Court filings: District Court, Joshua intervenors' motion for an award of attorneys' fees concerning the Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) strike issue; District Court, Joshua intervenors' memorandum in support of an award of attorneys' fees concerning the Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) strike issue; District Court, affidavit and activity statement of John W. Walker; District Court, affidavit of Joy C. Springer; District Court, Little Rock School District's (LRSD's) motion for attorneys' fees and costs; District Court, affidavit of Christopher Heller; District Court, brief in support of Little Rock School District's (LRSD's) motion for attorneys' fees and costs

The transcript for this item was created using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and may contain some errors. f\LED uRT S 01s11~1C\ ci9p.l(.P,.NSAS u. N 01s1R1c IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT Cdm.~ 2, 6 1997 EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS J\.lN ?.- WESTERN DIVISION _ ,., Mccu~\11\Ac\C-, CLI:. JA N~tS OE.P .CLE.RI(. sv: LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. PLAINTIFFS V. NO. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, MRS. LORENE JOSHUA ET AL. JUN 2 7 1997 DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS INTERVENORS KATHERINE W. KNIGHT, ET AL. OFFICE OF DESEGREGATION MONITORl&lt: THE JOSHUA INTERVENORS' MOT10'N.FOR''A'N A WARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES CONCERNING THE PCSSD STRIKE ISSUE The Joshua Intervenors respectfully move for the entry of an order against the PCSSD defendants, awarding attorneys' fees for the work of their representatives concerning the PCS SD strike issue. The award sought is set forth in Attachment One to this motion. This motion is based upon the affidavits of John W. Walker and Joy C. Springer, the declaration of Robert Pressman, attachments to these documents, 1 the accompanying memorandum, and the following allegations: (1.) On August 27, 1996, the PCSSD defendants filed a motion seeking equitable relief, including an order "directing that PACT end [a] strike .... " A 9-page memorandum supported the motion. The court scheduled the matter for a hearing on the following day, August 28, 1996. (2.) On August 28, 1996 the Joshua Intervenors filed a memorandum opposing the relief sought by the PCSSD. Joshua argued in part: "Moreover, resolution of the contract dispute between 1 These documents are attached to this motion. 1 - the teachers and the District is not a desegregation obligation covered by the settlement agreement" (at 2); see also at 4 ("The Joshua Intervenors simply observe that the District has not identified a single provision of the settlement agreement which the union has violated.") (3 .) On August 28, 1996, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the PCSSD motion, which it treated as a motion for a preliminary injunction. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court "enjoin[ ed] the teachers from further striking following the Labor Day weekend." Transcript, at 18. ( 4.) The Knight Intervenors appealed this court's judgment enjoining the strike. Thereafter, on May 1, 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed this court's judgment. In words echoing those set forth in the memorandum promptly filed by Joshl!:i on August 28, 1996, the court reasoned: "But we cannot agree that the settlement agreem~nt, even by implication, took away the right to strike, assuming such a right exists under state law, nor can we - find any other source of authority for the action the District Court took" (Slip Opin., at 5). (5 .) The position taken by the Joshua Intervenors was premised upon two ir.terests of the plaintiff class. First, it sought to focus the attention of the parties and the court, and the use of hearing time, on matters within the scope of the agreements and designed for the benefit of the class members. Second, it sought to avoid a situation where teachers could view class members negatively, because their litigation would be a vehicle for suppressing a tool available to the teache1 s to advance their economic interests. (6.) The Joshua Intervenors are entitled to the fee award sought in this motion against the PCSSD because their representatives' efforts constituted a reasonable post-judgment activity to defend their earlier victory embodied in the approved agreements. Alternatively, and without waiving the foregoing contention, Joshua Intervenors note that they ultimately prevailed in their action to 2 - defend their earlier victory -- and are entitled to the award sought on that basis. (8.) The attachments to this motion, and the accompanying memorandum, show that the time and the rates claimed for the representatives of the Joshua Intervenors, as set forth on Attachment One of this motion, are reasonable. WHEREFORE the Joshua