Court filings: District Court, memorandum brief in support of Little Rock School District's (LRSD's) response to Pulaski County Special School District's (PCSSD's) motion for attorneys' fees, prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest as respects the pooling issue

The transcript for this item was created using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and may contain some errors. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT v. PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL JUN 3 n 1991 V I ' OFFICE OF DESEGREGATION MONITORING MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS INTERVENORS LRSD'S RESPONSE TO PCSSD'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST, AND POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST AS RESPECTS THE POOLING ISSUE I. Attorneys' Fees. Federal law governs PCSSD's request for attorneys' fees. A prevailing defendant can recover attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 only where the plaintiff's claim was frivolous. However, PCSSD is not a prevailing defendant, and even if it was, LRSD's pooling claim was not frivolous. Accordingly, PCSSD's motion for attorneys' fees should be denied. A. 42 u.s.c. 1988. Prevailing defendants in civil rights litigation may recover attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. However, the Supreme Court has declared that a prevailing defendant is entitled to attorneys' fees only in very narrow circumstances. Eichman v. Linden & Sons, Inc., 752 F.2d 1246, 1248 (7th Cir. 1985), citing Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412 (: l~Vcndky\lnd\pcu-foc.bri (1978). "A court may award prevailing defendants attorney's fees - under section 1988 only if the plaintiff's claim was 'frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or . . the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.'" Flowers v. Jefferson Hospital Ass'n, 49 F.3d 391, 392 (8th Cir. 1995), quoting Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 422. Moreover, the prevailing defendant must affirmatively prove that the plaintiff's claim was "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless." Marquart v. Lodge 837, 26 F.3d 842, 851 (8th Cir. 1994) ("A survey of the Eighth Circuit's most recent decisions awarding attorneys' fees to 'prevailing defendants' in civil rights cases reveals that this Circuit has been unwilling to award attorneys' fees where the defendant is unable to prove that the plaintiff's case is meritless. 11 ) (emphasis in original). PCSSD's claim for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 fails for two reasons. First, while PCSSD may have prevailed on the pooling issue, LRSD remains the "prevailing party" in the case as a whole. In Jenkins v. Missouri, F.3d , 1997 WL 268815, *l (8th Cir. 1997), the Eighth Circuit stated that "status as a prevailing party is determined on the outcome of the case as a whole, rather than by piecemeal assessment of how a party fares on each motion along the way." The court noted that "(t)his is true of matters decided after judgment on the merits, as well as those decided before." Id. Thus, PCSSD is not a "prevailing defendant" under 42 u.s.c. 1988. PCSSD's request for attorneys' fees also fails because LRSD's pooling claim was not "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless". (:\hofrc\/crdlcy\1n,d\pcw-foc .bri 2 LRSD's interpretation of the pooling agreement, although rejected by the this Court, was the only interpretation consistent with the language of the agreement and with the only contemporaneous explanation of the agreement. See Docket No. 2610. The Eighth Circuit described LRSD's interpretation of the pooling agreement as "completely logical." Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District, 60 F.3d 436, 437 {1995). LRSD's interpretation of the pooling agreement was not "frivolous", and as a result, PCSSD cannot recover attorneys' fees even if it was a prevailing defendant. PCSSD also argues that it may be awarded attorneys' fees under Ark. Code Ann. 16-22-308. State law governs the award of attorneys' fees only in diversity cases where the underlying claim was governed by state law. In federal question cases, attorneys' fees cannot be awarded unless authorized by federal law. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 {1975). The present case is a federal question case. This Court's original jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. 