{"response":{"docs":[{"id":"abj_p15099coll2_898","title":"E. M. Friend","collection_id":"abj_p15099coll2","collection_title":"Oral Histories","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, Alabama, Jefferson County, Birmingham, 33.52066, -86.80249"],"dcterms_creator":["Friend, E. M.","Kraft, Cathy"],"dc_date":["1985-11-12"],"dcterms_description":null,"dc_format":["image/jpeg"],"dcterms_identifier":null,"dcterms_language":["eng"],"dcterms_publisher":["Birmingham, Ala. : Birmingham Public Library"],"dc_relation":null,"dc_right":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"dcterms_is_part_of":["Birmingham Jewish Federation\"Memory Bank\" Project Oral History Interviews. Archives Department"],"dcterms_subject":["Jews--Alabama--Birmingham--History","Friend, E. M.--Interviews"],"dcterms_title":["E. M. Friend"],"dcterms_type":["Text"],"dcterms_provenance":["Birmingham Public Library (Ala.)"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["http://cdm16044.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15099coll2/id/898"],"dcterms_temporal":["1981/1990"],"dcterms_rights_holder":null,"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":null,"dlg_local_right":["This material may be protected under Title 17 of the U. S. Copyright Law which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research."],"dcterms_medium":["typescripts"],"dcterms_extent":null,"dlg_subject_personal":["Friend, E. M."],"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":null},{"id":"xhs_inrec_295","title":"Dick Wolfsie and Guests on Night Talk","collection_id":"xhs_inrec","collection_title":"Indianapolis recorder","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, Indiana, Marion County, Indianapolis, 39.76838, -86.15804"],"dcterms_creator":["Indianapolis recorder (Firm)"],"dc_date":["1985-11-09"],"dcterms_description":["Talk show host Dick Wolfsie is shown on a set with four guests seated around a sofa. One of the guests is a member of the Ku Klux Klan. Two of the other guests are African American. Left to right: Dick Wolfsie; unidentified; James Farrands, Imperial Grand Dragon of the KKK; Sam Jones; and William Crawford."],"dc_format":["image/jpeg"],"dcterms_identifier":null,"dcterms_language":null,"dcterms_publisher":null,"dc_relation":null,"dc_right":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dcterms_is_part_of":["Indianapolis Recorder Collection, P 0303, Indiana Historical Society"],"dcterms_subject":["Television talk shows--Indiana--Indianapolis","Ku Klux Klan (1915- )","Racism--Indiana--Indianapolis","Race relations","Indianapolis (Ind.)--Race relations","Television programs--Indiana--Indianapolis"],"dcterms_title":["Dick Wolfsie and Guests on Night Talk"],"dcterms_type":["StillImage"],"dcterms_provenance":["Indiana Historical Society"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["https://images.indianahistory.org/digital/collection/p0303/id/295"],"dcterms_temporal":null,"dcterms_rights_holder":null,"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":null,"dlg_local_right":null,"dcterms_medium":["black-and-white photographs"],"dcterms_extent":null,"dlg_subject_personal":["Wolfsie, Dick"],"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":null},{"id":"pth_bcja_metapth595041","title":"The Intellectual and the Politician","collection_id":"pth_bcja","collection_title":"Barbara C. Jordan Archives","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, Texas, Travis County, Austin, 30.26715, -97.74306"],"dcterms_creator":["Jordan, Barbara, 1936-1996"],"dc_date":["1985-11-09"],"dcterms_description":["Text of a speech given by Barbara C. Jordan as an address to the Graduate Assembly of the University of Texas-Austin Faculty Club. The speech is entitled \"The Intellectual and the Politician.\""],"dc_format":["image/jpeg"],"dcterms_identifier":["local-cont-no: TSOU_0436-011-001","ark: ark:/67531/metapth595041"],"dcterms_language":["eng"],"dcterms_publisher":null,"dc_relation":null,"dc_right":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"dcterms_is_part_of":null,"dcterms_subject":["African American women politicians--Texas","Speeches, addresses, etc.","University of Texas","Universities and colleges--Faculty","Clubs--Texas--Austin","Politics, Practical"],"dcterms_title":["The Intellectual and the Politician","Texas Senate Papers"],"dcterms_type":["Text"],"dcterms_provenance":["Texas Southern University. Library"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth595041/"],"dcterms_temporal":null,"dcterms_rights_holder":null,"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":null,"dlg_local_right":null,"dcterms_medium":["speeches (documents)"],"dcterms_extent":["1 p. ; 28 cm."],"dlg_subject_personal":["Jordan, Barbara, 1936-1996"],"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":null},{"id":"xhs_inrec_349","title":"KKK Leaders Appear on \"Night Talk\"","collection_id":"xhs_inrec","collection_title":"Indianapolis recorder","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, Indiana, Marion County, Indianapolis, 39.76838, -86.15804"],"dcterms_creator":["Indianapolis recorder (Firm)"],"dc_date":["1985-11-09"],"dcterms_description":["Imperial Wizard James Blair, (left) and Grand Dragon James Farrands discuss their racist ideology during an appearance on the television program \"Night Talk.\" They are wearing their Ku Klux Klan robes and hats."],"dc_format":["image/jpeg"],"dcterms_identifier":null,"dcterms_language":null,"dcterms_publisher":null,"dc_relation":null,"dc_right":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dcterms_is_part_of":["Indianapolis Recorder Collection, P 0303, Indiana Historical Society"],"dcterms_subject":["Ku Klux Klan (1915- )","Racism--Indiana--Indianapolis","Race relations","Indianapolis (Ind.)--Race relations","Hats--Indiana--Indianapolis","Costume--Indiana--Indianapolis","Television programs--Indiana--Indianapolis","Television talk shows--Indiana--Indianapolis"],"dcterms_title":["KKK Leaders Appear on \"Night Talk\""],"dcterms_type":["StillImage"],"dcterms_provenance":["Indiana Historical Society"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["https://images.indianahistory.org/digital/collection/p0303/id/349"],"dcterms_temporal":null,"dcterms_rights_holder":null,"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":null,"dlg_local_right":null,"dcterms_medium":["black-and-white photographs"],"dcterms_extent":null,"dlg_subject_personal":null,"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":null},{"id":"bcas_bcmss0837_826","title":"Court filings: Court of Appeals, decision, 778 F.2d 404","collection_id":"bcas_bcmss0837","collection_title":"Office of Desegregation Management","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, 39.76, -98.5","United States, Arkansas, 34.75037, -92.50044","United States, Arkansas, Pulaski County, 34.76993, -92.3118","United States, Arkansas, Pulaski County, Little Rock, 34.74648, -92.28959"],"dcterms_creator":null,"dc_date":["1985-11-07"],"dcterms_description":null,"dc_format":["application/pdf"],"dcterms_identifier":null,"dcterms_language":["eng"],"dcterms_publisher":["Little Rock, Ark. : Butler Center for Arkansas Studies. Central Arkansas Library System."],"dc_relation":null,"dc_right":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"dcterms_is_part_of":["Office of Desegregation Monitoring records (BC.MSS.08.37)","History of Segregation and Integration of Arkansas's Educational System"],"dcterms_subject":["African Americans--Education","African Americans--Civil rights","African Americans--Segregation","Court records","Education--Arkansas","Educational law and legislation","School integration","Civil rights--Arkansas","Little Rock (Ark.)--History--20th century"],"dcterms_title":["Court filings: Court of Appeals, decision, 778 F.2d 404"],"dcterms_type":["Text"],"dcterms_provenance":["Butler Center for Arkansas Studies"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["http://arstudies.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/bcmss0837/id/826"],"dcterms_temporal":null,"dcterms_rights_holder":null,"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":null,"dlg_local_right":null,"dcterms_medium":["documents (object genre)"],"dcterms_extent":null,"dlg_subject_personal":null,"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":"\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n   \n\n   \n\n\n   \n\n\n   \n\n\n\n\n   \n\n\n\n\n   \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n   \n\n   \n\n \n\n\n   \n\n   \n\n  \n\n\n   \n\n  \n\n \n\n\n   \n\n  \n\n \n\n\n   \n\n  \n\n  \n\nThis transcript was created using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and may contain some errors.\nThis project was supported in part by a Digitizing Hidden Special Collections and Archives project grant from The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and Council on Library and Information Resoources.\n   \n\n   \n\n  \n\n\n   \n\n  \n\n \n\n\n   \n\n   \n\n \n\n\n   \n\n  \n\n \n\n   \n\n \n\n  \n\n\n   \n\n \n\n  \n\n\n\n   \n\n  \n\n  \n\n\n   \n\n   \n\n  \n\n \n\n \n\n\n   \n\n  \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n   \n\n \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n   \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n "},{"id":"bcas_bcmss0837_815","title":"Court filings: Court of Appeals, ruling","collection_id":"bcas_bcmss0837","collection_title":"Office of Desegregation Management","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, 39.76, -98.5","United States, Arkansas, 34.75037, -92.50044","United States, Arkansas, Pulaski County, 34.76993, -92.3118","United States, Arkansas, Pulaski County, Little Rock, 34.74648, -92.28959"],"dcterms_creator":null,"dc_date":["1985-11-07"],"dcterms_description":null,"dc_format":["application/pdf"],"dcterms_identifier":null,"dcterms_language":["eng"],"dcterms_publisher":["Little Rock, Ark. : Butler Center for Arkansas Studies. Central Arkansas Library System."],"dc_relation":null,"dc_right":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"dcterms_is_part_of":["Office of Desegregation Monitoring records (BC.MSS.08.37)","History of Segregation and Integration of Arkansas's Educational System"],"dcterms_subject":["Court records","African Americans--Education","African Americans--Segregation","Education--Arkansas","Educational law and legislation","School integration","School districts","Civil rights--Arkansas","Little Rock (Ark.)--History--20th century"],"dcterms_title":["Court filings: Court of Appeals, ruling"],"dcterms_type":["Text"],"dcterms_provenance":["Butler Center for Arkansas Studies"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["http://arstudies.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/bcmss0837/id/815"],"dcterms_temporal":null,"dcterms_rights_holder":null,"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":null,"dlg_local_right":null,"dcterms_medium":["documents (object genre)"],"dcterms_extent":null,"dlg_subject_personal":null,"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":"\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n   \n\n   \n\n\n   \n\n\n   \n\n\n\n\n   \n\n\n\n\n   \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n   \n\n   \n\n \n\n\n   \n\n   \n\n  \n\n\n   \n\n  \n\n \n\n\n   \n\n  \n\n \n\n\n   \n\n  \n\n  \n\nThis transcript was created using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and may contain some errors.\nThis project was supported in part by a Digitizing Hidden Special Collections and Archives project grant from The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and Council on Library and Information Resoources.\n   \n\n   \n\n  \n\n\n   \n\n  \n\n \n\n\n   \n\n   \n\n \n\n\n   \n\n  \n\n \n\n   \n\n \n\n  \n\n\n   \n\n \n\n  \n\n\n\n   \n\n  \n\n  \n\n\n   \n\n   \n\n  \n\n \n\n \n\n\n   \n\n  \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n   \n\n \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n   \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n "},{"id":"gych_rbrl214droh_rusk-iiiii","title":"Dean Rusk interviewed by Richard Rusk and Thomas Schoenbaum. 