{"response":{"docs":[{"id":"bcas_bcmss0837_1627","title":"Court Filings: District Court, declaration of Robert Pressman and affidavit of Austin Porter Jr.","collection_id":"bcas_bcmss0837","collection_title":"Office of Desegregation Management","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, 39.76, -98.5","United States, Arkansas, 34.75037, -92.50044","United States, Arkansas, Pulaski County, 34.76993, -92.3118","United States, Arkansas, Pulaski County, Little Rock, 34.74648, -92.28959"],"dcterms_creator":["United States. District Court (Arkansas: Eastern District)","Pressman, Robert","Porter, Austin, Jr."],"dc_date":["1995-11-21"],"dcterms_description":null,"dc_format":["application/pdf"],"dcterms_identifier":null,"dcterms_language":["eng"],"dcterms_publisher":["Little Rock, Ark. : Butler Center for Arkansas Studies. Central Arkansas Library System"],"dc_relation":null,"dc_right":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"dcterms_is_part_of":["Office of Desegregation Monitoring records (BC.MSS.08.37)","History of Segregation and Integration of Arkansas's Educational System"],"dcterms_subject":["Little Rock (Ark.)--History--20th century","Education--Arkansas","Educational law and legislation","Lawyers"],"dcterms_title":["Court Filings: District Court, declaration of Robert Pressman and affidavit of Austin Porter Jr."],"dcterms_type":["Text"],"dcterms_provenance":["Butler Center for Arkansas Studies"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["http://arstudies.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/bcmss0837/id/1627"],"dcterms_temporal":null,"dcterms_rights_holder":null,"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":null,"dlg_local_right":["Available for use in research, teaching, and private study. Any other use requires permission from the Butler Center."],"dcterms_medium":["judicial records"],"dcterms_extent":["46 pages"],"dlg_subject_personal":["Porter, Austin, Jr.","Pressman, Roberta"],"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":"The transcript for this item was created using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and may contain some errors.  I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Spec. Sc. Dist. Number 1 Civil Action No. LR-C-82-866, E.D. Ark., Western Div. DECLARATION OF ROBERT PRESSMAN Robert Pressman swears under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct: A. Employment in Civil Rights Division (1.) Following my graduation from Columbia Law School in June 1965, I worked as an attorney in the Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, from August 2, 1965 ' through July 31, 1970. The Division enforced civil rights laws concerning voting rights, access to public facilities and public accommodations, school desegregation, equal employment opportunity, and freedom from mistreatment by police personnel. My work at various times involved each of these areas. It encompassed giving guidance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on investigations of possible civil rights violations and compiling factual material and analyzing complex fact patterns, as well as legal research. (2.) For roughly the first two years of my tenure in the Division, I was assigned to work on problems arising in the northern part of Mississippi. During this period, I frequently travelled to Mississippi and, among other things, made appearances in the Carroll County school desegregation case. I also investigated the status of school desegregation in other systems, including Lee County, Pontotoc County, Tunica County, and the City of Corinth. In 1967, the Division was reorganized and my work shifted to 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Illinois. There, I developed facts concerning school segregation in School District 151 of Cook County, Illinois. The Department's suit against that district was its first northern case. I participated in the trial. See United States v. School District 151, 286 F. Supp. 786, 787 (N.D. Ill. 1968); 301 F. Supp. 201, 205 (N.D. Ill. 1969). My Illinois work also included school segregation issue in Cairo, East St. Louis, and Madison County, Illinois. (3.) In 1969, the Division was again reorganized, this time along subject matter lines. I was assigned to the education section. From October 1969 through my departure from the Division at the end of July 1970, I worked principally on Alabama school desegregation issues, particularly on Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, a statewide case involving 100 local districts, as well as state officials. Efforts were underway in this period to secure implementation of plans satisfying the standards of Green v. County School Board. I prepared written comments on issues arising in more than 30 Alabama districts and appeared frequently before the three-judge court (Judges Richard T. Rives, Frank M. Johnson, and H.H. Grooms). I also appeared before Judge Johnson in the separate Montgomery County school desegregation case and prepared for the Department briefs in two appeals from the decisions of the three-judge court in the Lee case. See, for example, Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 448 F.2d 746, 747 (5th Cir. 1971). (4.) On December 15, 1969, I received a Certificate of Award for outstanding work, in the Attorney General's Twentieth Annual Awards Ceremony. Four of the Division's ninety attorneys were given this award at that time. 2 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I B. . Employment at the Center for Law and Education (5.) In August 1970, I began working at the Center for Law and Education (CLE), a component of the federally-funded program of legal services for low-income persons, administered since 1975 by the Legal Services Corporation. As the \"national back-up center'' on education issues for the entire legal services program, the Center's principal role was to promote throughout the program strong representation of clients experiencing education problems. The work consisted of providing advice to legal services personnel on particular client problems; conducting training programs; writing publications and articles; engaging in administrative advocacy; and participating as co-counsel in some cases. My employment at the Center ended as of September 15, 1995, due to lay off, because the Congress chose to eliminate funding for national support programs like CLE. (6.) In 1972, upon its filing, I began working on the Boston school desegregation case as co-counsel for the plaintiff class of Black parents and students. My involvement has continued to the present, although the case is largely inactive with only a few orders remaining in place. See, for example, Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 414 (O.Mass. 1974) (liability ruling) and Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F. 2d 527, 528 (1st Cir. 1976) (argued appeal in which the court affirmed the placing of the operation of a high school in receivership). Through the years, I had the occasion in Morgan to address the issue of an award of attorneys fees and costs in a number of instances. Indeed, Judge Garrity presently has under submission a request that CLE receive an award for 547 hours of my work in Morgan in the period from October 1988 through June 1993 at a rate of $200 per hour. There were also a number of times through the years when the inquiries from 3 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I legal services attorneys and other advocates to which I responded concerned fee awards. (7.) In the 1970's I also did some work in the Detroit school desegregation case, Bradley v. Milliken, and more than 1000 hours of work on behalf of the plaintiffsintervenors in the Omaha school desegregation case, United States v. School District of Omaha. See, for example, 521 F.2d 530 (wrote brief for successful appeal with the court's opinion reflecting to a substantial degree the factual statement in the brief). In addition, particularly in the earlier years of my tenure at the Center for Law and Education, legal services attorneys and other advocates asked questions about school desegregation issues in a number of instances, to which I responded. (8.) During the 1970's, I played a role at CLE in the development of a racial discrimination theory ultimately employed successfully in securing a delay in the Florida program of denying standard high school diplomas to students failing a \"competency test.\" See Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979), affd, 644 F.2d (5th Cir. 1981). In the Debra P. litigation, I participated briefly in the trial (due to an illness in the family of a CLE colleague) and wrote a portion of the trial memorandum setting forth a theory accepted by the courts ( denial of standard high school diploma based upon competency test result perpetuated earlier intentional discrimination against black students who began their educations in segregated and unequal elementary schools). (9.) In 1986, I wrote two memoranda on racial discrimination claims for use in the legal services program. (a) The first, focusing on racial discrimination in school discipline and curricula, contained the following headings: ''Typical Problems,\" \"Gathering Information About a Discrimination Problem,\" ''The Legal Bases of Racial Discrimination 4 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Claims\" (including constitutional and Title VI claims), \"Other Material re Disparate Discipline,\" ''Material Regarding Disaimination in Curriculum,\" and \"Remedial Principles.\" (b) The second memorandum is titled \"Discriminatory Allocation of Resources within a School District\" (14 pages). I first used this document in a training program for legal services attorneys in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1986. (10.) I participated during my tenure at CLE, as a trainer or lecturer, in a minimum of 40 sessions on education issues for legal services workers, parents, and\\or students. One such session in the late 1980's for legal services attorneys concerned ways to monitor consent deaees and other judgments in institutional refonn cases. I prepared for this event a lengthy memorandum summarizing and organizing, according to topic, a large number of reported and unreported decisions relevant to the topic of monitoring a decree. C. Work on the Ayers Case (11.) In January 1987, the North Mississippi Rural Legal Services Program asked me to join their staff members providing representation to the named plaintiffs and the plaintiff class in the case then styled Ayers v. Allain, Civil Action No. 4:75CVOO9-B-O, Northern District of Mississippi. Ayers concerns the nature of the obligation of Mississippi officials to eliminate racial disrimination and segregation from the operation of the Mississippi system of public universities. I have played an active role in the case since that time. My work in Ayers through March 1995, totalled in excess of 6,000 hours, and involved, inter alia, framing and responding to discovery requests; taking depositions; identifying and preparing exhibits; preparing exhibit lists and other materials required as 5 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I part of the standard pre-trial submission; participating in settlement efforts; making an opening statement; presenting and aoss~xamining witnesses and otherwise participating in two lengthy hearings; 1 preparing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; preparing appellate briefs; arguing before a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circui~ as well as that court sitting en bane, 2 and supporting the efforts of my brother and sister co-counsel. Currently, some of my time is spent working on an appeal from the district court's decision on remand, Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F.Supp. 1419 (N.D. Miss. 1995). D. Court Appearances (12.) During the course of my legal career, I have made appearances in the following federal courts: M.D. Ala., S.D.Ala., M.D. Fla., S.D. Fla., N.D. Ill., D. Mass., N. D. Miss., E.D. Mich., D. Neb., D. N. H., and D. S. Car.; Court of Appeals for the First, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits (filed briefs and argued); Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (filed briefs); United States Supreme Court (filed briefs). E. Work in this Case (13.) In September 1995, John W. Walker requested me to assist him and other persons in his firm to prepare a comprehensive fee application for the post-judgment monitoring phase of this case. Attachment One to this declaration, which is incorporated 1 The first hearing in 1987 consumed approximately 25 trial days. In 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the lower courts had employed the wrong legal standard in dismissing the case, articulated the correct standard, and remanded for further proceedings. see united states Y, Fordice, 112 s.ct. 2727. The hearing on remand in the trial court consumed 44 trial days in 1994. 2 see Ayers v, Allain, 893 F.2d 732 (5th cir. 1990); Ayers y, Allain, 914 F.2d 676, 677 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane) (argued in each instance). 6 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I herein by reference, sets forth my time and activities in working on this project. Because it was necessary for me to learn matters already known by Mr. Walker and his staff, and the nature of some of the work, the motion seeks an award for 120 hours, only 50.2 percent of the time which I actually worked on this very extensive undertaking. I believe that my \"learning curve\" regarding the case was less than it would have been, had I not had extensive experience regarding school desegregation, racial discrimination, monitoring, and fee award issues. (14.) The amount sought for my time is $175 per hour. The following factors support the reasonableness of this hourly rate: (a) the higher rates awarded to John W. Walker by Arkansas district courts as shown by his affidavit, filed with the joshua motion; (b) the approval of rates of $200 per hour to counsel in this case and the Kansas City school desegregation case by the Court of appeals for the Eighth Circuit during the mid- 1980's, as shown by that court's McDonald decision cited in the Joshua memorandum in support of the motion; (c) the rates for Little Rock law firms shown in Arkansas Business, November 13, 1995, at 25; (d) the fact that the Center for Law and Education seeks an award of $200 per hour for my time in the Boston school desegregation case for work in the period from 1988 through 1993; and (e) the fact that the Center seeks an award of $250 per hour for the more than 6000 hours which I worked in the Mississippi higher education case in the period from 1987 to 1994 (with any award to be used by the Center for work on behalf of low income persons). I dedare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information, and the information set forth in the attachment, which is incorporated herein by reference, are true and correct. 7 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Executed on this :)J)day of tJ ~ , 1995. Robert Pressman STATE OF ARKANSAS ) 1 )ss. COUNTY OF hJ})1tu ) SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this c20 day of 1995. Notary Public My Commission Expires: 9/;7/~? l I 8 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I IN THE UNITED SATES DISTRICT COURT OF ARKANSAS EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. v. LR-C-82-866 PUIASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL. KATHERINE W. KNIGHT, ET AL. ATTACHMENT ONE PIAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS INTERVENORS SCHEDULE OF HOURS OF ROBERT PRESSMAN DATE ACTIVITY TIME 9/18/95 Discuss fee 3.00 petition with JWW and JS seeking relevant records, such as docket and ruling of 12/1/92; identify substantive decisions on case; identify pertinent Eighth Cir. \u0026 Ark. fee decisions (MQQon~lg, HslcQissi, Jeffer, etc.); study rel. parts of Schwartz treatise on fees I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 9/19/95 9/20/95 9/21/95 9/23/95 9/24/95 9/25/95 9/26/95 9/27/95 Begin to draft motion; Schwartz treatise (paralegals, rates, fees for fee petition); call to Norman Chachkin ~ status of fees for appeals; read prior LR, vs, PCSSD decisions Study Del. Vallev decision and cases cited on monitoring; identify issues to discuss with JWW Review case docket Read PC settlement agreement \u0026 study parts bearing on fees \u0026 make notes Work on memorandum in support of award of fees for post-judgement monitoring Work on memorandum Work on fee memorandum and motion for award of fees; study docket; study treatise (fees for fee petition and rates) Motion for fees 2.40 1.00 1.00 1.50 7.50 3.00 5.50 0.25 I I 9/28/95 Work on topics for 4.50 JS affidavit and I discuss with JS; work on motion for fees (areas I covered in LR plan); examine transcript 2/24/94 .I n JWW role; work on topics for JWW aff. and fee memorandum I 9/29/95 Work on memorandum 5.50 I 9/30/95 Work on fee memo; 6.50 read Tr. 6/7/94 I and make notes I 10/1/95 Work on fee memo; 7.00 complete Tr. of 6/7/94 and make notes I 10/2/95 Work on Part II. 6.50 of memo; work on I motion in support of fees (attachments) I 10/10/95 Read Duran case 0.16 I (10th Cir.) 10/11/95 Work on memo; 0.80 I research cases on allocation among defendants, cost I of investigators and post-judg. mon. I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 10/12/95 10/14/95 10/15/95 10/16/95 10/17/95 10/18/95 Identify tasks to get petition filed; research on waiver issue; work on motion (attachments) Read Tr. of 1/24/94 \u0026 make notes Work on list of tasks (3 pages) Work on RP affidavit for fee petition; speak to JS i:g JWW affidavits in other cases \u0026 securing transcripts Work on RP affidavit; research Eighth Cir. and Ark. cases on scope of settlement/release ; identify and read cases on interim fees; read cases on fees for post-judgement monitoring; topics for JWW affidavit; work on ideas~ para. IV-B of settlement Read Tr. 1/24/94 and make notes; work on \"to do list\"; work on memo in support of motion 1.50 0.50 LOO 2.75 7.66 3.80 I I 10/19/95 Work on memo. , RP 3.25 I affidavit 10/20/95 Read Tr. 1/25/94 3.25 I and make notes 10/21/95 Read transcripts 7.75 , 1/25/94 \u0026 6/28/94 \u0026 make notes; work on memo; work with I JS on aff. (Joshua mon., discipline work); review JS aff. I 10/22/95 Read transcripts 6.25 I 6/28/94, 6/29/94, 3/29/94 and 7/28/94 and make notes; work on I memo; work on motion (attachments) I 10/23/95 Discuss \"to do 1.50 list\" for fee I petition \u0026 issues presented with JWW \u0026 JS; call to CH I n fee petition I 10/24/95 Determine JWW 3.00 hours as reflected in transcripts; review bills I submitted by other counsel in post-settlement period; I help gather \u0026 organize time records for JWW firm I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 10/26/95 10/25/95 10/27/95 10/30/95 10/31/95 11/1/95 Review transcripts at ODM for the period 1/25/91 to 8/3/92 to identify time and role for JWW and other members of the firm and make notes Substantive work on case: work with JS on motion and memorandum n LRSD faculty and administrators Review JS aff. Organize data from review of transcripts of hearings, including members of the firm participating in each hearing: issues to discuss with JS Work on memorandum in support of fees: work on motion (attachment): work on ideas re Para. IV-B of settlement Read decisions on interpreting settlement: plan needed steps in call to JS \u0026 work on JWW hours week of 10/23/95 2.25 2.33 0.33 1.0 7.0 1.0 I I 11/4-5/95 Make notes for 2.0 I section of brief addressing PC settlement agreement (9/89) I 11/7/95 At law library, do 4.25 research on I interpreting contracts (Restatement, I Eighth Circuit and Ark. cases); write part of memo on I contract principles, including reading decisions I 11/8/95 Work on 3.75 I memorandum; compile RP hours on fee petition for affidavit; I review JS compilation of hours I 11/9/95 Organize materials 8.50 n: reconstruction I of JWW time ., 11/10/95 Organize materials 9.00 n: reconstruction of JWW time; check RP schedule of I hours and JS schedule I 11/11/95 Work on 9.50 reconstruction of JWW time with JWW 1 and JS; check JS schedule of hours I I I I I 11/12/95 Work on 10.25 I reconstruction of JWW time with JWW and JS; calculate number of hours I worked by counsel for NLRSD after settlements I 11/13/95 Work on 9.75 reconstruction of I JWW time with JWW and JS; work on memo in support of I fees 11/14/95 Work on 9.50 I reconstruction of JWW time with JWW and JS; interview I Opal Sims u: her work at Walker law firm; brief law student on two 'I projects; discuss Mark B. time with him I 11/15/95 Work on 10.25 reconstruction of I JWW time with JWW and JS; work on Opal Sims and R. I Eddington affs.; prepare motions for extension; I work on summary chart I 11/16/95 Work on 10.25 reconstruction of JWW hours with JWW I and JS I I I I I 11/17/95 Compile hours 9.50 I worked by Friday firm: work on motion (attachment): work I on topics for JWW affidavit: review litigation I expenses: read cases on fees for fee petition: review JS I attachment I 11/18/95 Work on 11.25 memorandum: confer with WAB I 11/19/95 Work on 14.75 memorandum: work I on motion and attachments: confer with JWW n: strategy: work ,, on topics for JS aff. : work on expenses and H. I Hall aff.: identify remaining steps; work on BP I aff. 11/20/95 Work on BP aff.: 4.25 I work with JWW and JS on JWW hours; work on memo and ,, attachments to motion I 238.98 Hours TOTAL I I I I .I , , , , I I I I .I ,, , :, t I t I I I' I I IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. V. NO. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL. AFFIDAVIT OF AUSTIN PORTER JR. PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS Comes the affiant, Austin Porter Jr., submitting the following affidavit under oath: 1. I graduated from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock in the fall of 1982 with a major in criminal justice. During the spring of 1983, I was awarded one of two Winthrop Rockefeller Scholarships to attend law school at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock (UALR) School of Law. I enrolled at the UALR School of Law during the fall of 1983. I graduated from the UALR School of Law on May 18, 1986. On August 25, 1986, I was admitted to the practice of law before the Bar of Arkansas. I have also been admitted to practice before the United States District Court, Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas. 2. Upon completion of law school, I went to work for Central Arkansas Legal Services (CALS), where I handled cases such as domestic relations, consumer, real estate and landlord tenant. I worked at CALS from August, 1986 until May 5, 1989. I then worked at Walker, Roaf, Campbell, Ivory \u0026 Dunklin. While at this firm, I handled personal injury litigation and criminal matters. I also continued to handle consumer matters. I joined 1 I I I 1, I I t I I I I ,, I I ,, I ,, I I the firm of John W. Walker, P.A. on September 2, 1991, and have been involved in employment discrimination cases and voting rights cases. 3. The professional associations that I hold memberships are: American Bar Association, Pulaski County Bar Association and the W. Harold Flowers Law Society. I served on the Board of Directors of the Pulaski County Bar Association during 1990 and 1991. I served as chairman of the Law Day Committee for the Pulaski County Bar Association. 4. Some of the cases that I have been involved in are: Tammie McFarlin, et al. v. Newport Special School District, 980 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1992); Harrison v. Moore, United States District No. PB-C-91-0468, Johnny Whitfield, et al. v. Forrest City School District, fil..lll, United States District Court No. H-C-88-86, Adams v. Hartwick, United States District Court No. LR-C-86-747, Petty v. Scan, United States District Court No. LR-C-91- 324, Green v. Bell, 308 Ark. 473, 826 S.W.2d 226 (1992), Simmons on Behalf of Simmons v. Hooks, 843 F.Supp. 1296 (ED.Ark. 1994), Gloria Leapheart v. The City of Morrilton, et fil., United States District Court No. LR-C-91-696, Sherri Betton v. Sears. United States District Court No. LR-C-91-852, Willie Ashford v. The City of Hamburg, Arkansas, et al., United States District Court No. 93-1032, Tarar Porter v. Carolyn Staley. United States District Court No. LR-C-94-8, Richard Day and Calvin Hollowell v. F. G. \"Buddy\" Villines, fil..fil., United States District Court No. LR-C-94-849. 5. The fee that I am requesting in this case is $130.00 per hour which is reasonable and commensurate with my experience and qualifications. The rate is comparable to that of other attorneys with my experience, and working in Little Rock, Arkansas who are 2 I , , I 'I I 'I ' I I I I I I (' ,, t ,, 'I I involved in this type of litigation or in general practice. (See the affidavits of Mark D'Auteuil and Jerome Green attached herein as Exhibits \"A\" and \"B\", which were recently submitted in the case of Gloria Leapheart v. The City of Morrilton, et al., United States District Court No. LR-C-91-696). 6. I was recently awarded an hourly rate of $130.00 for the work that I performed in the case of Gloria Leapheart v. The City of Morrilton, et al., United States District Court No. LR-C-91-696 and Willie Ashford v. The City of Hamburg, Arkansas, et al., United States District Court No. 93-1032. 7. The total time that I am seeking to be compensated for in this case is 175.50 hours. 8. The total time of 175.50 hours is a conservative but reasonable submission based upon my time records which were prepared contemporaneously to the performance of the work. I have attached a true and accurate account of the hours that I have expended in representing the Joshua lntervenors and their interest in this case. The total amount of time being billed is submitted upon careful review of my records, and consultation with co-counsel, and necessary reductions of hours have been made in order to avoid unproductive and duplicative work. 9. My time record is being submitted for hours that I have expended for work directly related to this case (68.50) and for hours that are related to this case and came about as a result of students who were referred to our office either by the school districts and/or class members; the total hours for these cases are 1 07. 00 hours. 10. As a result of our representation of the Joshua lntervenors as well as our 3 I I , , 'I I I I I I I I I I' I l ,I t ,, , I I monitoring of the schools in Pulaski County, we are often asked to take cases whereby a student has been disciplined or has been denied some right in school due to race or color. The cases listed below (with the exception of Brandon Nunnely) involved students who were recommended to be suspended and/or expelled from school due to having been charged with a criminal offense. During the school hearings where we would be representing the child, we often argued that it is fundamentally unfair to suspend and/or expel a child for merely being charged with a criminal offense. Furthermore, these students had criminal charges filed against them by the state. A. Cynthia Mahomes/Brandon Nunnely - I represented Brandon Nunnely in a case against the Pulaski County Special School District. Brandon is a handicapped child, and wanted to attend a special Dyslexia school. The PCSSD did not want to pay for this school. A hearing was held, and ultimately the Special Law Judge ruled that the district did not have to pay for this expense. B. Carla Jordan - a student at North Side Jr. High. Ms. Jordan was charged with Battery 2nd, Disorderly Conduct, and Attempted Assault. Ms. Jordan was accused of attacking Nolan Ricks and was charged with Battery 2nd, a class D felony. The Battery charge was thrown out of court, and she was found delinquent on the Disorderly Conduct and Attempted Assault charges. C.. Remal Brown - a student at Sylvan Hills High School. Remal was charged with Criminal Attempt to Commit Rape - Class A felony, Terroristic Threatening - Class D felony, and Battery in 3rd Degree - Class A misdemeanor. Remal was accused of trying to rape a student at Sylvan Hills High School during school hours. This juvenile was 4 , , 1 I I -I I' I 'I I ,, \\ t I I ,I ,'I I II ultimately found delinquent on these charges. D. Richard Ridgel - a student a Joe T. Robinson. Richard was charged with Battery 2nd for striking a teacher during a fight with another student. The juvenile accidently hit the teacher during the fight. The juvenile plead no contest to these charges. E. Kenneth Clay - a student at McClellan High School. This case received a great deal of publicity; the paper reported that a gang fight occurred at school. Kenneth is charged with inciting a riot, a class D felony. Trial on this case is set for trial on January 3 \u0026 4, 1995. This statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, records, information and belief. STATE OF ARKANSAS) )ss. COUNTY OF LONOKE ) Austin Porter Jr. ,8 SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a Notary Public, on this dOday of !Ver. , 1995. 5 MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: q I I l I 2-0o,:s 6 ,, I t t I I 1 \\ I ,, I ,, 1' I I ,I. ' I II I I In reference to: DATE 09/04/91 12/18/91 12/19/91 01/12/92 06/30/92 08/03/92 07/05/93 07/06/93 07/07/93 07/08/93 04/19/94 04/20/94 ACTIVITY STATEMENT -AUSTIN PORTER JR. Little Rock School District, et al. v. Pulaski County Special School District, et al.; Lorene Joshua, et. al.; Katherine Knight, et al. (lntervenors) ACTIVITY HOURS Court appearance before the 8th Circuit of Appeals regarding the proposed plan modifications 3.5 School Hearing before Judge Wright on the financing aspects of the desegregation plan and interdistrict schools 6.5 School Hearing before Judge Wright on the financing aspects of the desegregation plan and interdistrict schools 8. 0 School Hearing before Judge Wright on proposed plan modifications 8.0 School Hearing before Judge Wright the incentive schools 7.5 School Hearing before Judge Wright regarding the LRSD budget 8.0 Reading over school budget - Preparation for the budget hearing 6.5 Reading over school budget - Preparation for the budget hearing 3.5 School hearing before Judge Wright on the LRSD and PCSSD budgets 8.5 School hearing before Judge Wright on LRSD and PCSSD budgets 8.5 Met with client Richard Ridgel 2.0 Court appearance on behalf of Richard Ridgel 1.0 1 I I DATE ACTIVITY HOURS ' 04/28/94 Met with client Richard Ridgel to discuss trial strategy 1.5 ' 06/07/94 Court appearance on behalf of client Richard Ridgel 1.0 09/23/94 Went to juvenile court to copy Ridgel file 1.5 I' 09/25/94 Read Ridgel file 1.0 I 09/28/94 Met with client Ridge; discussion of trial strategy 1.5 09/29/94 Court appearance on behalf of Richard Ridgel 2.5 I' 10/26/94 Met with client R. Brown and parent S. Williams 2.0 discussed case I 10/27/94 Read over Brown file 1.5 ' 11/07/94 Received client's letter; re: school actions .5 I 11/07/94 Spoke with client over the telephone re: case and strategy .5 11/07/94 Spoke with Dr. Patrick Smith, M.D. re: R. Brown .3 I 01/20/95 Met with client K. Clay and parent to discuss case 1.0 t 02/08/95 Conference with Joy Springer re: B. Nunnerly matter .5 02/09/95 Read over Nunnerly file 1.0 I 02/13/95 Read over Nunnerly file 1.0 I 02/14/95 Met with Client C. Mahomes; discussed case 2.5 ii , 02/15/95 Worked on trial brief for hearng on behalf of Nunnerly 8.5 02/16/95 Reviewed evidence and documents in file re: Nunnerly 1.0 t 02/17/95 Dictated letter to Client Mahomes re: hearing .2 \\I 02/19/95 Legal Research re: Nunnerly hearing 2.5 I 2 , , I I' DATE ACTIVITY HOURS I 02/20/95 Hearing preparation and Hearing re: Nunnerly matter 11 .5 I 02/22/95 Spoke with Ms. Mahomes re: Nunnerly hearing .2 02/24/95 Hearing preparation re: Nunnerly matter 1.5 I 02/24/95 Hearing re: Nunnerly matter 5.5 I 03/01/95 Court appearance on behalf of R. Ridgel 1.5 03/13/95 Worked on Findings of Fact re: Nunnerly matter 6.5 , , 03/14/95 Worked on Findings of Fact re: Nunnerly matter 6.5 I 03/22/95 Met with client K Clay and parents; discussed hearing strategy 1.0 I 03/23/95 Court Appearance - LR. Municipal Court on behalf of K Clay 1.5 05/05/95 Went to juvenile court to pick up subpoenas and prepared for I service re: R. Brown matter 2.5 11 05/15/95 Spoke with witnesses re: R. Brown matter 1.5 I 05/17/95 Went to juvenile court to copy file re: Brown matter 2.0 t 05/25/95 Preparation for hearing re: R. Brown matter 4.5 05/26/95 Hearing re: R. Brown matter 4.0 I 06/15/95 Spoke with clients' sister and aunt re: hearing of R. Brown .5 ' 06/15/95 Dictated letter to client re: hearing of R. Brown 1.5 I, 07/17/95 Met with client C. Jordan 2.0 07/17/95 Read over Jordan file 1.0 ' 07/19/95 Court Appearance - Pulaski County Circuit Court on behalf of K Clay 2.0 I 07/19/95 Spoke with the case coordinator for Judge Warren re: C. Jordan.25 I 3 I I I DATE ACTIVITY HOURS I 07/20/95 Received letter from case coordinator re: C. Jordan matter .1 I 08/02/95 Spoke with client and Dr. Smith re: R. Brown matter .5 08/07/95 Court appearance on behalf of R. Brown 1.0 ' 09/19/95 Prepared Motion for Discovery re: K Clay matter 1.0 I. 09/21/95 Copied file in Prosecuting Attorney's Office re: K Clay matter 2.0 09/21/95 Read over clients' file re: K Clay matter 3.5 I' 09/21/95 Drafted Motion for Severance re: K Clay matter 2.5 I 09/22/95 Court Appearance on behalf of K Clay 1.5 09/22/95 Spoke with Larry Jegley re: K Clay matter .2 I 10/30/95 Dictated letter to client C. Jordan .25 I 11/14/95 Hearing in Juvenile Court on behalf of C. Jordan 1.7 I t TOTAL HOURS EXPENDED 175.2 II I I ' 11 I 4 I,  This project was supported in part by a Digitizing Hidden Special Collections and Archives project grant from The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and Council on Library and Information Resources. "},{"id":"bcas_bcmss0837_1626","title":"Court filings: Court of Appeals, rulings on African American voters appeal the District Court' s order dismissing their claim under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, against LRSD, and the Joshua Intervenors appeal the District Court's August 10, 1994, order granting LRSD's motion to close Ish Incentive School.","collection_id":"bcas_bcmss0837","collection_title":"Office of Desegregation Management","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, 39.76, -98.5","United States, Arkansas, 34.75037, -92.50044","United States, Arkansas, Pulaski County, 34.76993, -92.3118","United States, Arkansas, Pulaski County, Little Rock, 34.74648, -92.28959"],"dcterms_creator":["United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"],"dc_date":["1995-06-05"],"dcterms_description":null,"dc_format":["application/pdf"],"dcterms_identifier":null,"dcterms_language":["eng"],"dcterms_publisher":["Little Rock, Ark. : Butler Center for Arkansas Studies. Central Arkansas Library System"],"dc_relation":null,"dc_right":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"dcterms_is_part_of":["Office of Desegregation Monitoring records (BC.MSS.08.37)","History of Segregation and Integration of Arkansas's Educational System"],"dcterms_subject":["Little Rock (Ark.)--History--20th century","Little Rock School District","Joshua Intervenors","Knight Intervenors","Special districts--Arkansas--Pulaski County","Ish Elementary School (Little Rock, Ark.)","Education--Arkansas","Education--Evaluation","Education--Finance","Education, Elementary","Educational law and legislation","Educational planning","School board members","School boards","School management and organization","School integration","School facilities"],"dcterms_title":["Court filings: Court of Appeals, rulings on African American voters appeal the District Court' s order dismissing their claim under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, against LRSD, and the Joshua Intervenors appeal the District Court's August 10, 1994, order granting LRSD's motion to close Ish Incentive School."],"dcterms_type":["Text"],"dcterms_provenance":["Butler Center for Arkansas Studies"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["http://arstudies.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/bcmss0837/id/1626"],"dcterms_temporal":null,"dcterms_rights_holder":null,"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":null,"dlg_local_right":["Available for use in research, teaching, and private study. Any other use requires permission from the Butler Center."],"dcterms_medium":["judicial records"],"dcterms_extent":["22 pages","27 pages"],"dlg_subject_personal":null,"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":"The transcript for this item was created using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and may contain some errors.  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT CONFIDENTIAL -- NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Nos. 93-3469EA, 93-3594EA No. 93-3469EA Little Rock School District, Plaintiff/Appellee, * * * * ** * * * ** Anne Mitchell; Bob Moore; Pat * Gee; Pat Rayburn; Mary J. * Gage; North Little Rock * Classroom Teachers Association; * Pulaski Association of * Classroom Teachers; Little Rock* Classroom Teachers Association; * Alexa Armstrong; Karlos * Armstrong; Ed Bullington; * Khayyam Davis; Janice Dent; * John Harrison; Alvin Hudson; * Tatia Hudson; and Milton * Jackson, * Appellants, * * * * Lorene Joshua; Leslie Joshua; * Stacy Joshua; and Wayne Joshua, * * Intervenors/Appellants, * * * Katherine Knight; Sara * Matthews; Becky McKinney; * Derrick Miles; Janice Miles; * John M. Miles; NAACP; Joyce * Person; Brian Taylor; Hilton * Taylor; Parsha Taylor; Robert * Willingham; and Tonya * Willingham, * * Intervenors, * JUN 1 5 1995 Office of Desegreg;,.tion Monitoring On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. * v. * * Pulaski County Special School * District, #1; North Little Rock* School District; Leon Barnes; * Sheryl Dunn; Mac Faulkner; * Richard A. Giddings; Marianne * Gosser; Don Hindman; Shirley * Lowery; Bob Lyon; George A. * Mccrary; Bob Moore; Steve * Morley; Buddy Raines; David * Sain; Dale Ward; John Ward; * Judy Wear; and Grainger * Williams, * Defendants, * * * * * Philip E. Kaplan; Janet * Pulliam; and John Bilheimer, * Movants, Office of Desegregation Monitor; Claimant, * * * * * * * * * * Parent's Plan; Horace A. * Walker; P.A. Hollingsworth; and* Kenneth G. Torrence, * Movants, * * * * Dale Charles; Robert L. * Brown, Sr.; Gwen Hevey Jackson; * Diane Davis; and Raymond * Frazier; * * Plaintiffs/Appellants, * Pulaski County Board of Education; Defendant/Appellee, * * * * * * * -2- O.G. Jacovelli, Individually * and as President of the Board * of Education of the Little * Rock School District; Patricia * Gee, Individually and in her * Official Capacity as a Member * of the Board of Education of * the Little Rock School * District, a Public Body; * Dr. George Cannon, Individually* and in his Official Capacity as* a Member of the Board of * Education of the Little Rock * School District, a Public Body; * John Moore, Individually and in* his Official Capacity as a * Member of the Board of * Education of the Little Rock * School District, a Public Body; * Dorsey Jackson, Individually * and in his Official Capacity as* a Member of the Board of * Education of the Little Rock * School District, a Public Body; * Dr. Katherine Mitchell, * Individually and in her * Official Capacity as a * Member of the Board of * Education of the Little Rock * School District, a Public Body; * W.D. Hamilton, Individually and* in his Official Capacity as a * Member of the Board of * Education of the Little Rock * School District, a Public Body; * Cecil Bailey, Individually and * in his Official Capacity as a * Member of the Pulaski County * Board of Education, a * Public Corporate; Thomas * Broughton, Individually and in * his Official Capacity as a * Member of the Pulaski County * Board of Education, a Public * Corporate; and Dr. Martin * Zoldessy, Individually and in * his Official Capacity as a * Member of the Pulaski County * Board of Education, a Public * Corporate, * Defendants. * * -3- No. 93-3594EA * * * * * * Little Rock School District, * Plaintiff/Appellee, * * * * Anne Mitchell; Bob Moore; Pat * Gee; Pat Rayburn; Mary J. Gage; * North Little Rock Classroom * Teachers Association; Pulaski * Association of Classroom * Teachers; Little Rock Classroom* Teachers Association; Alexa * Armstrong; Karlos Armstrong; * Ed Bullington; Khayyam Davis; * Janice Dent; John Harrison; * Alvin Hudson; Tatia Hudson; * and Milton Jackson, * * On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District Intervenors, * of Arkansas. * * Lorene Joshua; Leslie Joshua; * Stacy Joshua; and Wayne Joshua, * * Intervenors/Appellants, * * * Katherine Knight; Sara * Matthews; Becky McKinney; * Derrick Miles; Janice Miles; * John M. Miles; NAACP; Joyce * Person; Brian Taylor; Hilton * Taylor; Parsha Hilton; Robert * Willingham; and Tonya * Willingham, * Intervenors, v. * * * * * * Pulaski County Special School * District, #1; and North Little * Rock School District, * Defendants/Appellees, * * -4- * * Leon Barnes; Sheryl Dunn; Mac * Faulkner; Richard A. Giddings; * Marianne Gosser; Don Hindman; * Shirley Lowery; Bob Lyon; * George A. Mccrary; Bob Moore; * Steve Morley; Buddy Raines; * David Sain; Dale Ward; John * Ward; Judy Wear; and Grainger * Williams, * Defendants, * * * * * * Philip E. Kaplan; Janet * Pulliam; and John Bilheimer, * Movants, Office of Desegregation Monitor, Claimant, * * * * * * * * * * Parent's Plan; Horace A. * Walker; P.A. Hollingsworth; and* Kenneth G. Torrence, * Movants, * * * * Dale Charles; Robert L. * Brown, Sr.; Gwen Hevey Jackson; * Diane Davis; and Raymond * Frazier, * Plaintiffs, Pulaski County Board of Education, Defendant, * * * * * * * * * * O.G. Jacovelli, Individually * and as President of the Board * -5- of Education of the Little Rock* School District; Patricia Gee, * Individually and in her * Official Capacity as a Member * of the Board of Education of * the Little Rock School * District, a Public Body; * Dr. George Cannon, Individually* and in his Official Capacity * as a Member of the Board of * Education of the Little Rock * School District, a Public Body; * John Moore, Individually and * in his Official Capacity as * a Member of the Board of * Education of the Little Rock * School District, a Public Body; * Dorsey Jackson, Individually * and in his Official Capacity as* a Member of the Board of * Education of the Little Rock * School District, a Public Body; * Dr. Katherine Mitchell, * Individually and in her * Official Capacity as a Member * of the Board of Education of * the Little Rock School * District, a Public Body; * W.D. Hamilton, Individually and* in his Official Capacity as a * Member of the Board of * Education of the Little Rock * School District, a Public Body; * Cecil Bailey, Individually and * in his Official Capacity as a * Member of the Pulaski County * Board of Education, a Public * Corporate; Thomas Broughton, * Individually and in his * Official Capacity as a Member * of the Pulaski County Board of * Education, a Public Corporate; * and Dr. Martin Zoldessy, * Individually and in his * Official Capacity as a Member * of the Pulaski County Board of * Education, a Public Corporate, * * Defendants. * -6- Submitted: January 10, 1995 Filed: June 5, 1995 Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge. RICHARDS. ARNOLD, Chief Judge. Two appeals' involving the Little Rock School District (LRSD) are consolidated for our review. In the first case, AfricanAmerican voters2 appeal the District Court' s 3 order dismissing their claim under the Voting Rights Act of 1965,  2, as amended, 42 U.S.C.  1973, against LRSD. In the second case, the Joshua Intervenors appeal the District Court's August 10, 1994, order granting LRSD's motion to close Ish Incentive School. We affirm in both cases. I. We review first Charles's claim that the LRSD's election-zone plan adopted by the Pulaski County Board of Education (PCBE) and 1Initially, three appeals were consolidated. In the third case, the Joshua Intervenors appealed the District Court's order of September 27, 1994, rejecting the present site of Stephens School as a possible location of the new Stephens Interdistrict School. That appeal has been dismissed by agreement of the parties. Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1., No. 93-3592 (8th Cir. Jan. 19, 1995) (per curiam). 2Plaintiffs Dale Charles, Robert L. Brown, Sr., Gwen Hervey Jackson, Diane Davis, and Raymond Frazier, are African-American residents of Little Rock who live within the Little Rock School District. We shall refer to these parties as \"Charles.\" 3The Hon. Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas. -7- - approved by the District Court violates the Voting Rights Act. He alleges that the approved plan denies African-American voters within the LRSD equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process and to elect representatives of their choice. More specifically, he insists that the plan dilutes the vote of AfricanAmerican residents of the LRSD because those residents are numerous and compact enough to justify the creation of three single-member zones in which they would be in the majority, 4 instead of the two zones provided for in the adopted plan. 5 In 1986, a plan was adopted containing seven single-member zones for election of members of the LRSD school board. Two of the zones were majority-minority zones. 6 In July of 1992, Charles filed this complaint alleging that the 1986 plan should be revised on the basis of the 1990 census. Four rezoning plans were prepared 4Charles proposes the following plan: Total Pop. Per cent. Minority Zone 1 23,704 64.70% African-American Zone 2 24,870 64.00% African-American Zone 3 24,230 5.30% African-American Zone 4 25,380 5.10% African-American Zone 5 23,839 8.70% African-American Zone 6 25,635 61. 70% African-American Zone 7 26,016 25.80% African-American 5Maps of the parties' plans are contained in an appendix to this opinion. 6The following plan was approved in 1986: Total Pop. Per cent. Minority Zone 1 25,399 81. 50% African-American Zone 2 25,295 68.90% African-American Zone 3 25,210 7.83% African-American Zone 4 24,844 2.96% African-American Zone 5 25,016 18.30% African-American Zone 6 25,107 17.30% African-American Zone 7 25,043 14.10% African-American -8- - and presented at a public meeting. The Pulaski County Board of Education (PCBE), the responsible body under Arkansas law, selected alternative four. 7 Under alternative four, Zone Two is a majorityminority zone, and Zone One is a supermajority zone (65% or more minority population). On February 16, 1993, PCBE submitted the plan to the District Court for approval. Charles filed objections alleging that the plan violated 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Following a trial, the District Court approved the plan adopted by the PCBE and dismissed Charles's complaint. The Charles plaintiffs bring this appeal. On several occasions we have reviewed challenges brought under the Voting Rights Act to Arkansas's electoral practices. On each of these occasions we have set forth the requirements for establishing a violation of  2 of the Voting Rights Act, and proceeded mindful of the fact that \"equal political opportunity [is] the focus of the enquiry.\" Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2658 (1994). We do so once again in this case. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 1982, provides: by (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision 7The following plan the District Court: Total Pop. Zone 1 25,533 Zone 2 25,764 Zone 3 24,578 Zone 4 24,216 Zone 5 24,456 Zone 6 24,663 Zone 7 24,464 was selected by the PCBE and later approved Per cent. 79.82% 59.39% 4.52% 5.12% 19.14% 35.55% 28.45% -9- Minority African-American African-American African-American African-American African-American African-American African-American in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f) (2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section. (b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 42 U.S.C.  1973. The leading case interpreting the statute is Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). In Gingles, the Supreme Court identified three necessary preconditions which must be established to maintain an action under  2: ( 1) the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in one or more single-member districts; (2) the minority group is politically cohesive; and (3) the majority votes sufficiently as a block to enable it usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. Id. at 50-51. Once the plaintiff has established the three preconditions, a court must look to \"the totality of the circumstances\" to determine whether minority voters have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. Seven additional factors should be considered at this stage of the case: 1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the -10- right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; 3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 177, 206-07. Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as a part of the plaintiffs' evidence are: 1. whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group; 2. whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. Ibid. This list is not comprehensive or exclusive. Gingles, 478 -11- U.S. at 45. The District Court began by holding that the relevant comparison is between the plan adopted by the PCBE and the 1986 plan, the one in effect right before the adoption of the challenged plan. With respect, we think this was not the correct standard. The statute asks whether minority voters have less political opportunity than other voters. The inquiry is whether minority opportunity is less under the challenged plan than what it would be under some other arrangement, one that would comply with  2. Under the District Court's approach, plaintiffs could never prevail unless the plan in suit was less favorable to them than whatever plan preceded it. They would have to prove 11 retrogression. 11 A majority of the Supreme Court has rejected that theory. 11Retrogression is not the inquiry in 2 dilution cases. 11 Holder v. Hall, 114 s. Ct. 2581, 2587 (1994) (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); id. at 2589 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (the comparison must be with 11an objectively reasonable alternative practice as a benchmark  11 ); id. at 2622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.) ( 11minority voters' potential 'in the absence of' the allegedly dilutive mechanism must be measured against the benchmark of an alternative structure or practice that is reasonable and workable under the facts of the specific case.\") (footnote omitted); accord, Jeffers v~ Tucker, 847 F. Supp. 655, 658 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (three-judge court). In the present case, the best approach is to treat the plan proposed by the plaintiffs as a prima facie reasonable alternative for purposes of this case. We shall use this approach as a sort of working hypothesis. This is the framework used in Jeffers v. Tucker, supra. It makes sense because the plaintiffs' plan is a way of making concrete their contention that the Gingles preconditions are met. Their plan shows, for example, in their - view at least, that it is possible to create one more reasonably -12- compact and contiguous district in which African-Americans will have a majority. Two more preliminary points are in order. First, Charles claims that 2 requires the LRSD to maximize African-American representation. A similar claim was considered and rejected in Jeffers v. Tucker, supra. In the context of a challenge to state legislative districts in the same county where LRSD is located, the Jeffers v. Tucker Court concluded that 2 did not require maximization of minority-group representation. See Jeffers, 84 7 F. Supp. at 657. 8 After Jeffers v. Tucker was decided, the Supreme Court spoke dispositively to this issue: \"Failure to maximize cannot be the measure of 2. 11 De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2660 (1994). Just as we reject Charles's maximization claim, we must also reject LRSD's claim that proportional representation precludes a finding of vote dilution under  2. In De Grandy, supra, the Supreme Court considered the state of Florida's argument that \"no dilution occurs whenever the percentage of single-member districts in which minority voters form an effective majority mirrors the minority voters' percentage of the relevant population.\" Ibid. In rejecting this argument, the Court stated: \"Proportionality. would thus be a safe harbor for any districting scheme. The safety would be in derogation of the statutory text and its considered 8The Court said: \"The Voting Rights Act does not require, invariably and in every instance, that districts be drawn so as to maximize minority political power. Such a result would be akin to a requirement of proportional representation, which the Voting Rights Act itself rejects.\" Jeffers, 847 F. Supp. at 657, quoting West v. Clinton, 786 F. Supp. 803, 806 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (three-judge court). -13- purpose, however, and of the ideal that the Voting Rights Act attempts to foster.\" Ibid. Consequently, even if the LRSD can show proportional representation, the inquiry must not end there, but must encompass all factors relevant to the plaintiffs' claim. We assume for purposes of this appeal the three Gingles preconditions: that numerous and geographically compact to that plaintiffs have met they are sufficiently form a third majority- African-American district; 9 that voting in LRSD is racially polarized; and that white voters usually vote in sufficient numbers to defeat candidates preferred by African-Americans. See De Grandy, supra, 114 S. Ct. at 2656 (assuming without deciding that first condition has been satisfied). We proceed directly to analyze \"the totality of the circumstances,\" including the three Gingles preconditions, the \"Senate factors,\" and other relevant facts. We turn first to the first two Senate factors, the ones said to be most important in Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at 48-49 n.15. First, African-American candidates have enjoyed a reasonably good measure of success in Little Rock elections in general. The record contains evidence of two LRSD elections, one at large (conducted before state law was changed to require zone elections in districts of a certain size) and one in a zone. In both elections an African-American candidate defeated a white candidate. 10 The 9In describing the racial makeup of the various actual and proposed election zones, the District Court and the parties have used total population figures. We think voting-age population is a better criterion, but we must deal with the case as the parties present it. Cf. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2655-56 (accepting arguendo voting-age-population statistics, despite a contention that at least half of the Hispanic voting-age residents of the region are non-citizens ineligible to vote). 10LRSD has moved to supplement the record to show the results of recent school elections. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. Because we are holding for defendants on the basis of the record as it now exists, this motion is denied as moot. -14- - District Court also considered 33 \"exogenous\" elections -- races in Little Rock but not for the school board. African-American candidates won most of these races. Many of these victories can be explained by special circumstances, however (for example, an African-American running as an incumbent, or running in a plurality race against several white candidates). The second Senate factor, racially polarized voting, is without doubt present to a degree, as plaintiffs' statistical proof has shown. There is a .high correlation between the number of voters in a precinct and the number of votes cast for African-American candidates. On the other hand, there has been some decisive cross-over voting of whites for African-American candidates. See, g__,__g_,_, Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 216 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., 498 U.S. 1019 (1991) (subsequent history omitted). We discuss briefly the other factors. Certainly there is a history of official discrimination in Arkansas, though its present effects are less pronounced in Pulaski County than in some other parts of the State. There are no discriminatory voting practices now in use in the LRSD. There is a majority-vote requirement, but in elections by zone this practice actually works to the advantage of African-American voters in zones where they have a majority. We do not think that the majority-vote requirement cuts strongly either way in this case. The socioeconomic status of AfricanAmericans is lower than that of whites in the LRSD, and this condition is partly due to the effects of past racial discrimination. This factor cuts in favor of Charles, though, again, not so strongly as it would in the Delta region. The remaining factor - unresponsiveness to the concerns of minority citizens - has not been proved. The evidence on this subject is equivocal at best. On the whole, we think these factors, when considered on the assumption that the three preconditions have been met, do not make - a strong enough case in Charles's favor. The judgment we have to -15- make is necessarily imprecise. It is even, in some sense and to some degree, subjective. But our experience with these cases, especially Jeffers v. Tucker, supra, holding that  2 does not require the creation of an additional majority-African-American State Senate district in Pulaski County, leads us to conclude that a violation of law has not been proved here. We find two aspects of the case especially persuasive. First, although the plaintiffs' proposed zone boundaries are nowhere nearly so bizarre as the ones held presumptively unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Shaw, they are markedly less regular and compact than those in LRSD's adopted plan. And second, African-Americans have consistently achieved proportional representation on the LRSD board. Since 1983, they have continuously held two out of seven seats (28.6%). They make up 29% of LRSD's voting-age population. This fact, while by no means an absolute defense, has recently been given special importance by the Supreme Court. See De Grandy, supra. Nor are we persuaded that this state of affairs is likely to change in the foreseeable future. On balance, we agree with the District Court that plaintiffs have not proved a violation of 2 of the Voting Rights Act. II. Our second case involves the desegregation of Pulaski County schools. The Joshua Intervenors, representatives of the AfricanAmerican students in Pulaski County, challenge the closing of Ish Incentive School. They maintain that it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to close Ish without a hearing; that the closing of Ish is precluded by the settlement agreement; and that the Little Rock School District (LRSD} should be estopped to close Ish because it has failed to satisfy the settlement agreement's recruitment requirements. below. Each of these arguments is considered -16- A. In 1989, the parties to the desegregation case -- the LRSD, the Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) , the North Little Rock School District (NLRSD), and the Joshua Intervenors, along with the McKnight Intervenors -- entered into a settlement agreement. The agreement was approved by this Court in 1990. Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District, 921 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1990) (subsequent history omitted) . This agreement put in place the framework for a concerted effort to end racial segregation in Pulaski County schools. The District Court has the onerous task of exercising jurisdiction over the implementation of the settlement agreement. Under the agreement, four desegregation plans, one for each school district and an Interdistrict Plan, were formed. The LRSD and Interdistrict plans are the focus of this case. Under the LRSD Plan, the district was to establish eight incentive schools. These incentive schools would initially be all or virtually all AfricanAmerican, with future projections of 50 to 62 per cent. AfricanAmerican. The incentive schools would sponsor special compensatory-education programs and receive twice as much money per pupil as other elementary schools. Attendance at an incentive school would be open to African-American students living within the particular school's attendance zone. In the Interdistrict Plan, provisions were made for the establishment of six interdistrict magnet schools in addition to the six interdistrict schools in existence when the plan was approved. These interdistrict schools were to emphasize distinct educational themes. African-American students from the LRSD and white students from the PCSSD were expected to attend the interdistrict schools. Preparations are now under way for the building of King -17- - Interdistrict School. King's future location was designated in the Interdistrict Plan to be \"in downtown Little Rock . in the general area along I-630 between I-JO and University Avenue.\" LRSD Plan, at 139. The District Court approved the specific site for King on March 17, 1992. Leonard Thalmueller was hired to design King's attendance zone. Dr. Thalmueller prepared three plans for review by the Office of Desegregation, which presented the plans to the LRSD. In the plan adopted by LRSD, the King attendance zones included Ish Incentive School's attendance zones. On May 5, 1993, LRSD moved for approval of King's attendance zones. Over the Joshua Intervenors' objections, the District Court gave conditional approval to the King attendance zones on June 11, 1993. The District Court's approval was conditioned on Ish's remaining open unless the LRSD established that fewer than 100 students wanted to attend Ish during the 1993-94 academic year. During the 1992-93 academic year, 229 students lived in Ish's attendance zones. Ish had an enrollment of 183 students. Ninetythree were from within the Ish attendance zone, while the other 90 resided outside its attendance zone. The conditional approval required that LRSD survey students within the Ish attendance zone, including those not attending Ish currently, and all students attending Ish, including students from outside the Ish attendance zone. On June 11, 1993, the District Court entered an order requiring LRSD to submit the proposed survey, along with a plan for executing the survey and implementing the survey results, within ten days. The court gave Joshua five days to file responses and objections to the proposed survey and plan. No objections were filed. In compliance with the District Court's order, LRSD filed its proposed survey and its plan for implementing the survey on June 21, 1993. The district proposed sending form letters, King and Ish fact sheets, and a School Selection Form to parents of potential students. Accordingly, the District Court approved the -18- - survey and implementation plan on June 30, 1993. The survey was then conducted. LRSD mailed 260 survey forms, and 173 of the forms were returned. Of the 173 forms returned, 82 students requested Ish. Based on the survey results, LRSD moved the District Court to close Ish. Joshua filed a response to the motion to close Ish expressing opposition, challenging the survey process, and requesting a hearing. On August 2, 1993, the Court denied Joshua's objections as untimely, and granted LRSD's motion to close Ish. B. First, we address Joshua's claim that remand for a hearing is required. While we recognize the possible validity of some of the objections raised by Joshua, we cannot say that the District Court acted arbitrarily by refusing to hold a hearing. In its order dated June 11, 1993, the Court specifically requested that objections to the survey be submitted within five days after LRSD filed the proposed survey and implementation plan. LRSD's proposed survey and plan were filed on June 21, 1993. Joshua made no objections to the survey format or the implementation plan until the survey was completed, more than a month later. Most of the objections Joshua makes now could have been made prior to the survey. It was important for the matter to be decided quickly. The District Court's decision to expedite its ruling concerning Ish's future by providing a timeline for pleadings was not arbitrary. The Court did not abuse its discretion. C. Turning to the heart of this appeal, we now consider the substance of the decision to modify the settlement agreement and approve the closing of Ish Incentive School. The District Court gave two reasons for its decision. First, the survey results -19- - indicated that fewer than 100 students wanted to attend Ish during the 1993-94 academic year. Second, the District Court cited the opening of King Interdistrict School as a desegregated alternative to Ish. A party seeking modification of a consent decree \"must establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree.\" Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 393 (1992). If the moving party meets this burden, the District Court must then determine \"whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.\" Id. at 391. The modification \"must not create or perpetuate a constitutional violation,\" nor \"strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor.\" Ibid. In this case, Joshua insists that the settlement agreement requires that the district maintain incentive schools and provide double funding for them. Closing Ish, she maintains, is in direct conflict with the settlement agreement. In addition, she asserts that the reasons espoused by the Court for closing Ish do not provide a proper basis for a major modification of the settlement agreement. But nothing in the settlement agreement requires the district to maintain a particular incentive school for an indefinite period of time. What the agreement requires is that the district maintain a number of .incentive schools \"sufficient to accommodate that number of black students who, by attending those schools, make it possible to achieve a student population in the remaining Little Rock Schools of 55 percent black and 45 percent white with a variance of 5 percent.\" Interdistrict Plan, April 29, 1992, at 4. At the outset the parties contemplated that \"[a]s new Interdistrict Schools are established those seats attributable to LRSD will be available for those students who otherwise would or could have been assigned to an incentive school.\" Ibid. -20- Se "},{"id":"bcas_bcmss0837_1642","title":"Court filings concerning Office of Desegregation Monitoring 1994-95 Incentive School Monitoring Report, Little Rock School District third quarter status report, and ODM 'Monitoring Report 1994-95 Four-Year-Old Program in the LRSD","collection_id":"bcas_bcmss0837","collection_title":"Office of Desegregation Management","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, 39.76, -98.5","United States, Arkansas, 34.75037, -92.50044","United States, Arkansas, Pulaski County, 34.76993, -92.3118","United States, Arkansas, Pulaski County, Little Rock, 34.74648, -92.28959"],"dcterms_creator":["United States. 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Any other use requires permission from the Butler Center."],"dcterms_medium":["judicial records"],"dcterms_extent":["37 pages"],"dlg_subject_personal":null,"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":"District Court, order; Court of Appeals, order denying motion for stay; District Court, two orders; District Court, notice of filing, Office of Desegregation Monitoring report, ''1994-95 Incentive School Monitoring Report''; District Court, notice of filing, Little Rock School District (LRSD) third quarter status report; District Court, notice of filing, Office of Desegregation Monitoring, ''Monitoring Report: 1994-95 Four-Year-Old Program in the Little Rock School District (LRSD)''; District Court, notice of filing, Arkansas Department of Education (ADE) project management tool; District Court, notice of filing, Little Rock School District (LRSD) project management tool  The transcript for this item was created using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and may contain some errors.  IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FILED~ U.S. DISTRICT COUAT EASTERN DISTRICT AR~~$}.$ ' 1995 EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS JAMEo/ W.J,1cCUHMACK, CLERK WESTERN DIVISION By: , . -~hJ '; .', ,;- ,iJ LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT v. NO, LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL. MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL. KATHERINE W. KNIGHT, ET AL. 0 R D E R  '  ' oe.:--ruRI( . PLAINTIFF DEFENDANTS INTERVENOR$ INTERVENORS Through an earlier Order, the Court has scheduled hearings ta begin at 9:00 a.m. on June 8 and 9, 1995. The purpose of these hearings is to review the progress of the Little Rack School District (LRSD) in relation to its 1995-96 budget, and to determine the extent to which the district has fulfilled certain orders of the Court. By 5:00 p.m. on Friday, May 26, 1995 the district must submit to the Court, the Office of Desegregation Monitoring, and the parties all documents, budget material, business cases, and any other information which the district expects to introduce as subject matter far the hearing. As at the last budget hearings, these submissions must include at least: the district's tentative budget, as defined in the LRSD Program Planning and Budgeting Manual of Augu~t 1994; and any new or revised business cases for programmatic or position additions, deletions, or modifications that are reflected in the budget. The district must also identify any major adjustments it has made in the budget since suPmi~ting its 1995-96 proposed budget document to the ('ourt last month, including projected revenue increases, I\" ojccted revenue reductions, projected expenses, and proposed deficit reduction measures. Each new or revised deficit reductic111 strategy must be accompanied by a rationale for the assumptions underlying it, as well as the steps and tiroelines the distri1L will follow in implementing the strategy. Additionally, the district is required to 1,rcGcnt evidence to demonstrate how it has met all the requirement ,, specif i ed in the Court's October 24, 1994 order, which addressed 111 ,,ny aspects of the LRSD's budgeting process. SO ORDERED this 1st day of May 1995. -2- EDWARD L . WRIGHT I 1903-1977) ROBERT S. LINDSEY ( 1913-19911 RONALD A. MAY ISAAC A. SCOTT. JR. JAMES M. MOODY JOHN G. LILE GORDON S. RATHER. JR. TERRY L. MATHEWS DAVID M. POWELL ROGER A. GLASGOW C. DOUGLAS BUFORD, JR. PATRICK J . GOSS ALSTON JENNINGS. JR. JOHN R. TISDALE KATHLYN GRAVES M. SAMUEL JONES Ill JOHN WILLIAM SPIVEY 111 LEE J, MULDROW WENDELL L . GRIFFEN N. M. NORTON. JR. EDGAR J. TYLER CHARLES C. PRICE CHARLES T. COLEMAN JAMES J. GLOVER EDWIN L . LOWTHER. JR. BEVERLY BASSETT SCHAFFER CHARLES L. SCHLUMBERGER SAMMYE L . TAYLOR WALTER E. MAY ANNA HtRAI GIBSON Dr. Donald Stewart WRIGHT, LINDSEY 8: JENNINGS ATTORNEYS AT LAW 200 WEST CAPITOL AVENUE SUITE 2200 LITTLE ROCK. ARKANSAS 72201-3699 (501) 371-0808 FAX 1501 I 376-9442 OF COUNSEL ALSTON JENNINGS GEORGE E. LUSK. JR. May 4, 1995 Pulaski County Special School District P. o. Box 8601 Little Rock, Arkansas 72216 GREGORY T JONES 1-4. KEITH MORRISON BETTINA E. BROWNSTEIN WALTER MCSPADDEN ROGER D. ROWE NANCY BELLHOUSE MAY JOHN D. DAVIS JUDY SIMMONS HENRY KIMBERLY WOOD TUCKER MARK L. PRYOR RAY F. COX, JR. HARRY S. HURST. JR. TROY A. PRICE PATRICIA SIEVERS LEWALLEN JAMES M. MOODY. JR. KATHRYN A. PRYOR J. MARK DAVIS CLAIRE SHOWS HANCOCK KEVIN W. KENNEDY MARK A. ROGERS JERRY J. SALLINGS M. TOCO WOOD R. GREGORY ACLIN FRED M. PERKINS Ill WILLIAM STUART JACKSON MICHAEL 0 . BARNES STEPHEN R. LANCASTER FRED ANDREW WOOD JUDY M. ROBINSON BETSY MEACHAM AINSLEY H. LANG Re: LRSD v. State of Arkansas, Eighth Circuit Appeal Dear Don: Enclosed for your records is a copy of the Court of Appeals' order denying the State's motion for a stay. By copy of this letter to Ann Brown, I am likewise sending her a copy for her files. MSJ/jhs .Enclosure / \\ cc: Ann Brown (w/encl.)- Cordially yours, WRIGHT, LINDSEY \u0026 JENNINGS 1-, '--- -~ M. S muel Jones, III MAY 5 1995 Office of Desegregation Moniioring UNITED ST ATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT \u0026 CUSTOM HOUSE MICHAEL E. GANS Clerk of Court Mr . Timothy Gauger ATfORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 200 Tower Building 323 Center Street Little Rock, AR 72201-2610 1114 MARKET STREET ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63101 April 28, 1995 TELEPHONE (314) 539-3600 Re: 95-1481EALR Little Rock School District vs. State of AR (Special Panel Referral - MAY1995) Dear counsel : Enclosed is a copy of an order entered today in the above case at the direction of the court. lmt Enclos~re) cc: chard Wilson Roachell . Samuel Jones III John w. walker William Henry Trice III Samuel Arnold Perroni Christopher John Heller Jim McCormack ~.:L; . ,M..,.,~ T. Michael E. Gans Clerk of court District Court/Agency Case Number(s): 82-CV-866 District Court/Agency Case Number(s): 82-CV-866 ' United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTII CIRCUIT MAY J 1995 omce cf Des~c;regauon Mo::i on119 No. 95-1481EA, 95-1482EA No. 95-1481EA * * * * * * Little Rock School District; * * Plaintiff-Appellee, * * Anne Mitchell; Bob Moore; Pat * Gee; Pat Rayburn; Mary J. Gage; * * Intervenors-Appellees, * * North Little Rock Classroom * Teachers Association; Pulaski * Association of Classroom * Teachers; Little Rock Classroom* Teachers Association; * Intervenors, * * * Alexa Armstrong; Karlos * Armstrong; Ed Bullington; * Khayyam Davis; Janice Dent; * John Harrison; Alvin Hudson; * Tatia Hudson; Milton Jackson; *  Lorene Joshua; Leslie Joshua; * Stacy Joshua; Wayne Joshua; * Katherine Knight; Sara * Matthews; Becky McKinney; * Derrick Miles; Janice Miles; * John M. Miles; NAACP; Joyce * Person; Brian Taylor; Hilton * Taylor; Parsha Taylor; Robert * Willingham; Tonya Willingham; * v. * Intervenors-Appellees, * * On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Pulaski county Special School * District, #1; North Little Rock* School District; Leo~ Barnes; * Sheryl Dunn; Mac Faulkner; * Richard A. Giddings; Marianne * Gosser; Don Hindman; Shirley * Lowery; Bob Lyon; George A. * Mccrary; Bob Moore; Steve * Morley; Buddy Raines; David * Sain; Bob Stender; Dale Ward; * John Ward; Judy Wear; * Grainger Williams; * * Defendants-Appellees, * * The Arkansas State Board of * Education; State of Arkansas; * * Defendants-Appellants, * Office of Desegregation Monitor, Claimant. * * * * * * * * No. 95-1482EA * * * * Little Rock School District; * * Plaintiff-Appellant, * * Anne Mitchell; Bob Moore; Pat * Gee; Pat Rayburn; Mary J. Gage; * * Intervenors-Appellants, * * North Little Rock Classroom * Teachers Association; Pulaski * Association of Classroom * Teachers; Little Rock Classroom* Teachers Association; * Intervenors, Alexa Armstrong; Karlos Armstrong; Ed Bullington; * * * * * -2- Khayyam Davis; Janice Dent; * John Harrison; Alvin Hudson; * Tatia Hudson; Milton Jackson; * Lorene Joshua; Leslie Joshua; * Stacy Joshua; Wayne joshua; * * Intervenors-Appellants, * * Katherine Knight; Sara * Matthews; Becky McKinney; * Derrick Miles; Janice Miles; * John M. Miles; NAACP; Joyce * Person; Brian Taylor; Hilton * Taylor; Parsha Taylor; Robert * Willingham; Tonya Willingham; * Intervenors, v. * * * * * * Pulaski County Special School * District, #1; * * Defendant-Appel lee, * * North Little Rock School * District; Leon Barnes; * Sheryl Dunn; Mac Faulkner; * Richard A. Giddings; Marianne * Gosser; Don Hindman; Shirley * Lowery; Bob Lyon; George A. * Mccrary; Bob Moore; Steve * Morley; Buddy Raines; David * Sain; Bob Stender; Dale Ward; * John Ward; Judy Wear; * Grainger Williams; * * Defendants, * * The Arkansas State Board of * Education; State of Arkansas; * * Defendants-Appellees, * Office of Desegregation Monitor, Claimant. * * * * * -3- Filed: April 28, 1995 Before RICHARD s. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge. ORDER The motion of appellants State of Arkansas and Arkansas Department of Education for stay of the order of the District Court is denied. Appellants are instructed to make the payment required by the District Court's order forthwith. We agree with the reasons given by the District Court for denying the stay. It is so ordered. A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT. -4- IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT v. NO. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL. MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL. KATHERINE W. KNIGHT, ET AL. 0 R D E R FILED U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT ARKANSAS MAY 1 2 1995 JAMES Wj ~~AMACK, Cl.ERK By: \\ ,dl/v~\\J.JL DEP CWU( PLAINTIFF DEFENDANTS INT ERVEN ORS INT ERVEN ORS Before the Court is the renewed motion of the Pulaski County Special School District (\"PCSSD\") for permission to replace portable buildings with permanent school construction at certain PCSSD junior high schools. The Court has reviewed the updated information provided by the PCSSD and finds that the motion should be granted. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion of the PCSSD for permission to replace certain portable buildings (docket entry# 2390) is granted . ~ DATED this j_2:.._ day of May 1995. 11-US DOCUMENT ENTERED ON DOCKET SHE!:T IN COYP~flT~E 58 ANDn::?(a} A'\\CP ON J,- 1 BY 1 -=- 2410 FILED U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT ARKANSAS IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MAY 1 2 1995 EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS JAMES W McC~RMACK CLERK WESTERN DIVISION By \\j : ' ~  , C? \\,l/1 \",,\\ L '\"'--DEP ClERI\u003c LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT v. NO. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL. MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL. KATHERINE W. KNIGHT, ET AL. 0 R D E R PLAINTIFF DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS INT ERVEN ORS Before the Court is the Joshua Intervenors' motion for a hearing to consider their motions to hold the Little Rock School District in contempt of court and for injunctive and other relief. See docket entries# 2361 \u0026 # 2405. The motion (docket entry # 2403) is granted. The Court hereby schedules a hearing on July 6, 1995, at 9:30 a.m., to consider the motions. The parties are directed to exchange the names of all witnesses no later than June 2, 1995. All discovery shall be completed by June 23, 1995. The parties may conduct discovery beyond this date if all parties are in agreement to do so; however, the Court will not be available to resolve any disputes which arise during the course of this extended discovery. Counsel shall mark and exchange all exhibits prior to the hearing, stipulating to as many as possible. The exhibits are to be listed on the attached sheet. Note stipulations and objections on the exhibit list. If there is an objection to an exhibit, - attach a statement setting out the basis for both the offer and the 2 4 1 1 - objection. The list is to be delivered/mailed to Sandy Carpenter no later than June 30, 1995. SO ORDERED this /;;}_~ay of May 1995. ,..,,v 10 , , new . Jj O I I CA .. IU I\\ lltnittb ~atts ilintrirt \u003c!rourt _____________Ea _s'---'-te~r~n'-'---- DISTRICT OF ---=A=-r.:.:.k=-an:.:.s=.:a=-s=----------- - v. -EXHIBIT _ LISJ CASE NUMBER: PRESIDING JUDGE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY OEFENOANT'S ATTORNEY TRIAL. DATE(S) COURT REPORTER COVRTROOM DEPUTY PL.F. DEF. CATE ~- Rec'd DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBITS NO. NO. OFFERED . . - . - .  1nc1ue1e  notation as 10 tne locat ion of any exhibit not nelel wltn IIM cue Ill or not available t,euuM~. Melissa R. Guldin Associate Monitor Horace R. Smith Associate Monitor 1994-95 INCENTIVE SCHOOLS MONITORING REPORT May 17, 1995 Office of Desegregation Monitoring United States District Court Little Rock, Arkansas Ann S. Brown Federal Monitor MAY 1 7 199S JAMES W. McCORMACK, CLERK By: -------- OEP Cl.ERK Margie L. Powell Associate Monitor Polly Ra,mer Office Manager HERSC\u003eH.L H . FRIOAY 11922 1 994 1 ROBERT V L ICHT . PA . - LLIAM H SUTTON . P . A . MES 'N MOORE RON M . :ISEMAN , JR .. P . A . JOE 0 . 3ELL . PA. JOHN C. ECHOI.S.? A , JAMES ,I, . auTTRY , ? A . FREDERICKS . URSERY , ? . A . M. T . L ARZELERE . PA . OSCAR E. OAV I S, JR .. P. A . JAMES C. CLARK , J R., ? A . THOMAS P \\. EGGETT . P . A . JOHN OEWEY WATSON, P . A . PAUL 3 . SENHAM Ill . P . A . LARRY W aURKS, PA . A . WYCX.L 1FF NISBET . JR . PA . JAMES EDWARD H ARRIS , PA . J . PHILLIP MAL COM . P . A . JAMES M . SI MPSON . PA. MEREDITH P CATLE T T , PA , J AMES M . SAXTON , P A . J. SHEPHERD RUSSEL L I ll , P. A. DONALD H i:IACON . ? .A WILLIAM iHOMAS aAXTER , P .A WALTER A . PAU L SON II.PA . BARRY !: . C OP LI N .P A . RICHARD 0 . TAY L O R. P A . J OSEPH a. ''UR S T . J R , PA . EL I ZABETH ROBBEN MURRA Y.PA, CHRISiOP~ER MEL L ER. ? . A . LAURA HENSLE Y SMI T H . P. A . ROBERTS . SHAFER . P A . WILL IAM M . GRIFFIN Ill , PA . THOMAS N . ROSE . PA. MICHAEL S. \\400RE , ? . A . DIANE S. MA CX. EY, o .A WALTER M . EBEL 111, P A . FRIDAY. ELDREDGE \u0026 CLARK A PARTNERSHIP OF INDIVIDUALS ANO PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS ATTORNEYS AT LAW 2000 FIRST COMMERC IAV8UILOING 400 WEST CAPITOL LITTLE ROCK. ARKANSAS 72201-3493 TELEPHONE 501 -376-2011 FAX NO . 501 - 376 - 2147 May 19, 1995 Office ct Hand-Delivered Mr. John W. Mrs. Ann Brown ICEVIN A. CRASS , P . A . WILLIAM A . WADDELL . J R , P A CLYOE \"TA8'\" TURNER , P A . CALVIN J . HALL. l' . A SCOTT J . LANCASTER . P A . JERRY L. MALONE. P A . M . GAYLE CORLEY. l' . A. ROBERT a. BEACH , J R .. PA . J. LE BROWN. l' . A . JAMES C . BAKER. JR .. PA . H . CHARLES GSCHWEND. JR .. i' .lo HARRY A. LIGHT . P. A . SCOTT H. TUCltER . P. A . JOHN CLAYTON RANOOLPH . P .:. GUY ALTON WADE. P. A . PRICE C . GARDNER . P . A . J . MICHAEL ?ICICENS TONIA I' . JONES DAVID O. WILSON JEFFREY H. MOORE ANO REW T . TURNER DAVIO M . CiRAF CARLA G . SPAINHOUR JOHN C . FENDLEY . JR . ALLISON GRAVES JOHANN C. ROOSEVEL T R. CHRISTOPHER LAWSON GREGORY D . TAYLOR TONY L. WILCOX FRAN C . HICKMAN 8ETiY J . !\u003eEMORY COUHSl!L WILLIAM J. SMITH WILL IAM A . El.OREOGC. J R. , ? A S . S. 0::LAAIC WILLIAM L . TERRY , ? A . WILLIAM L. PATTON . J R. , P ;. WIUTUt ~ OIIUCT 140 . 1501) 370- 1553 Walker John Walker , P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR He.?:'itage West Building, Suite 520 201 East Markham Street 72206 Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Sam Jones Mr. Richard Roachell Wright, Lindsey \u0026 Jennings 2200 Worc~en Bank Building 200 West Capitol First Federal Plaza, Suite 504 401 Wesc Capitol Avenue Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Steve Jones Jack, Lyon \u0026 Jones, P.A. 3400 Capitol Towers Little Rock, AR 72201 Capicol \u0026 Broadway Streets Little Rock, AR 72201 Re: Third Quarter Status Report Gentlemen and Mrs. Brown: Enc~osed please find the LRSD's Third Quarter Status for the 1994-95 school year filed pursuant to the Order Court. Thank you for your attention to this matter. ~nc~~y, p ~ z ~ L_~ Jerry L. Maloned::.=-~ LRSD Attorney diana'PC,S-Sd\\swus .l tr Report of the Gentlemen and Mrs. Brown May 19 , 1995 Page 2 JLM/ dtw Enclosure cc (w/ enc ) : diana\\4)CSSd\\sllW1.IU' Dr. Henry P. Williams Mrs. Estelle Matthis ::'.AS'i'S~'l' DIS~:ZICT Or. -~KANSAS '.'1ESTE~'l' DIVISION :::..::;::'TLE ROCK SCECCL ;:::sT:z:cT vs. ?ULASKI COUNTY S?EC:X.. SCHOOL ~:STRICT NO. :, ::'.T ~=- ~~ ~ ~~~~ \"':'--~ !f='~ . .. \"1 .. -  - u ---  ~ 1~IA; / 9 !995 ?I.A.:NTI?:' '.JEFENDANTS :)TTERVENORS :\u003c.A.THERINE KNIGnT, ET AL ~~TE~VENORS LRSD's 1994-95 THIRD QUARTER STATUS REPORT . \"LRSD\" or - \"Disr.rict\") , for its Stac:us Reporr. :or the t:hi:?:\"d quarr.er of the 1994-95 school year, st.ates: 1. Attached herer.o as Exhibit 1 (Volumes I and r:) is a true and accurac:e copy of t:he District's Third Quarr.er Star.us Reporr. of Desegregation Programs generated through the courr.-:nandated program planning and budger.ing process. 2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and accurate copy of the Disr.ricr.' s Thi:?:\"d Cuarr.e:?:\" Status Report: ~f :-on-desegregar.ion Programs generaced c~rough the court-mandaced program planning and budgeting process. WHEREFORE, the :::..~ttle Rock School Jisr.r~ct: submits its Desegregation and Non-desegregacion Star.us Reporcs fer the third d11111\\pCS.I.Ql.saw\u0026.Jrd -1- daata\\pcud\\staU.lrd sc:-.oc:.. :_;ear ?~IDAY, ~~JREDGE \u0026 c:....~2-~ Att:orneys at: Law 2000 Fi:-st: Commers~~~ 3uiliing 400 West: Capicol 'i:....:..ccle Rock, _;;.rkansas 1501) 376-2011 \"'2201-3493 .c..':'~ORNEYS ?OR ?I.A:::,-:::? ~ITT~E ~oc~ SC~OOL JIS~RIC~ ----. __,,,-;-'1'1 --~~-c.;--:--:~~-\\-- --~- ----=- -- . -=--===---- ---------- _____ _...., ._ .,.-~==...;=~=-_,1.;,....:/;_-:...'~:....--__ ___-_ __ _:;===--~ ,/ _, ..-, er:-y ;;_.;.-.. . \\.J f. aJ- .one / ~ar :. J. ~o. 3509S -2- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE :crry _. Y!alone, do :1ereoy cerc.:...:, -::-.at: a copy of the .:orego:..~g LRSD's ~~ird Quar-::er S:acus Recor-: =~r -=~e :994-~= school year i:as :::een hand-del:..vered on May Jf', :995, ..:.oon c::e f:::llowing: dw,a\\p:::ud\\SWUI.Jrd Y!r. John W. Walker -70H.L\"\\T ~'1 . ,-IALKER, ? . _:;_. Atcor~eys at: ~aw : 723 3roadway ~icc~e Rock, ~R 72206 Y!r. Samuel M . ..=-ones, :::::: NRIGn7, ~I)IDSEY \u0026 JENNINGS ~ttcr~eys at: ~aw 2200 Worchen Bank 3u:..~c:..:i.g 200 West: Capit:ol ~ictle Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Stephen W. Jones JACK, LYON \u0026 JONES, P.A. Att:orneys at: Law 3400 Capit:ol Towers Capitol \u0026 Broadway Streets Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Richard W. Roachell ROACHELL \u0026 STREETT Attorneys at: Law Firsc Federal Plaza, Suite 504 401 West Capitol Avenue Little Rock, AR 72201 Y!rs . .lVln Brown Attor:i.ey at: Law Jericage West Building, Suice 520 201 Ease Markham Street: Sittle Rock, AR 72201 ~--::::::;:::::=::;:::::::::::::,__..