Intervenors move that the PCSSD defendants be ordered to pay )j-{;M.00 the amount of$ --to John W. Walker, P.A., for the work of Joshua Intervenors' representatives in opposing the PCSSD motion. JOHNW. WALKER, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72206 501-374-3758 Robert Pressman MA# 405900 22 Locust A venue Lexington, MA 02173 617-862-1955 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I do hereby state that a copy of the foregoing Motion and attachments, as well as the accqf11panying Memorandum, were sent via United States mail to all counsel of record on this c2.f1fl_ day ofJ une ~ 1997. Sb v1J .U/oKo A J~ W. Walker " 4 ATTACHMENT A SUMMARY OF THE JOSHUA INTERVENORS' FEE CLA AGAINST THE PCSSD REGARDING THE PCSSD STRIKE ISSUE John W. Walker Robert Pressman Joy C. Springer 11 . 7 hours at $ 250\ hour 5. 75 hours at $ 200\ hour 10.9 hours at$ 50\ hour Grand total 5 $2,925.00 $1,150.00 $ 545.00 $4,620.00 FILED RT U.S. DDl~s\R~~\ cAi~ANSAS EASTERN ' IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUN 2 6 1997 EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS JAMES W. McCORMACK, CLERK WESTERN DIVISION By: OEP.ClERK LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. PLAINTIFFS V. NO. LR-C-82-866 Fy r= p..;. F P,' r:! D PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICr/ E~AE':~-t -~, ~ DEFENDANTS MRS. LORENE JOSHUA ET AL. KATHERINE W. KNIGHT, ET AL. JUN ?. 7 1997 INTERVENORS OFFICE OF INTERVENORS DESEGREGATION MONITORING THE JOSHUA INTERVENORS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF AN A WARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES CONCERNING THE PCSSD STRIKE ISSUE A. Introduction This memorandum supports the accompanying motion of the Joshua Intervenors for an award - of attorneys' fees against the PCSSD defendants in connection with the PCCSD st:-ike issue. It discusses the predicate for this award, as well as the time claimed and the rates sought. B. The Predicate for an Award As detailed in the motion, the position taken by the Joshua Intervenors concerning the court's involvement in the PCSSD strike issue was ultimately the one adopted by the Court of Appeals in ruling in the appeal filed by the Knight Intervenors. As also explained in the motion (at paragraph 5), the position taken by the Joshua Intervenors is properly viewed as protecting the value of the court-approved settlement, for class members, in two regards; that is, by focusing the attention of the court r and the parties on the substantive relief gained by intervenors in the settlement;1 and by avoiding a 1 Such an effort was appropriate. The Joshua Jntervenors' motions regarding the incentive schools and ODM recommendations, pending at the time of the August 28, 1996 hearing, were never heard on the merits. The Joshua Jntervenors' motions concerning the Robinson High School and PCSSD discpline were denied tersely, without hearings by the court. situation where the plaintiff class could be scapegoated by the teachers. Alternate grounds support the award sought. The Joshua Intervenors having broadly prevailed in this action by virtue of the settlement, their representatives are entitled to fees for reasonable postjudgment monitoring, including "defensive [steps], seeking to preserve relief obtained earlier . . . . " Jenkins v. Missouri, Appeal No. 96-3870 (8th cir. May 22, 1997), Slip Opin. generally and at ---; 2 see also Association of Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Schafer, 83 F.3d 1008, 1012 (8th Cir. 1996) (defending a victory). We note also, that as to PCSSD, there is no claim of a waiver of fees for monitoring. Secondly, the Joshua Intervenors ultimately prevailed on this matter. They are, therefore, entitled to fees on this matter as a prevailing party. E,&, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1n8. C. The Hours Claimed and the Rates Sought "The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number - of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433 (1983). This "lodestar" amount yields a presumptively reasonable fee. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986). 1. The Time Claimed The time claimed, totalling ---- hours, was "reasonably expended on the litigation .... " Hensley, supra. As this submission shows, intervenors claim only a modest amount of time for the work of lead counsel, Robert Pressman (only on this petition), and Ms. Joy Springer. Intervenors' representatives studied the materials filed by the parties, prepared a memorandum, participated in the hearing on August 28, 1996, and prepared this petition. As it is customary in this market to bill the time of a paralegal separately (J. Springer Aff., para. ---), it is proper to make a sepan.te award for Ms. Springer's time. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1989). Indeed, involving Ms. 2 See paragraph beginning "Another factor that has been considered . ... " Springer was cost-effective. Id., at 288. 