1331{a), 1343(3) and (4) 2201 and 2202 and 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1988 and 2000d. Jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement is based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (6). See Docket Nos. 1947 and 2337. Because this Court's jurisdiction was and is based on federal law, attorneys' fees cannot be awarded under Ark. Code Ann. 16- 22-308. In Home Savings Bank v. Gillam, 952 F.2d 1152 {9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth circuit reversed an award of attorneys' fees based f:\hancVcrdky\Jr,d\p:::u--fcc.bti 3 on state law where the district court's jurisdiction was based on a federal question. The court stated: Because established federal common law disfavors the award of attorney's fees in federal question cases absent an express congressional directive, we hold that the district court erred in applying Alaska's law on attorney's fees. Incorporation of state law occurs in federal question cases only in the absence of federal coJillDon law or statutory law. * * * Since the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 95 s.ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), the rule in federal courts had been that, absent an express statutory coJillDand, attorney's fees will not be awarded in civil cases. Id., at 1162 (emphasis supplied). PCSSD's reliance on TCBY Systems, Inc. v. RSP Co., 33 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 1994), is misplaced. Jurisdiction in that case was based on diversity. As the Supreme Court noted in Alyeska, "A very - different situation is presented when a federal court sits in a diversity case." Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 259 n.31. Therefore, federal law governs PCSSD's request for attorneys' fees. Under 42 U.S.C. 1988, a prevailing defendant can recover attorneys' fees only where the plaintiff's claim was frivolous. However, PCSSD is not a prevailing defendant, and even if it were, LRSD's claim was not frivolous. attorneys' fees should be denied. B. Timeliness. Accordingly, PCSSD's motion for Included in PCSSD's fee request is work performed before this Court's Order dated March 16, 1994. PCSSD failed to request attorneys' fees within 14 days of that Order. Consequently, they r:\horne\fcrdlcy\l r.d\p::114-(oc .bti 4 have waived any right to fees for work performed before the March - 16, 1994. See Local Rule B-3. D. Work on Appeal. Also included in PCSSD's fee request is work performed on the two Eighth Circuit appeals of the pooling issue. In each case, PCSSD failed to timely file a request with the Eighth Circuit to recover attorneys' fees for its work on appeal. A substantial question exists as to whether this Court has authority to award attorneys' fees for work on appeal absent the issue being remanded by the Eighth Circuit. See Eighth Circuit Rule 4 7C. This is currently one of the issues pending before the Eighth Circuit in the State's appeal of this Court's award of attorney's fees to LRSD and PCSSD. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 19, Appeal No. 97- 1350, attached hereto as Exhibit A. LRSD prays that this Court stay any award of fees for work on appeal pending the Eighth Circuit's resolution of this issue. Moreover, PCSSD did not prevail on the first appeal of this issue. LRSD appealed this Court's March 16, 1994 order, and the Eighth Circuit vacated the order and directed this Court to "take evidence regarding the purposes of the clauses at issue." See Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District, 60 F.3d 435, 436 (8th Cir. 1995). Even if this Court finds that PCSSD is entitled to a reasonable fee, PCSSD should not be compensated for work on this first appeal in which PCSSD lost. f:\homeVcndlcy\Jnd'9c-fec .bri 5 E. Reasonable Hourly Rate. In an Order filed December 12, 1996, this Court awarded attorneys' fees to PCSSD for the work of M. Samuel Jones and Claire Hancock at an hourly rate of $160.00 and $145.00, respectively. See Docket No. 2883. The State has appealed contending that these hourly rates are excessive. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 23, Appeal No. 97-1350, attached hereto as Exhibit A. Even so, PCSSD now asks for an even higher hourly rate for the work of attorneys Jones and Hancock. LRSD believes that the hourly rates awarded by this Court in its December 12, 1996 Order are reasonable and, unless reduced by the Eighth Circuit, should be applied in the present case should a fee be awarded. F. Lack of Detail. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme Court stated that the "fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates." The Eighth Circuit has held that " [ i] nadequate documentation may warrant a reduced fee." H.J. Inc. v. Flygt Corp., 925 F.2d 257,260 (8th Cir. 1991). "Incomplete or imprecise billing records preclude any meaningful review by the district court of the fee application for 'excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary' hours . II The Supreme Court in Hensley noted that "at should identify the general subject matter expenditures." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 n.12. least counsel of his time In H.J. Inc., supra, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's 20% fee (;\hon-c\fcndlcy\lnd\p::sfc,c.bti 6 reduction based on inadequate documentation where the fee applicant's time records included numerous vague entries such as "legal research", "trial prep" and "met w/ client." Similarly, the vast majority of PCSSD's time entries contain no description of the subject matter on which time was spent. This failure justifies a significant reduction in any fee awarded to PCSSD. II. Prejudgment Interest. As with its argument for attorneys' fees, PCSSD incorrectly relies on Arkansas law and federal diversity cases to support its request for prejudgment interest. Federal law governs whether prejudgment interest may be awarded in federal question cases. See Mansker v. TMG Life Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 1322, 1330 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The question of whether interest is to be allowed, and also the rate of computation, is a question of federal law where the cause of action arises from a federal statute."). Under federal law as interpreted by the Eighth Circuit, PCS SD' s motion for prejudgment interest is untimely and should be denied. See Reyher v. Champion International Corp., 975 F.2d 483, 489 (8th Cir. 1992). In Reyher, supra, the Eighth circuit held that the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 apply to postjudgment motions for prejudgment interest. Id. Rule 59 requires that postjudgment motion be filed within 10 days of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). When a motion is untimely under Rule 59 ( e) , "the district court loses jurisdiction over that motion and any ruling on it becomes a nullity." Id. f:\horne \fcn:tlcy\lr'ld\p:;:N-(ce.bri 7 Judgment was entered in favor of PCSSD on July 30, 1996. Docket No. 2724. PCSSD did not file its request for prejudgment interest until on or about June 5, 1997. Thus, PCSSD's motion for prejudgment interest is untimely under Rule 59 and should be denied. 1 III. Postjudgment Interest. As with the above issues, PCSSD incorrectly relies on Arkansas law to support it claim for postjudgment interest. Post judgment interest on judgments of federal district courts is governed by 28 u.s.c. 1961. LRSD admits that it owes PCS SD post judgment interest on the July 30, 1996 judgment as provided in that statute. LRSD also admits that it has not yet satisfied the July 30, 1996 judgment. LRSD understood that it had an agreement with PCSSD to withhold payment of the judgment until after conclusion of LRSD's appeal. It was understood that postjudgment interest would accrue during this time. PCSSD and LRSD are currently attempting to determine the precise amount owed and are negotiating payment terms. IV. Prayer. LRSD prays that PCSSD's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Prejudgment Interest be denied; that LRSD be awarded its costs and 1PCSSD may argue that Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 governs its request for prejudgment interest rather than Rule 59. However, the Eighth Circuit noted in Reyher that Rule 60 "cannot be used to impose additional affirmative relief." Reyher, 975 F.2d at 489 n.l. Therefore, Rule 60 cannot be used after the fact to award PCSSD prejudgment interest. (;\ha-nc\fcrdlcy\l r-.d\pcM-(oc .bri 8 attorneys' fees expended herein; and that LRSD be awarded all other just and proper relief to which it may be entitled. f: \home \fcrd le y\J nid\pc:u- fee. bri Respectfully Submitted, LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT FRIDAY, ELDREDGE & CLARK First Commercial Bldg., Suite 2000 400 West Capitol Little Rock, AR 72201-3493 (501) 376-2011 BY: 9 O9ristopher Heller (#BlP?3) ~ohn C. Fendley, Jr. (M182) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been served on the following people by depositing a copy of same in the United States mail on this X,"!' day of r , 1997. Mr. John W. Walker JOHN W. WALKER, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Sam Jones Wright, Lindsey & Jennings 2200 Worthen Bank Bldg. 200 West Capitol Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Steve Jones JACK, LYON & JONES, P.A. 425 W. Capitol, Suite 3400 Little Rock, AR 72201-3472 Mr. Richard Roachell Mr. Travis Creed Roachell Law Firm First Federal Plaza 401 West Capitol, Suite 504 Little Rock, AR 72201 Ms. Ann Brown - HAND DELIVERED Desegregation Monitor Heritage West Bldg., suite 510 201 East Markham Street Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Timothy G. Gauger Office of the Attorney General 323 Center Street 200 Tower Building Little Rock, AR 72201 !hJistopher Heller' '\.o/1n C. Fendley, Jr. f:\horn::Vcrdlc.y\Jnd\pc:u-fcc.bri 10 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION V. LITTLE ROCK $CHOOL DISTRICT and PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 No. 97-1350EALR APPELLANT APPELL:SES Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Western Division Hon. Susan Webber Wright APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF : EXHIBIT SUMMARY A. WAIVER OF ORAL ARGUMENT This appeal arises from the Pulaski County, Arkansas desegregation litigation. In response to motions brought by ihe three school districts in Pulaski County, by order entered January 13, 1995, the District Court found that the Arkansas Department of Education ("ADE") violated the 1989 Settlement Agreement between the State of Arkansas and the three districts. The District Court's order was affirmed in part and reversed in part by this Court. ~ Little Rock School District v. Pulaski countv Special School District No. 1. et al., 83 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 1996), reh'a denied {June 27, 1996). After this Court's mandate issued, the Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) and the Little Rock School District (LRSD) filed motions in the District Court seeking an award of attorneys' fees and costs. By orders entered December 10, 1996 and December 12, 1996, the District Court awarded PCSSD and LRSD $36,464.00 and $43,083.32 respectively in attorneys' fees and costs. ADE appeals from these two orders. ADE believes that this appeal can be resolved on the briefs alone and therefore does not request oral argument. i TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMM.l>.RY .AJ.\ffi WAIVER OF O~ZU, ARGUMENT TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES PRELIMINARY STATEMENT STATEMENT OF ISSUES STATEMENT OF THE CASE SUMM.l>.RY OF ARGUMENT ......................... ......................... ARGUMENT A. B. ................................... Standard of Review The District Court Erred in Awarding Fees to LRSD and PCSSD Under 42 U.S.C. 1988 .............. . C. The District Court Erred in Awarding PCSSD and LRSD Costs and Attorneys' Fees in Connection With Their Defense of ADE's Appeal and Their Prosecution of Their CrossAppeal of the District Court's i ii iii l 2 3 14 15 15 15 January 15, 1995 Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 D. The District Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding Fees to LRSD and PCSSD Based Upon 1996 Regular Hourly Rates Instead of the Discounted Rates Actually Charged the Districts During 1994 Through 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 CONCLUSION ................................... CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ADDENDUM ................................... ii 24 25 26 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Aleveska Pipeline co. v. Wilderness Societv, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 689 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1982) Corder v. Brown, 25 F. 3d 833 (9ti:c Cir. 1994) DeGidio v. Puna, 920 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1990) Delta Special School District No. s v. State Board of Education, 745 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1984) Fogertv v. Fantasv. Inc., 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1986) International Travel Arranaers. 1 nc. v. Western Airlines. Inc., 623 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1980) Jenkins v. state of Missouri, 967 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir. 1992) Klein v. Zavaras, 80 F.3d 432 (10th Cir. 1996) Little Rock School District v. Pulaski Countv Special School District No. , , 921 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1990) Little Rock School District v. Pulaski Countv Special School District No. 1, 83 F. 3d 1013 (8th Cir. 1996) Missouri v. Jenkins, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) iii PAGE(Sl 15 20 I 23 15, 22 16 17 15 17 22 17 17 3 5, 19 22, 23 TABLE o~ AUTHORITIES (Cont.) CASES Patrick v. Staples, 780 F.Supp. 1528 (N.D. Indiana 1991) Winter v. Cerro Gordo Countv Conservation Board, 925 F. 2d 1069 ( 8th Cir. 1991) Wvcoff v. Hedcrepeth, 34 F. 3d 614 ( 8th Cir:. 1994) STATUTES Ark. Code Ann. 16-22-308 42 u.s.c. 1983 42 u.s.c. 1988 OTHER AUTHORITIES Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(a) Eighth Circuit Local Rule 47C Local Rule B-3 of the United States District Court for the Eastern and Western Districts Of Arkansas iv PAGE{Sl 17 15, 23 16 PAGE(Sl 7 16 passim PAGE(Sl 19 19 5 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The Arkansas Department of Education (ADE) appeals from orders entered on December 10 and December 12, 1996, by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Western Division, the Hon. Susan Webber Wright, District Judge, in the action styled Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1. et .al., No. LR-C-82-866. In those orders the District Court ordered ADE to pay a total of $79,547.32 to the Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) and Little Rock School District (LRSD) in attorneys' fees and costs. Apx. 56-61. The District Court's jurisdiction was originally invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 133l(a), 1343(3) and (4), 2201 and 2202, 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1~83, 1988 and 2000d, and the Fou~teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 in that the District Court's December 10 and December 12, 1996 orders are collateral orders that are final with respect to all issues raised therein. ADE's notice of appeal was filed on January 8, 1997, and hence was timely filed under Fed. R. App. Proc. 4(a) (1). 