______ '/ C ~~--- -__/,/'J, ~ - . ;---,n. / / . -~-----=::::::. s ..:-erry L. Malor.e -3 - Melissa R. Guldin Associate Monitor MONITORING REPORT: FILED U.S. OISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT ARKANSAS 1994-95 FOUR-YEAR-OLD PROGRJ\\M6.MES W. McCORMACK, CLERK IN THE LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DIST~'\"\"-t-------oEP Cl.fRK May 26, 1995 Office of Desegregation Monitoring United States District Court Little Rock, Arkansas Ann S. Brown Monitor I Polly Ramer Office Manager Atkansas DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION M 31 IA.STATE CAPITOL MALL LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72201-1071  (501) 682-4475 ay , ~~::, GENE WILHOIT, Director, General Education Division John W. Walker, Esq. John W. Walker, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72206-1220 M. Samuel Jones III, Esq. Wright, Lindsey \u0026 Jennings 2200 Worthen Bank Building Suite 200 Little Rock, AR 72201-3699 Richard W. Roachell, Esq. Roachell \u0026 Streett First Federal Plaza 401 West Capitol A venue Suite 504 Little Rock, AR 72201 Dear Counsel of Record: Christopher J. Heller, Esq. Friday, Eldredge, \u0026 Clark First Commercial Building 400 West Capitol Avenue Suite 2000 Little Rock, AR 72201-3407 Ann Brown, Monitor Office of Desegregation Monitoring 201 E. Markham, Suite 510 Heritage West Building Little Rock, AR 72201 Stephen W. Jones, Esq. Jack, Lyon \u0026 Jones, P.A. TCBYTower 425 West Capitol Avenue Suite 3400 Little Rock, AR 72201 Please find enclosed a copy of the Arkansas Department of Education's Project Management Tool for the month of May. If you need any additional information, please let me know. Sincerely, i~ Elizabeth Boyter Enclosure cc: EB/say Alice Holcomb Sara Fairbanks Suzanne Griscom Tony Minicozzi Mark Hudson Kem Treat HERSCHEL H . FRIDAY ! 1922 -1 994) ROBERT V . LIGHT , P .A . WILLIAM H . SUTTON , P . A . JAMES W . MOORE - NM . EISEMAN , JR., P . A . . BELL . P .A . C . ECHOLS . P. A . J SA . BUTTRY , P . A . FREDERICKS . URSERY , P.A . H , T . LARZELERE , P.A . OSCAR E. DAVIS , JR . , P .A . JAMES C. CLARK , JR ., P. A . THOMAS P. LEGGETT , P . A . JOHN DEWEY WATSON. P. A . PAUL B. BENHAM Ill , P . A . LARRY W . BURKS , P .A . A . WYCKLIFF NISBET , JR ., P .A . JAMES EDWARD HARRIS , P .A . J . PHILLIP MALCOM , P. A . JAMES M . SIMPSON , P. A . MEREDITH P. CATLETT . P. A . JAMES M . SAXTON , P .A . J. SHEPHERD RUSSELL Ill , P .A . DONALD H . BACON , P. A . WILLIAM THOMAS BAXTER , P . A . WALTER A . PAULSON 11 , P. A . BARRY E. COPLIN , P. A . RICHARD 0. TAYLOR , P .A . JOSEPH 8 . HURST , JR .. P. A. ELIZABETH ROBBEN MURRAY , P. A . CHRISTOPHER HELLER . P. A . LAURA HENSLE Y SMITH, P . A . ROBERTS . SHAFER , P . A . WILLIAM M . GRIFFIN 111 , P. A . THOMAS N . ROSE . P .A . MICHAELS . MOORE . P .A . DIANE S . MACKEY . P .A . WALTER M . EBEL Ill , P .A. FRIDAY, ELDREDGE \u0026 .CLARK A PARTNERSHIP OF INDIVIDUALS AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS ATTORNEYS AT LAW 2000 FIRST COMMERCIAL BUILDING 400 WEST CAPITOL LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72201 - 3493 TELEPHONE 501-376-2011 FAX NO. 501-376-2147 May 31, 1995 Mrs. Ann Brown Attorney at Law CC: fJ; II KEVIN A . CRASS, P .A. WILLIAM A. WADDELL. JR ., P. A . CLYDE TAB TURNER. P. A . CALVIN J. HALL, P. A . SCOTT J. LANCASTER. P. A . JERRY l. MALONE, P. A . M . GAYLE CORLEY . P. A . ROBERT B. BEACH , JR .. P .A . J . LEE BROWN. P.A . JAMES C. BAKER, JR ., P . A . H . CHARLES GSCHWEND. JR ., P.A . HARRY A . LIGHT , P. A . SCOTT H . TUCKER , P . A . JOHN CLAYTON RANDOLPH , P. A . GUY ALTON WADE , P. A . PRICE C . GARONER . P.A. J . MICHAEL PICKENS TONIA P . JONES DAVID 0. WILSON JEFFREY H . MOORE ANDREW T . TURNER DAVID M. GRAF CARLA G. SPAINHOUR JOHN C. FENDLEY , JR . ALLISON GRAVES JONANN C . ROOSEVELT A. CHRISTOPHER LAWSON GREGORY 0 . TAYLOR TONY L . WILCOX FRANC . HICKMAN BETTY J. DEMORY COUNSEL WILLIAM J. SMITH WILLIAM A. ELDREDGE. JR ., P.A . 0 . 5 . CLARK WILLIAM L. TERRY , P . A . WILLIAM L. PATTON , JR ., P.A. (501) 370-1553 Mr. John W. Walker JOHN W. WALKER, P.A. Attorneys at Law 1723 Broadway Heritage West Building, Suite 520 201 East Markham Street Little Rock, Arkansas 72206 Mr. Sam Jones WRIGHT, LINDSEY \u0026 JENNINGS Attorneys at Law 2200 Worthen Bank Building 200 West Capitol Avenue Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Mr. Stephen W. Jones JACK, LYON \u0026 JONES, P.A. 3400 Capitol Towers Capitol \u0026 Broadway Streets Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Mr. Richard Roachell ROACHELL \u0026 STREETT Attorneys at Law First Federal Plaza, Suite 504 401 West Capitol Avenue Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Re: LRSD v . PCSSD/Proj ect Management Tool l r:,1,.J ,(,.,. il,\"'\"'J) I Gentlemen and Mrs. Brown: Enclosed please find the LRSD's 1995-96 Budget/May Project Management Tool filed pursuant to the Order of the Court. By agreement, three copies are being delivered to Mrs. Brown and two copies are being delivered to Mr. Walker. diana\\pcssd\\tool-may. Jtr Gentlemen and Mrs. Brown May 31, 1995 Page 2 Thank you for your attention to this matter. JLM/dtw Enclosures cc (w/enc) : tl1ana\\pcssd\\toolmay.lu Sincerely, Dr. Henry P. Williams Dr. Russell Mayo Dr. Robert Clowers IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. NO. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL MAY 3 1 1995 PLAINTIFF DEFENDANTS MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL INTERVENORS KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL Office of Desegreg:i. 1 Mei to, ir. NTERVENORS LRSD's 1995-96 BUDGET/MAY PROJECT MANAGEMENT TOOL The Plaintiff, Little Rock School District (\"LRSD\"), for its 1995-96 Budget/May Project Management Tool, states: 1. Pursuant to the Order of this Court, the LRSD does hereby submit its Project Management Tool for the month ending May 31, 1995, relating to its 1995-96 budget. WHEREFORE, the Little Rock School District submits its Project Management Tool for the month ending May 31, 1995, relating to its 1995-96 budget. diana\\pcssd\\budge1.may Respectfully submitted, FRIDAY, ELDREDGE \u0026 CLARK Attorneys at Law 2000 First Commercial Building 400 West Capitol Little Rock, Arkansas 72201-3493 (501) 376-2011 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF _Ll'.I'.TLE____OCK SCHOOL DISTRICT \u003c ---- d ~ / /-Z~ ~ :-~77 ~-~ ~ _ - -- Jerry L. MaJ.:: -- Bar No. I. D. 85096 -1- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Jerry L. Malone, do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing LRSD's 1995-96 Budget/May Project Management Tool has been served by U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, except as otherwise indicated, on May 31, 1995, upon the following: c.J1ana\\pessd\\budget. may Mr. John W. Walker JOHN W. WALKER, P.A. Attorneys at Law 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72206 Mr. Samuel M. Jones, III WRIGHT, LINDSEY \u0026 JENNINGS Attorneys at Law 2200 Worthen Bank Building 200 West Capitol Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Stephen W. Jones JACK, LYON \u0026 JONES, P.A. Attorneys at Law 3400 Capitol Towers Capitol \u0026 Broadway Streets Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Richard W. Roachell ROACHELL \u0026 STREETT Attorneys at Law First Federal Plaza, Suite 504 401 West Capitol Avenue Little Rock, AR 72201 Mrs. Ann Brown (Hand-delivered as per Order by the Court) Attorney at Law Heritage West Building, Suite 520 201 East Markham Street Little Rock, AR 7220_1 -~ ~ -=--- Jerry L. Malone -2-  This project was supported in part by a Digitizing Hidden Special Collections and Archives project grant from The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and Council on Library and Information Resources. "},{"id":"bcas_bcmss0837_1632","title":"Court filings concerning majority to minority (M-to-M) transfers, District budgets, Stephens Elementary School, motion to release incentive school Kindergarten seats and four-year-old program seats, and reinstatement of ADE as defendant","collection_id":"bcas_bcmss0837","collection_title":"Office of Desegregation Management","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, 39.76, -98.5","United States, Arkansas, 34.75037, -92.50044","United States, Arkansas, Pulaski County, 34.76993, -92.3118","United States, Arkansas, Pulaski County, Little Rock, 34.74648, -92.28959"],"dcterms_creator":["United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"],"dc_date":["1994-08-24/1994-08-31"],"dcterms_description":null,"dc_format":["application/pdf"],"dcterms_identifier":null,"dcterms_language":["eng"],"dcterms_publisher":["Little Rock, Ark. : Butler Center for Arkansas Studies. Central Arkansas Library System"],"dc_relation":null,"dc_right":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"dcterms_is_part_of":["Office of Desegregation Monitoring records (BC.MSS.08.37)","History of Segregation and Integration of Arkansas's Educational System"],"dcterms_subject":["Little Rock (Ark.)--History--20th century","Little Rock School District","Special districts--Arkansas--Pulaski County","Joshua Intervenors","Knight Intervenors","Education--Arkansas","Education--Evaluation","Education--Finance","Arkansas. Department of Education","Education, Elementary","Educational law and legislation","Educational planning","School improvement programs","School management and organization","School integration","Stephens Elementary School (Little Rock, Ark.)","Student assistance programs"],"dcterms_title":["Court filings concerning majority to minority (M-to-M) transfers, District budgets, Stephens Elementary School, motion to release incentive school Kindergarten seats and four-year-old program seats, and reinstatement of ADE as defendant"],"dcterms_type":["Text"],"dcterms_provenance":["Butler Center for Arkansas Studies"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["http://arstudies.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/bcmss0837/id/1632"],"dcterms_temporal":null,"dcterms_rights_holder":null,"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":null,"dlg_local_right":["Available for use in research, teaching, and private study. Any other use requires permission from the Butler Center."],"dcterms_medium":["judicial records"],"dcterms_extent":["87 pages"],"dlg_subject_personal":null,"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":"Court of Appeals, brief for appellee, Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD); District Court, stipulation for proposed order on voluntary majority to minority (M-to-M) transfers; District Court, notice of filing, Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) revised budget for 1994-95; District Court, notice of filing, Little Rock School District (LRSD) program planning and budgeting process; District Court, order; District Court, status report regarding Stephens Elementary School; District Court, response to motion for extension; District Court, motion to release incentive school Kindergarten seats and four-year-old program seats; District Court, memorandum brief in support of motion to release incentive school Kindergarten seats and four-year-old program seats; District Court, order; District Court, Joshua intervenors' motion to supplement the basis for its prior motion to reinstate the Arkansas Department of Education (ADE) as a party defendant; District Court, notice of filing, Little Rock School District (LRSD) project management tool; District Court, Arkansas Department of Education (ADE) project management tool  The transcript for this item was created using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and may contain some errors.  RECEIVED - AUG 2 41994 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Office of Desegregation Morntonng LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT APPELLANT vs. No. 94-2070 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT APPELLEE Appeal From The United States District Court For The Eastern District of Arkansas Western Division Honorable Susan Webber Wright District Judge BRIEP FOR APPELLEB PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT Submitted by: M. Samuel Jones, III WRIGHT, LINDSEY \u0026 JENNINGS 200 West Capitol Avenue suite 2200 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201-3699 (501) 371-0808 Attorneys for Pulaski county Special School District TABLE OP CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUMMARY OF THE CASE AND WAIVER OF ORAL ARGUMENT PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ARGUMENT CONCLUSION ADDENDUM . . . . . . . . . . . i ii 1 3 4 5 7 13 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES: Appeal of Little Rock School District, 949 F.2d 253 LRSD v. PCSSD, 921 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1990) ii Page 10 1, 7, 10 SUMMARY or THE CASE AND WAIVER or ORAL ARGUMENT on January 7, 1994, the PCSSD moved the District Court to require the LRSD to pay over to PCSSD approximately $167,000 which PCSSD claimed LRSD owed it pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. This appeal arises from the District Court's order of March 16, 1994, awarding a mone'T judgment to PCSSD based upon the District Court's interpretation and enforcement of the Settlement Agreement approved by this Court on December 12, 1990, as reported at LRSD v. PCSSD, 921 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1990). That Settlement Agreement, among other more weighty matters, settled a dispute between the PCSSD and the LRSD concerning which district was entitled to receive certain state payments for majority-to-minority transfers pursuant to a stipulation originally entered into on August 26, 1986, and approved by the District Court and adopted as its order on February 27, 1987. To settle that disputed entitlement, the parties agreed to \"pool\" almost all state payments for interdistrict majority-tominority transfers. In addition to the pooling of the state payments, the PCSSD committed to contribute an additional $200,000 to the \"pool\" for the first five years of its operation. Because the payments received by the state include \"incentive\" or \"bonus\" payments above and beyond the cost of educating the transferring children, and because of the PCSSD's additional contribution of $200,000, the pool presently generates excess sums over and above the costs of educating these transferring students. 1 The PCSSD successfully moved the District Court for an order directing LRSD to pay PCSSD approximately $167,000 generated during the 1992-93 school year which LRSD had refused to pay. No hearing was sought by either party. This case presents the issue of whether or not the District Court abused its discretion in interpreting the parties' Settlement Agreement in favor of the PCSSD. PCSSD does not believe oral argument is necessary to resolve the issues presented on appeal. 2 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The PCSSD agrees with the preliminary statement submitted by LRSD. 3 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT LRSD'S OBLIGATION UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT TO POOL M-TO-M PAYMENTS IS INDEPENDENT OF PCSSD'S OBLIGATION TO EQUALIZE THE INSTRUCTIONAL BUDGETS OF INTERDISTRICT SCHOOLS BECAUSE LRSD CANNOT DEMONSTRATE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE DISTRICT COURT. II. III. Appeal of Little Rock School District, 949 F.2d 253 LRSD v. PCSSD, 921 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1990) THE 1989 DISPUTE BETWEEN LRSD AND PCSSD OVER THE ALLOCATION OF M-TO-M FUNDING WHICH LED TO THIS FEATURE OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SUPPORTS THE DISTRICT COURT'S HOLDING IN FAVOR OF THE PCSSD. EVEN THOUGH NO HEARING WAS NECESSARY TO CONSTRUE THE MEANING OF AN AGREEMENT PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY THIS COURT; NEVERTHELESS, LRSD WAIVED ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING BY FAILING TO REQUEST ONE EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT. 4 1. STATEMENT OP THE CASE The Factual Background of Section II, 0(3} of the Settlement Agreement The LRSD correctly observes that the Settlement Agreement is dated March 1989 (as revised September 28, 1989). LRSD Brief at 5. Pursuant to the State's obligation to pay the entire costs of M-toM students, the parties entered into a stipulation with the State which detailed the method and manner by which the state would reimburse these costs. Ad. 5-7 (Majority-to-Minority Stipulation). However, as late as September 25, 1989, the LRSD and PCSSD were still in dispute concerning whether the receiving district for Mto- M students should receive the sending district's costs per average daily membership or its own costs per average daily membership. The difference was approximately $700 per student at that time. App. 73. This issue over allocation of money between the two districts was ultimately resolved as of September 28, 1989, by agreeing to the pooling arrangement. In addition to these state reimbursements for the actual costs of educating the students, the State agreed to provide incentive monies to encourage such transfers. Each sending district is reimbursed by the State for one-half of the regular state aid the district would otherwise receive had the student stayed in the home district. Ad. 6. These sums were likewise pooled. The incentive amount paid to PCSSO is almost double that paid to LRSD, but all is now pooled. 5 To finalize the Settlement Agreement, PCSSD further agreed to pay an additional $200,000 per year into the pool over and above its M-to-M payments. 2. The Dispute Between LRSD and PCSSD LRSD did not challenge the worksheet appended to the PCSSD motion dated January 7, 1994 (App. 64); neither did it seek a hearing either before or after the ruling of the District Court. LRSD's only argument is that because this paragraph of the Settlement Agreement contains a statement concerning the equalization of instructional budgets at interdistrict schools, and because it contends without any appropriate record support that this has not been accomplished, then the entire pooling provision fails. PCSSD contends, as endorsed by the District Court, that the equalization provision has nothing to do with the independent obligation to distribute the excess funds. App. 58 (Order, March 16, 1994), and that the Settlement Agreement should not be modified. 6 ARGUMENT I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT LRSD'S OBLIGATION UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT TO POOL M-TO-M PAYMENTS IS INDEPENDENT OF PCSSD' S OBLIGATION TO EQUALIZE THE INSTRUCTIONAL BUDGETS OF INTERDISTRICT SCHOOLS BECAUSE LRSD CANNOT DEMONSTRATE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE DISTRICT COURT. standard of Review. The LRSD goes to great lengths to reduce the Settlement Agreement to an ordinary contract in its effort to seek de novo review by this Court. (LRSD Brief at 5.) Significantly, however, LRSD ignores the clear holding of this Court in LRSD v. PCSSD, 921 F.2d 1371 at 1394, that: 8. The District Court is instructed to monitor closely the compliance of the parties with the settlement plans and the Settlement Agreement, to take whatever action is appropriate, in its discretion, to ensure compliance with the plans and the agreement, and otherwise to proceed as the law and the facts require. [emphasis supplied) This is precisely what the District Court did in this instance. Application of the Standard of Review. PCSSD filed its \"Motion to Enforce settlement Agreement.\" The District Court found noncompliance with the Settlement Agreement by LRSD and ordered LRSD to come into compliance. This is just the kind of discretion this Court decided to grant the District Court in enforcing compliance with the Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, LRSD's arguments that this Court should exercise de novo review are misplaced and are probably made only because LRSD knows it has no chance to prevail pursuant to the abuse-ofdiscretion standard. 7 At most, LRSD's argument is that there are two possible interpretations of the Settlement Agreement. However, LRSD has neither shown nor argued anything to demonstrate that the District Court's interpretation is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. on its face, and at a minimum, the District Court's conclusion is reasonable that: The Court agrees with PCSSD that the provision regarding the equalization of the instructional budgets has nothing to do with the PCSSD's entitlement to a distribution of the excess M-to-M funds generated by the interdistrict school transfers, and that these provisions \"simply happened to appear in the same section of the Settlement Agreement.\" App. 59. Lending ever more reasonableness to the Court's order is its finding that: As the PCSSD points out, the LRSD may itself be on the receiving end of an annual distribution of excess M-to-M funds once the mix of students changes over time. App. 59. In what is partly a finding of fact and partly a conclusion of law, the District court concluded by finding that: The PCSSD has honored its commitments and requirements under the terms of the Settlement Agreement as regards this motion, and the LRSD offers no valid reason for refusing to withhold the distribution of $167,113 that is owed the PCSSD by the LRSD. App. 60. Thus, LRSD's argument that PCSSD was in \"anticipatory breach\" of the Settlement Agreement (LRSD Brief at 9) was rejected by the District court as a matter of fact, and LRSD has offered this Court 8 no evidence to set aside the finding as either clearly erroneous or - constituting an abuse of discretion. 