2. The Hourly Rates Sought The rates sought are John W. Walker$ 250 per hour, Robert Pressman$ 200 per hour, and Joy C. Springer $ 50 per hour. These are "reasonable hourly rate[s]" for these advocates taking account of the nature of this case and their "skill[s], experience[s], and reputation[s]." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984). In order to avoid repetition, intervenors' argument on rates relies upon the details set forth in the accompanying affidavits. These documents show, among other things, that Mr. Walker has long been active in this case, been lead counsel in a very large number of civil rights cases, and been praised by members of the federal bench for his expertise in this sphere. J. Walker Aff., paras. 3, 5, 7, 9. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit compensated Mr. Walker at the rate of$ 250 per hour for his work on the appeal in the case of Shirley Harvell v. Blytheville School District, 93- 1009EAJ (Order, August 19, 1996). See J. Walker A.ff, para. 8 and attachment. He currently charges fee-paying clients this rate. Aff., para. 9.3 With regard to Mr. Pressman, a district judge familiar with his work during the lengthy Boston school desegregation case compensated almost all of his time for the period October 1988 through June 1993 at the rate of$ 200 per hour. See Morgan v. Gittens, 915 F.Supp. 457, 472-74 (D.Mass. 1996). The affidavits appended to Mr. Pressman's declaration here also support a rate of 3 To be sure, this court in dictim, in an order of September 2 3, 1996, at 9, n. 6, set a rate of $ 200 per hour for lead counsel. However, this rate is inconsistent with the rate established by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, at minimum, lead counsel's rate should not be lower than$ 225 per hour, a rate employed by two other judges of this court on a total of four occasions. See J. Walker Aff., para. 8. $ 200 per hour. 4 The affidavit of Ms. Springer attached to the motion shows that she has considerable experience in civil rights litigation generally, and this case in particular. In Jeffers v. Clinton, 776 F.Supp. 465,470,476 (E.D.Ark.) (2 to 1), a three-judge court utilized rates of$ 40 per hour for local paralegals and $ 50 per hour for out-of-town paralegals in a voting rights case, for work in the period 1989 to 1991. The passage of time since this work was performed justifies the higher rate sought for Ms. Springer's work in this case. We note also the following factors. First. The rates sought are supported by rates approved by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (in instances other than the one cited with regard to Mr. Walker). See McDonald v. Armontrout, 860 F.2d 1456, 1460, 1461 (1988) (the court noted its approval in 1986 in the Pulaski County School Desegregation Case of the rate of "$ 200 per hour for a Washington, D.C. 'cooperating attorney who had been in practice approximately thirty years"' and of the same rate in 1988 in the Kansas City case for "an experienced civil rights attorney for his services in [that] school desegregation case ... "); Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, v. Miller, 70 F.3d 517, 520 (1995) (rates ofup to$ 260 per hour for attorneys based in Chicago); see also the Declaration of Thomas I. Atkins, former General Counsel of the NAACP, attached to the Declaration of Mr. Pressman. Second. The rates sought here are supported by the reasoning of the Court of A~peals for the Eighth Circuit, which has emphasized the connection between the rates employed in cases like this one and fulfilling the goal of facilitating civil rights enforcement, which underlies the fee statutes on 4 Recently, in this case, the LRSD did not challenge a rate of$ 200 per hour for Mr. Pressman/or work in opposing the termination of jurisdiction as to the LRSD and preparing the related fee petition. This court then granted the full award sought by the Joshua Jntervenors, in an order entered on May 16, 199 7. which the plaintiffs rely. See Casey v. City of Cabool. MO, 12 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1993). Conclusion There is no basis for departing from the lodestar amount here. Therefore, an award should be made to John W. Walker, P.A. in the amount of $4i~O-OO Respectfully submitted, JOHNW. WALKER, P. A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72206 501-374-3758 Robert Pressman MA# 405900 22 Locust A venue Lexington, MA 02173 617-862-1955 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I do hereby state that a copy of the foregoing Motion and attachments, as well as the accAmpanying Memorandum, were sent via United States mail to all counsel of record on this MdayofJune~ 1997. ~/-.~ J~er IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. V. NO. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. MRS. LORENE JOSHUA ET AL. KATHERINE W. KNIGHT, ET AL. AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN W. WALKER STATE OF ARKANSAS) )SS. COUNTY OF PULASKI) PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS INTER VEN ORS INTERVENORS Comes now the affiant, JOHN W. WALKER, who submits the following affidavit under oath: Educational and Professional Qualifications 1. I graduated from Arkansas AM&N College in Pine Bluff, Arkansas in 1958 with a major in Sociology. In 1960, I was awarded a John Hay Whitney Opportunity Fellowship which I used to obtain a Master's Degree from New York University in Education (Human Relations) in 1961. In 1961, I enrolled in the Yale University Law School from which I received my law degree in 1964. At Yale Law School, in 1964, I was a finalist in the Thurman Arnold Appellate Moot Court Competition. I have studied further at Fisk University (the Race Relations Institute) and at many legal training seminars which focused upon the subject of civil rights law in particular. 1 In 1964, I was admitted to practice before the Bar of Arkansas. Subsequently, I was admitted to, and still practice before, the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the 2. Eighth, Fifth, Eleventh, and Tenth Circuits, the United States District Court, Western District of Texas, and the United States District Court, Eastern and Western District of Arkansas. 3. I completed a legal training internship in New York City with the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF) in September, 1965. In 1965, I opened a private general law practice in Little Rock which emphasized civil rights law. In 1968, Norman Chachkin (now of the LDF) and I opened one of the first integrated law firms in the South. That law firm has continued to be operated on an integrated basis since that time although it has undergone several name changes. My own work continues to emphasize civil rights legal activity. 4. I hold membership in the American and National Bar Associations, and the W. Harold Flowers and Pulaski County Bar Associations. From 1976 to 1982, I was a member of the Arkansas Board ofExaminers. I have served as a member of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. I am a member of the Board ofDirectors of the LD F b New York. 5. The following is a partial listing of major cases where I have been lead counsel: Employment Paxton v Union National Bank, 688 F. 2d. 522, 574 (8th Cir. 1982); Maney v Brinkley Municipal Water Works, 802 F 2d. 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1986); Rogers v International Paper Co., 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Powell v Georgia Pacific Paper Company, Civ. Nos. 73- C-l and E.D. 73-C-3 (Ark. 1993); Williams v Anderson, 562 F 2d. 1081 (8th Cir. 1977); Clark v Mann, 562 F 2d. 1104 (8th Cir. 1977); Parham v Southwestern Bell, 433 F 2d. 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Robinson v Klassen, Civ. No LR-C-73-301 (E.D. Ark. 1981); 2 McFadden v Arkansas State Hospital, Civ. No. LR-C-78-153 (E.D. 1989; 1994); Taylor v Jones, 653 F 2d. 1193 (8th Cir. 1981); Hollowell v Gravett, Civ. No. LR-C-86-600 (E.D. Ark. 1989); and Perryman v Johnson Products, 698 F 2d. 1138 (11th Cir. 1983); Hollowell and Day v. Randy Johnson, E.D. Ark., October 30, 1995 .. Education Clark v Board of Education, 705 F 2d. 265 (8th Cir. 1983); Dowell v Oklahoma City Board of Education, 890 F 2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989); Arvizu v Board of Education of Waco, Texas, 296 F 2d. 1309 (5th Cir. 1974); Kemp v Beasley. 389 F 2d. 178 (8th Cir. 1972); Raney v Board of Education of Gould, Arkansas, 381 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1967); Kelley v Altheimer, 378 F 2d. 483 (8th Cir. 1967); Little Rock School District v Pulaski County Special School District, 839 F 2d. 1296 (8th Cir. 1987), cert den., 102 L. Ed. 2d. - 146 (1988); Smith v Board of Education of Morrilton, 365 F 2d. 770 (8th Cir. 1966); and Sherpell v. Humnoke School Dist. No. 5.; Rusk v. The Stuttgart School District,_ F.Supp. ___J E.D. Ark. (1994). Housing Williams v Matthews, 499 F. 2d. 819 (1974). Criminal Justice Winters v Beck, 407 F 2d. 125 (8th Cir. 1969). Public Accommodations Daniel v Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969). Voting Rights Sherpell v Humnoke, 814 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1989); Harvell v Ladd, 931 F. 2d. 226 (8th 3 - Cir. 1992); Harvell v Ladd, __ F. 3d. __ (8th Cir. 1994); Williams v City of Texarkana, 32 F. 3d. 265 (8th Cir. 1994). 