1 STATEMENT OF ISSUES I. Whether the District Court Erred in Awarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs to LRSD and PCSSD Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. --42 u.s.c. 1988; --DeGideo V. Puna, 920 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1990); --Delta School Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1984); --Wycoff v. Hedgepeth, 34 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1994) II. Whether the District Court Erred in Awarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs to LRSD and PCSSD for Work Performed Defending ADE's Appeal and Prosecuting LRSD's and PCSSD's Cross-Appeal of the District Court's January 13, 1995 Order. --Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 689 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1982); --Fed. R. App. Proc. 39(a); --Eighth Circuit Local Rule 47C. III. Whether the District Court Erred in Awarding Attorneys' Fees To LRSD and PCSSD Based Upon Their Attorneys' 1996 Regular Hourly Rates Instead of the Actual Discounted Rates Paid by the Districts for Work Performed by Their Attorneys During 1994, 1995 and 1996. --Missouri v. Jenkins, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989); --Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 689 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1982); --Winter v. Cerro Gordo Countv Conservation Bd., 925 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1991) --International Travel Arranaers, Inc. v. Western Airlines. Tnc., 623 F. 2d 1255 ( 8th Cir. 1980) . 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is an appeal arising from the Pulaski County, Arkansas school desegregation litigation. The parties to this appeal are appellant Arkansas Department of Education (ADE) and appellees Pulaski County Special School District No. 1 (PCSSD) and the L1ttle Rock School District (LRSD). In 1989 the State of Arkansas, the three school districts in Pulaski County, and two groups of intervenors agreed to settle the remedial aspects of the school desegregation litigation. The parties submitted to the District Court "comprehensive settlement agreements covering both interdistrict and intradistrict desegregation measures -- agreements referred to by the parties as the 'setclement plans.' They also submitted a separate but related document, called the 'settlement agreement,' settling the financial liability of the State of Arkansas.n Little Rock School District v. Pulaski Countv Special School District No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371, 1376 (8th Cir. 1990). This Court reviewed and approved the settlement documents and directed the District Court to approve the settlement plans and the Settlement Agreement as written by the parties . .IQ.. at 1394. Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the District Court entered an order on January 18, 1991, dismissing the State of Arkansas as a party to the case. 3 A. LRSD's and PCSSD's Motions to Enforce the Settlement Agreement In July of 1994 LRSD filed a motion asking the District Court to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement against the State and ADE. LRSD contended that the State breached the Settlement Agreement by enacting a law that shifted the responsibility for the payment of workers' compensation claims brought by school district employees from the State to each school district in the state. PCSSD joined in this motion. Later, in August of 1994, LRSD and PCSSD filed a second motion asking the District Court to enforce the Settlement Agreement against the State and ADE. In this motion, LRSD and PCSSD contended (a) that ADE improperly treated M-M Transfer students in calculating the amount of "loss funding" due the Pulaski County school districts; (bl that ADE improperly excluded certain funds, known as Education Excellence Trust Funds, in a multiplier that determined the amount of "loss funding" due the three Pulaski County school districts; and (c) that the manner in which the State planned to implement a statewide public school computer network violated the Settlement Agreement . After a four-day hearing, the District Court, by order entered January 13, 1995, granted in part and denied in part 4 LRSD's and PCSSD's motions to enforce the Settlement Agreement. B. The Appeal and Cross Appeals of the District Court's Januarv 13, 1995 Order The State and ADE appealed the District Court's January 13, 1995 order. PCSSD and LRSD