1 Not only is the District Court's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement neither an abuse of discretion nor clearly erroneous, it is entirely reasonable. Indeed, if LRSD has some real concern with the instructional budgets (beyond utilization of this statement to seek relief from its pooling obligation), then its clear remedy is to file a motion with the District Court to test that separate issue. LRSD has not done this. Even if this Court were to agree with LRSD's alternative argument that the Settlement Agreement could be found to be ambiguous, this would avail the LRSD nothing. Again, if the paragraph is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, with any of the interpretations being plausible, then the District Court, in its discretion, may adopt any of the alternative interpretations. The issue of \"intent\" should be reached if and only if the agreement were subject to I1Q reasonable interpretations without receipt of extrinsic evidence. In its conclusion stated at page 10 of its brief, LRSD seeks to be released from its pooling obligation. This would be 1 Although LRSD contends at least twice in its brief that PCSSD had given LRSD notice that it would be \"impossible to equalize the instructional budgets of the interdistrict schools\" (LRSD Brief at 8-9), the only record support it offers for this assertion is the same statement contained in its own brief filed with the District Court. ~ App. 66. Even assuming that a \"notice\" had any relevance to the instant issue, LRSD neither sought a hearing to make proof on this issue nor did it tender any documentary evidence of this assertion in any of its filings with the District Court, nor did it move to \"enforce\" this provision. 9 tantamount to this Court's reversing the opinion it issued in LRSD v. PCSSD, 921 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1990), where this Court approved the entire Settlement Agreement of which the paragraph before the Court today represents a part. In the 1990 appeal, Little Rock was one of the prominent proponents of the proposition that: \"Of course, the District court may suggest modifications, but ultimately, it must consider the proposal as a whole and as submitted. Approval must then be given or withheld.\" ~ at 1388. Indeed, in rejecting the District Court's conclusion in that instance that the parties had waived their right to object to court-imposed modifications, this Court stated: What they said was something quite different; that if differences of opinion as to the meaning of the Settlement Agreement arose in the future, they could be authoritatively resolved by the courts. ML. at 1389 n.14 (emphasis supplied]. That is precisely what happened in this instance. The District Court exercised its discretion and resolved a dispute between two parties as to the meaning of the Settlement Agreement. That which Little Rock now seeks would serve to emasculate the Agreement, eliminate a key condition which induced PCSSD to enter into it in the first instance and constitute a \"remedy\" foreclosed by this Court's 1990 decision. As this same panel observed in 1991 in Appeal of Little Rock school District. 949 F.2d 253 at 257: The District Court should proceed with that discretion and flexibility that characterizes courts of equity. Its decisions, whatever they are, are of course subject to review on appeal, but the review will be on an abuse of discretion basis, and we will give a healthy measure of 10 deference to reasoned choices made by the District Court. (emphasis supplied] This Court should simply do now what it said it would do in 1991: Give a healthy measure of deference to the reasoned choices made by the District Court. II. THE 1989 DISPUTE BETWEEN LRSD AND PCSSD OVER THE ALLOCATION OF M-to-M FUNDING WHICH LED TO THIS FEATURE OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SUPPORTS THE DISTRICT COURT'S HOLDING IN FAVOR OF THE PCSSD. It is undisputed that because the PCSSD is a relatively poor district in terms of local resources and the LRSD is a relatively wealthy district in terms of local resources that PCSSD receives substantially more state aid per student than does LRSD. Pursuant to Section 13 c. of the M-to-M Stipulation: Each home district (sending district] shall receive from the State for each student who voluntarily transfers from his/her home district to a host district (the receiving district) one-half of the State aid (table rate) it would have received had the student remained in his/her home district. Ad. 6. Accordingly, by agreeing to pool all M-to-M monies, including these \"incentive\" monies, the PCSSD surrendered a financial entitlement that is much more valuable per student than is the same entitlement in the Little Rock District. Further, the PCSSD relinquished the claim it had asserted that it should receive from the State LRSD's cost per student, reasoning that since the PCSSD would be educating those same students, that same money should follow those students. Finally, for a period of five years the PCSSD agreed to contribute $200,000 a year to the pool to finalize the settlement. 11 Although it should be obvious, given the foregoing financial - details, this Court is entitled to infer that because this was the last issue resolved between the LRSD and the PCSSD, that it is an important one as respects the PCS SD' s agreement to fully and completely settle financial issues with the LRSD. Because the PCSSD surrendered significant financial claims and makes substantial financial contributions to the pool, such circumstances support the interpretations made by the District Court. III. EVEN THOUGH NO HEARING WAS NECESSARY TO CONSTRUE THE MEANING OF AN AGREEMENT PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY THIS COURT; NEVERTHELESS, LRSD WAIVED ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING BY FAILING TO REQUEST ONE EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT. LRSD does not contend it sought or desired a hearing on this issue. It simply observes that there was not one. The record developed in this case since its assignment to the current Judge indicates that hearings have been matters of routine and held with great frequency in this case. App. i-viii (Docket entries). Further, the PCSSD is hard pressed to understand how such a \"hearing\" could have amounted to little more than oral argument, a matter which is entirely discretionary with the District Court. Finally, the District Court does consider requests for reconsideration, but none was sought by LRSD in this instance and no post-ruling request for a hearing was made. 12 CONCLUSION The District court's order of March 16, 1994 should be summarily affirmed and the PCSSD should be awarded its reasonable costs, including attorneys' fees, for this appeal. O:dnl20l.030 Respectfully submitted: WRIGHT, LINDSEY \u0026 JENNINGS 200 West Capitol Avenue Suite 2200 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201-3699 (501) 371-0808 By ~ J-J -~90---- M. Samuel/Jones III ,76060) Attorn~y~-~-~or Pula~i County Specia~l Distr'-fct 13 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL. vs. NO. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL, SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL. STIPULATION FOR PROPOSED ORDER ON VOLUNTARY MAJORITY TO MINORITY TRANSFERS PLAINTIFF INTERVENORS DEFENDANTS Plaintiff Little Rock School District (\"LRSD\"), and defendants Pulaski County Special School District (\"PCSSD\"), North Little Rock School District (\"NLRSD\"), and Arkansas State Board of Education (\"State Board\"), being in agreement on the voluntary majority-to-minority transfers, submit the following stipulations for the proposed order: 1. Beginning in the 1987-88 school year and continuing thereafter, LRSD, PCSSD and NLRSD will permit and encourage voluntary majority-to-minority interdistrict transfers. The three districts will cooperate in the development of programs to acquaint parents, guardians and students with interdistrict opportunities. The implementation of majority-to-minority transfer provisions is contingent upon the implementation of all other provisions of the remedy ordered by the Court. 2. Eligibility: ADD-1 a. Black students who are members of the racial majority at a school in any participating district which district is 50 percent or more black in its enrol l ment shall be eligible to transfer voluntarily to a school and district in any other participating district in which school and district they would be in the racial minority. b. White students who are members of the racial majority at a school in a participating district which C  district is more than 50% white in its enrollment shall be eligible to transfer voluntarily to a school and district in any other participating district in which they would be in the racial minority. Prior to the transfer of any student, the home district shall issue a statement that the transferring student is in good standing. If the student is not in good standing, the student may be permitted to transfer on a provisional basis. 3. Students wishing to transfer shall file applications with their home districts. Applications must be filed before May 1 of the preceding school year and a student may not transfer more than once in any school year. The home district will process all applications and forward copies to the host districts. The home district will furnish its complete file on each student with his/her application. 2 ADD-2 4. Transfer assignments will be made subject to av lability of space in schools and grade levels, and the host districts' ability to comply with state standards. 5. The host district shall honor the placement for the students as certified by the home district, which shall be communicated to the parent or guardian prior to transfer. If, during the first semester, testing, performance, remedial efforts, and consultation indicate that an adjustment of placement should be made, it shall be made after the first semester in consultation with the student's parent or guardian. 6. The commitment to accept a student shall be for the duration of the student's voluntary participation. Once a student exercises his or her right to participate, the student will continue in the initially selected school for at least one full school year or until the student graduates or affirmatively withdraws from participation as herein set out. Students will not have to transfer each year or exercise a transfer choice to remain in the host district. Students shall be encouraged to continue to participate at their initial school of choice. It is expected that the student will follow the pattern of assigned schools for the resident students in the school in which the transfer student first enrolls. 7. Students who have elected to transfer shall remain students of the host district until they choose to return to the district where they reside. 3 ADD-3 8. Host districts shall not have the authority to remand tr sfer students to the home district. Host districts shall have the authority to discipline, suspend or expel a transfer student using the same due process procedures applicable to resident students. 9. Once admitted, transfer students will be expected to meet the same general standards, academic and other, as applied to students of the host district. 10. Information about each district's academic and disciplinary policies and procedures will be made available to prospective transfer students on request. This should include information on pupil-teacher ratios, promotion and retention, counseling assistance, grading, student code of conduct, disciplinary action, and suspension and expulsion. 11. The host district shall respond to the educational needs of students without regard to their status as a transfer or resident student. Transfer students shall be eligible and encouraged to participate in all school programs funded and sponsored by the host district (academic, athletic, extra-curricular and other) and shall not suffer any disability or ineligibility because they are voluntary interdistrict transfer students. Participation in after-school activities will be facilitated by the provision where needed of extra-curricular buses or other forms of transportation which will be available to all such transfer students, the cost of which shall be borne by the State as provided in paragraph 12. 4 ADD-4 12. The State Board shall pay the full cost of tt isporting students opting for interdistrict transfers. However, the State Board shall have the 09tion of (1) ?aying the school districts for trans9orting the students o r (2) contracting for the services or (3) transporting the students with a state operated system. 13. The State Board shall pay the home and host districts in accordance with the following procedures: a. Each year school districts shall calculate and certify to the State Board of Education their cost per student in regular schools (grades K-12) including all add-ons for special education, TAG, vocational education and other purposes. The cost per student shall include all costs for instruction and support services minus student transportation, food service, and restricted federal program costs. (To the extent that the host district does not receive pro-rata increases in restricted federal program costs by hosting transfer students who are eligible to participate in federal programs, the cost per student shall be increased on a pro-rata basis for such transfer students.) The State shall pay the costs for full-time equivalent students who have been transferred to the host district. Payments made for the current year shall be based on costs for the 5 ADD-5 previous year. The host district shall report each transfer student on forms as required by the State Department of Education. b. Each host district shall estimate the cull-time equivalent of transfer students and transmit such estimate, along with the names of the students, to the State in September of each year when payment begins. A correction will be made in January of each year. Payments shall be made by the State monthly through forward funding to each district based upon the September estimate as corrected. The students transferred to the host district shall not be counted in the number used to calculate regular state aid for the district. c. Each home district shall receive from the State for each student who voluntarily transfers from his/her home district to a host district one-half of the State aid (table rate) it would have received had the student remained in his/her home district. Information about these students shall be reported on forms as required by the State Department of Education and shall be reported at the same time as the reports are made by the host district. The students transferred from the home district shall not be counted in the number used to calculate regular 6 ADD-6 state aid for the home district. All transfers of handicapped students shall be contingent on the availability of appropriate programs a~d resources, as identified in the IEP, at the hos: school. d. The provisions contained herein do not apply to magnet schools and programs. 14. All parties to this stipulation recognize that the present racial balance of the North Little Rock School District approximates that of the entire county and they are desirous of not upsetting that balance through the operation oE the Majority to Minority Transfer Program. The parties further recognize that any court approved student assignment plan by any party could be compromised if the Majority to Minority Transfer Program caused significant changes in student assignment plans. To avoid this result, all parties agree that any party may choose to include or not include said Majority to Minority transfer students for purposes of student assignment under any court order. Further, all parties recognize that substantial participation in the Majority to Minority program could have the result of creating technical departures from targeted student ratios at one or more schools. All parties agree that any such departure resulting from the lawful operation of the Majority to Minority program shall not give rise to a claim or contention that such departure from targeted ratios constitute 7 ADD-7 violations of any law or regulation and, specifically, shall ne ~ be urged or suggested as grounds for liability in this or similar litigation. Additionally, any such resulting departures from targeted ratios shall not require the districts affected to reconstitute or recompose the student body of any affected school. Agreed this 26th day of August, 1986. PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NOR DIS 2258L 8 LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT ARKANSAS STATE BOARD OF ~ ADD-8 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On August 23, 1994, a copy of the foregoing was mailed to: Mr. Christopher Heller FRIDAY, ELDREDGE \u0026 CLARK 2000 First Commercial Building 400 West Capitol Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. John Walker JOHN WALKER, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Steve Jones JACK, LYON \u0026 JONES, P.A. 3400 Capitol Towers Capitol \u0026 Broadway Streets Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Richard Roachell ROACHELL AND STREETT First Federal Plaza 401 West Capitol, Suite 504 Ms. Ann Brown Desegregation Monitor Heritage West Building, Suite 510 201 East Markham Street Little Rock, AR 72201 Ms. Elizabeth Boyter ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 4 State Capitol Mall Little Rock, AR 72201-1071 O:dnl201.030 14 AUG 2 4 1994 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION Office of Desegregation t\\/lc:,: .. ,. LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT PLAINTIFF v. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL DEFENDANTS INT ERVEN ORS INTERVENORS NOTICE OF FILING Attached to this notice of filing is the revised PCSSD budget for 1994-95 as approved by the PCSSD Board of Directors on August 23, 1994. The court will note that the PCSSD proposes to balance this budget by, if necessary, closing school one or two days early. However, even though the PCSSD used this means as its - device to balance the budget, under all present revenue forecasts, sufficient additional state aid should be received by the PCSSD during the 1994-95 school year to enable it to operate a full school year. Respectfully submitted: WRIGHT, LINDSEY \u0026 JENNINGS 200 West Capitol Avenue Suite 2200 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201-3699 (501) 371-0808 By on, M. S At s I (76060) u aski County istrict CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On August ll, 1994, a copy of the foregoing was mailed to:. Mr. Christopher Heller Friday, Eldredge \u0026 Clark 200 First Commercial Building Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Mr. Stephen Jones Jack, Lyon \u0026 Jones 400 TCBY Tower Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Mr. John W. Walker John W. Walker, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, Arkansas 72206 Mr. Richard Roachell Roachell \u0026 Streett 401 West Capitol, Suite 504 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Ms. Ann Brown, Monitor Office of Desegregation Monitoring Heritage West Building 201 East Markham, Suite 510 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Ms. Elizabeth Boyter Arkansas Department of Education 4 State Capitol Mall Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 ~~~\\J J:jlpl238 .030 2 AUG 2 4 i994 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT v. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, ET AL MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL PLAINTIFF DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS INTERVENORS NOTICE OF FILING/PROGRAM PLANNING AND BUDGETING PROCESS The Little Rock School District (\"LRSD\"), for its Notice of Filing, states: 1. Attached hereto as Exhibit No. 1 is a true and accurate copy of the Program Planning and Budgeting Process document for the 1994-95 school year which will guide the development of the LRSD's planning and budgeting activities for the 1996 fiscal year. Ind.Iii 1 WHEREFORE, the Little Rock School District does hereby submit this Notice of Filing and requests that it be awarded any and all legal and proper relief to which it may be entitled. lnd.lil Respectfully submitted, FRIDAY, ELDREDGE \u0026 CLARK 2000 First Commercial Bldg. 400 West Capitol Street Little Rock, AR 72201 (501) 376-2011 2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been served on the following people by depositing copy of same in the United States mail on this ~'iday of August, 1994. Mr. John Walker JOHN WALKER, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, AR 72206 Mr. Sam Jones WRIGHT, LINDSEY \u0026 JENNINGS 2200 Worthen Bank Bldg. 200 West Capitol Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Steve Jones JACK, LYON \u0026 JONES, P.A. 3400 Capitol Towers Capitol \u0026 Broadway Streets Little Rock, AR 72201 Mr. Richard Roachell Roachell and Streett First Federal Plaza 401 West Capitol, Suite 504 Little Rock, AR 72201 Ms. Ann Brown (hand delivered pursuant to the order of the Court) Desegregation Monitor Heritage West Bldg., Suite 510 201 East Markham Street . Little Rock, AR 72201-~~4 ~ ~ -~~c~yiJ? -~ ~ - Jerry L. Malone lnd.m 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. No. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1, ET AL MRS. LORENE JOSHUA, ET AL KATHERINE KNIGHT, ET AL ORDER AUG 2 ~ 1994 DEFENDANTS INTERVENORS INTERVENORS Before the Court is the motion of the Joshua Intervenors for an extension of time within which to exchange documents they intend to offer as evidence as well as the names of witnesses they intend to call at the hearing scheduled for the week of September 12, 1994. The motion is granted. The time for exchanging documents and witnesses is extended until and including September 6, 1994. The parties and the State are reminded that they must provide the ODM with copies of the above material at the same time. SO ORDERED th i s _2.J/ day of August 1994. UNITEIY'STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 2 2 8 AUG 2 5 199.t LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT v. NO. LR-C-82-866 PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SC "},{"id":"suc_p17173coll43_21954","title":"South Carolina Council on Human Relations, Box 9, Folder 443, Administrative, General, 3 September 1974 - 10 September 1974, September 1974","collection_id":"suc_p17173coll43","collection_title":"New insights in the American civil rights movement: South Carolina Council on Human Relations records","dcterms_contributor":["South Carolina Council on Human Relations","South Carolina Council for Human Rights"],"dcterms_spatial":["United States, South Carolina, 34.00043, -81.00009"],"dcterms_creator":["South Carolina Council on Human Relations","South Carolina Council for Human Rights"],"dc_date":["1974-09-03/1974-09-10"],"dcterms_description":["Folder 443 contains the administrative records of the South Carolina Council on Human Relations, Southern Regional Council, and correspondence between members, community leaders, and the Council."],"dc_format":["image/jpeg"],"dcterms_identifier":null,"dcterms_language":["eng"],"dcterms_publisher":["Columbia, S.C. : University of South Carolina. 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Libraries"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["http://cdm17173.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p17173coll43/id/18105"],"dcterms_temporal":["1970/9999"],"dcterms_rights_holder":null,"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":null,"dlg_local_right":["Copyright Undetermined. For further information please contact South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208."],"dcterms_medium":["memorandums","correspondence","judicial records","postcards","reports"],"dcterms_extent":["1 folder"],"dlg_subject_personal":null,"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":null},{"id":"nara_supreme-court_596300","title":"Judgement in the Supreme Court Decision for Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al.","collection_id":"nara_supreme-court","collection_title":"Records of the Supreme Court of the United States 1772 – 2007","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, 39.76, -98.5","United States, Kansas, Shawnee County, Topeka, 39.04833, -95.67804"],"dcterms_creator":["United States. Supreme Court"],"dc_date":["1955-05-31"],"dcterms_description":null,"dc_format":["application/pdf"],"dcterms_identifier":["NAID: 596300"],"dcterms_language":["eng"],"dcterms_publisher":null,"dc_relation":null,"dc_right":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/NKC/1.0/"],"dcterms_is_part_of":["Records of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1772 – 2007, Series Appellate Jurisdiction Case Files, 1792 – 2020, Case File for Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al.,  National Archives at Washington, DC"],"dcterms_subject":["Segregation in education--United States","Discrimination in education--United States"],"dcterms_title":["Judgement in the Supreme Court Decision for Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al."],"dcterms_type":["Text"],"dcterms_provenance":["United States. National Archives and Records Administration"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["https://catalog.archives.gov/id/278082331"],"dcterms_temporal":null,"dcterms_rights_holder":null,"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":null,"dlg_local_right":null,"dcterms_medium":["judicial records"],"dcterms_extent":null,"dlg_subject_personal":["Brown, Oliver, 1918-1961--Trials, litigation, etc."],"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":"Supreme Court of the United States\r\n\r\nNo. 1 ---- , October Term, 1954\r\n\r\nOliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emmanuel et al.,\r\nAppellants,\r\n\r\nvs.\r\n\r\nBoard of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, et al.\r\n\r\nAppeal from the United States District for the District of Kansas.\r\n\r\nThis cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, and was argued by counsel.\r\n\r\nOn consideration whereof, It is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed with costs; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said District Court to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with the opinions of this Court as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to this case.\r\n\r\nPer Mr. Chief Justice Warren,\r\nMay 31, 1955.\r\n\r\nFile No. ____\r\n\r\nSupreme Court of the United States\r\nOCTOBER TERM, 1954\r\n-----\r\nTerm No. 1\r\n\r\nJUDGMENT\r\n\r\nFile: May 31, 1955\r\n\r\nForm 38—1-52-M2\r\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE"},{"id":"nara_supreme-court_1656510","title":"Opinion","collection_id":"nara_supreme-court","collection_title":"Records of the Supreme Court of the United States 1772 – 2007","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, 39.76, -98.5","United States, Kansas, Shawnee County, Topeka, 39.04833, -95.67804"],"dcterms_creator":["United States. 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National Archives and Records Administration"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1656510"],"dcterms_temporal":null,"dcterms_rights_holder":null,"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":null,"dlg_local_right":null,"dcterms_medium":["judicial records","decisions (judicial records)"],"dcterms_extent":null,"dlg_subject_personal":["Brown, Oliver, 1918-1961--Trials, litigation, etc."],"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":"[Top left corner of the page, handwritten]\r\n5 -File\r\n\r\n[Centered, bold text]\r\nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\r\n---------------\r\nnOS. 1, 2, 4 AND 10.-----OCTOBER TERM, 1953/\r\n----------------\r\n\r\n[Left side of page]\r\nOliver Brown, et al.,\r\nAppellants,\r\n1 v.\r\nBoard of Education of Topeka,\r\nShawnee County,\r\nKansas, et al.\r\n\r\nHarry Briggs, Jr., et al.,\r\nAppellants,\r\n2 v.\r\nR. W. Elliott, et al.\r\n\r\nDorothy E. Davis, et al.,\r\nAppellants,\r\n4 v.\r\nCounty School Board of\r\nPrince Edward County,\r\nVirginia, et al.\r\n\r\nFrancis B. Gebhart, et al.,\r\nPetitioners,\r\n10 v.\r\nEthel Louise Belton, et al.\r\n\r\n[Right half of the page]\r\nOn Appeal From the\r\nUnited States District\r\nCourt for the District of Kansas.\r\n\r\nOn Appeal From the\r\nUnited States District\r\nCourt for the Eastern\r\nDistrict of South Carolina.\r\n\r\nOn Appeal From the\r\nUnited States District\r\nCourt for the Eastern\r\nDistrict of Virginia\r\n\r\nOn Writ of Certiorari to\r\nthe Supreme Court of\r\nDelaware.\r\n\r\n[Centered]\r\n[May 17, 1954.]\r\n\r\nMR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.\r\nThese cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions,\r\n\r\nCentered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\n2 BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION\r\n\r\nbut a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion.--(1)\r\nIn each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in\r\n\r\n--------------------\r\n--(1)In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro children of elementary school age residing in Topeka. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a Kansas statute which permits, but does not require, cities of more than 15,000 population to maintain separate school facilities for Negro and white students. Kam. Gen. Stat. 72-1724 (1949). Pursuant to that authority, the Topeka Board of Education elected to establish segregated elementary schools. Other public schools in the community, however, are operated on a non segregated basis. The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U. S. C. 2281 and 2284, found that segregation in public education has a detrimental effect upon Negro children, but denied relief on the ground that the Negro and white schools were substantially equal with respect to buildings, transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications of teachers. 98 F. Supp, 797. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. 1253.\r\nIn the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing in Clarendon County. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. 8. C. Const., Art. XI, 7; 8. C. Code 5377 (1942). The three-judge District Court, Convened under 28 U. S. C.. 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The coiurt found that the Negro schools were inferior to the white schools and ordered the defendants to begin immediately to equalize the facilities,. But the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 98 F. Supp. 529. This Court vacated the District Court's judgement and remanded the case for the purpose of obtaining the court's views on a report filed b the defendants concerning the progress made in the equalization program. 342 U. S.. 350. On remand, the District Court found that substantial equality had been achieved except for buildings and that the defendants were proceeding to rectify this\r\n\r\n[Centered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\nBROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 3\r\n\r\nobtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a non segregated basis. In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segre-\r\n\r\n----------------------\r\ninequality as well. 103 F. Supp. 920. The case is again here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. 1253.\r\nIn the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs are Negro children of high school age residing in Prince Edward County. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Va. Const., 140; Va. Code 22-221 (1950). The three- judge District Court, convened under 28 U. S. C. 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The court found the Negro school inferior in physical plant, curricula, and transportation, and ordered the defendants forthwith to provide substantially equal curricula and transportation and to \"proceed with all reasonable diligence and dispatch to remove\" the inequality in physical plant. But, as in the South Carolina case, the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 103 F. Supp. 337. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. 1253.\r\nIn the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing i New Castle County. They brought this action in the Delaware Court of Chancery to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Del. Const., Art. X, 2; De;l. Rev. Code 2631 (1935). The Chancellor gave judgement for the plaintiffs and ordered their immediate admission to schools previously attended only by white children, on the ground that the Negro schools were inferior with respect to teacher training, pupi;-teacher ratio, extra-curricular activities, physical plant, and time and distance involved in travel. 87 A. 2d 862. The Chancellor also found that segregation itself results in an inferior education for Negro children (see note 10, infra), but did not rest his decision on that ground. Id., at 865. The Chancellor's decree was affirmed by Supreme Court of Delaware, which intimated, however, that the defendants might be\r\n\r\nCentered, top of page]\r\n1. 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\n4 BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.\r\n\r\ngation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called \"separate but equal\" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 1631 U. S. 537. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.\r\nThe plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not \"equal\" and cannot be made \"equal,\" and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction.--(2) Argument was heard in the 1962 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court.--(3)\r\nReargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1808. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This\r\n\r\n--------------------------\r\nable to obtain a modification of the decree after equalization of the Negro and white schools had been accomplished. 91 A. 2d 137, 152. The defendants, contending only that the Delaware courts had erred in ordering the immediate admission of the Negro plaintiffs to the white schools, applied to this Court for certiorari. The writ was granted, 344 U. nS. 891. The plaintiffs, who were successful below, did not submit a cross-petition.\r\n--(2)344 U. S. 1, 141, 891.\r\n--(3)345 U. S. 972. The Attorney General of the United States participated both Terms as amicus curiae.\r\n\r\n[Centered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\nBROWN v. BOATD OF EDUCATION. 5\r\n\r\ndiscussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problems with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most abid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among \"all persons born or naturalized in the United States.\" Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.\r\nAn additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history, with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public education at that time.\"--(4) In the\r\n\r\n-------------------------\r\n--(4)For a general study of the development of public education prior to the Amendment, See Butts and Cremin, A History of Education in American Culture (1953), Pts. I, II; Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (1934) ed.), cc. II-XII. School practices current at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment are described in Butts and Crimen, supra, at 269-275; Cubberley, supra, at 288-339, 408-431; Knight, Public Education in the South (1922), cc. VIII, IX. See also H. Ex. Doc. No. 315, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1871). Although the pattern in both the North and the South, the development in the South did not begin to gain momentum until about 1850, some twenty years after that in the North. The reasons for the somewhat slower development in the South 9e. g., the rural character of the South and the different regional attitudes toward state assistance) are well explained in Cubberley, supra, at 408-423. In the country as a whole, but particularly in the South, the War virtually stopped all progress in public education. Id., at 427-428. The low status of Negro education in all sections of the country, both before and immediately after the War, is described in Beale, A History of Freedom of Teaching in American Schools (1941), 112-132, 175-195. Compulsory school attendance laws were not generally adopted until after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it was not until 1918 that such laws were in force in all the states. Cubberley, supra, at 563-565.\r\n\r\n[Centered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\n6 BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.\r\n\r\nSouth, the movement toward free common schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes as almost non-existent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences ss well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public education had already advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. Thr curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states; and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.\r\nIn the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race.--(5) The doctrine of\r\n\r\n--------------------------------\r\n--(5)Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 67-72 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 307-308 (1879):\r\n\"It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or\r\n\r\n[Centered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\nBROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION. 7\r\n\r\n\"separate but equal\" did not make its appearance in this Court until 1806 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but transportation.\"--(6) American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been dix cases involving the \"separate but equal\" doctrine in the field of public education.--(7) In Cumming v, County Board of Education, 175 U. S.. 528, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged.--(8) In more recent cases, all on the graduate school level, inequality was found in that spcific benefits enjoyed by ehite studengts were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 395 U. S. 337; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629; McLaurin v.\r\n\r\n----------------------\r\nright, most valuable to the colored race,--the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored--exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.\"\r\nSee also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 318 (1879); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 344-345 (1879).\r\n--(6)The doctrine apparently originated in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1849), upholding school segregation against attack as being violative of a state constitutional guarantee of equality. Segregation in Boston public schools was eliminated in 1855. Mass. Acts 1855, c. 256. But elsewhere in the North segregation in public education has persisted until recent years. It is apparent that such segregation has long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of sectional concern.\r\n--(7)See also Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908).\r\n--(8)In the Cumming case, Negro taxpayers sought an injunction requiring the defendant school board to discontinue the operation of a high school for Negro children until the board resumed operation of a high school for Negro children. Similarly, in the Gong Lum case, the plaintiff, a child of Chinese descent, contended only that state authorities mhad misapplied the doctrine by classifying him with Negro children and requiring him to attend a Negro school.\r\n\r\n[Centered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\n8 BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.\r\n\r\nOklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637. In none of these cases was it necessary to reexamine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.\r\nIn the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other \"tangible\" factors.--(9) Our decision,therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.\r\nIn approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.\r\nToday, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school\r\n\r\n--------------------------\r\n--(9)In the Kansas case, the court below found substantial equality as to all such factors. 98 F. Supp. 797, 798. In the South Carolina case, the court below found that the defendants were proceeding \"promptly and in good faith to comply with the court's decree.\" 103 F. Supp. 920. 921. In the Virginia case, the court below noted that the equalization program was already \"afoot and progressing\" (103 F. Supp. 337, 341); since then, we have been advised, in the Virginia Attorney General's brief on reargument, that the program has now been completed. In the Delaware case, the court below similarly noted that the state's equalization program was well under way. 91 A. 2d 137, 149.\r\n\r\n[Centered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\nBROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION. 9\r\n\r\nattendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.\r\nWe come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other \"tangible\" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the Minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.\r\nIn Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on \"those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school.\" In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: \". . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.\" Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status i the community that may affect their hearts and minds\r\n\r\n[Centered to of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\n10 BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.\r\n\r\nin a way unlikely ever to be un done. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:\r\n\"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school system.\"--(10)\r\n\r\nWhatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority.--(11) Any lan-\r\n\r\n\r\n------------------------\r\n--(10)A similar finding was made in the Delaware case: \"I conclude from the testimony that in our Delaware society, State-imposed segregation in education itself results in the Negro children, as a class, receiving educational opportunities which are substantially inferior to those available to white children otherwise similarly situated.\" 87 A. 2d 862, 865.\r\n--(11)K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Mid century White House Conference on Children and Youth, 21950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (McIver, ed., 1949), 44-48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).\r\n\r\n[Centered top of page]\r\n\r\nBROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 11\r\n\r\nguage in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.\r\nWe conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of \"separate but equal\" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by he Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.--(12)\r\nBecause these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question--the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term.--(13) The Attorney General\r\n\r\n----------------------\r\n--)12)See Bolling v. Sharpe, infra, concerning the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.