6. I have served as Chairman of the Board of the Arkansas Opportunities industrialization Center (OIC). the Center for Law and Education (Cambridge, Mass.), and the Leadership Roundtable (Little Rock, Arkansas). In 1968, I was a member of the Arkansas Constitutional Revision Study Commission. In the early 1970's, I was a member of the Land Use Study Commission of the Southern Governors Conference. I have served as a member of the Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education. I have spoken or lectured at several annual meetings of the National Bar Association; the American Bar Association; other bar associations; many public colleges and many high schools regarding many subjects but primarily upon the subject of Civil Rights Law. I have also received numerous awards for my representation of civil rights causes and cases. 7. I have participated actively in this case and the predecessor litigation since the 1960's. 8. The foregoing recitations establish my educational and professional qualifications. It is my opinion that the bar of first rank with comparable qualificaitons in other fields of law command the highest hourly rates for their work. Those rates range between $150.00 and $300.00 per hour in this market. The State of Arkansas has contracted for legal services in the range of $150.00 per hour for experienced counsel. In an Order dated August 19, 1996, in the case of Harvell v. Blytheville School District, Appeal No. 93-1009 EAJ, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit compensated my time at the rate of $250.00 per hour for a successful appeal in a voting rights case. See the papers attached to this affidavit. My time has been compensated at the rate of $225.00 per hour on at least four occasions in the Arkansas District Courts. These cases are as follows: (a) Ashford v. City of Hamburg. C.A. No. 93-1032 (W.D. Ark.) (Order 1/19/95) 4 - (Judge Barnes); (b) McFadden v. Arkansas State Hospital, C.a. No. LR-C-78-153 (Order, 4/18/95) (Judge Howard); (c) Davis v. Franks, C.A. No. 88-4082 (Order, 5/16/96) (Judge Barnes); (d) Day and Hollowell v. Johnson. C.A. No. LR-C-94-849 (Order 9/27/96) (Judge Howard) (stayed ... r pending outcome of substantive appeal). 9. In Taylor v. Jones, Circuit Judge Richard Arnold described me as a member of the bar of the "first rank." In April, 1995, in the aforementioned Order in McFadden v. Arkansas State Hospital. cited in paragraph 8., Judge George Howard, Jr. wrote: "The Court notes that Walker is one of the most preeminent civil rights attorneys in the State" (at 3). 10. The fee which I request herein of $250.00 per hour is my usual and customary fee which I routinely charge fee paying clients. The total time for which this fee is sought is 11. 7 hours. 11. Counsel and co-counsel herein have taken great care to prevent their submission from - reflecting duplicate and non-productive efforts. I have reviewed the submissions of all representatives of the intervenors and believe they are accurate. correct and reasonable. 12. A statement and activities for which I claim compensation is attached hereto. The foregoing statement is true and correct to the bestof my knowledge, records, information and belief. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ay of 199 ~~LQ. ~Lll MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 9/11/ZfJJ') IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DMSION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. PLAINTIFFS V. NO. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. MRS. LORENE JOSHUA ET AL. KATHERINE W. KNIGHT, ET AL. DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS INTERVENORS DATE - 8/27/96 8/27/96 8/ /96 9/09/96 9/11/96 9/14/96 6/25/96 ACTIVITY STATEMENT OF JOHN W. WALKER ACTIVITY Conference with JCS re: PCSSD special board meeting; Attended meeting Review and study of PCS SD Motion and Memorandum; drafted and finalized Joshua Intervenors' Response to Motion; preparation for hearing Prepare for hearing and hearing before Judge Wright on Motion Review and study of Knight Motion for TRO and Brief Review and study Knight Response to PCS SD Motion (Response and Memorandum) Review and study PCS SD Reply to Knight Response, including Brief Review draft Fee Petition Total Hours Expended Hourly Rate Total Fee Requested HOURS 1.3 3.5 6.5 .3 NC .1 NC 11.7 $ 250.00 $2,925.00 Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. Civil Action No. LR-C-82-866 Declaration of Robert Pressman Robert Pressman swears under penalty of perjury that the following information is truthful: A. Employment in Civil Rights Division (1). Following my graduation from the Columbia Law School in June 1965, I worked as an attorney in the Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, from August 2, 1965 through July 31, 1970. The Division enforced civil rights laws concerning voting rights, access to public facilities and public accommodations, school desegregation, equal employment opportunity, and freedom from mistreatment by police personnel. My work at various times involved each of these areas. It encompassed giving guidance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on investigations of possible civil rights violations and compiling factual material and analyzing