1985 Nov. 5.","collection_id":"gych_rbrl214droh","collection_title":"Dean Rusk oral history collection, 1984-1989","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, 39.76, -98.5","Vietnam, 16.16667, 107.83333"],"dcterms_creator":["Rusk, Dean, 1909-1994","Schoenbaum, Thomas J.","Rusk, Richard"],"dc_date":["1985-11-05"],"dcterms_description":["Dean Rusk (1909-1994), attorney, U.S. Secretary of State, born in Cherokee County, Georgia. Rusk joined the Dept. of State from 1947-1952 as Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs and for Far Eastern Affairs. From 1952-1960 he was president of the Rockefeller Foundation. In 1961, President Kennedy appointed Rusk to the office of Secretary of State. He remained in this position until 1969. In 1970, he became the Samuel H. Sibley Professor of International Law at the University of Georgia, a position he held until his death in 1994.","Interviewed by Richard Rusk and Thomas J. Schoenbaum.","Related materials located in other repositories: United States Dept. of State Records, 1961-1968, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.; White House Cabinet and Staff files, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass.; White House Cabinet and Staff files, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Tex.","In this interview, Rusk describes the Tet Offensive, its aftermath, and U.S. reactions to the events. He discusses the concerns about leaks during Johnson's administration and touches upon public dissent about the war. Rusk focuses on the disagreements among the members of the Cabinet about U.S. military policy in Vietnam, in particular, troop increases and the bombing halt in Vietnam. He touches on Richard Russell's role in the Senate and upon Fulbright's Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on Vietnam.","Related collections in this repository: Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Dean Rusk collection; Parks Rusk collection; and Dean Rusk personal papers."],"dc_format":["audio/mpeg"],"dcterms_identifier":null,"dcterms_language":["eng"],"dcterms_publisher":null,"dc_relation":null,"dc_right":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dcterms_is_part_of":["Dean Rusk Oral History Collection","http://russelldoc.galib.uga.edu/russell/view?docId=ead/RBRL214DROH-ead.xml"],"dcterms_subject":["Government and the press--United States","United States","United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations","United States--Foreign relations--Vietnam","Government and the press","Protest movements","Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Public opinion","Cabinet officers--United States","Public opinion--United States","Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Protest movements","Vietnam","Presidents--United States Staff","Tet Offensive, 1968","Vietnam--Foreign relations--United States","Diplomatic relations","Presidents--Staff","Cabinet officers","Public opinion"],"dcterms_title":["Dean Rusk interviewed by Richard Rusk and Thomas Schoenbaum. 1985 Nov. 5."],"dcterms_type":["Sound"],"dcterms_provenance":["Richard B. Russell Library for Political Research and Studies"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["http://purl.libs.uga.edu/russell/RBRL214DROH-RuskIIIII/ohms"],"dcterms_temporal":null,"dcterms_rights_holder":null,"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":["Dean Rusk Oral History Collection, OH Rusk IIIII, Richard B. Russell Library for Political Research and Studies, University of Georgia Libraries, Athens, Georgia, 30602-1641."],"dlg_local_right":["Resources may be used under the guidelines described by the U.S. Copyright Office in Section 107, Title 17, United States Code (Fair use). Parties interested in production or commercial use of the resources should contact the Russell Library for a fee schedule."],"dcterms_medium":["oral histories (literary works)"],"dcterms_extent":["1 interview (62 min.) : digital, stereo"],"dlg_subject_personal":["Rusk, Dean, 1909-1994","Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973","Russell, Richard B. (Richard Brevard), 1897-1971"],"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":"RICHARD RUSK:  All the major networks chimed in with their own editorial positions of the Vietnam policy. Many of them took a negative point of view. Walter Cronkite came out against it, and George Christian made the comment that \"shock waves rolled through the government,\" when Cronkite made his remarks. LBJ's [Lyndon Baines Johnson] comment was at the time--and I think we asked this earlier--\"If we've lost Walter, we've lost the war.\" Do you recall? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  I don't remember much flap in my own mind about Walter Cronkite. I do remember one remark that he made on the newscast, not a commentary or editorial. He referred to the \"tired platitudes of the Secretary of State.\" What he overlooked was that the platitudes came from the reporters. If you keep getting the same tired old questions, you give them the same answers. (laughter) So I thought his comment was a little lopsided. No, when John [Bertram] Oakes became head of the editorial board of the New York Times, and when [James] Russell Wiggins left the Washington Post and then [Benjamin C.] Bradlee came in, such personnel changes and attitudes made a considerable difference. I remember sending up to the New York Times, when Johnny Oakes was there, a copy of the editorial written by the New York Times at the time of the signing of the Southeast Asia Treaty. This editorial started out \"The signing of the Manila Pact was a great diplomatic triumph for President [Dwight David] Eisenhower and Secretary John Foster Dulles.\" It went on and on in that direction. Well, I took this up to have them compare their attitude at the beginning of the SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] Treaty with what their attitude had come to be on Vietnam and I got back a tortured thirty-page memorandum from Johnny Oakes on this subject. It's somewhere in the files if you want to look at it. \r\n \r\nSCHOENBAUM:  Do you think he personally wrote that? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Oh, I think so. I think so. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  He did? Let me ask you a real general question. As you yourself acknowledge, the grass roots turned against the war. And to a large extent all these people are weighing in with editorials opposed to the war. Can you blame these people for having had a change of heart? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, in the first place I don't believe that it was the news media who changed the attitude of people at the grass roots. I think it was the duration of the war and the continuing casualties that we--A kind of war weariness set in. I don't believe that the American people in general derive their opinions from the news media to the extent that some people think. After all, most of the newspapers in the country were strongly opposed to Franklin [Delano] Roosevelt. And he was overwhelmingly elected four times. Now, when you say \"blame.\" I don't challenge the constitutional right of those who came to be dissenters on Vietnam. I do think that they should accept responsibility for the effects of what they said and did, just as I accept responsibility for what I did. I think they ought to do the same. And they should accept the fact they encouraged Hanoi to persist and to continue the fight in order to win politically what Hanoi could not win militarily. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Now the American people had this change of heart. And it occurred over about three years' time, really, from when we first introduced our own ground forces there in '65. And here it is'68, about three years later. And we had this reversal of public opinion. World War II lasted longer than that with a great many more casualties. Why the difference? People could stay united-- \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Don't exaggerate the unity in World War II. After all, World War II started, as far as we were concerned, with the attack on Pearl Harbor. And there was this son-of-a-bitch [Adolf] Hitler proclaiming that the Germans were the master race. Well, we had our own ideas about who was the master race. (laughter) But the last time I looked at the figures I was surprised to learn that the desertions in World War II were higher than were the desertions in Vietnam. Of course, in World War II they had more places to run to. It was somewhat easier to desert in World War II than it was in Vietnam. But nevertheless, one of General [George Catlett] Marshall's principal preoccupations in World War II was somehow to get across to the ordinary soldier what the war was all about, the great issues that were involved in the war. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  You told us about that memo that you got from the government. Do you think in any way the American people, in a very general way, just didn't have quite the same amount of fiber that this group-- \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Oh, I think that the American people are-- \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Just got soft in some way? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Not so much that as war weary. I think the American people are very impatient about war. And here was a war that was being fought on television in their living rooms every day. Now this raises some very important questions. Does this mean that we'll have to do quickly and with overwhelming force whatever we decide to do in a situation of this sort in the future? \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  We've got some good comment from you on these particular points. Let me get back to the Tet Offensive and what it meant to me, and to a lot of us. And that is, regardless of the question whether or not it was really a tactical victory or defeat for the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, the very fact that they could do it after three years of a real pounding from American forces, and the very fact that they could put their lives on the line in such a massive way all over South Vietnam, suggested to us that those were the kind of people that we just weren't going to be able to beat short of obliterating them and obliterating North Vietnam. And if that was true, somehow we just misjudged that conflict. We came in on the wrong end of a civil war. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Now this was not a civil war, Richard. There were civil war elements in it. There were Vietcong in the South who were part of the effort to overthrow the South Vietnamese government. But the people who came in from North Vietnam could not be called participants in a civil war. In this postwar period we've had several divided countries: Germany, Korea, China, Vietnam. Now each part of those divided countries had sufficient standing as a political entity to be entitled to the protections and the obligations of international law. If you want to test it, just suppose that the West Germans threw sixty regiments of West German forces into East Germany. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  This is a critical point. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  There is no way that the Russians would have looked upon such an effort as a family quarrel among Germans. And we had a heck of a war in Korea over the same issue. And the Chinese and the North Koreans are the only people that the United Nations have ever specifically branded as aggressors. So although there were civil war elements in this Vietnam problem, the attack by North Vietnam on South Vietnam could not be described as civil war. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Because of that international conference of'54 and the fact that that line had been drawn, you are saying that that conferred legitimacy? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, both parts of Vietnam had political standing. Each part had been recognized by a considerable number of states and they were entitled to the protections of international law. And, indeed, the Southeast Asia Treaty itself included South Vietnam as one of the protocol states that was entitled to the protections of the Southeast Asia Treaty. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  I don't agree with a whole lot of this, but I can't see the point of arguing it out because we've done it on earlier occasions. \r\n \r\nSCHOENBAUM:  Could we maybe get back to the chronology? \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Yeah, let's do go back. \r\n \r\nSCHOENBAUM:  I have a few questions. On March 17, LBJ, in reaction to [Arthur Joseph] Goldberg and Goldberg's advocacy of a bombing halt, is reported to have exploded in rage and said at a meeting, \"I'm not going to stop the bombing and I've told you that. Doesn't everybody at this meeting realize that?\" Kind of in reaction to Goldberg's pressuring him too hard. Do you remember this? And at this time, the record shows you were among those who were advocating a partial bombing halt, which LBJ ultimately accepted March 31, of course, in his speech. Do you remember? That must have been a critical week. Of course on March 25 the \"wise men\"-- \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Such questions came up regularly at the Tuesday luncheon session with LBJ. And LBJ told us, and told people in Congress, that [Robert Strange] McNamara was his right arm to get on with the military side of it; I was his left arm to try to find a way to halt this thing by peaceful means. And so we discussed bombing halts quite frequently at these Tuesday luncheon sessions. LBJ came to be disenchanted with the productivity of bombing halts. He had had several and nothing happened in the way of political settlement. And he came to the view that all a bombing halt did was to give the North Vietnamese a chance to step up their movement of men and supplies into South Vietnam, and that they took full advantage of it, and to hell with it. So he got to be very tough about bombing halts. But then in the first half of 1968, when he too, I think, recognized that people at the grass roots had decided we better call it off, he was more amenable to such possibilities. There was a time there when he was very resistant to bombing halts. \r\n \r\nSCHOENBAUM:  You, among others, helped convince him obviously on that partial bombing halt? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  If we had one, the answer is yes, because I was trying to give the political processes, the various contacts with Vietnam by other governments and other groups, every chance to see if there was any possibility that North Vietnam was interested in calling this whole thing off on some reasonable basis. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Yeah, it was early in March, Pop, that you presented that idea to LBJ; this was for a partial bombing halt. I think you also tied it in with an article by Barbara Ward that you thought was quite good and you passed that on to LBJ. Sir Patrick Dean also saw you frequently during this time. God, what was the point I was wanting to make here? \r\n \r\nSCHOENBAUM:  The partial bombing halt. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Yeah, right. There's some controversy going on that in these later accounts that Clark [McAdams] Clifford, and even William [Putnam] Bundy to some extent, and some others didn't really think this was a meaningful bombing halt that you were proposing, that it was something more to shore up American domestic opinion, that you didn't think the North Vietnamese would respond to it in terms of negotiations. And Clark Clifford in these later accounts was very leery of this proposal of yours. Do you recall any of this controversy? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  I don't remember the details. In retrospect I don't think the North Vietnamese ever had any incentive to negotiate. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  You're probably right on that point. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  By that time they were hearing too many voices out of the homefront back here, which urged them to persist. I think I've indicated earlier on a tape that I think I myself underestimated the persistence of the North Vietnamese. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  That's true. \r\n \r\nSCHOENBAUM:  Yeah. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  I must say that I thought there would come a time, as happened in Korea, with the Berlin Blockade, and other situations, when they would be prepared to find a way to call the whole thing off. And that did not occur. \r\n \r\nSCHOENBAUM:  But on April 4 the North Vietnamese did announce that they were going to enter into a peace negotiation. Were you surprised at that? Was that regarded as not meaningful in a deeper sense? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, there was sparring back and forth, but we actually did organize discussions in the late spring and summer of 1968. \r\n \r\nSCHOENBAUM:  Yeah, those were the Paris Peace Talks. Why-- \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, you see, the North Vietnamese probably thought, may well have thought as had the Poles, the Rumanians, and some others, that their problem was to find a way for us to save face while getting out. Well, we weren't trying to save face; we were trying to save South Vietnam. And so some of these efforts proved to be fruitless because the North Vietnamese were concentrating on getting what they wanted in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. And that's not what we had in mind. \r\n \r\nSCHOENBAUM:  Well, the April 4 event, whatever it was, was the first time, unlike the previous times which come from the Poles or the Indians; it had come directly from the North Vietnamese. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah, I forget the details quite frankly. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Pop, do you remember that on March 10 there was a meeting at the Gridiron Club? And it was from that group that this story came out that this massive troop request of 206,000 men was being considered. That created quite a hullabaloo. It was not put out officially by the government. It must have been leaked. Do you recall what the source of the leak was and what kind of uproar that obviously must have caused people like Lyndon Johnson? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  I don't know where the leak came from on that. There were so many people in the government that knew about this 200,000 figure that it would have been a miracle if it had not leaked out somehow, somewhere. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Well, the thing was reported by Neil Sheehan and Hedrick [L.] Smith. The story was carried in the New York Times. It was released during the Gridiron Club [sic]. And the speculation was that the story started with Townsend [Walter] Hoopes. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  I just don't know. (laughter) If somebody were to swear to me that Townsend Hoopes had leaked it, I wouldn't be surprised. But I don't have any information. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  You don't have any particular recollections or anecdotes or LBJ's response to that? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  And it could have come out of Saigon. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Was that one reason that you and LBJ were so cagey about keeping this bombing halt possibility out of the task group, out of some of the task group meetings? It was certainly out the drafts of these Presidential speeches. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  The bombing halt problems came up in the Tuesday luncheon sessions. There was the forum for that kind of discussion. And that wouldn't have been turned over to any task group. After all, the Tuesday luncheon sessions were, in effect, statutory meetings of the National Security Council. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Because the bombing halt itself was not inserted into the draft of the President's speech until the very end. And my question was, did you keep it out of these earlier drafts for fear of leaks, because of these earlier leaks that had occurred? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  No, you begin with the state of the mind of the President. At what point was he willing to entertain such ideas? Now, he had tried these things on several times over a period of two or three years and got nothing for them except intensified efforts by the North Vietnamese. And so he wasn't easy to persuade until later in'68 when he too recognized that the people at the grass roots had decided we better chuck it. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Did you have a hard time persuading him in early March that, in fact, we needed this bombing halt? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  I forget. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  You don't recall what his reaction was? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  No. I remember there was one bombing halt. Rather, we did some bombing in North Vietnam while I think Mr. [Aleksei Nikolaevich] Kosygin was visiting Hanoi. Various people raised their eyebrows at that. But I was visiting Saigon during that same period, and the Vietcong tried to do some major bombing around Saigon. They attacked one of the major bridges, for example. I wasn't particularly impressed with the fact that we were bombing in the North while Kosygin was on his visit. Hell, they were bombing while I was on a visit to Saigon. Another element in my own mind that affected these questions: I myself had doubts about the utility of some of that bombing in the far North: Hanoi and Haiphong areas. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  That we've got. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  We've got you very extensively on that. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Because I'm not sure that the impact upon the war itself was worth the cost of men and planes that that bombing cost us. So to me a bombing halt was not all that much of a big deal. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Yeah. At what point did the President sign in with his decision that a bombing halt should be part of this effort? Would this have occurred right before his Presidential speech? Would it have been earlier in March? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  It was sometime in March, but I forget now just the date. And you have my recollection on the work we put in on the President's speech at the end of March-- \r\n \r\nSCHOENBAUM:  Yeah. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  --at which he announced he would not run again. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  You don't recall when he signed in with that decision? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  No I don't. When you say signed in with a decision, there was not a decision until he made it. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  That's right. And in his own book he points out that, really, until he made that Presidential speech March 31, that he had the option of making that decision in any fashion preferred, and he wouldn't really definitively have made that decision in his own mind until the time before the speech. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Now another thing about LBJ that may have a bearing on several of these things. He would postpone a decision until he was ready to act. When he made a decision he wanted to act straightaway. So he did not make advanced decisions to be leaked to the newspapers and things of that sort before he was ready to act. I'm sure there were times when he deliberately did not make a decision so that there was nothing to leak. But when he did make a decision he wanted to act straightaway. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Walt [Whitman] Rostow called you \"first among equals of all the people advising LBJ.\" And in his book The Vantage Point LBJ says that you of all his advisors \"best understood the way I wished to move.\" Other people who knew both of you said that LBJ wanted to hear Dean Rusk's views last; that you were the one that he turned to in the final analysis of all the people that advised him. We've got your view on why this may have been so, due to your common heritage and the close relationship you formed. But looking back at this Tet offensive and that post-Tet policy review, and the influence you personally might have had on LBJ, in what way, and specifically with regard to policy, how do you think you might have influenced him? There were a number of issues. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  That would require a detailed examination of particular issues that I don't, quite frankly, have in mind. But I was very close to LBJ. He apparently did rely heavily upon me during his Presidency. I'd suggested to him in 1967 that he get somebody else in my place, and he said, \"No,\" that he wanted me to be Secretary of State as long as he was President. But I just don't know whom else he talked to, what other sources of advice he might have gotten, some of it outside of the government. I'm sure that he talked frequently with Senator Dick [Richard Brevard] Russell, [Jr.] on a lot of these things, and oddly other leaders of Congress. \r\n \r\nSCHOENBAUM:  They were close personal friends? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah, but Lyndon Johnson and Dick Russell had some differences on the civil rights business, for example: major differences. But Lyndon Johnson talked to Dick Russell at least three or four times a week when he was President, on all sorts of things. Among other things, because Dick Russell could deliver twenty-five votes in the Senate on any subject whatever. And LBJ respected that. I think I put on tape already how Dick Russell came to be a member of the [Earl] Warren Commission. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  No. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, apparently LBJ called Senator Russell and said he wanted him to serve on a commission to investigate the assassination of John F. [Fitzgerald] Kennedy. And Senator Russell apparently said, \"No, under no circumstances. I simply will not do that, Mr. President. You will have to find someone else.\" About ten days later LBJ called Senator Russell back and said, \"Senator, I just thought I would let you know that I'm announcing the formation of the commission to investigate the assassination of John F. Kennedy and your name is on it.\" And Russell said, \"But, Mr. President, I told you that under no circumstances would I do that.\" And LBJ apparently said, \"Well, I remember you said that, Senator, but your name is on the list.\" And he hung up. And so Senator Russell found himself on the Warren Commission. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  I'll be darned. Who told you that story? LBJ or Russell? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  LBJ. (laughter) But Russell did have, at the end of the day, great respect for the office of the Presidency. And he refused to make a scene out of it when he found himself on the Warren Commission. (laughter) But he really got the LBJ treatment on that one. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Speaking of the LBJ treatment let me ask you about him and this loyalty thing. When confronting LBJ on the war, Clark Clifford, who was a [sic] long friend of his, said that this--the way he said it, \"This Judas appeared.\" Earlier he had been in support, now he was confronting LBJ on the war and \"this Judas appeared.\" \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Who was the Judas? \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  This new LBJ, or this new thing that came between them in their relationship. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  I see. Okay. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  And he said his personal relationship with LBJ deteriorated as he, Clark Clifford, became critical of the war. And other people have said that LBJ's insistence on personal loyalty and the need to win in Vietnam sort of poisoned the well. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  That doesn't surprise me that Clark Clifford might have said that. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  He didn't say that last statement, but he did say the earlier. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  But this is not just a question of personal loyalty, it's a question of constitutional loyalty. I think that makes a critical difference. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  My question is, how did you handle this aspect of LBJ where he seemed to have, what many people thought, obsessive concern with loyalty? Robert McNamara, for example. They were very close officially and worked well together. And then Bob McNamara apparently changed his mind on Vietnam and that relationship just deteriorated. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, LBJ told me that somewhere along the way, 1966 or something like that, somewhere in there, Bob McNamara told him in a personal conversation that he, McNamara, would like someday to be President of the World Bank. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Okay. This story we have. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  All right. I personally think that McNamara's service came to a conclusion because the Presidency of the World Bank became open at that point, and LBJ had remembered that conversation and nominated McNamara to be President of the World Bank. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Right, but their relationship soured. It was no longer close; it was no longer officially good. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah, there might have been--I don't know. There might have been other factors. For example, Bob McNamara was very much of a Kennedy man. He was close socially and personally with Bobby [Robert Francis] Kennedy as he had been with John F. [Fitzgerald] Kennedy. And as you know LBJ and Bobby Kennedy had some problems with each other. And that might have some bearing. But when Bob McNamara left the government he spoke in a very moving way and broke into tears, in terms of what he said about his service with LBJ and so forth. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  You didn't find it a problem? You didn't find LBJ's concern with loyalty as being obsessive, something that you had to work around? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  No, because to me it was wholly in accord with the Constitution. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Could you speak critically and openly to LBJ on those aspects? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Sure. At those Tuesday luncheon sessions we debated each other sometimes fiercely, and also debated the President. Because we knew that those who were at those Tuesday luncheons wouldn't rush out and talk to the Washington Post and the New York Times about it. So we knew--I mean if you're in a cabinet meeting or NSC [National Security Council] meeting with thirty or forty people sitting around the room, you could not have such frank conversations because somebody would leak it. No, I never had any problem in expressing my views frankly and candidly to the President, partly because he knew that at the end of the day I knew where the constitutional responsibility lay, and respected it. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  On March 15 Dean [Gooderham] Acheson met with LBJ at the White House, I believe over lunch, and had a long talk with him. He told LBJ that the Joint Chiefs didn't know what they were talking about, that the U.S. was not winning the war, nobody believed LBJ anymore, that the American people were no longer in support of the policy. It sounds like a pretty blunt briefing on behalf of Dean Acheson. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Where did you get that? \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Harry-- \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Harry [C.] McPherson, [Jr.]? \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Not McPherson. [Herbert] Schandler? I've seen it elsewhere. It's in several of these accounts. Anyway, that was the essence of their conversation. That same night LBJ called you over to the White House and you guys met for two hours. Do you recall it? This was March 15. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  No, not really. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  And Dean Acheson had just unloaded on LBJ. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  I think there's another element that runs through some of this. Clark Clifford and Dean Acheson were, among other things, partisan Democrats. And I think they were giving much more weight to domestic politics and the upcoming election than some of the rest of us were. I think I've told you he little story about Harry Truman, saying to the State Department, \"I don't want to get advice from you fellows based upon domestic politics. In the first place, good policy is good politics.\" Well, I think Clark Clifford, particularly, has always been strongly moved by domestic party considerations, more than most people who turn up in the job of Secretary of Defense. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  More so than his legitimate feeling that the war was just wrong and had to end? \r\n \r\n \r\nEND OF SIDE 1 \r\n \r\n \r\nBEGINNING OF SIDE 2 \r\n \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  You were saying that it was not hard for LBJ to accept contrary advice on Vietnam. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  He would accept other points of view if he had confidence in the motives of those who were offering the advice. Also bear in mind that a President gets a good deal of information on who is saying what to the press behind the scenes around town. And one thing that used to make him very angry was to discover that people in his own administration were trying to undercut him by what they were saying to the newsmen around town. That he looked upon as poison. On that point I don't blame him. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Yeah. I couldn't follow the chronology. The New Hampshire primary, and then Robert Kennedy's announced candidacy for the Presidency obviously contributed to this feeling of the President that there had been erosion of political support for him. Jane Mossellem says that Bobby Kennedy used to come in on Saturdays and talk with you. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Occasionally. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Just the two of you? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah, occasionally. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  It happened frequently, at least as she remembers it. She said it happened quite a bit. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  That was chiefly during the Kennedy administration. It happened less frequently during the Johnson administration. And I don't think he did when he became a Senator. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  What were those talks all about? Just various things? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Just chewing the fat. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Chewing the fat? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah. Bobby Kennedy was interested in foreign policy matters. And he just wanted to talk over some of these matters and I was glad to talk with him. My understanding with President Kennedy was that we would let Bobby Kennedy show his interest in foreign policy matters, but that if Bobby ever got in my way that I would take it up with President Kennedy and he would straighten it out. So I don't feel that Bobby Kennedy directly interfered adversely in the conduct of our foreign relations. But he was interested. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Did he talk to you about the war? Did he weigh in with any significant opposition to it? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  The intriguing thing to me is that Bobby Kennedy volunteered to President Johnson to go to Saigon as our ambassador. And I vetoed that on the grounds that this country could not take another Kennedy tragedy, and Saigon was just too dangerously opposed to Bobby Kennedy. Ironically, in terms of what might have happened-- \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  That might have been the safest place to send him. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  It's possible. But Bobby was prepared to go to Saigon as ambassador at one point. But then when he got into politics, I suspect his views changed considerably. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Apparently Bobby Kennedy, in some of these accounts, made an offer to LBJ not to run for the Presidency if LBJ would choose a new Secretary of State. (laughter) \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, LBJ told me, with some chuckles, that Senator Bobby Kennedy had come to him and said that if LBJ would take my resignation and make Bill [William Don] Moyers Secretary of State that he, Bobby, would not run for the Presidency. Now, I only got that from LBJ. What the truth of it is, I just can't be certain. But-- \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Did you do anything response to that? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Not at all. Not at all. But there was no way--whatever LBJ might have done with me, he would not have asked Bill Moyers to be Secretary of State. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  The other half of that proposition by Bobby was if LBJ would appoint a commission to review Viet policy, with RFK chairing that committee-- \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  I've never heard that one. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Never heard that one? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  No. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Just as a minor tidbit. Were you ever told that after the New Hampshire primary, some people found out that the reason the voters were dissatisfied with LBJ was mainly for not pursuing a tougher policy. And that those people outnumbered the ones who wanted a withdrawal somehow: three or four to one. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, that doesn't surprise me, because we had pretty strong support at the grass roots throughout most of that experience, at least through the mid-sixties. And I suppose on balance at any given time along there, there would have been support for more, rather than less, use of force. LBJ never gave it a moment's thought. But my guess is that there would have been popular support if we had dropped an atomic bomb or two on North Vietnam, however irrational such an act would have been, because there was strong support at the grass roots. By the way, the thing about the grass roots: As late as 1966, I myself came down here to the Atlanta stadium to attend an affirmation of Vietnam rally organized by the students of the colleges and universities of this area. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Right. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  On that day it rained cats and dogs! The heaviest rain I ever saw! So that the stadium was not heavily-- \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  I saw that in the news. Got any particular memories of that incident? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  No, except that one year later you could not have imagined that the students of the colleges and universities of this area would have organized such a demonstration of support. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Pop, let's talk about this March 28 meeting to polish the draft of the Presidential speech to be given on March 31. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Right. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Let me just review some of the history of it. The initial draft had recommended no bombing halt, 28,000 men for reinforcements, made only a pro forma plea for negotiations, and according to this account, was a little bit aggressive in tone. Again, there was confusion about this meeting, and your role and Clifford's role. Townsend Hoopes quotes Clifford as saying, \"Dean Rusk was troubled and sincerely anxious to find some way to the negotiating table.\" Clark Clifford kind of dominated the talk for a while, changed the tone of the speech. You ended up advising the second draft. You decided to include a bombing halt proposition in there. Walt Rostow went along with all of this; you went along with all this. Were you somewhat persuaded by Clark Clifford at this meeting? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, what I was more persuaded by was increasing evidence that people at the grass roots were coming to the conclusion that we better chuck it if we couldn't wind it up promptly and that the more moderate tone of that March 31 speech seemed to me to point in the direction of starting some talks, rather than simply the belligerency of all out determination to fight it through to a conclusion. And I think it's possible that the tone of that speech helped stimulate Hanoi themselves to become a little more active in indicating a readiness to talk. After all, that happened in April didn't it? Their announcement? \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  That's right. April 4. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah, well, that might have been a direct response to LBJ's final speech on the subject. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Were you comfortable with the way that speech actually read? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yes, I was. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  You were? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Except that when we prepared the draft we did not have the final paragraph in it about LBJ not running again. But, no, I worked on what I thought was the final draft of that speech, and then took off to New Zealand for an ANZUS [Asia-New Zealand-United States] meeting. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  That's right. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Then I was notified on the plane halfway across the Pacific that there would be another additional final paragraph. And I knew that LBJ would announce that he was not running again, because he had told me the year before that he would have to announce that he was not running again no later than March to give other candidates a chance to get in position. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  That's right. At the time that you guys met on March 28 to review that first draft, had LBJ made up his own mind about that bombing halt proposal of yours discussed earlier? Do you have any recollections about that? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Probably he didn't really make up his mind until he saw and approved the final draft of the speech. He, as I said earlier, usually made his decisions after full reflection, and then when he was prepared to execute. But I doubt that he had made up his mind too much in advance of that speech. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Do you think Clark Clifford was influential, if not in your overall thinking on Vietnam during that entire period, was he influential on that point in the draft of that speech? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  He and I, for a change, more or less agreed on the tone of that speech. And he expressed apparently some surprise to find that that was my view. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Yeah. At the end of that meeting you had Bill Bundy draft a cable to Saigon notifying that LBJ had accepted the proposal to stop the bombing of North Vietnam, north of the Twentieth Parallel. Then Rostow called LBJ and informed him of the work that was going on the second draft, asked to see him later in the day. You went over to the White House that evening. And you met extensively with LBJ. Any recollection of the particular session? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  No. I don't. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  You were working on a seven-page alternative draft. LBJ called you into his office alone. And you discussed these things I guess. He authorized sending this cable to Saigon, informing [Ellsworth] Bunker in South Vietnam of his plans, and that included the bombing halt. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Right. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  You don't recall the substance of your remarks to LBJ? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  I think my remarks were reflected in the outcome of what was actually done. I would not have sent such a cable to Saigon without LBJ's full approval; I mean, that's for sure. It would not have been within my authority to do so because I did not have the authority to decide on a bombing halt. The President was the Commander-in-Chief. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  I have this feeling that LBJ kind of made up his mind that night at the White House on the 28th of March. He had his speech coming up and he had to decide what he was going to say. And it seemed like that was the point of decision. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  I think that's probable. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  You think that's probable? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah. By the way, on the personal relations between Johnson and Clifford. On [Richard Milhous] Nixon's inauguration day, following the inauguration, we top members of the Johnson Administration went out to Clark Clifford's house for a little luncheon session, with LBJ and Lady Bird [Claudia Alta Taylor Johnson]. And then some of us raced to the airport; Johnson was moving out to the airport by helicopter. Some of us, including your Mom [Virginia Foisie Rusk] and me, raced to the airport to be there when he took off. I remember we went around that circumferential highway eighty miles an hour to try to get there before Lyndon Johnson left. But that was a rather warm affair, that luncheon session Clark Clifford gave for LBJ. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Was that right? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah. So I don't know how bitter the tension between them came to be. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Things might be developed by other people more so than-- \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  That's right. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Well, lots of relationships are coming full circle years after the fact. Harry McPherson signed in with his own feelings about the March 28th meeting; he was there apparently. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah, he was one of the principal speech writers for LBJ. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  That's right. He was working on the draft of the speech. And it was his feeling that something more that Clark Clifford's persuasiveness and his convictions caused Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow to acquiesce and change their minds, and change in particular the tone of the speech. And I'll tell you what he said about it. What he says, in talking about the fact that you and Rostow went along, he said, \"Why should that have been? Clark Clifford was one of the most persuasive men in Washington, etc. But something more than Clifford's style and contacts must have caused men like Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow, staunch believers in the justice and necessity of the war, to acquiesce. Something like conversations with President Johnson, who had in turn been talking with Congress.\" And he goes on to describe LBJ's contacts with the Congress. And he concludes, \"This I believe he must have communicated to his most trusted advisors, Rusk and Rostow. And this, more than Clifford's logic and the impressive sources of his information, must have caused them to talk of 'how' instead of 'whether' after he spoke at this particular meeting.\" \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Does that sound like a likely reconstruction? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  It's possible that was a part of it. But also we were beginning to hear from the people at this point. So that on issues like that at the end of the day the people are the boss. Okay, boy, I've got to break and sign off. \r\n \r\n[break in recording] \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Pop, we were discussing this earlier bombing proposal of yours in early March, around March 4, 5, and 6. There was the decision on the part of you and Lyndon Johnson not to cable Ellsworth Bunker about this proposed or possible bombing halt. Did you also keep this possible action from Clark Clifford? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Probably not. I did not play games with people or colleagues in the government. After all, he was the Secretary of Defense. And the bombing halt would be of direct interest to him. So I think it's probable that he and I discussed it at some point during this period. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Were you or LBJ concerned about leaks coming out of the Defense Department, that group of civilians that was working with Clifford? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, to some extent. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  There had been that leak-- \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  In any event, again it was LBJ's practice not to want to leak forward decisions. If he was going to take a bombing halt, he would take it and do it. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Right away. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  But not have word spreading around town that he was about to do something. He didn't like that at all. That was not his method of operation. But I think it's very likely that I talked about that very privately with Clark Clifford. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  And probably not in any larger group? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  That's right. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  When that leak went out about the 206,000 man troop request that [William Childs] Westmoreland apparently wanted, that leak did come, looking back, in retrospect, it did come from the defense civilians: Townsend Hoopes specifically, I think. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  It's probable. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Do you recall a lot of anger, definite backlash, or reaction from either you or LBJ that \"this is really a kind of leaky group over there and we are going to have to hold our cards a lot closer?\" \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, I think there was some of that feeling. You see, LBJ was extremely sensitive to leaks that were clearly designed to undermine his policy. That was the thing that really set him off. He had some suspicions as did I about who some of the leakers were. I can't name them because I can't prove it. But you have a pretty good idea about who's talking around town. That sort of thing gets back to you. The reporters themselves help you discover who such people are. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  I've got a good chapter on that. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  You said earlier that you didn't totally understand Clark Clifford's conversion from being a very firm hawk on Vietnam to almost being a dove, and taking the position he ultimately took. Do you think that his having to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March, or was that February, may have been the catalyst that would have caused Clifford to-- \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Did he testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the Armed Services Committee? \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  He was asked to. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  I see. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  And he got with [James William] Fulbright and said that he would rather not. And the reason for that was that there was a policy evaluation going on right now, that he wasn't very sure where he stood; his own views were changing. He felt very uncomfortable going before that group. I suppose that really could have been a catalyst for him having to defend a position in congressional testimony before the TV cameras and everything else. Did he ever discuss that with you? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Not particularly. I think, given his state of mind after the Tet offensive, I can see why he might be very uncomfortable about testifying before a congressional committee, particularly in public. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Remember it was after that Tet offensive that you gave that tremendous two days of testimony for the Fulbright hearings on nationwide TV. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  No, that was in '67. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  That was '67? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Okay. All right. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  I might just comment on that. Bill Fulbright wanted me to come to the Foreign Relations Committee in a public session before television in '67. And LBJ did not want me to do it, and told me not to go. Well, that gave me a real problem. I tried to work it with Fulbright that we would have an executive session on closed circuit. But LBJ did not want a public debate because there were certain feelers going on, and he thought such a thing would get in the way of such feelers. So I filibustered that point for several weeks. But Bill Fulbright and I both knew that if we wanted a foreign aid bill, which we would have to have, that I'd have to come before the committee. And so the time came when I had to appear on behalf of foreign aid. And so they had me. I went down there and we spent two days talking about Vietnam and almost nothing about foreign aid. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Did I tell you what the reaction was at Cornell? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  No. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  A lot of these students who had been opposed to the war came around and said, \"Rich, I'm afraid your Dad didn't change my views on Vietnam, but he sure did a hell of job testifying.\" I had a number of people come up to me-- \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  I had a good deal of mail on that. And the principal theme of much of the mail was that I had managed somehow to keep my cool. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  (laughter) Under this probing from the Senators. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  That's right. Many people commented on that. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Yeah. Bill Fulbright said in his opening comments to you when you showed up, he said, \"I know that you understand that those in this room and the public at large will understand that the discussion between you and the committee, etc., is not inspired in any way by any personal animus towards you. Every member of this committee has a high regard for you personally. All of us, and I particularly, recognize that few officials in Washington today have performed their duty to their country with greater devotion and energy that you have. The fact that many of us disagree with your views in no way implies that we do not have a profound respect for your intelligence and integrity, and that we do not admire your devotion and sense of duty.\" So that was Bill Fulbright's opener. And it was quite a statement on his part. I heard you had said, \"That was like a grace before you started carving me up.\" Okay: Then Clifford says he's reluctant to testify; Fulbright won't take his understudy. They tried to ask [Paul H.] Nitze to go up there and testify, and Nitze prefers to resign. And LBJ gets wind of this, banishes him from the White House. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah, Nitze put himself in a rather awkward position on that, because he simply refused to go down to meet a committee of Congress and defend the administration's position on Vietnam. In that situation, since he was the Deputy Secretary of Defense, it might have been better for him to resign, because he was not able to perform his duty as the Deputy Secretary of Defense. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  And apparently his threatened resignation really rocked Clifford to some extent. I think it was one of the things that helped persuade him. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Right. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  The cabinet meeting on March 13 went for two-and-a-half hours. Was Vietnam discussed? Did the cabinet play any significant role during this Tet policy review? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, these cabinet meetings are very interesting, because at almost every cabinet meeting LBJ would ask me and the Secretary of Defense to make some comments on Vietnam. And then LBJ would go right around the table, asking each cabinet officer, \"Do you have any comments? Do you have any questions?\" They all sat there silent, even though some of them after they left the cabinet were pretty strong doves. I've written several letters to friends trying to get some explanation of how it was that people, including cabinet officers, would not really step up and say what was on their minds. The more I look into that question, the more complicated the question comes to be. But, for example, [William] Ramsey Clark was sitting at my right at the cabinet table. When he left office he could go all the way to Hanoi, but when he was Attorney General, a member of the cabinet, he couldn't lean eight inches to his left and say to the Secretary of State, \"I don't agree with what you are doing in Vietnam.\" That to me is a great mystery. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  You don't recall the cabinet's signing in in any significant way-- \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  No. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  --on Vietnam during this period? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  No, the cabinet was not a place where such decisions are made. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Or even serious discussions? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense usually made some comments on Vietnam. And those comments were serious. But there was no general debate.  \r\n \r\n[break in recording] \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  We're talking about Dean Acheson and the extent of his influence with both Lyndon Johnson and Dean Rusk. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  We always listened carefully to what Dean Acheson had to say. He was a man of great experience and a very intelligent man. We did not take his advice on the Cuban Missile Crisis because he wanted to open up the crisis with a strike against Cuba. He was very much opposed to the quarantine method because he thought that was too weak. But you see, Dean Acheson had never served as Secretary of State under the circumstances where a full nuclear exchange was possible, was operationally possible. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Okay. That we've got. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah. And he also was criticized very heavily while he was in office, by a good many Republicans, as being soft on communism. And my guess is that after he left office he overreacted to some of that criticism by being extra hard-boiled on a lot of issues. But I must say that his change of view on Vietnam in '68 made an impact, and caused one to think. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  I bet it did! \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Yeah. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Precisely because he had that very strong orientation. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  And at least it was a measure that the political tides were moving against the continuations of the war if a man like Dean Acheson would abandon ship. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Any comment on your relationship to Dean Acheson? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Oh, I was very close to Dean Acheson during the Truman Administration when he was Secretary of State. And I visited him at his home quite frequently. Virginia and I went out to his farm in Maryland on occasion. And the rumor has it that he was one of those who urged Kennedy to turn to me as a Secretary of State. But he was, I think, disappointed in my service as Secretary of State on certain points. For example, he was a Europeanist and did not like the strong support we gave to the decolonization process: the Portuguese colonies and Africa, for example, and certain attitudes toward South Africa itself. I was never sure whether his law firm had some of those people as clients, and that gave me pause at one or two occasions. But on the whole he was helpful. On the whole he was helpful. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  He tended to make your life a little difficult for you, I guess. I asked Bill Bundy what Dean Acheson thought of your job as Secretary of State and Bill said that was a very unfair question, and then said Dean Acheson could be very critical about you, but he was very critical about everybody, and not excepting himself, Bill Bundy. I guess he was very caustic, very outspoken, very abrasive. \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, Dean Acheson enjoyed caustic remarks; he relished them. He liked to get a good wisecrack off at somebody else's expense. And he didn't suffer fools gladly. He didn't care, for example, for outside advisers; these committees of advisers that were brought into the government to speak their piece. He used to refer to them as just \"another bunch of sons-of-bitches from out of town.\" And he had a disdain for the processes of the Congress. But, nevertheless, I think we remained friends until his death. But I was critical of him in certain points, and he was critical of me I'm quite sure. Although when we were sitting personally together he was always polite and considerate. He never hurled blasts at me in my presence. I felt he put a few darts in my back around Georgetown. \r\n \r\nRICHARD RUSK:  Pop, we talked earlier about Robert Kennedy and his declaring for the Presidency, bolting the Democratic party to run against an incumbent Democratic President. Have you got any particular opinions of him or that action? \r\n \r\nDEAN RUSK:  Well, there was a very strong sense of political ambition in the Kennedy clan. \r\n \r\n \r\nEND OF SIDE 2 "},{"id":"wtu_eopi_6682x5682","title":"A.G. Gaston","collection_id":"wtu_eopi","collection_title":"Eyes on the Prize Interviews","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, 39.76, -98.5","United States, Alabama, Jefferson County, Birmingham, 33.52066, -86.80249"],"dcterms_creator":["Gaston, A. G. (Arthur George), 1892-1996","Blackside, Inc.","DeVinney, James"],"dc_date":["1985-11"],"dcterms_description":["Filmed interview with A.G. Gaston conducted for Eyes on the Prize. Discussion centers on the Birmingham campaign of 1963 and his efforts to reach a negotiated settlement between civil rights activists and the city government, including Bull Connor.","The original interview elements, 16mm negative and 1/4\" audio reel to reel, were preserved during 2010-2016 due to the generosity of a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Thanks to a grant from the National Historical Publications and Records Commission (NHPRC), the preserved films were digitized to create 10-bit uncompressed HD files and the original 1/4\" elements were digitized to create 24-bit 96kHz .wav files. The picture and audio were then reassembled at the Film \u0026 Media Archive."],"dc_format":null,"dcterms_identifier":["MAVIS Interview Record: 77","gas0015.0077.040"],"dcterms_language":["eng"],"dcterms_publisher":["Washington University in St. Louis","Blackside, Inc."],"dc_relation":null,"dc_right":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dcterms_is_part_of":["Interview gathered as part of Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years 1954-1965"],"dcterms_subject":["Birmingham (Ala.)--Race relations","Civil rights demonstrations--Alabama--Birmingham","Nonviolence","Civil rights--History--20th century","Civil rights movements--United States","Race relations--United States","Oral History--United States"],"dcterms_title":["A.G. Gaston"],"dcterms_type":["MovingImage"],"dcterms_provenance":["Washington University (Saint Louis, Mo.). Libraries. Special Collections. Film \u0026 Media Archive"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["http://repository.wustl.edu/concern/videos/6682x5682"],"dcterms_temporal":null,"dcterms_rights_holder":["Copyright of Washington University Libraries and Blackside, Inc."],"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":null,"dlg_local_right":null,"dcterms_medium":["interviews","moving images"],"dcterms_extent":["00:16:41:00"],"dlg_subject_personal":["Gaston, A. G. (Arthur George), 1892-1996","Connor, Eugene, 1897-1973","Hanes, Art","King, Martin Luther, Jr., 1929-1968","Shuttlesworth, Fred L., Rev., 1922-2011","Vann, David J."],"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":"A.G. Gaston 1\r\nInterview with A.G. Gaston\r\nNovember 1, 1985\r\nProduction Team: C\r\nCamera Rolls: 515-516\r\nSound Rolls: 1508\r\nInterviewer: James A. DeVinney\r\nInterview gathered as part of Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years (1954-1965).\r\nProduced by Blackside, Inc. Housed at the Washington University Film and Media Archive,\r\nHenry Hampton Collection.\r\nPreferred Citation\r\nInterview with A.G. Gaston, conducted by Blackside, Inc. on November 1, 1985, for Eyes on\r\nthe Prize: America’s Civil Rights Years (1954-1965). Washington University Libraries, Film\r\nand Media Archive, Henry Hampton Collection.\r\nNote: These transcripts contain material that did not appear in the final program. Only text\r\nappearing in bold italics was used in the final version of Eyes on the Prize.\r\n00:00:02:00\r\n[camera roll 515]\r\n[sound roll 1508]\r\n[slate]\r\nCAMERA CREW MEMBER #1: Rolling.\r\nCAMERA CREW MEMBER #2: OK.\r\n[sync tone]\r\nCAMERA CREW MEMBER #1: OK, JIM, IT’S ALL YOURS.\r\nINTERVIEWER: OK, DR. GASTON, YOU HAVE BEEN A VERY SUCCESSFUL\r\nBLACK MAN IN YOUR CAREER, SO THAT WHEN 1963 CAME AROUND, WHY\r\nYOU WERE ALREADY QUITE WEALTHY. SO I'M JUST WONDERING HOW, HOW\r\nYOU CAME BY YOUR SUCCESS, IF YOU COULD JUST TELL US A LITTLE BIT\r\nABOUT THAT.\r\nGaston: I don't know about wealthy, but I had been around here a long time. Ninety-three\r\nyears old, you know? And I worked over there at U.S. Steel for $3.10 a day, so it's a long\r\ntime before I was wealthy, as you call it.\r\nA.G. Gaston 2\r\n00:00:37:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: WELL, WHAT WAS IT LIKE FOR BLACK PEOPLE IN\r\nBIRMINGHAM BEFORE THE 1963 DEMONSTRATIONS? DO YOU REMEMBER\r\nWHAT THAT—\r\nGaston: Pretty tough, pretty tough.\r\nINTERVIEWER: HOW SO?\r\nGaston: There were, there were no conveniences, public conveniences available to black\r\npeople, on equal basis. Quite a bit of unemployment. You can understand the segregated job\r\nsituations. They had jobs for whites and jobs for blacks and so forth. Those were the\r\nconditions that many of the black folks came through, and some of them survived, and made\r\na little money.\r\n00:01:14:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: DID YOU, WHEN YOU LOOKED AROUND AT THE\r\nCIRCUMSTANCES THAT EXISTED FOR BLACK PEOPLE IN THIS COMMUNITY,\r\nDID YOU FEEL SOME SORT OF RESPONSIBILITY BECAUSE YOU HAD BEEN\r\nSORT OF FORTUNATE IN MAKING SOME MONEY? DID YOU FEEL AN\r\nOBLIGATION TO DO SOMETHING?\r\nGaston: Well, yes, it was all of us in the same pot. We was, we was self-, self-survival.\r\nWasn't so much as helping myself, it was helping the other fellow so we all could survive.\r\nThat was my interest in the civil rights movement. It wasn't a selfish movement; it was for all\r\nof us. As I say, Arthur Shores did quite a bit of the legal work, but I was fortunate enough to\r\nhave had a little money and I did the financing, most of it.\r\n00:01:54:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: OK, I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU, IN 1962 THEY STARTED CHANGING\r\nTHE GOVERNMENT OVER DOWN HERE—\r\nGaston: Yeah.\r\nINTERVIEWER: —SID SMYER WAS A LITTLE BIT EMBARRASSED ABOUT\r\nTHINGS, AND BEGAN WORKING. WERE YOU INVOLVED IN SOME OF THE\r\nPLANS TO CHANGE THE CITY GOVERNMENT?\r\nGaston: Not directly on it, indirectly. As I say, I provided the funds for the, the civil rights\r\nfolks who was agitating, and provided facilities for those civil rights activists, such as Andy\r\nYoung, and those boys who come over here, and with the movement, with, with Martin King.\r\nA.G. Gaston 3\r\n00:02:29:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: OK, I’M BACKING UP JUST A LITTLE BIT EARLIER, THOUGH,\r\nBECAUSE THEY WERE CHANGING THE GOVERNMENT OVER. THERE WAS A\r\nCOMPETITION BETWEEN—\r\nGaston: Oh, prior to then, they were, yeah.\r\nINTERVIEWER: —[unintelligible] BULL CONNOR. DID YOU THINK THAT THAT\r\nELECTION, THE OUTCOME OF THAT MIGHT CHANGE BIRMINGHAM?\r\nGaston: Yeah, I was, I was. I was with David Vann. I supported him in his election. He was,\r\nseemed to have been spearheading that movement. I was very active with that group when\r\nVincent Townsend, who was with _The Birmingham News_, who was very active. So I—\r\n00:02:58:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: HOW, HOW WERE YOU ACTIVE?\r\nGaston: Well, I was participating. I was one had a little money and they kind of accepted me\r\nin a way. I was a member of the Chamber of Commerce, along with Arthur Shores, back in\r\nthose days, and naturally I had, I was, had communication with, with the leaders.\r\n00:03:17:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: OK, NOW YOU WERE INVOLVED IN THE CHAMBER OF\r\nCOMMERCE, THERE WAS ALREADY PLANS TO CHANGE THE CITY\r\nGOVERNMENT, BRING IN ALBERT BOUTWELL, GET RID OF BULL CONNOR,\r\nAND SOME OF THOSE PEOPLE. DIDN'T YOU THINK THAT CHANGE WAS\r\nCOMING? DIDN'T YOU THINK THAT MAYBE MARTIN LUTHER KING'S\r\nINTERVENTION WAS UNNECESSARY, OR HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THAT?\r\nGaston: Well, we didn't, we didn't anticipate the need for Martin King at that time. This,\r\nthis Martin King thing came, and all of a sudden, things sparked off down at Montgomery\r\nwith this lady that had the bus problem, down there, and then Martin went on over to Atlanta.\r\nAnd we had a fellow named Shuttlesworth that was raising sand around here. And his idea\r\nwas to, to get into the schools, and of course, it was an organization that we supported, and\r\nwhat is this, I'm trying to think of that organization’s, the name of the—Southern\r\nConference, what was the name of it?\r\nINTERVIEWER: ALABAMA OR–\r\nGaston: Yeah, that was Shuttlesworth's movement, see? And I financed it. Well we, they had\r\nno pla-, no place to stay when they started bringing in folks from Atlanta, and Montgomery\r\nup here, and that's when I put them up at the motel, down there. They had no money. I didn't\r\nparticipate actively for any of the organizations, but I financed it. And some of the activities\r\nA.G. Gaston 4\r\nthat I didn't approve of, in a way. I was financing the group, but an incident, they were taking\r\nthe kids out of school, you know marching. And I thought that was unnecessary. In fact,\r\nmy idea was the kids, many of them, didn't know what it was all about to start with. But\r\nthey were using them, and very effectively. And I got criticized from, from, from them, by\r\nsome of them. Hosea Williams, that boy is very popular, from Atlanta, now, he was one of\r\nthe fellows who called me an Uncle Tom, a super Uncle Tom. [laughs] Old Hosea did. But\r\nthe guys couldn't eat, they had no place to stay and eat, other than me they couldn't do\r\nnothing but, you know, ‘cause I was feeding them and putting them up down there. And\r\nthat's the only thing I had. I was with the movement, but my idea of approaching it was\r\nsomewhat different from some of the folks that, that, that you might call radicals. I was\r\ntrying to approach it from, and I did it, from a, very effectively. My place on the, on the\r\nChamber there—\r\n[cut]\r\n[wild audio]\r\nGaston: —got some of the leaders to, to move. They were willing to do something for me\r\nthat they wouldn't have done for Martin King, or to Shuttlesworth.