cross-appealed, contending . that the District Court did not grant them full and appropriate relief on their motions. On May 15, 1996, this Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the District Court's January 13, 1995 order . .s.ae. Little Rock School District v. Pulaski countv Special School District No. 1, 83 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 1996). LRSD and PCSSD filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by this Court on June 27, 1996. No party sought from the Eighth Circuit an award of attorneys' fees or costs in connection with the appeal or cross-appeal, and no order awarding costs or fees to any party was entered by the Eighth Circuit. C. PCSSD and LRSD Seek Extensions of Time Within Which to File Motions for Attorneys' Fees and Costs Under Local Rule Local B-3 of the United States District Court for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas, any motion by PCSSD or LRSD for attorneys' fees incurred in connection with the District Court's January 13, 1995 order was due within fourteen days of the entry of the order, ~, on or before January 27, 1995. On January 26, 5 1995 PCSSD and LRSD filed a motion asking for an extension of time to file such a motion. The District Court extended the time to February 17, 1995. Apx. 66. On February 17, 1995, PCSSD and LRSD filed another motion'for an extension of time; asking that their motions for attorneys' fees not be due until after this court resolved ADE's appeal and the districts' cross-appeal of the District Court's January 13, 1995 order. The District Court granted this motion, giving PCSSD and LRSD until "fourteen days after the appeal is decided or withdrawn" to file a motion for attorneys' fees. Apx. 71. On May 29, 1995 (fourteen days after this Court announced its decision affirming in part and reversing in part the District Court's January 13, 1995 order), PCSSD and LRSD filed a motion in the District Court asking for a further extension of time within which to file a motion for attorneys' fees. Apx. 72. The District Court granted that motion, giving PCSSD and LRSD until June 28, 1996 to file their motions. Apx. 74. On June 28, 1996 PCSSD and LRSD again filed a motion asking for additional time to submit an attorney fee motion. Apx. 75. On July 1, 1996 the district Court granted the motion, giving PCSSD and LRSD until 30 days after this Court's mandate issued to file a motion for attorneys' fees . Apx. 78. 6 On August 19, 1996 LRSD filed another motion seeking more time within which to file a motion for attorneys' fees. Apx. 79. ADE filed an opposition to this motion on August 22, 1996. The District Court granted LRSD's motion on August 27, 1996. Apx. 82. D. PCSSD's Motion for Fees and costs On August 16, 1996, PCSSD finally filed its initial motion for attorneys' fees and costs. 1 In its motion the only basis PCSSD cited for its fee request was Ark. Code Ann. 16-22-308, which permits a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in a breach of contract action. Apx. 83-84. The affidavit filed in support of the motion provided no information concerning the billing rates of or the activities performed by the various persons who allegedly worked on b~half of PCSSD in connection with PCSSD's motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement. Apx. 85-88. On August 30, 1996, ADE filed its opposition to PCSSD's motion. ADE opposed the motion on the grounds, inter alia, that state law could not form the basis for a fee award to PCSSD, that PCSSD had failed to provide sufficient information to enable the Court to calculate a reasonable 1 While PCSSD's motion purported to seek "costs" in addition to attorneys' fees, the motion itself contained no information concerning such claimed "costs." 7 fee award, and that the District Court lacked authority to compensate PCSSD for time its attorneys spent defending ADE's appeal and prosecuting PCSSD's cross-appeal of the District Court's January 13, 1995 order. Three weeks later, on September 20, 1996, PCSSD filed a "Supplemental Motion for Costs and Attorneys' Fees as to the State Defendants." In its "Supplemental Motion" PCSSD claimed that it was entitled to an award of fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The "Supplemental Motion" did not provide any further information concerning the hourly rates or activities performed by the attorneys, paralegals and document clerks that purportedly worked on behalf of PCSSD in connection with PCSSD's motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement. On October 4, 1996, ADE filed a response to PCSSD's "Supplemental Motion." In its response ADE argued, among other things, that PCSSD was not entitled to fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 or any other exception to the "American rule," and that PCSSD's motion must still be denied for its failure to present evidence sufficient