complex fact patterns, as well as legal research. (2.) For roughly the first two years of my tenure in the Division, I was assigned to work on problems arising in the northern part of Mississippi. During this period, I frequently travelled to Mississippi and, among other things, made appearances in the Carroll County school desegregation case. I also investigated the status of school desegregation in other systems, including Lee County, Pontotoc County, Tunica County, and the City of Corinth. In 1967, the Division was reorganized and my work shifted to Illinois. There, I developed facts concerning school segregation in School District 151 of Cook County, Illinois. The Department's suit against that district was its first northern case. I participated in the trial. See United States v. School District 151, 286 F. Supp. 786, 787 (N.D. Ill. 1968); 301 F. Supp. 201, 205 (N.D. Ill. 1969). My Illinois work also included school segregation issue in Cairo, East st. Louis, and Madison County, Illinois. (3.) In 1969, the Division was again reorganized, this time along subject matter lines. I was assigned to the education section. From October 1969 through my departure from the Division at the end of July 1970, I worked principally on Alabama school desegregation issues, particularly on Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, a statewide case involving 100 local - districts, as well as state officials. Efforts were underway in this period to secure implementation of plans satisfying the standards of Green v. County School Board. I prepared written comments on issues arising in more than 30 Alabama districts and appeared frequently before the three-judge court (Judges Richard T. Rives, Frank M. Johnson, and R.H. Grooms). I also appeared before Judge Johnson in the separate Montgomery County school desegregation case and prepared for the Department briefs in two appeals from the decisions of the three-judge court in the Lee case. See, for example, Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 448 F.2d 746, 747 (5th Cir. 1971). (4.) On December 15, 1969, I received a Certificate of Award for outstanding work, in the Attorney General's Twentieth Annual 2 Awards Ceremony. Four of the Division's ninety attorneys were given this award at that time. B. Employment at the Center for Law and Education (5.) In August 1970, I began working at the Center for Law and Education (CLE), a component of the federally-funded program of legal services for low-income persons, administered since 1975 by the Legal Services Corporation. As the "national back-up center" on education issues for the entire legal services program, the Center's principal role was to promote throughout the program strong representation of clients experiencing education problems. The work consisted of providing advice to local legal services personnel on particular client problems; conducting training programs; writing publications and articles; - engaging in administrative advocacy; and participating as cocounsel in some cases. My employment at the Center ended as of September 15, 1995, due to lay off, because the Congress chose to eliminate funding for national support programs like CLE. (6.) In 1972, upon its filing, I began working on the Boston school desegregation case as co-counsel for the plaintiff class of Black parents and students. My involvement has continued to the present, although the case is largely inactive with only a few orders remaining in place. See, for example, Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 414 (D.Mass. 1974) (liability ruling) and Morgan y, McDonough, 540 F. 2d 527, 528 (1st Cir. 1976) (argued appeal in which the court affirmed the placing of the operation of a high school in receivership). 3 (7.) In the 1970's I also did some work in the Detroit school desegregation case, Bradley v. Milliken, and more than 1000 hours of work on behalf of the plaintiffs-intervenors in the Omaha school desegregation case, United States v. School District of Omaha. See for example 521 F.2d 530 (wrote brief for successful appeal with the court's opinion reflecting to a substantial degree the factual portion of the brief). (8.) During the 1970's, I played a role at CLE in the development of a racial discrimination theory ultimately employed successfully in securing a delay in the Florida program of denying standard high school diplomas to students failing a "competency test." See Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979), aff'd, 644 F.2d (5th Cir. 1981). In the Debra - I:..._ litigation, I participated briefly in the trial (due to an illness in the family of a CLE colleague) and wrote a portion of the trial memorandum setting forth a theory accepted by the courts (denial of standard high school diploma based upon competency test result perpetuated earlier intentional discrimination against black students who began their