\r\n00:05:55\r\nCAMERA CREW MEMBER #2: WE’RE ABOUT TO RUN OUT.\r\nINTERVIEWER: OK, LET’S JUST CHANGE THE ROLL HERE AND WE’LL–\r\n[cut]\r\n[camera roll 516]\r\n[slate]\r\nCAMERA CREW MEMBER #1: LET ME GET A SLATE HERE. OK, AND MARK.\r\n[sync tone]\r\nCAMERA CREW MEMBER #1: THANK YOU. [pause] OK, JIM, IT’S ALL YOURS.\r\n00:06:09:00\r\nINTERVIEW: OK, LET ME ASK YOU THEN, IF YOU WERE SUPPORTING MARTIN\r\nKING AND SOME OF THOSE PEOPLE, AND GTVING THEM SOME FINANCIAL\r\nHELP, LETTING THEM USE YOUR MOTEL AND THINGS LIKE THAT, SURELY\r\nSOME OF THE PEOPLE IN BIRMINGHAM MUST HAVE BEEN UPSET WITH YOU,\r\nDID YOU HAVE CALLS?\r\nA.G. Gaston 5\r\nGaston: Yeah, yeah. My house was bombed, the motel was bombed, and but I think what I\r\ndid helped save the situation from polarizing the whites and the blacks, because I was a kind\r\nof moderate between the two. The whites wasn't too happy with me, you know? I had money\r\nand I was supporting these radicals over here. So they were giving me hell, and the black\r\nfolks, they were giving me hell, says I was an Uncle Tom, [laughs] ‘cause I was supporting\r\nthe whites. I was, I was trying to keep the town from—And so, when they started the\r\nbombing, I told them at the Chamber of Commerce, Sid Smyer, who was a very prominent\r\nman in this town, who had very influential, and I just told Sid, I just slipped up his, his office\r\nin the back. I couldn't let the blacks see me having conferences with him. But it was that type\r\nof communication that saved the town. Because the blacks was fixing to bomb up the town,\r\nthat is they were getting dynamites out, and the whites, they were doing the same, and I could\r\nsee, I'm a property owner, I had, I had selfish interests there, my business was going to be\r\nburned up, and everything. So I told Mr. Smyer what was fixing to happen. And they got it\r\nover to the white people, that I think saved the situation. I make no compromise. I think I, I'm\r\nproud of what I done, [laughs] even if I caught hell on it from both sides. Because today, you\r\ncan see the climate in Birmingham that probably wouldn't have been here at that time. It was\r\nafter we changed this thing, then the white and the black began to kinda come to their sense,\r\nand this community started going.\r\n00:08:00:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT SOME OF THE PEOPLE AT THAT TIME.\r\nTELL ME WHAT YOU REMEMBER OF BULL CONNOR?\r\nGaston: Bull said that I was his best nigger in town. Old Gaston, my good nigger. That was\r\nhis compliment to me. [laughs] And I thought it was most embarrassing thing I ever saw, but\r\nI couldn't really say anything. It was those kind of a situations where the white and blacks\r\ncouldn't communicate. We had a, we had a white man that announced for some political\r\noffice here, I remember, and the newspaper took a picture of him shaking hands with a black\r\nman on the street, and that in itself caused him to lose the election. The entire thing was so\r\ntense, at that time, nobody profited from it.\r\n00:08:44:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: TELL ME ABOUT FRED SHUTTLESWORTH.\r\nGaston: He was a brave young man. He took the blunt. I got him out of jail many a time.\r\n[laughs] He was he was trying to integrate the school. The night that Martin King was in jail\r\nover here—when he wrote the letter about the Birmingham jail—Martin was in jail, over\r\nhere, and Shuttlesworth was, had his, beat all up, and had to come down there bloody and\r\neverything. And, and then it was fixing to have a mess in this town. It was at that time I got\r\nArthur to go there and get, get Martin out of jail. Well, the, the group didn't want him to get\r\nout of jail, because the longer he was in jail, it would inspire the movement to move. So we\r\ngot Martin out of jail, and we got Shuttlesworth straightened out, and that saved that situation\r\nthat night. I believe maybe the next day though is the time that march started. I believe that\r\ntime they started in the park, out there, where Bull came down there with the hose pipe. But\r\nA.G. Gaston 6\r\nShuttlesworth was a, was a leader. He was the one who led the organization that brought\r\nKing over here from Atlanta.\r\n00:09:57:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: WHAT ABOUT WYATT TEE WALKER? REMEMBER HIM?\r\nGaston: Yeah, well, yeah, Wyatt, he was with that organization, one of the leaders in there.\r\n00:10:03:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: WHAT WAS ART HANES LIKE AS MAYOR? DO YOU\r\nREMEMBER?\r\nGaston: Yeah, [laughs] he was one of those radical mayors. I think it’s him and his son was a\r\nlawyer. I think he, he wasn't, he was back, he wasn't too much more better [sic], better than\r\nBull Connor back in that day. But things really started changing when Boutwell got in. And it\r\ndidn't go too far then, but it did turn a little back to center from when, then when David Vann\r\ngot in there, that's really when it started going on the right track.\r\n00:10:43:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: TELL ME ABOUT DAVID VANN.\r\nGaston: He was a good man, he just made a mistake. I had lunch with him yesterday.\r\n[coughs] He was a, made a good mayor, but he made one mis- [coughs], one [coughs], one\r\nmistake. They had a police that shot a black girl here, and Vince Townsend and I were in\r\nOperation New Birmingham. David Vann was trying to do the right thing and he appointed a\r\ncommittee. It was a decision for him to make, he appointed this committee, [laughs] and this\r\ncommittee, they came up with, said with the situation, that, that they didn't accept, and that,\r\nthat made him very unpopular. That's when Richard Arrington came in leading the group that\r\nhe had, and, and he probably from, and Richard Arrington today is doing a doggone good\r\njob. He's very popular in this community.\r\n00:11:32:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: DO YOU REMEMBER WHEN THEY BLEW UP THE 16TH STREET\r\nCHURCH?\r\nGaston: Yeah.\r\nCAMERA CREW MEMBER 1: HANG ON TWO SECONDS HERE. MOVE JUST A\r\nLITTLE BIT HERE. LET ME—WE’RE STILL ROLLING.\r\nINTERVIEWER: WE’RE ALMOST DONE HERE.\r\nA.G. Gaston 7\r\nGaston: Yeah.\r\nINTERVIEWER: LET’S RUN OUT THIS FILM.\r\nGaston: This be all—\r\n00:11:43:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: REMEMBER WHEN THEY BLEW UP THE 16TH STREET CHURCH?\r\nGaston: Yeah.\r\nINTERVIEWER: TELL ME ABOUT IT. WHERE WERE YOU?\r\nGaston: Well, well that’s, that was when I, the time that the black was just about ready to do\r\nsome fighting back. ‘Cause they had bombs, they had dynamite, stuff stored up around, some\r\nof it was around our place there. And I could see, with dynamite in the hands of blacks who\r\nwere very upset at that, that period, and the, and the Klan, who was prepared for those two\r\ncoming together. And I was, I was afraid then to think, well, it was that time that they wanted\r\nto get the, the president to send the, the officers—what do you call them? The?\r\n00:12:33:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: MARSHALLS?\r\nGaston: Hm? Marshals. The marshals. And Martin King and I, we had a committee, went to\r\nsee the president. I, I was opposed. I was on the Chamber, the Chamber really didn't want the\r\nmarshals, and I agreed with them. We didn't want to do the outside, we thought we could do\r\nit ourselves. And so I, I prevailed on King and them to not to insist on Kennedy not to have\r\nthe marshals in here. We sat in the office, in, with the president, I remember so very well.\r\nReverend, Reverend Ware, who was one of us, into the Oval Office, [laughs] he had to go in\r\nthe toilet, you know? [laughs] That Oval Office, I, it was quite interesting. But when we got\r\nthrough with the president, and the president was pretty upset, he was breathing fire, he said\r\nnow don't you go out there and tell the press out there that I wouldn't send in the—what do\r\nyou call them?\r\n00:13:35:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: MARSHALS.\r\nGaston: The marshals, there. He said, y'all didn't ask for them. I said, yeah, we didn’t. But\r\nthen, we, we, we met over there at the Hilton Hotel and King and them had to prevail on me.\r\nI wasn't going over there unless we agreed to not to call for the officers, for the marshals. So\r\nwe agreed not to call for the officers, and we didn't. And, but they sent a committee. I mean,\r\nthe president sent two, a retired Army officer, and whoever, y'all ought to know who it was.\r\nThey came down, and from then on, just started to get the thing together.\r\nA.G. Gaston 8\r\n00:14:08:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: WHAT ARE THE REAL ISSUES AT THAT TIME?\r\nCAMERA CREW MEMBER #1: I GOT A HUNDRED FEET. I WONDER—\r\nGaston: The real issue was getting integration in the, in the, in the restrooms of the city,\r\nfitting on clothes in the stores, and that type of stuff.\r\n00:14:21:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: WELL THERE WAS A LOT OF DISCUSSION AND DEBATE ABOUT\r\nTHE USE OF NON-VIOLENCE TO COMBAT THE VIOLENCE. THERE WAS A LOT\r\nOF VIOLENCE IN BIRMINGHAM, AND YET MARTIN WAS TALKING ABOUT\r\nUSING NON-VIOLENT METHODS. DID YOU APPROVE OF THAT?\r\nGaston: Now me, myself, I couldn't do it, so I don't get in it. But he succeeded, and I agree\r\nwith every bit of the world, he succeeded with it and he got results from it. And I'm well\r\nprepared to give him all the credit and honor for it. But in the outer hall in our building down\r\nthere, I was sitting in the audience, when King up there making a speech and some young,\r\nobnoxious fellow jumped up on the platform and attacked him. And he wouldn't even let us,\r\nand I went to call the police and King stopped me. [laughs] He the one they would have\r\nwanted arrested, see? And they were planning to, it was in a black audience, can you\r\nimagine? And they would have tore him up. King wouldn't let them. And then, the police\r\ncame anyway, and King wouldn't even press charges against him.\r\n00:15:15:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: WHAT'S YOUR OUTSTANDING MEMORY DURING THAT TIME?\r\nGaston: Well, that was it. That, it was there, to stand up on my building looking down at\r\nBull Connor and them shooting water in the park right cross from my office there, in that\r\npark. I guess that's the most outstanding thing in my mind right now.\r\n00:15:32:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: HOW DID YOU FEEL WHEN YOU SAW THAT?\r\nGaston:\r\nI just couldn't imagine what could have happened. I could see my building, bombing up,\r\nand everything, I just couldn't know what was going to happen. That, plus that, that, that\r\nbombing of that, that, that church down there, killing those kids. Those will always stay in\r\nmy mind. But I can reflect back on it now and see what has happened as a community that\r\nwe’re living in. See the leadership that Richard Arrington has given this town, and the…I can\r\nsee the relief that has come to many white people, even white businesses that are better off\r\nA.G. Gaston 9\r\ntoday, because instead of having two toilets, they have only one toilet now. So they save\r\nmoney. [laughs] So the whole thing worked all right. I can see the transit system, where it,\r\nthey had to have the black folks on the back of the thing, now the black folks is running the\r\nthing. You know, everybody's happy on it. So, I've been, seen it all. And profited from it.\r\n00:16:37:00\r\nINTERVIEWER: OK, THANK YOU VERY MUCH, DR. GASTON—\r\nGaston: Yeah.\r\n[cut]\r\n[end interview]\r\n00:16:41:00"},{"id":"suc_idn_3483","title":"Letter from William Jennings Bryan Dorn to Anne Newman, October 30, 1985","collection_id":"suc_idn","collection_title":"Isaiah DeQuincey Newman, (1911-1985), Papers, 1929-2003","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, South Carolina, 34.00043, -81.00009"],"dcterms_creator":["Dorn, William Jennings Bryan, 1916-2005"],"dc_date":["1985-10-30"],"dcterms_description":["1 page"],"dc_format":["image/jpeg"],"dcterms_identifier":null,"dcterms_language":["eng"],"dcterms_publisher":["Columbia, S.C. : University of South Carolina. 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