to enable the District Court to compute a "reasonable" fee award. On November 21, 1996, the District Court entered an order directing PCSSD to submit, within ten days, "an affidavit documenting the time spent litigating these matters and the position or job title and hourly rates for 8 those who worked on the matters." The District Court further specified that "the affidavit should set forth the activity performed and time spent by each individual." Apx. 133-34. On December 2, 1996, PCSSD filed a second affidavit signed by its attorney, Sam Jones. Apx. 135. "Attached to the affidavit were billing records that purported to show the time spent by attorneys, paralegals and document clerks on behalf of PCSSD. Apx. 139-170. In the affidavit, attorney Jones stated that his current normal billing rate was $175.00 per hour, but that during 1996 PCSSD was charged only $135.00 per hour for his time. Apx. 136. The affidavit further stated that attorney Claire Hancock's current normal billing rate was $145.00 per hour, but that PCSSD was charged only $110.00 per hour for her time. Apx. 136. The affidavit further stated that the time of Angell Jones, the Manager of the firm's Litigation Support Department, was currently billed at $75.00.per hour during 1996 (Apx. 136); the billing records attached to the affidavit showed, however, that Ms. Jones' time was billed to PCSSD at a rate of $55.00 during 1994. Apx. 139, 147. The billing records attached to the affidavit also showed, among other things, that PCSSD was billed $110.00 per hour for attorney S. Jones' time during 1994 (Apx. 139, 147), and included time spent by attorneys, paralegals and 9 document clerks for work performed in connection with PCSSD's defense of ADE's appeal and PCSSD's prosecution of its cross-appeal of the District Court's January 13, 1995 order. Apx. 148-165. E. LRSD's Motion for Fees and costs LRSD filed its motion for fees and costs on August 30, 1996. LRSD's motion sought an award of $42,520 in attorneys' fees (262 hours spent by attorney Chris Heller at a rate of $160.00 per hour and 6 hours spent by attorney Clay Fendley at a rate of $100.00 per hour) and $563.32 in other unidentified "costs." Apx. 89. Like PCSSD, LRSD sought attorneys' fees for its attorneys' work defending ADE's appeal and prosecuting LRSD's cross-appeal of the District Court's January 13, 1995 order. Apx. 95-132. The affidavit submitted in support of LRSD's motion stated that attorney Heller's current normal billing rate was $160.00 per hour and attorney Fendley's current normal billing rate was $100.00 per hour. Apx. 89. The billing records attached to LRSD's motion, however, showed that LRSD was only billed $105.00 per hour for attorney Heller's time from June, 1994 through at least November of 1995, and that LRSD was only billed $85.00 per hour for attorney Fendley's time through at least November of 1995. Apx. 103, 122, 125, 127-131. LRSD's motion also sought attorneys' fees for time spent by LRSD's lawyers on appeal. Apx. 125-132. 10 With respect to costs, the billing records attached to LRSD's motion showed that a total of approximately $4380 was billed to LRSD as "expenses" during the period from June of 1994 through November of 19952 (Apx. 103, 122, 127-129, 131- 32), but LRSD's motion did not identify which particular items of the total "expenses" LRSD wanted the District Court to direct ADE to pay. See generally Apx. 89-132. ADE filed its opposition to LRSD's motion on September 16, 1996. ADE objected to any award of fees for time spent on appeal, ADE pointed out that LRSD's request for $160.00 per hour and $100.00 per hour for time spent by attorneys Heller and Fendley was excessive and would result in a windfall to LRSD in light of the actual hourly rates paid by LRSD, and ADE pointed out that some of the allegedly "compensable" time spent by LRSD's attorneys was spent on matters unrelated to LRSD's litigation against the State and ADE. F. The District Court's December 10 and December 12. 1996 Orders On December 10, 1996, only eight days after PCSSD finally submitted an affidavit with billing records to 2 These total "expenses" included charges listed as "binding expense," "deposition expense," "copy charges, 11 "Lexis computerized research," "messenger expense," "postage," "fax," "express mail," "filing fees," "preparation expense, 11 "meals," "Westlaw computerized research," "airline ticket," "parking" and "taxi." 11 support its fee motion and before ADE had filed any response to it, the District Court entered an order granting LRSD's and PCSSD's motions for attorneys' fees and costs. The District Court found that LRSD and PCSSD were prevailing parties entitled to an award of-fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. The District Court awarded PCSSD $28,854.50 in attorneys' fees. The award was based, among other things, 3 upon billing rates of $110.00 per