educations in segregated and unequal elementary schools). (9.) In 1986, I wrote two memoranda on racial discrimination claims for use in the legal services program. (a) The first, focusing on racial discrimination in school discipline and curricula, contained the following headings: "Typical Problems," "Gathering Information About a Discrimination Problem," "The Legal Bases of Racial Discrimination Claims" (including 4 constitutional and Title VI claims), "Other Material re Disparate Discipline," "Material Regarding Discrimination in Curriculum," and "Remedial Principles." (b) The second memorandum is titled "Discriminatory Allocation of Resources within a School District" (14 pages). I first used this document in a training program for legal services attorneys in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1986. (10.) I participated during my tenure at CLE, as a trainer or lecturer, in a minimum of 40 sessions on education issues for legal services workers, parents, and\or students. One such session in Colorado during the late 1980's for legal services attorneys concerned ways to monitor consent decrees and other judgments in institutional reform cases. I prepared for this event a 34-page memorandum titled "Materials on Monitoring and - Enforcement of Judgments." c. Work on the Ayers Case (11.) In January 1987, the North Mississippi Rural Legal Services Program asked me to join their staff members providing representation to the named plaintiffs and the plaintiff class in the case then styled Ayers v. Allain, Civil Action No. 4:75CV009- B-O, Northern District of Mississippi. Ayers concerns the nature of the obligation of Mississippi officials to eliminate racial disrimination and segregation from the operation of the Mississippi system of public universities. I have played an active role in the case since that time. My work in Ayers through March 1995, totalled in excess of 6,000 hours, and involved, inter alia, framing and responding to discovery requests; taking 5 depositions; identifying and preparing exhibits; preparing exhibit lists and other materials required as part of the standard pre-trial submission; participating in settlement efforts; making an opening statement; presenting and crossexamining witnesses and otherwise participating in two lengthy hearings (with the second exceeding 40 days of trial); preparing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; preparing appellate briefs; arguing before three panels of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, as well as that court sitting en banc, 1 and supporting the efforts of my brother and sister cocounsel. o. Court Appearances (12.) During the course of my legal career, I have made - appearances in the following federal courts: M.D. Ala., S.D.Ala., E.D. Ark., M.D. Fla., S.D. Fla., N.D. Ill., D. Mass., N. D. Miss., E.D. Mich., D. Neb., D. N. H., and D. S. Car.; Court of Appeals for the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits (filed briefs and argued); United States Supreme Court (filed briefs). E. Work in this District Court (12.) In September 1995, I began to assist John W. Walker 1 See Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990); Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676, 677 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane) (argued in each instance). A fresh appeal followed the district court's March 1995 decision. See Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419. I later argued in March 1996 before a panel considering a stay of a part of the district court's order and on November 4, 1996 before the panel hearing the matter on the merits. See Ayers v. Fordice, 111 F.3d 1183, 1188 (5th Cir. 1997). 6 and other persons in his firm with various facets of their work. My many projects have included: several fee petitions; work on a large number of issues in the Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. case; participation in the Honorable v. North Little Rock Sch. Dist. student discipline case in this court; preparation of the appellees' brief on appeal in Day and Hollowell v. Johnson, a case in which Judge Howard invalidated in part on the basis of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 and Title VII, the attempt by the newly elected sheriff to discharge two African American captains; support to an attorney in the Walker firm in the ongoing MOPAC case involving Title VII issues, as well as work on other employment discrimination issues; and preparation of the complaint and discovery efforts in Young v. City of Little - Rock, alleging the wrongful arrest and detention of a black resident of Little Rock. F. The Current Fee Petition (13.) Attachment One to this Declaration, which is incorporated herein by reference, sets forth my time and activities in working on this particular petition. It is based upon records prepared on a daily basis. An award is sought