features of the PCSSD Plan, the Interdistrict Plan, and the Plans of the other school districts were not specifically mandated as remedial devices by the Court of Appeals. For instance, the six interdistrict schools, while subsequently embraced by the Court of Appeals, were never mandated as part of any prescribed remedy. For that matter, the Court of Appeals never specifically mandated that the PCSSD pursue affirmative action in hiring and in staffing its schools and other operations. Indeed, it held in 1985 that the territorial transfer was the remedy for, among other things, violations in the areas of special education, transportation, and employment of faculty and administrators. Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Soecial School District, 778 F.2d 404, 434-435 (8th Cir. 1985 ) . To be sure, these topics and others are prominently featured in the Plan. Some are among the Green factors to be discussed later. However, because they were not specifically mandated as part of any remedy, issues arise such as burden of proof as to compliance and will be discussed fully infra. were 1985. THE GREEN FACTORS I. RACIAL BALANCE AND STUDENT ASSIGNMENT The guidelines for racial balance in all three districts initially addressed and laid down by the en bane Court in It explained then that: In constructing a desegregation remedy, a court may not rigidly require a particular racial balance. Pasadena Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-38, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-06, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 ((1976); 7 Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 739-40, 94 S.Ct. at 3124-25; Swann, 402 U.S. at 22-25, 91 S.Ct. at 1279-81. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the awareness of the racial composition of a school district or school districts is a useful starting point in developing an effective remedy, and thus the limited use of racial ratios is within the Court's equitable discretion. Swann, 402 U.S. at 25, 91 S.Ct. at 1280. Thus, the Supreme Court has approved a remedy imposed by the district court requiring that all schools in the school district be roughly within the same racial balance. Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 455 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2941, 2945 n. 3, 61 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979); Swann, 402 U.S. at 23-25, 91 S.Ct. at 1279-80. Our Court has consequently approved the use of flexible ratios in desegregation remedies on numerous occasions ... In any event, in this case, we have closely tailored the remedy to the violations and we are not requiring a particular racial balance in each district (Citations omitted.) LRSD v. PCSSD, 778 F.2d at 433. The en bane Court then articulated the guideline applicable in this case: 4. After the boundaries between LRSD and PCSSD have been adjusted, each school district as reconstituted shall be required to revise its attendance zones so that each school will reasonably reflect the racial composition of its district. Consistent with earlier district court orders with respect to these schools, school districts may, where necessary, be permitted to depart from this remedial guideline in that school enrollments may over- or underrepresent blacks or whites by as much as one-fourth of the remedial guideline for either race. We see no reason why, on this record, the variance should exceed this level. [Emphasis added.] 778 F.2d at 435. Ultimately, of course, the current PCSSD Plan was examined by the Court of Appeals which approved the student assignment goals agreed to by all of the parties. The Court of Appeals 8 explicitly approved the student assignment goals of the PCSSD and the other parties interpreting them as follows: So far as racial ratios were concerned, the Plan included the following goals: 13. With the exception of Bayou Meto, the goal of the plan shall be to achieve a minimum black student enrollment of 20% by the end of six years in all PCSSD schools .... 14. With the exception of Bayou Meto, it is hoped that the dynamics of the plan will result, by the end of the implementation period, in all PCSSD schools being within the range of plus or minus 25% of the then prevailing district-wide average of blacks by organizational level. However, at a minimum, at the end of the implementation period, no PCSSD school shall have a black enrollment which exceeds the then prevailing black ratio, by organizational level, in the Little Rock School District. LRSD v. PCSSD, 921 F.2d at 1378-79. - As will be explained further, the PCSSD believes it has satisfied, for a period of years, the racial balance and student assignment components of its Plan. Before specifically examining the racial balance outcomes in the PCSSD, it is useful to examine the racial balance outcomes that pertain in Freeman v. Pitts, in which a declaration of unitary status was affirmed even upon facts dramatically different than the outcomes found in the PCSSD. As the Supreme Court explained in Freeman: Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake. It is to be pursued when racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation. Once the racial imbalance due to the de jure violation has been remedied, the school district is under no duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors. Swann, 402 U.S., at 31-32, 91 S.Ct., at 1283-84 9 ("Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the system. This does not mean that federal courts are without power to deal with future problems; but in the absence of a showing that either the school authorities or some other agency of the State has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court should not be necessary"). If the unlawful de jure policy of a school system has been the cause of the racial imbalance in student attendance, that condition must be remedied. The school district bears the burden of showing that any current imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation. 112 S.Ct. at 1447. It is instructive to set forth the outcomes of the DeKalb County schools as summarized by the United States Supreme Court. Concerned with racial imbalance in the various schools of the district, respondents presented evidence that during che 1986-1987 school year DCSS had the following features: (1) 47% of the students attending DCSS were black; (2) 50% of the black students attended schools that were over 90% black; (3) 62% of all black students attended schools that had more than 20% more blacks than the systemwide average; (4) 27% of white students attended schools that were more than 90% white; (5) 59% of the white students attended schools that had more than 20% more whites than the systemwide average; (6) of the 22 DCSS high schools, five had student populations that were more than 90% black, while five other schools had student populations that were more than 80% white; and (7) of the 74 elementary schools in DCSS, 18 are over 90% black, while 10 are over 90% white. Id., at 31a. 112 s.ct. ac 1438. Despite these statistical outcomes, the United States Supreme Courc found that the system was unitary with respect to student assignment and racial balance. As we will examine below, the track record of the PCSSD is far superior to that of the 10 schools in DeKalb County, Georgia, is in compliance with any and all tests which may be reasonably applied, and that the PCSSD has demonstrated its entitlement to unitary status. THE PCSSD OUTCOMES District-wide, the racial composition of the PCSSD since 1989 has been as follows: I I 89-90 I I Total I 21,607 I I % Black I 26 I PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT EIGHT YEAR ENROLLMENT COMPARISON 90-91 I 91-92 I 92-93 I 93-94 I 94.95 21,597 I 21,062 I 21,633 I 20,426 I 20,417 26 I 27 I 28 I 30 I 31 I 95-96 I 96-97 I 20,534 I 20,295 I 32 I 33 Since 1989, the composition of the District's elementary schools has been as follows: School Adkins Elem Total % Black Arnold Drive Elem Total % Black Baker Elem Total % Black Bates Elem Total % Black Bayou Meto Elem Total % Black Cato Elem Total % Black Clinton Elem Total % Black College Station Elem Total % Black Crystal Hill Elem Total % Black PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT EIGHT YEAR ENROLLMENT COMPARISON' 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 93.94 371 360 352 420 411 40 36 39 36 37 387 411 408 390 348 18 16 14 18 23 294 291 268 283 294 27 30 25 27 25 698 638 737 680 599 47 46 47 45 45 602 596 611 648 649 2 2 2 1 1 656 655 663 650 569 21 24 21 21 22 242 279 310 326 277 40 38 34 33 40 776 746 40 43 94.95 95-96 96-97 397 343 312 39 36 38 375 380 381 25 24 22 304 318 318 24 27 24 550 485 464 53 56 54 639 635 628 1 2 3 523 552 542 23 22 22 661 661 739 49 50 47 316 309 323 43 41 41 791 790 778 45 46 46 21995-1996 School Racial Balance Monitoring Report: LRSD PCSSD Dated January 30, 1996, by Office of Desegregation Monitoring, Docket No. 2614 11 I I I School 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 Dupree Elem Total 470 414 431 458 428 435 462 438 % Black 20 21 24 23 22 22 26 26 Fuller Elem Total 587 560 529 524 473 431 381 375 % Black 57 56 58 57 63 58 57 59 Harris Elem Total 633 616 605 546 479 331 325 303 % Black 31 32 34 40 47 44 50 53 Jacksonville Elem Total 796 817 844 847 763 759 752 731 % Black 32 28 27 27 31 37 41 42 Landmark Elem Total 563 566 522 518 498 499 484 504 % Black 47 46 44 46 46 43 41 43 Lawson Elem Total 334 345 331 321 304 305 308 294 % Black 19 15 16 14 16 23 19 16 Oak Grove Elem Total 572 573 515 469 438 435 451 421 % Black 12 14 13 24 24 22 23 24 Oakbrooke Elem Total 678 659 629 592 600 449 455 453 % Black 25 21 18 18 21 22 23 24 Pine Forrest Elem Total 625 677 658 518 434 455 498 456 % Black 14 14 15 20 21 19 20 21 Pinewood Elem Total 614 619 631 619 580 549 579 543 % Black 27 27 27 30 31 29 31 35 Robinson Elem Total 450 433 443 420 411 388 387 382 % Black 22 22 23 25 24 22 25 21 Scott Elem Total 203 207 205 191 147 158 136 127 % Black 37 34 34 35 34 32 36 35 Sherwood Elem Total 518 448 443 490 450 459 463 416 % Black 24 24 26 24 26 24 27 25 Sylvan Hills Elem Total 755 802 755 735 685 424 444 422 % Black 18 16 17 18 23 21 25 24 Taylor Elem Total 455 468 423 420 388 409 420 397 % Black 24 28 26 26