\r\n--(13)\"4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment\r\n\"(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by normal geographic schools districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or\r\n\"(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions?\r\n\"5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are\r\n\r\n[Centered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\n12 BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.\r\n\r\nof the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitted segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954.--(14)\r\n\r\n[Far right margin]\r\nIt is so ordered.\r\n\r\n\r\n----------------------------\r\nbased, and assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4 (b),\r\n\"(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;\r\n\"(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;\r\n\"(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees;\r\n:(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance worth directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so, what general directions should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?\"\r\n--(14)See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this Court (effective July 1, 1954).\r\n\r\n"},{"id":"gildlehr_glcollcr_glc07940","title":"Brown v. Topeka Board of Education","collection_id":"gildlehr_glcollcr","collection_title":"Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History: The Collection","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, District of Columbia, Washington, 38.89511, -77.03637","United States, Kansas, Shawnee County, Topeka, 39.04833, -95.67804"],"dcterms_creator":["Warren, Earl, 1891-1974"],"dc_date":["1954"],"dcterms_description":["The United States Supreme Court's decision declaring segregated schools unconstitutional.","Inscribed to Peter H. 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Board of Education--Trials, litigation, etc.","Judgments--United States","Courts of last resort--United States","Segregation--Kansas--Topeka","Segregation in education--Kansas--Topeka","School integration--Kansas--Topeka","Topeka (Kan.)--Race relations","Race relations","Racial discrimination--Kansas--Topeka","African Americans--Civil rights--Kansas--Topeka","African Americans--Education--Kansas--Topeka","Civil rights--Kansas--Topeka","Civil rights--United States","Brown, Oliver, 1918- --Trials, litigation, etc."],"dcterms_title":["Brown v. 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Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, et al.","collection_id":"nara_supreme-court","collection_title":"Records of the Supreme Court of the United States 1772 – 2007","dcterms_contributor":null,"dcterms_spatial":["United States, 39.76, -98.5","United States, Kansas, Shawnee County, Topeka, 39.04833, -95.67804"],"dcterms_creator":["United States. Supreme Court"],"dc_date":["1954"],"dcterms_description":null,"dc_format":["application/pdf"],"dcterms_identifier":["NAID: 278081084"],"dcterms_language":["eng"],"dcterms_publisher":null,"dc_relation":null,"dc_right":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/NKC/1.0/"],"dcterms_is_part_of":["Records of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1772 – 2007, Series Appellate Jurisdiction Case Files, 1792 – 2020, Case File for Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al.,  National Archives at Washington, DC"],"dcterms_subject":["Segregation in education--United States","Discrimination in education--United States"],"dcterms_title":["No. 1, October Term 1954: Oliver Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, et al."],"dcterms_type":["Text"],"dcterms_provenance":["United States. National Archives and Records Administration"],"edm_is_shown_by":null,"edm_is_shown_at":["https://catalog.archives.gov/id/278081084"],"dcterms_temporal":null,"dcterms_rights_holder":null,"dcterms_bibliographic_citation":null,"dlg_local_right":null,"dcterms_medium":["judicial records"],"dcterms_extent":null,"dlg_subject_personal":["Brown, Oliver, 1918-1961--Trials, litigation, etc."],"dcterms_subject_fast":null,"fulltext":"[Top left corner of the page, handwritten]\r\n5 -File\r\n\r\n[Centered, bold text]\r\nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\r\n---------------\r\nnOS. 1, 2, 4 AND 10.-----OCTOBER TERM, 1953/\r\n----------------\r\n\r\n[Left side of page]\r\nOliver Brown, et al.,\r\nAppellants,\r\n1 v.\r\nBoard of Education of Topeka,\r\nShawnee County,\r\nKansas, et al.\r\n\r\nHarry Briggs, Jr., et al.,\r\nAppellants,\r\n2 v.\r\nR. W. Elliott, et al.\r\n\r\nDorothy E. Davis, et al.,\r\nAppellants,\r\n4 v.\r\nCounty School Board of\r\nPrince Edward County,\r\nVirginia, et al.\r\n\r\nFrancis B. Gebhart, et al.,\r\nPetitioners,\r\n10 v.\r\nEthel Louise Belton, et al.\r\n\r\n[Right half of the page]\r\nOn Appeal From the\r\nUnited States District\r\nCourt for the District of Kansas.\r\n\r\nOn Appeal From the\r\nUnited States District\r\nCourt for the Eastern\r\nDistrict of South Carolina.\r\n\r\nOn Appeal From the\r\nUnited States District\r\nCourt for the Eastern\r\nDistrict of Virginia\r\n\r\nOn Writ of Certiorari to\r\nthe Supreme Court of\r\nDelaware.\r\n\r\n[Centered]\r\n[May 17, 1954.]\r\n\r\nMR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.\r\nThese cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions,\r\n\r\nCentered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\n2 BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION\r\n\r\nbut a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion.--(1)\r\nIn each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in\r\n\r\n--------------------\r\n--(1)In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro children of elementary school age residing in Topeka. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a Kansas statute which permits, but does not require, cities of more than 15,000 population to maintain separate school facilities for Negro and white students. Kam. Gen. Stat. 72-1724 (1949). Pursuant to that authority, the Topeka Board of Education elected to establish segregated elementary schools. Other public schools in the community, however, are operated on a non segregated basis. The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U. S. C. 2281 and 2284, found that segregation in public education has a detrimental effect upon Negro children, but denied relief on the ground that the Negro and white schools were substantially equal with respect to buildings, transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications of teachers. 98 F. Supp, 797. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. 1253.\r\nIn the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing in Clarendon County. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. 8. C. Const., Art. XI, 7; 8. C. Code 5377 (1942). The three-judge District Court, Convened under 28 U. S. C.. 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The coiurt found that the Negro schools were inferior to the white schools and ordered the defendants to begin immediately to equalize the facilities,. But the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 98 F. Supp. 529. This Court vacated the District Court's judgement and remanded the case for the purpose of obtaining the court's views on a report filed b the defendants concerning the progress made in the equalization program. 342 U. S.. 350. On remand, the District Court found that substantial equality had been achieved except for buildings and that the defendants were proceeding to rectify this\r\n\r\n[Centered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\nBROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 3\r\n\r\nobtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a non segregated basis. In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segre-\r\n\r\n----------------------\r\ninequality as well. 103 F. Supp. 920. The case is again here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. 1253.\r\nIn the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs are Negro children of high school age residing in Prince Edward County. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Va. Const., 140; Va. Code 22-221 (1950). The three- judge District Court, convened under 28 U. S. C. 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The court found the Negro school inferior in physical plant, curricula, and transportation, and ordered the defendants forthwith to provide substantially equal curricula and transportation and to \"proceed with all reasonable diligence and dispatch to remove\" the inequality in physical plant. But, as in the South Carolina case, the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 103 F. Supp. 337. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. 1253.\r\nIn the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing i New Castle County. They brought this action in the Delaware Court of Chancery to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Del. Const., Art. X, 2; De;l. Rev. Code 2631 (1935). The Chancellor gave judgement for the plaintiffs and ordered their immediate admission to schools previously attended only by white children, on the ground that the Negro schools were inferior with respect to teacher training, pupi;-teacher ratio, extra-curricular activities, physical plant, and time and distance involved in travel. 87 A. 2d 862. The Chancellor also found that segregation itself results in an inferior education for Negro children (see note 10, infra), but did not rest his decision on that ground. Id., at 865. The Chancellor's decree was affirmed by Supreme Court of Delaware, which intimated, however, that the defendants might be\r\n\r\nCentered, top of page]\r\n1. 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\n4 BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.\r\n\r\ngation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called \"separate but equal\" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 1631 U. S. 537. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.\r\nThe plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not \"equal\" and cannot be made \"equal,\" and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction.--(2) Argument was heard in the 1962 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court.--(3)\r\nReargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1808. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This\r\n\r\n--------------------------\r\nable to obtain a modification of the decree after equalization of the Negro and white schools had been accomplished. 91 A. 2d 137, 152. The defendants, contending only that the Delaware courts had erred in ordering the immediate admission of the Negro plaintiffs to the white schools, applied to this Court for certiorari. The writ was granted, 344 U. nS. 891. The plaintiffs, who were successful below, did not submit a cross-petition.\r\n--(2)344 U. S. 1, 141, 891.\r\n--(3)345 U. S. 972. The Attorney General of the United States participated both Terms as amicus curiae.\r\n\r\n[Centered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\nBROWN v. BOATD OF EDUCATION. 5\r\n\r\ndiscussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problems with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most abid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among \"all persons born or naturalized in the United States.\" Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.\r\nAn additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history, with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public education at that time.\"--(4) In the\r\n\r\n-------------------------\r\n--(4)For a general study of the development of public education prior to the Amendment, See Butts and Cremin, A History of Education in American Culture (1953), Pts. I, II; Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (1934) ed.), cc. II-XII. School practices current at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment are described in Butts and Crimen, supra, at 269-275; Cubberley, supra, at 288-339, 408-431; Knight, Public Education in the South (1922), cc. VIII, IX. See also H. Ex. Doc. No. 315, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1871). Although the pattern in both the North and the South, the development in the South did not begin to gain momentum until about 1850, some twenty years after that in the North. The reasons for the somewhat slower development in the South 9e. g., the rural character of the South and the different regional attitudes toward state assistance) are well explained in Cubberley, supra, at 408-423. In the country as a whole, but particularly in the South, the War virtually stopped all progress in public education. Id., at 427-428. The low status of Negro education in all sections of the country, both before and immediately after the War, is described in Beale, A History of Freedom of Teaching in American Schools (1941), 112-132, 175-195. Compulsory school attendance laws were not generally adopted until after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it was not until 1918 that such laws were in force in all the states. Cubberley, supra, at 563-565.\r\n\r\n[Centered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\n6 BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.\r\n\r\nSouth, the movement toward free common schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes as almost non-existent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences ss well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public education had already advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. Thr curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states; and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.\r\nIn the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race.--(5) The doctrine of\r\n\r\n--------------------------------\r\n--(5)Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 67-72 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 307-308 (1879):\r\n\"It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or\r\n\r\n[Centered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\nBROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION. 7\r\n\r\n\"separate but equal\" did not make its appearance in this Court until 1806 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but transportation.\"--(6) American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been dix cases involving the \"separate but equal\" doctrine in the field of public education.--(7) In Cumming v, County Board of Education, 175 U. S.. 528, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged.--(8) In more recent cases, all on the graduate school level, inequality was found in that spcific benefits enjoyed by ehite studengts were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 395 U. S. 337; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629; McLaurin v.\r\n\r\n----------------------\r\nright, most valuable to the colored race,--the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored--exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.\"\r\nSee also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 318 (1879); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 344-345 (1879).\r\n--(6)The doctrine apparently originated in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1849), upholding school segregation against attack as being violative of a state constitutional guarantee of equality. Segregation in Boston public schools was eliminated in 1855. Mass. Acts 1855, c. 256. But elsewhere in the North segregation in public education has persisted until recent years. It is apparent that such segregation has long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of sectional concern.\r\n--(7)See also Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908).\r\n--(8)In the Cumming case, Negro taxpayers sought an injunction requiring the defendant school board to discontinue the operation of a high school for Negro children until the board resumed operation of a high school for Negro children. Similarly, in the Gong Lum case, the plaintiff, a child of Chinese descent, contended only that state authorities mhad misapplied the doctrine by classifying him with Negro children and requiring him to attend a Negro school.\r\n\r\n[Centered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\n8 BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.\r\n\r\nOklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637. In none of these cases was it necessary to reexamine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.\r\nIn the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other \"tangible\" factors.--(9) Our decision,therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.\r\nIn approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.\r\nToday, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school\r\n\r\n--------------------------\r\n--(9)In the Kansas case, the court below found substantial equality as to all such factors. 98 F. Supp. 797, 798. In the South Carolina case, the court below found that the defendants were proceeding \"promptly and in good faith to comply with the court's decree.\" 103 F. Supp. 920. 921. In the Virginia case, the court below noted that the equalization program was already \"afoot and progressing\" (103 F. Supp. 337, 341); since then, we have been advised, in the Virginia Attorney General's brief on reargument, that the program has now been completed. In the Delaware case, the court below similarly noted that the state's equalization program was well under way. 91 A. 2d 137, 149.\r\n\r\n[Centered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\nBROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION. 9\r\n\r\nattendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.\r\nWe come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other \"tangible\" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the Minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.\r\nIn Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on \"those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school.\" In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: \". . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.\" Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status i the community that may affect their hearts and minds\r\n\r\n[Centered to of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\n10 BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.\r\n\r\nin a way unlikely ever to be un done. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:\r\n\"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school system.\"--(10)\r\n\r\nWhatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority.--(11) Any lan-\r\n\r\n\r\n------------------------\r\n--(10)A similar finding was made in the Delaware case: \"I conclude from the testimony that in our Delaware society, State-imposed segregation in education itself results in the Negro children, as a class, receiving educational opportunities which are substantially inferior to those available to white children otherwise similarly situated.\" 87 A. 2d 862, 865.\r\n--(11)K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Mid century White House Conference on Children and Youth, 21950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (McIver, ed., 1949), 44-48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).\r\n\r\n[Centered top of page]\r\n\r\nBROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 11\r\n\r\nguage in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.\r\nWe conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of \"separate but equal\" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by he Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.--(12)\r\nBecause these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question--the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term.--(13) The Attorney General\r\n\r\n----------------------\r\n--)12)See Bolling v. Sharpe, infra, concerning the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.\r\n--(13)\"4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment\r\n\"(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by normal geographic schools districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or\r\n\"(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions?\r\n\"5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are\r\n\r\n[Centered, top of page]\r\n1, 2, 4 \u0026 10\r\n\r\n12 BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.\r\n\r\nof the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitted segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954.--(14)\r\n\r\n[Far right margin]\r\nIt is so ordered.\r\n\r\n\r\n----------------------------\r\nbased, and assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4 (b),\r\n\"(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;\r\n\"(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;\r\n\"(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees;\r\n:(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance worth directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so, what general directions should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?\"\r\n--(14)See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this Court (effective July 1, 1954).\r\n\r\n"},{"id":"nara_supreme-court_278082331","title":"No. 2, October Term 1954: Harry Briggs, Jr., et al. v. 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